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be taken of the future until we know how this goes. A
battle is a veil through which it is not wise to peer.

It may be well to see in the afterlight what was passing in the enemy’s mind.

In July, 1941, the German Army Planning Staff had made a study of future operations, called Plan “Orient,” to overthrow the British position in the Middle East. Their major assumption was that the Russian war would come to a successful end in the autumn. If so – a big “If” – a Panzer corps from the Caucasus would drive southward through Persia in the winter of 1941–42. From Bulgaria, if Turkey were acquiescent, a force of ten divisions, half of them armoured and motorised, would traverse Anatolia into Syria and Iraq. If Turkey resisted, double that strength would be needed, and in consequence the plan would have to wait till 1942. The German and Italian forces in Africa were given only the third place. Their rôle during the summer and autumn of 1941 was to be purely defensive, except that Tobruk was to be taken. By the winter their losses in men and equipment would be made up, and then, when the general assault was made on Persia and Iraq, and our attention and forces were distracted, the Axis army in Libya would advance on Cairo.

The African adventure had never been favoured by the German High Command. German forces had only been sent to stop the Italian rout. When this was checked, and we were driven back, the success did not lead to any change of heart. The sea voyage across the Mediterranean, with its perils from submarines and air attacks from Malta, was not to their liking. North Africa would always remain a minor theatre, owing to the “greater difficulties in

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reinforcement which would be experienced by the Axis as compared with the Allies.” Nor was co-operation with Italians, on land, sea, or air, particularly attractive to German minds. It was only with grudging acquiescence that Rommel’s shortages were made up. If the enemy had chosen, they could have spared and ferried, at an accepted cost, the forces necessary to make our position untenable.

It will presently be seen how it was that Malta, their chief obstacle, was never assaulted. No doubt their heavy loss in Crete was a deterrent.

A letter sent at the beginning of August, 1941, from the German War Staff to the generals commanding the West, North, and South Groups outlined the objectives which would be pursued on the morrow of a Russian defeat.

(a)
Strengthening of the armed forces in North Africa with a view to rendering possible the capture of Tobruk.

In order to permit the passage of necessary transports, attacks by the German Air Force on Malta should be resumed.

Provided that weather conditions cause no delay and the service of transports is assured as planned, it can be assumed that the campaign against Tobruk will begin in mid-September.

(b)
Plan “Felix” [i.e., the seizure of Gibraltar, with the active participation of Spain] must be executed in 1941.

(c)
Should the campaign in the East be over, and Turkey comes to our side, an attack on Syria and Palestine in the direction of Egypt is contemplated, after a minimum period of eighty-five days for preparation….

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The autumn and winter months were therefore our opportunity. The German Air was gone from Sicily. The Russian front lapped up the fuel needed for the Italian Fleet. During August thirty-three per cent of the supplies and reinforcements to Rommel were lost. In October this important figure rose to sixty-three per cent. The Italians were pressed to organise an alternative route of supply by air. At the end of September Mussolini undertook to carry reinforcements by air to Tripoli at the rate of fifteen thousand men a month, but by the end of October only nine thousand had arrived. Sea transport to Tripoli was at the same time brought to a standstill, and only a few convoys ran our blockade and reached Benghazi. The October losses at last however forced the German High Command to send oil to the Italian Navy. A far more important step was also taken. Admiral Doenitz reluctantly agreed to move twenty-five German U-boats from the Atlantic struggle into the Mediterranean. Here was a real stroke, the consequences of which were not long to be delayed.

In the interval our control exercised from Malta was decisive, and the activities of “Force K,” which the Admiralty, at my desire, had created there, yielded rich prizes. On the night of November 8, acting on an aircraft report, they pounced upon the first Italian convoy since the resumption of traffic, consisting of ten merchant ships, escorted by four destroyers with cruiser support. All the merchant ships were quickly annihilated. One destroyer was sunk and another damaged by our cruisers. The Italian cruisers took no part in the affair. I sent this good news to President Roosevelt.

Former Naval Person

9 Nov. 41

to President Roosevelt

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The destruction between Italy and Greece of the
Axis convoy destined for Benghazi is highly important
both in itself and in its consequences. It is also noteworthy that the two Italian heavy cruisers would not face
our two six-inch light cruisers, nor their six [actually
four] destroyers our two.

I have also an increasingly good impression of the
Moscow front.

Once more the convoys were suspended, and Rommel had good reason to complain to the German High Command.

General Rommel to O.

9 Nov. 41

K.W
.
5

The tempo of the transport of troops and supplies to
North Africa has been reduced still more. To the end of
October, 1941, of the sixty thousand tons of supplies
promised by the Italians only 8093 tons have reached
Benghazi. Of those troops originally intended for the
attack on Tobruk about one-third of the artillery and
various important communications units will not arrive
from Europe even by November 20. Furthermore, it is
uncertain when the twenty 15.5-cm. guns bought from
France in Tunis will arrive. … Of the requested three
Italian divisions for an attack in November only one will
be available, and that below strength.

But now our interval of immunity and advantage came to its end. The U-boats arrived upon the scene. On November 12, while returning to Gibraltar after flying more aircraft into Malta, the
Ark Royal
was struck by a torpedo from a German U-boat. All attempts to save the ship failed, and this famous veteran, which had played such a distinguished part in so many of our affairs, sank when only twenty-five miles from Gibraltar. This was the beginning of a series of grievous losses to our Fleet in the Mediterranean and a

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weakness there which we had never known before. All was however now ready for our long-delayed offensive, and it is to the Western Desert that we must now turn.

On November 15 I sent General Auchinleck a message from the King for him to use “if, when, and as” he thought fit.

Prime

Minister

to

15 Nov. 41

General Auchinleck

I have it in command from the King to express to all
ranks of the Army and Royal Air Force in the Western
Desert, and to the Mediterranean Fleet, His Majesty’s
confidence that they will do their duty with exemplary
devotion in the supremely important battle which lies
before them. For the first time British and Empire troops
will meet the Germans with an ample equipment in
modern weapons of all kinds. The battle itself will affect
the whole course of the war. Now is the time to strike
the hardest blow yet struck for final victory, home, and
freedom. The Desert Army may add a page to history
which will rank with Blenheim and with Waterloo. The
eyes of all nations are upon you. All our hearts are with
you. May God uphold the right!

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10

Operation “Crusader”

Ashore, Aloft, and Afloat

Sense of Drama Absent from Modern Battles —

The Opposing Armies and Plans — The Eighth
Army Attack — Surprise Achieved — The First
Three Days — The XIIIth Corps Pierces the
Frontier Line — General Auchinleck’s Account of
the Battle — Rommel’s Daring Stroke — The
Swaying Struggle — Auchinleck Flies to the
Desert Headquarters — His Orders to General
Cunningham Save the Battle — His Decision to
Replace General Cunningham — My Letter to
President Roosevelt of November
20
— The Vichy
Danger — Naval Attacks upon the Enemy Convoys — Resolute Advance of the New Zealand
Division to Sidi Rezegh — Rommel Retreats,
Abandoning His Frontier Garrisons — Tobruk
Relieved — Losses in the Battle — Gloom in
Rome — Naval Disasters — “Ark Royal” and