Colossus (57 page)

79
. Kennedy,
Great Powers
.

80
. Although Hanson’s
Decline of the American Empire
appeared as early as 1993.

81
. According to Charles Kupchan, for example, “Europe [would] soon catch up with America … because it is coming together, amassing the impressive resources and intellectual capital already possessed by its constituent states”: Kupchan,
End
, pp. 119, 132.

82
. John Mearsheimer concluded his economically deterministic
Tragedy of Great Power Politics
with this grim verdict: “The United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead.” Should China keep growing, in other words, the United States would cease to be the dominant power in Asia: Mearsheimer,
Tragedy
, p. 402. Cf. ibid., p. 383f. Oddly, Russia is double-counted in Mearsheimer’s tables, and the comparable American data are omitted.

83
. See Huntington, “Lonely Superpower,” p. 88.

84
. Todd,
Après l’Empire
.

85
. Calculations based on data in Maddison,
World Economy
, appendix A. A study by Goldman Sachs estimates that Chinese output could exceed American by 2041.

86
. Maddison,
World Economy
, p. 261, table B-18.

87
. World Bank,
World Development Indicators
database. An international dollar is an imaginary unit that has the same purchasing power over the gross domestic product of any country as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. This adjustment eliminates the effects of exchange rate movements and differentials in prices for equivalent goods between countries (a Big Mac costs more in the United States than in China). Measuring income and output in current dollars gives very different results. In 1980, using current dollars, the U.S. share of world output was just 10.6 percent, nearly a third what it is today. Seven years later it was up to a quarter, its highest share since. 1960, and between 1995 and 2002 it rose from a quarter to a third. Note that income here is gross national income, which (in the World Bank’s definition) is “the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad.” The measure of output is gross domestic product, which (again in the World Bank’s definition) “is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy, plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.”

88
. Though this is not strictly speaking the right comparison. If we add together Maddison’s estimates for the gross domestic product of Britain and all its colonies in 1913, the total (adjusting for purchasing parity) comes to over 20 percent of his estimate for world GDP. It might be more accurate to say, then, that the U.S. economy today and the combined economies of the British Empire a century ago account for roughly similar shares of world output.

89
.
http:grassrootsbrunnet.net/keswick-ridge/mcdonalds/history_of_expansion.htm.
Technically, McDonal’s does not own these restaurants, but it sells franchises to restaurant proprietors. There is widening latitude for these to adapt McDonald’s products to suit local tastes. However, its inspectors ensure that franchisees conform to the standards of service and food quality set by McDonal’s in the United States.

90
. Neil Buckley, “Eyes on the Fries,”
Financial Times
, August 29, 2003.

91
.
Coca-Cola Company 2002 Annual Report 2002
, p. 44.

92
. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), “National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2004” (Green Paper), March 2003.

93
. Kennedy,
Rise and Fall
, p. 609, n. 18.

94
. Nye,
Paradox
, p. 8. See also his essay “The Velvet Hegemon,”
Foreign Policy
(May–June 2003) p. 74f., which responds to my critique “Think Again: Power,”
Foreign Policy
(March–April 2003).

95
. Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
Paradox
, p. 141.

96
. Ibid., p. 140f.

97
. On Americanization, see Bell,
Americanization and Australia
. Cf. Judge, “Hegemony of the Heart.”

98
. Held et al.,
Global Transformations
, pp. 344–63. Cf. Smith,
Talons of the Eagle
, p. 235f. Latin American cinemas are also dominated by U.S. films.

99
. Shawcross,
Deliver Us from Evil
, p. 119.

100
. Figures from the Evangelism and Missions Information Service, the U.S. Council of World Missions and the North American Missions Board.

101
.
http:bible.acu.edu/missions/page.asp?ID=174
; ID=894.

102
. Coker,
Conflicts
, p. 11. Cf. Stoll,
Is Latin America Turning Protestant?

103
. David van Biema, “Should Christians Convert Muslims?,”
Time
, June 30, 2003.

104
. See, e.g., Mandelbaum,
Ideas
, p. 1.

105
. Ibid., p. 288.

106
. Office of the President, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 17, 2003,
http:usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/secstrat.htm.

107
. See Bacevich,
American Empire
, p. 2f. But even Bacevich understates the extent of the resemblance: Andrew Bacevich, “Does Empire Pay?,”
Historically Speaking, 4, 4
(April 2003), p. 33.

108
. See my
Empire
, passim. Cf. Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
Paradox
, pp. 10, 144; Kurtz, “Democratic Imperialism.”

109
. Quoted in Morris,
Pax Britannica
, p. 517.

110
. Julien,
America’s Empire
, p. 13f.

111
. “President Bush’s Address to the Nation,”
New York Times
, September 7, 2003.

112
. See Jack P. Greene, “Empire and Identity,” p. 223. See also Pagden, “Struggle for Legitimacy,” p. 52.

113
. Office of the President, “National Security Strategy,” part 5: “Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction”

114
. See Acemoglu et al., “African Success Story.”

115
. Stephen Haber, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, “If Economists Are So Smart, Why Is Africa So Poor?”
Wall Street Journal
, July 30, 2003.

116
. This is something the people of Sierra Leone acknowledged when they openly welcomed British intervention in September 2000. In the space of a few days eight hundred paratroopers achieved what had hitherto eluded more than ten thousand United Nations peacekeepers: they ended the country’s horribly bloody internecine conflict.

117
. I first advanced this case in my book
The Cash Nexus
. For echoes of the same argument, see Cooper, “Postmodern State” and Mallaby, “Reluctant Imperialist.”

118
. See my
Empire
. Cf. Kurtz, “Democratic Imperialism.”

119
. Symonds,
Oxford and Empire
, p. 188.

120
. Louis, “Introduction,” pp. 5f.

121
. “Success of a free Iraq will be watched and noted throughout the region. Mil-lions will see that freedom, equality and material progress are possible at the heart of the Middle East. Leaders in the region will face the clearest evidence that free institutions and open societies are the only path to long-term national success and dignity…. And a trans-formed Middle East would benefit the entire world by undermining the ide-ologies that export violence to other lands…. The advance of democratic institutions in Iraq is setting an example that others [in the region] would be wise to follow”:
New York Times
, September 23, 2003.

122
. Ferguson, “Hegemony or Empire,” p. 154.

CHAPTER 1: THE LIMITS OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE

1
. Ibid.

2
. See Smith,
Civic Ideals
, esp. pp. 87–89,116.

3
. Ibid., pp. 130–34. Cf. Keyssar,
Right to Vote
.

4
. Van Alstyne,
American Empire
, p. 3; Hanson
American Emire
. 55.

5
. Hanson
American Empire
, p. 56

6
. Williams,
Empire as a Way of Life
, p. 35.

7
. Madison, “The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection,”
Federalist No. 10.

8
. Hamilton, “General Introduction,”
Federalist No. 1
.

9
. Freeman and Nearing,
Dollar Diplomacy
, p. 233.

10
. Van Alstyne,
American Empire
, p. 1.

11
. Ibid., p. 9.

12
. Maddison,
World Economy
, pp. 35, 250.

13
. Milner et al. (eds.),
History of the American West
, p. 161.

14
. Richardson et al.,
Texas
, p. 57.

15
. Milner et al. (eds.),
History of the American West
, p. 162.

16
. Billington,
Westward Expansion
, pp. 5–10.

17
. Figures from the University of Michi-gan Correlates of War database.

18
. Sylla, “U.S. Financial System,” p. 259ff. The United States had to pay an additional $3.8 million to cover previous claims filed by American merchants against France for ship seizures. See in general Kastor,
Louisiana Purchase
. On the complex constitutional implications of Jeffer-son’s action, see Adams,
Formative Years
, pp. 367–69.

19
. Kastor,
Louisiana Purchase
, p. 7f.

20
. Richardson et al.,
Texas
, p. 83f.

21
. Ibid., p. 89ff.

22
. Ibid., p. 98.

23
. Ibid., p. 151.

24
. Ibid., p.152.

25
. Ibid., p. 157.

26
. Milner et al. (eds.),
History of the American West
, p. 166. On the subsequent use of the phrase
manifest destiny
, see Horlacher, “Language,” p. 37.

27
. Richardson et al.,
Texas
, p. 166.