Colossus (60 page)

87
. See Gimbel, “Governing the American Zone,” pp. 92–96; Schlauch, “American Policy,” p. 125.

88
. The phrase was the British economist Lionel Robbins’s.

89
. Gaddis,
We Now Know
, p. 20.

90
. President Harry S. Truman’s Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947,
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm.

91
. Hoge and Zakaria,
American Encounter
, pp. 155–70.

92
. Text from
http:www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/05/documents/nsc.report.68/.

93
. Lundestad,
American “Empire,”
p. 44.

94
. Bell,
Americanization
, p. 3.

95
. Reinstein, “Reparations,” p. 146.

96
. Bailey,
Postwar Japan
, p. 38.

97
. Ibid., p. 60f.

98
. Ibid., pp. 52–61.

99
. Dower, “Occupied Japan,” p. 487.

100
. The average annual growth rate of West German
per capita
GDP averaged over 5 percent a year between 1950 and 1973, as against 8 percent in Japan. Greece, Spain and Portugal enjoyed even more rapid growth than Germany in the same period, according to Maddison,
World Economy
, table A1-d.

101
. Backer,
Priming the German Economy
, p. 186f.

102
. United States Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, November 17, 1975.

103
. Backer,
Priming the German Economy
, pp. 174–78.

104
. In 2001 69,200 U.S. troops were deployed in Germany and 40,200 in Japan, mostly on the island of Okinawa.

105
. Oppen (ed.)
Documents
, pp. 156–60.

106
. Layne, “America as European Hegemon,” p. 20.

107
. Maddison,
World Economy
, p. 261, table B-18.

108
. Lundestad,
American “Empire,”
p. 40.

109
. Schiller,
Mass Communications
, p. 50.

110
. See esp. Gilpin,
Political Economy
.

111
. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), “National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2004,” (Green Paper), March 2003. Cf. Malkasian,
Korean War
, p. 13f, 73.

112
. Gaddis,
We Now Know
, pp. 89, 102f.

113
. University of Michigan, Correlates of War database.

114
. Magdoff,
Age of Imperialism
, p. 42. For different figures, see Peter H. Smith,
Talons of the Eagle
, p. 119.

115
. Lundestad,
American “Empire,”
p. 54.

116
. Ibid., p. 65.

117
. Pei, “Lessons,” p. 52. Oddly, Pei ignores the case of South Korea; admittedly, its transition to democracy came a long time after the intervention.

118
. Witness the vain attempts by Dean Rusk to discourage the emergence of a “Bonn-Paris axis” in 1963: Layne, “America as European Hegemon,” p. 24f.

119
. Stueck,
Korean War
, p. 26.

120
. Gaddis,
We Now Know
, p. 71f.

121
. Malkasian,
Korean War
, p. 15. Cf. Spanier,
Truman-MacArthur
, p. 257ff.

122
. Malkasian,
Korean War
, pp. 11–17.

123
. Mueller,
War, Presidents and Public Opin-ion
, table 3.2, p. 48.

124
. Foot,
Wrong War
, pp. 189–94.

125
. Malkasian,
Korean War
, p. 9.

126
Stueck,
Korean War
, p. 132f.

127
. This consciousness of European vulnerability had already been clearly expressed in NSC 68, which warned of the danger of “surprise attack” in Europe. Text at
http:www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/05/documents/nsc.report.68/
.

128
. Gaddis,
We Now Know
, p. 103.

129
. McCullough,
Truman
, p. 837.

130
. Ferrell,
Truman
, p. 330.

131
. Truman,
Years of Trial and Hope
, p. 467ff. MacArthur invited the Chinese commander in chief to “confer in the field” or face the risk of “an expansion of our military operations to [China’s] coastal areas and interior bases.”

132
. Ibid., 472f. Ferrell,
Truman
, p. 332.

133
. Ferrell,
Truman
, p. 334. The mood of panic in Washington was palpable. The rushed press conference happened because Truman and his advisers feared that MacArthur “was going on a world-wide broadcast network” to resign before he could be fired: McCullough,
Truman
, p. 842.

134
. See Wittner (ed.),
MacArthur
, pp. 103–08.

135
. McCullough,
Truman
, pp. 837–50.

136
. Ibid., p. 852.

137
. Truman,
Years of Trial and Hope
, p. 459.

138
. Ibid., p. 464.

139
. McCullough,
Truman
, p. 833f.

140
. Foot,
Wrong War
, p. 23.

141
. McCullough,
Truman
, p. 853ff.; Ferrell,
Truman
, p. 335.

142
. McCullough,
Truman
, p. 854.

143
. Spanier,
Truman-MacArthur
, p. 273.

144
. For an overly sympathetic account, see Willoughby and Chamberlain,
MacArthur
, pp. 418–25.

145
. Foot,
Wrong War
, p. 176. The Chinese were fearful that a large proportion of the POWs would refuse to return home voluntarily.

146
. Ibid., p. 176f.

147
. Ibid., p. 184.

148
. Ibid., p. 25.

149
. Mueller,
War, Presidents and Public Opinion
, p. 105.

150
. The percentage of U.S. Army personnel killed in action fell from 13.6 percent in the second half of 1950 to just 3.6 percent in 1951 and little more than 1 percent in 1952 and 1953. See the figures in
http:/history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/korea/reister/ch1.htm
.

151
. For Korean War casualty statistics, there are now excellent electronic sources. See
http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/old%20site/public_html/toc/detail_casualty/PAGE%20FIVE.htm
;
http://www.centurychina.com/history/krwarcost.html
; and the invaluable
http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/war-stat2.htm.

152
. Kissinger, “Reflections on American Diplomacy” p. 50f.

153
. Greene,
Quiet American
, p. 124.

154
. Ibid., p. 96.

155
. Caputo,
Rumor
, p. 16.

156
. Ibid., p. 88f.

157
. Baker,
Nam
, p. 133.

158
. Ferguson, “Prisoner Taking.”

159
. Herring,
Longest War
, p. 268.

160
. Ibid., p. 192f.

161
. Karnow,
Vietnam
, p. 19.

162
. Herring,
Longest War
, p. 268.

163
. Karnow,
Vietnam
, p. 19.

164
. Ravenal et al., “Was Failure Inevitable?,” p. 268f.

165
. Palmer,
Twenty-five Year War
, p. 204f

166
. Karnow,
Vietnam
, p. 20f.

167
. Coker,
Conflicts
, p. 22.

168
. Palmer,
Twenty-five Year War
, p. 195.

169
. Ibid., p. 192f.

170
. Though of course there had been mil-itary advisers in Vietnam for some years; the first American to be killed there died as early as 1961. But the direct and overt participation of American forces in the war really dates from 1965.

171
. Mueller,
War, Presidents and Public Opinion
.

172
. Ravenal,
Never Again
, p. 106. Cf. Palmer,
Twenty-five Year War
, p. 190.

173
. Ravenal et al., “Was Failure Inevitable?” p. 275f; Abshire, “Lessons,” p. 406; Karnow,
Vietnam
, p. 17.

174
. Mueller,
War, Presidents and Public Opinion
, table 3.2, p. 49.

175
. Edelman,
Dear America
, p. 205.

176
. Julien,
Empire
, p. 13.

177
. Edelman,
Dear America
, p. 207.

178
. Siracusa, “Lessons,” p. 228.

179
. Roskin, “Generational Paradigms,” p. 569.

180
. Siracusa, “Lessons,” p. 228; Gaddis,
We Now Know
, p. 58.

181
. Herring,
Longest War
, p. 270.

182
. Siracusa, “Lessons,” p. 233; Roskin, “Generational Paradigms,” p. 575.

183
. Kupchan,
End
, p. 200. Cf. Lundestad,
“Empire,”
p. 92.

184
. Herring,
Longest War
, p. 267.

185
. Gaddis,
We Now Know
, p. 177; Lowenthal,
Partners in Conflict
, pp. 31–33.