The Grand Alliance (107 page)

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loaded in different ships, [and] that planes, because of
the imperfect packing, reach us broken?

Even Stalin seems after a while to have felt that he had gone too far in the tone of this communication, which I had not attempted to answer. The silence was expressive. On November 20 the Soviet Ambassador in London called on Mr. Eden at the Foreign Office. The following is Mr. Eden’s record of the conversation as sent in a telegram to Sir Stafford Cripps, now at Kuibyshev:
Foreign Minister to

20 Nov. 41

Sir Stafford Cripps

The Soviet Ambassador asked to see me this
afternoon, when he said that he had received instructions from M. Stalin, who had asked him to convey to
me that in sending his recent message to the Prime
Minister he had only practical and businesslike questions in view. It had certainly not been M. Stalin’s
intention to cause any offence to any members of the
Government, and least of all to the Prime Minister.

M. Stalin was very busy indeed with affairs at the
front, and had had virtually no chance to think of
anything else but affairs at the front. He had raised
important practical issues about mutual military assistance in Europe against Hitler and the post-war organisation of peace. These questions were very important,
and it was very undesirable to complicate them by any
personal misunderstanding or feelings. M. Stalin had
also overcome certain personal feelings in pursuing the
line he had taken, because the Finnish business had
greatly hurt him and the whole of the Soviet Union. “My
Fatherland,” said M. Stalin, “finds itself in a humiliating
position. Our request was made secretly. Then the
whole thing was published, and also the fact that His
Majesty’s Government did not consider it possible to
accept the Soviet request. This has put my country in a
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humiliated position, and has had a depressing effect on
the minds of my people.” M. Stalin had felt himself hurt
by this, but, in spite of this, he still pursued only one
end: to reach an agreement on mutual military assistance against Hitler in Europe and the post-war organisation of peace.

Stalin’s answer had made it clear that purely military talks would have little concrete result in the present state of mind of the Russian leaders. The almost hysterical note of Stalin’s message about Finland showed the gap in understanding between our two countries. I proposed therefore to make a further attempt to smooth out relations between us by offering to send Mr. Eden himself on a mission to Russia. It was in this sense that I telegraphed to M. Stalin on November 21:

Prime

Minister

to

21 Nov. 41

Premier Stalin

Many thanks for your message, just received. At the
very beginning of the war I began a personal correspondence with President Roosevelt, which has led to
a very solid understanding being established between
us and has often helped in getting things done quickly.

My only desire is to work on equal terms of comradeship and confidence with you.

2. About Finland. I was quite ready to advise the
Cabinet to declare war upon Finland when I sent you
my telegram of September 4. Later information has
made me think that it will be more helpful to Russia and
the common cause if the Finns can be got to stop
fighting and stand still, or go home, than if we put them
in the dock with the guilty Axis Powers by a formal
declaration of war and make them fight it out to the
end. However, if they do not stop in the next fortnight
and you still wish us to declare war on them, we will
certainly do so. I agree with you that it was very wrong
that any publication should have been made. We
certainly were not responsible.

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3. Should our offensive in Libya result, as we hope,
in the destruction of the German-Italian army there, it
will be possible to take a broad survey of the war as a
whole, with more freedom than has hitherto been
opened to His Majesty’s Government.

4. For this purpose we shall be willing in the near
future to send the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, whom
you know, via the Mediterranean to meet you at
Moscow or elsewhere. He would be accompanied by
high military and other experts, and will be able to
discuss every question relating to the war, including the
sending of troops not only into the Caucasus but into
the fighting line of your armies in the south. Neither our
shipping resources nor the communications will allow
large numbers to be employed, and even so you will
have to choose between troops and supplies across
Persia.

5. I notice that you wish also to discuss the post-war
organisation of peace. Our intention is to fight the war
in alliance with you and in constant consultation with
you to the utmost of our strength, and however long it
lasts, and when the war is won, as I am sure it will be,
we expect that Soviet Russia, Great Britain, and the
United States will meet at the council table of the
victors as the three principal partners and agencies by
which Nazism will have been destroyed. Naturally, the
first object will be to prevent Germany, and particularly
Prussia, breaking out upon us for the third time. The
fact that Russia is a Communist State and Britain and
the United States are not, and do not intend to be, is
not any obstacle to our making a good plan for our
mutual safety and rightful interests. The Foreign Secretary will be able to discuss the whole of this field with
you.

6. It may well be that your defence of Moscow and
Leningrad, as well as the splendid resistance to the
invader along the whole Russian front, will inflict mortal
injuries upon the internal structure of the Nazi regime.

We must not count upon such good fortune, but simply
keep on striking at them to the utmost with might and
main.

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M. Stalin replied two days later, and in a calmer tone:
Premier

Stalin

to

23 Nov. 41

Prime Minister

Many thanks for your message. I sincerely welcome
your wish as expressed in your message to collaborate
with me by way of personal correspondence based on
friendship and confidence. I hope this will contribute
much to the success of our common cause.

2. On the question of Finland, the U.S.S.R. never
proposed anything else – at least, in the first instance –

but the cessation of the military operations and the de
facto exit of Finland from the war. If however Finland
refuses to comply even with this in the course of the
short period you indicated, then I believe the declaration of war by Great Britain would be reasonable and
necessary. Otherwise an impression may be created
that there is no unity between us on the question of war
against Hitler and his most ardent accomplices, and
that the accomplices of Hitler’s aggression can do their
base work with impunity. With regard to Hungary and
Rumania, we can perhaps wait a little while.

3. I support by all means your proposal of an early
visit to the U.S.S.R. by the Foreign Secretary, Mr.

Eden. I believe our joint consideration and acceptance
of an agreement concerning the common military
operations of the Soviet and British forces at our front,
as well as speedy realisation of such an agreement,
would have a great positive value. It is right that consideration and acceptance of a plan concerning the post-war organisation of peace should be founded upon the
general idea of preventing Germany, and in the first
place Prussia, once more from violating peace and
once more plunging peoples into terrible carnage.

4. I also fully agree with you that the difference of
the State organisation between the U.S.S.R. on the one
hand and Great Britain and the United States of America on the other hand should not, and could not, hinder
us in achieving a successful solution of all the fundamental questions concerning our mutual security and
our legitimate interests. If there are still some omissions

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and doubts on this score I hope they will be cleared
away in the course of the negotiations with Mr. Eden.

5. I beg you to accept my congratulations on the
successful beginning of the British offensive in Libya.

6. The struggle of the Soviet armies against Hitler’s
troops remains tense. In spite however of all the
difficulties the resistance of our forces grows and will
grow. Our will to victory over the enemy is unbending.

As a result of Stalin’s pressing appeal it was decided to go ahead with arrangements to deliver an ultimatum with a time limit to the Finns, and also to Rumania and Hungary. I was most reluctant to be forced into this position, as the following minutes show:

Prime

Minister

to

28 Nov. 41

Foreign Secretary

You seem to be taking it for granted that war will be
declared on all three Powers [Finland, Rumania, and
Hungary] on December 3. I did not wish this decision to
be taken till we know what Finland will do. Moreover,
the 3d is too soon. The 5th is a fortnight after my
telegram to Stalin. I am only tonight sending my telegram to Mannerheim. We must leave reasonable time
for a reply.

My opinion about the unwisdom of this measure remains unaltered, and I still have hopes that the Finns will withdraw. I was not aware that this step would be taken at this juncture.

Prime

Minister

to

29 Nov. 41

Foreign Secretary

Finland and Company. I don’t want to be pinched for
time if there is a chance of Finland pulling out of the big
war. See also my telegram to Stalin [of November 21],

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which says, “if they do not stop in the next fortnight and
you still wish us to declare war on them …” Procedure
therefore should be as follows. If we have not heard by
the 5th that the Finns are not going to pull out, or have
heard they are contumacious, we then telegraph to
Stalin saying that “if he still wishes it” we will declare
war forthwith. The Rumanian and Hungarian declarations will follow, also in accordance with whatever he
may desire.