The Grand Alliance (109 page)

Reactions of the Middle East Commanders-in
-

Chief
—
We Drop the Sicily Project
—
My Minute
of October
28
— German Plans if Russia Were
Defeated — The Months of German Weakness in
the Mediterranean
—
The U-Boats Arrive upon the
Scene
—
A Message for the Desert Battle.

P
OLICY and inclination alike led me into the closest correspondence with President Roosevelt. Weekly and often almost daily I gave him the fullest tale of all I knew about our British thought and intentions and about the general war situation. There is no doubt that these interchanges commanded his closest attention, and excited his lively interest and sympathy. His replies were naturally more reserved, but by now I knew very well where he stood The Grand Alliance

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and what he wanted. I was in charge of a struggling country beset by deadly foes. He was aloft, august, at the head of a mighty neutral Power, whom he desired above all things to bring into the fight for freedom. But he could not as yet see how to do it. Meanwhile Britain had to plan her own scheme of war: how to fight Hitler, bringing all our forces to bear on the largest scale physically possible; how to help the Russians by supplies and by what could be only minor diversions; above all, how to keep alive!

Still, there was a plan for the rest of 1941 and for 1942

which had formed in my mind and obtained a great measure of fundamental acceptance from the Chiefs of Staff. This plan was of course at this date based upon the United States still staying out of the war while giving us all the aid that Congress would allow. I had become aware through my correspondence with the President that he was particularly alert about all naval affairs, and that he regarded French North Africa, including Dakar, and the Atlantic islands of Spain and Portugal, with special interest not only from American but from his personal ways of thought. These were also in harmony with my own views, and also, as I believe it will be judged, with a strategy which expressed the best we could possibly do alone, and also the best that we and the United States, should they become a belligerent, could do together.

My hopes were that we might win a decisive victory in the Western Desert and drive Rommel back through Libya and Tripolitania. If all went well this might bring about the rallying from Vichy of Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, and perhaps even the accession of Vichy itself. This purpose was only a hope built on a hope. But we held ready in the United Kingdom one armoured and three field divisions, with sufficient naval power, while the German Air Force was absorbed in Russia, to carry them to any point in the The Grand Alliance

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Western Mediterranean. If we got Tripoli, and France would not move, our possession of Malta would enable us to descend upon Sicily, and thus open up the only possible

“Second Front” in Europe within our power while we were alone in the West. I could not see anything else, except Norway, however good our fortune on the battlefield, which we could accomplish by ourselves in 1942. The plan for the invasion of Sicily had been carefully worked out by the Chiefs of Staff and the Planning Committee. We called it

“Whipcord.”

Once Rommel was beaten and his small, audacious army destroyed and Tripoli was ours, it was not thought impossible for four divisions of our best troops, about eighty thousand men, to land and conquer Sicily. The German Air Force, who had wrought us so much harm from the Sicilian airfields, had been called away to Russia, and there were now no German troops in the island. When our expedition was at sea and had entered the Mediterranean, it would of course be spotted. But the enemy could not know whether we were going to French North Africa – Bizerta, Algiers, Oran – or to Sicily or Sardinia. Such are the advantageous options open to naval power. What other plan of active offensive warfare was open to Britain and the Empire by themselves during 1942? How could we engage the Germans on a large scale? What schemes would offer to us so many choices, which are so desirable amid the uncertainties of war? It might be beyond our single-handed strength. It might go wrong. But at any rate it did not endanger our life-lines across the Atlantic or our power to defend ourselves from invasion at home.

It is one thing to see the forward path and another to be able to take it. But it is better to have an ambitious plan than none at all. All turned first on the success of General Auchinleck’s long-prepared offensive in the Western

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Desert. All had to be reviewed in relation to the unknown dangers which would be opened upon us by a German penetration to the Caspian, or their possible movement through Turkey in the same direction, or into the Middle East – Syria, Palestine, Persia, and Iraq. But throughout I regarded all these as comparatively unlikely possibilities. In the event this proved the correct view. I carried with me in the pursuit of these conjectural schemes at every stage the convictions and support of the Chiefs of Staff, and of my Ministerial colleagues on the Defence Committee and in the War Cabinet. In the end all were fulfilled in the exact order designed, but not until 1942 and 1943, and in very different and more favourable circumstances than those we could foresee in October, 1941.

While all these speculations influenced opinion in our secret circles I was determined that the preparation of the apparatus and plans for the invasion of the Continent should not slacken. Sir Roger Keyes had now reached the age of seventy. He had performed invaluable service in building up the Commandos and in pressing forward the design and construction of invasion craft. His high rank as Admiral of the Fleet and strong personality had created a certain amount of friction in the Service departments, and I reached the conclusion with much regret on personal grounds that the appointment of a new and young figure at the head of the overseas organisation would be in the public interest. Lord Louis Mountbatten was only a captain in the Royal Navy, but his exploits and abilities seemed to me to fit him in a high degree for the vacant post. He was at this time on a special mission to the United States, where he was received with great consideration. He cruised with the Pacific Fleet, and on his return to Washington had long

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discussions with the President, to whom he was authorised to disclose what we were doing in preparations for landings on the Continent and the plans I harboured. The President showed him the greatest confidence and invited him to stay at the White House. Before this visit could take place I had to summon him home.

Prime

Minister

to

10 Oct. 41

Lord

Louis

Mountbatten

We want you home here at once for something
which you will find of the highest interest.

Prime Minister to Mr.

10 Oct. 41

Harry Hopkins

We want Mountbatten over here for a very active
and urgent job. Please explain to the President how
disappointed he was not to be able to fulfil the invitation
to the White House with which he had been honoured.

He will seek an audience before leaving.

I had been vexed by a final delay of nearly a fortnight which General Auchinleck demanded in order to perfect his arrangements.

Prime

Minister

to

18 Oct. 41

General Auchinleck

Your telegram confirms my apprehensions. Date
was mentioned by you to Defence Committee, and
though we felt the delay most dangerous we accepted
it and have worked towards it in our general plans. It is
impossible to explain to Parliament and the nation how
it is our Middle East armies have had to stand for four
and a half months without engaging the enemy while all
the time Russia is being battered to pieces. I have

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hitherto managed to prevent public discussion, but at
any time it may break out. Moreover, the few precious
weeks that remain to us for the exploitation of any
success are passing. No warning has been given to me
of your further delay, and no reasons. I must be able to
inform War Cabinet on Monday number of days further
delay you now demand.

Moreover, the Lord Privy Seal leaves Monday for
United States, carrying with him a personal letter to the
President. In this letter, which would be handed to Mr.

Roosevelt for his eye alone and to be burnt or returned
thereafter, I was proposing to state that in the
moonlight of early November you intended to attack. It
is necessary for me to take the President into our
confidence, and thus stimulate his friendly action. In
view of the plans we are preparing for “Whipcord,”
1
I
am in this letter asking him to send three or four United
States divisions to relieve our troops in Northern
Ireland, as a greater safeguard against invasion in the
spring. I fixed the date of the Lord Privy Seal’s mission
in relation to the date you had given us. Of course, if it
is only a matter of two or three days the fact could be
endured. It is not however possible for me to concert
the general movement of the war if important changes
are made in plans agreed upon without warning or
reason. Pray therefore telegraph in time.

The date was finally fixed for November 18, as General Auchinleck desired.

Feeling the way the President’s mind was probably moving, I determined, on the eve of Auchinleck’s considerable venture in the Desert, to lay my whole thought before him.

Mr. Attlee, now generally recognised as Deputy Prime Minister, was to visit Washington to attend the International Labour Conference, and I sent by his hand to the President the letter which follows. It will become evident that this fell The Grand Alliance

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in very closely with the march of Mr. Roosevelt’s own thought.

Prime Minister to

20 Oct. 1941

President

Roosevelt

P
ART I

My dear Mr. President,

Some time this fall General Auchinleck will attack
the German and Italian armies in Cyrenaica with his
utmost available power.
2
We believe his forces will be
stronger than the enemy’s in troops, in artillery, in
aircraft, and particularly in tanks. His object will be to
destroy the enemy’s armed and above all armoured
forces, and to capture Benghazi as quickly as possible.