The Grand Alliance (110 page)

2. Should this operation prosper the plans which
have been prepared for a further rapid advance upon
Tripoli may be carried out. Should success attend this
further effort important reactions may be expected
which it is provident to study in advance.

3. General Weygand may be stirred into joining in
the war, or the Germans may make demands upon him
or Vichy for facilities in French North Africa which may
force him into the war.

4. To profit by these contingencies we are holding a
force equivalent to one armoured and three field
divisions ready with shipping from about the middle of
November. This force could either enter Morocco by
Casablanca upon French invitation or otherwise help to
exploit in the Mediterranean a victory in Libya.

5. In order to cover effectively these preparations we
have prepared large-scale plans for a descent upon the
Norwegian coast, and also for a reinforcement of the
Russians in Murmansk. There is substance as well as
shadow in these plans.

6. It seems therefore probable that we shall have to
send away from Great Britain four or even five
divisions, besides the 18th Division, which will arrive at
Halifax on November 7 on its journey round the Cape to
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Suez. We must expect that as soon as Hitler stabilises
the Russian front he will begin to gather perhaps fifty or
sixty divisions in the West for the invasion of the British
Isles. We have had reports, which may be exaggerated,
of the building of perhaps eight hundred craft capable
of carrying eight or ten tanks each across the North
Sea, and of landing anywhere upon the beaches. Of
course there will be parachute and airborne descents
on a yet unmeasured scale. One may well suppose his
programme to be: 1939, Poland; 1940, France; 1941,
Russia; 1942, England; 1943 – ? At any rate, I feel that
we must be prepared to meet a supreme onslaught
from March onwards.

7. In moving four or five divisions, including one
armoured division, out of the United Kingdom in these
circumstances we are evidently taking risks. Should
events happily take the course assumed in the earlier
paragraphs of this letter, and should we in fact reduce
our forces at home to the extent mentioned, it would be
a very great reassurance and a military advantage of
the highest order if you were able to place a United
States Army Corps and Armoured Division, with all the
air force possible, in the North of Ireland (of course at
the invitation of that Government as well as of His
Majesty’s Government), thus enabling us to withdraw
the three divisions we now have for the defence of
Great Britain, besides the troops in Iceland, which are
now being relieved.

8. We should feel very much freer to act with vigour
in the manner I have outlined if we knew that such a
step on your part was possible. Moreover, the arrival of
American troops in Northern Ireland would exercise a
powerful effect upon the whole of Eire, with favourable
consequences that cannot be measured. It would also
be a deterrent upon German invasion schemes. I hope
this may find a favourable place in your thoughts. I do
not suggest that any decision should be taken until we
see the result of the approaching battle.

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After some paragraphs dealing with questions of command and the relations of air and naval services to the Army, my letter continued:

P
ART
II

13. All my information goes to show that a victory in
Cyrenaica of the British over the Germans will alter the
whole shape of the war in the Mediterranean. Spain
may be heartened to fight for her neutrality. A profound
effect may be produced upon the already demoralised
Italy. Perhaps, most important of all, Turkey may be
consolidated in her resistance to Hitler. We do not
require Turkey to enter the war aggressively at the
present moment, but only to maintain a stolid,
unyielding front to German threats and blandishments.

As long as Turkey is not violated or seduced, this great
oblong pad of poorly developed territory is an impass-able protection for the eastern flank of our Nile Army. If
Turkey were forced to enter the war, we should of
course have to give her a great deal of support which
might be better used elsewhere, either in French North
Africa or in the Caucasus. We are making promises of
support to Turkey (contingent on the military situation)
which amount to between four and six divisions and
twenty or thirty air squadrons, and we are actively
preparing with them the necessary airfields in Anatolia.

But what Turkey requires to keep her sound is a British
victory over Germans, making all promises real and
living.

14. These dispositions, as I have set them out, do
not allow us in the next six months to make any serious
contribution to the Russian defence of the Caucasus
and Caspian Basin. The best help we can give the
Russians is to relieve the five Russian divisions now
crowded into Northern Persia. If these are brought
home and used in the battle, I have pledged the faith of
Britain to Stalin that no rightful Russian interest shall
suffer and that we will take no advantages in Persia at
their expense. I do not however see how, in the period
mentioned, we can put more than a symbolic force into
the Caucasus and the Russians retain a similar repre-The Grand Alliance

668

sentation in Persia. The Russians much disturb Persia
by their presence, their theories, and their behaviour,
and the outbreak of disorders would mean that we
should have to spread three or four British-Indian
divisions to keep open the communications from the
Persian Gulf to the Caspian. These communications,
which are a vital part of our joint aid to Russia policy,
would thus be largely choked by the need of supplying
the extra forces. I have been trying to get the Russians
to see this point.

15. In my telegram of July 25, 1941, which I sent
you before our Atlantic meeting, I spoke of the long-term project for 1943 of the simultaneous landing of say
fifteen thousand tanks from hundreds of specially fitted
ocean-going ships on the beaches of three or four
countries ripe for revolt. I suggested that the necessary
alterations could easily be made at this stage to a
proportion of your merchant ships now building on so
vast a scale. I now send you the drawings prepared by
the Admiralty, which illustrate the kind of treatment the
vessels would require. You will see that it is estimated
only to add about fifty thousand pounds to their cost,
and I suppose a proportionate delay. It seems to me
that not less than two hundred ships should be thus
fitted. There is sufficient time, as we cannot think of

[executing] such a plan before 1943. But the essential
counterpart of the tank programme you have now
embarked upon is the power to transport them across
the oceans and land them upon unfortified beaches
along the immense coastline Hitler is committed to
defend. I trust therefore, Mr. President, that this will
commend itself to you.

16. I send you a short note which I have made upon
the use of artillery, both field and flak. This has its
bearing upon the approaching offensive described in
Part I, as well as upon the organisation of our Home
Army to meet invasion.
3
All the authorities are agreed
upon the principles set forth, and you arc very welcome
to show this paper, should you think it worth while, to
your officers.

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17. I also send, for your own personal information, a
note I have made on the structure, present and future,
of the British and Imperial armies which we are endeavouring to organise in 1942.
4
Of course the figure of
about one hundred divisions does not, as is fully
explained, mean one hundred mobile standard field
divisions. Some are garrison; some are anti-aircraft;
and some are equivalents in brigade groups. Broadly
speaking however it represents a much more considerable deployment of military strength than we had
planned at the outbreak of the war. This has been
rendered possible by the fact that we have not been
engaged to any serious extent since the losses of
Dunkirk, and that munitions and reserves have accumulated instead of being expended on a great scale.

18. I have not referred to the Japanese menace,
which has seemed to grow so much sharper in the last
few days, nor to the splendid help you are giving us in
the Atlantic, because we discussed these great matters
so fully at our meeting, and events are now telling their
own tale in accordance with our anticipations. I still
think however that the stronger the action of the United
States towards Japan, the greater the chance of
preserving peace. Should however peace be broken
and the United States become at war with Japan, you
may be sure that a British declaration of war upon
Japan will follow within the hour. We hope to be able
before Christmas to provide a considerable battle
squadron for the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

19. Lastly, Mr. President, let me tell you how I envy
the Lord Privy Seal in being able to fly over to the
United States and have a good talk with you. My place
is here, and therefore I have taken this opportunity of
writing you so long a letter. Might I ask that all
reference to the forthcoming operations shall be kept
absolutely secret, and for yourself alone? For this
purpose I have separated the first part of the letter

[containing the actual date of our offensive] from the
rest, in the hopes that after reading it you will speedily
consign it to the flames.

With kindest regards and every good wish,

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Believe me, Mr. President,

Your sincere friend,

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

I also exposed these designs fully to the Middle East Commanders-in-Chief through the Minister of State, in order that they might realise that “Crusader,” the battle they were about to fight, might open to us a continuing path, and also to emphasise once again the urgency of their offensive. This paper, addressed to a different quarter, presents another aspect of the same conception as my letter which Mr. Attlee, in full accord, was bearing to the President.

Prime

Minister

to

25 Oct. 41

Minister of State

No one can assume that Germany will continue to
be inextricably engaged in Russia during the winter. It
is far more probable that in a month or so the front in
Russia, except in the South, will be stationary. Russia,
through loss of munitions capacity, will have been
reduced [temporarily] to a second-rate military Power,
even if Moscow and Leningrad are held. At any time
Hitler can leave, say, one-third of his armies opposite
Russia and still have plenty to threaten Great Britain, to
put pressure upon Spain, and to send reinforcements to
discipline Italy, as well as pushing on in the East.