The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (134 page)

11
     Another question is naturally raised, viz. what sort of parts belong to the form and what sort not to the form, but to the concrete thing. Yet if this is not plain it is not possible to define any thing; for definition is of the universal and of the form.
(30)
If then it is not evident what sort of parts are of the nature of matter and what sort are not, neither will the formula of the thing be evident. In the case of things which are found to occur in specifically different materials, as a circle may exist in bronze or stone or wood, it seems plain that these, the bronze or the stone, are no part of the essence of the circle, since it is found apart from them.
(35)
Of things which are
not
seen to exist apart, there is no reason why the same may not be true, just as if all circles that had ever been seen were of bronze; for none the less the bronze would be no part of the form; but it is hard to eliminate it in thought.
[1036b]
e. g. the form of man is always found in flesh and bones and parts of this kind; are these then also parts of the form and the formula? No,
(5)
they are matter; but because man is not found also in other matters we are unable to perform the abstraction.

Since this is thought to be possible, but it is not clear
when
it is the case, some people,
⁴²
already raise the question even in the case of the circle and the triangle, thinking that it is not right to define these by reference to lines and to the continuous,
(10)
but that all these are to the circle or the triangle as flesh and bones are to man, and bronze or stone to the statue; and they reduce all things to numbers, and they say the formula of ‘line’ is that of ‘two’. And of those who
assert the Ideas some
⁴³
make ‘two’ the line-itself, and others make it the Form of the line; for in some cases they say the Form and that of which it is the Form are the same,
(15)
e. g. ‘two’ and the Form of two; but in the case of ‘line’ they say this is no longer so.

It follows then that there is one Form for many things whose form is evidently different (a conclusion which confronted the Pythagoreans also); and it is possible to make one thing the Form-itself of all, and to hold that the others are not Forms; but thus all things will be one.
(20)

We have pointed out, then, that the question of definitions contains some difficulty, and why this is so. And so to reduce all things thus to Forms and to eliminate the matter is useless labour; for some things surely are a particular form in a particular matter, or particular things in a particular state. And the comparison which Socrates the younger
⁴⁴
used to make in the case of ‘animal’
⁴⁵
is not sound; for it leads away from the truth,
(25)
and makes one suppose that man can possibly exist without his parts, as the circle can without the bronze. But the case is not similar; for an animal is something perceptible, and it is not possible to define it without reference to movement—nor, therefore, without reference to the parts’ being in a certain state. For it is not a hand in any and every state that is a part of man,
(30)
but only when it can fulfil its work, and therefore only when it is alive; if it is not alive it is not a part.

Regarding the objects of mathematics, why are the formulae of the parts not parts of the formulae of the wholes; e. g. why are not the semicircles included in the formula of the circle? It cannot be said, ‘because these parts are perceptible things’; for they are not.
(35)
But perhaps this makes no difference; for even some things which are not perceptible must have matter; indeed there is some matter in everything which is not an essence and a bare form but a ‘this’.
[1037a]
The semicircles, then, will not be parts of the universal circle, but will be parts of the individual circles, as has been said before
⁴⁶
; for while one kind of matter is perceptible, there is another which is intelligible.

It is clear also that the soul is the primary substance and the body is matter,
(5)
and man or animal is the compound of both taken universally; and ‘Socrates’ or ‘Coriscus’, if even the soul of Socrates may be called Socrates,
⁴⁷
has two meanings (for some mean by such a term the soul, and others mean the concrete thing), but if ‘Socrates’
or ‘Coriscus’ means simply this particular soul and this particular body, the individual is analogous to the universal in its composition.
⁴⁸

Whether there is,
(10)
apart from the matter of such substances, another kind of matter, and one should look for some substance other than these, e. g. numbers or something of the sort, must be considered later.
⁴⁹
For it is for the sake of this that we are trying to determine the nature of perceptible substances as well, since in a sense the inquiry about perceptible substances is the work of physics,
(15)
i. e. of second philosophy; for the physicist must come to know not only about the matter, but also about the substance expressed in the formula, and even more than about the other. And in the case of definitions, how the elements in the formula are parts of the definition, and why the definition is one formula (for clearly the thing is one,
(20)
but in virtue of
what
is the thing one, although it has parts?)—this must be considered later.
⁵⁰

What the essence is and in what sense it is independent, has been stated universally in a way which is true of every case,
⁵¹
and also why the formula of the essence of some things contains the parts of the thing defined, while that of others does not.
(25)
And we have stated that in the formula of the substance the material parts will not be present (for they are not even parts of the substance in that sense, but of the concrete substance; but of
this
there is in a sense a formula, and in a sense there is not; for there is no formula of it with its matter, for this is indefinite, but there is a formula of it with reference to its primary substance—e. g. in the case of man the formula of the soul—for the substance is the indwelling form, from which and the matter the so-called concrete substance is derived;
⁵²
e. g. concavity is a form of this sort, for from this and the nose arise ‘snub nose’ and ‘snubness’); but in the concrete substance,
(30)
e. g. a snub nose or Callias, the matter also will be present.
⁵³
And we have stated that the essence and the thing itself are in some cases the same; i. e. in the case of primary substances, e. g. curvature and the essence of curvature, if this is primary.
[1037b]
(By a ‘primary’ substance I mean one which does not imply the presence of something in something else, i. e. in something that underlies it which acts as matter.) But things which are of the nature of matter, or of wholes that include matter,
(5)
are not the same as their essences, nor are accidental unities like that of ‘Socrates’ and ‘musical’; for these are the same only by accident.
⁵⁴

12
     Now let us treat first of definition, in so far as we have not treated of it in the
Analytics
⁵⁵
; for the problem stated in them
⁵⁶
is useful for our inquiries concerning substance. I mean this problem:—wherein can consist the unity of that, the formula of which we call a definition,
(10)
as for instance, in the case of man, ‘twofooted animal’; for let this be the formula of man. Why, then, is this one, and not many, viz. ‘animal’
and
‘two-footed’? For in the case of ‘man’ and ‘pale’ there is a plurality when one term does not belong to the other,
(15)
but a unity when it does belong and the subject, man, has a certain attribute; for then a unity is produced and we have ‘the pale man’. In the present case, on the other hand,
⁵⁷
one does not share in the other; the genus is not thought to share in its differentiae (for then the same thing would share in contraries; for the differentiae by which the genus is divided are contrary). And even if the genus does share in them,
(20)
the same argument applies, since the differentiae present in man are many, e. g. endowed with feet, two-footed, featherless. Why are these one and not many? Not because they are present in one thing; for on this principle a unity can be made out of
all
the attributes of a thing. But surely all the attributes in the definition
must
be one; for the definition is a single formula and a formula of substance,
(25)
so that it must be a formula of some one thing; for substance means a ‘one’ and a ‘this’, as we maintain.

We must first inquire about definitions reached by the method of divisions. There is nothing in the definition except the first-named genus and the differentiae. The other genera are the first genus and along with this the differentiae that are taken with it,
(30)
e. g. the first may be ‘animal’, the next ‘animal which is two-footed’, and again ‘animal which is two-footed and featherless’, and similarly if the definition includes more terms.
[1038a]
And in general it makes no difference whether it includes many or few terms—nor, therefore, whether it includes few or simply two; and of the two the one is differentia and the other genus; e. g. in ‘two-footed animal’ ‘animal’ is genus, and the other is differentia.

If then the genus absolutely does not exist apart from the species-of-a-genus,
(5)
or if it exists but exists as matter (for the voice is genus and matter, but its differentiae make the species, i. e. the letters, out of it), clearly the definition is the formula which comprises the differentiae.

But it is also necessary that the division be by the differentia
of the differentia
; e. g. ‘endowed with feet’ is a differentia of ‘animal’;
again the differentia of ‘animal endowed with feet’ must be of it
qua
endowed with feet.
(10)
Therefore we must not say, if we are to speak rightly, that of that which is endowed with feet one part has feathers and one is featherless (if we do this we do it through incapacity); we must divide it only into cloven-footed and not-cloven; for these are differentiae in the foot; cloven-footedness is a form of footedness.
(15)
And the process wants always to go on so till it reaches the species that contain no differences. And then there will be as many kinds of foot as there are differentiae, and the kinds of animals endowed with feet will be equal in number to the differentiae. If then this is so, clearly the
last
differentia will be the substance of the thing and its definition,
(20)
since it is not right to state the same things more than once in our definitions; for it is superfluous. And this does happen; for when we say ‘animal endowed with feet and two-footed’ we have said nothing other than ‘animal having feet, having two feet’; and if we divide this by the proper division, we shall be saying the same thing more than once—as many times as there are differentiae.

If then a differentia of a differentia be taken at each step,
(25)
one differentia—the last—will be the form and the substance; but if we divide according to accidental qualities, e. g. if we were to divide that which is endowed with feet into the white and the black, there will be as many differentiae as there are cuts. Therefore it is plain that the definition is the formula which contains the differentiae, or,
(30)
according to the right method, the last of these. This would be evident, if we were to change the order of such definitions, e. g. of that of man, saying ‘animal which is two-footed and endowed with feet’; for ‘endowed with feet’ is superfluous when ‘two-footed’ has been said. But there is no order in the substance; for how are we to think the one element posterior and the other prior? Regarding the definitions, then, which are reached by the method of divisions,
(35)
let this suffice as our first attempt at stating their nature.

13
     
[1038b]
Let us return to the subject of our inquiry, which is substance. As the substratum and the essence and the compound of these are called substance, so also is the universal. About two of these we have spoken; both about the essence
⁵⁸
and about the substratum,
⁵⁹
of which we have said
⁶⁰
that it underlies in two senses,
(5)
either being a ‘this’—which is the way in which an animal underlies its attributes—or as the matter underlies the complete reality. The universal also is thought by some to be in the fullest sense a cause, and a principle; therefore let us attack the discussion of this point also. For it seems
impossible that any universal term should be the name of a substance. For firstly the substance of each thing is that which is peculiar to it, which does not belong to anything else; but the universal is common,
(10)
since that is called universal which is such as to belong to more than one thing. Of which individual then will this be the substance? Either of all or of none; but it cannot be the substance of all. And if it is to be the substance of one, this one will be the others also; for things whose substance is one and whose essence is one are themselves also one.

Further, substance means that which is not predicable of a subject,
(15)
but the universal is predicable of some subject always.

But perhaps the universal, while it cannot be substance in the way in which the essence is so, can be present in this; e. g. animal’ can be present in ‘man’ and ‘horse’. Then clearly it is a formula of the essence. And it makes no difference even if it is not a formula of everything that is in the substance; for none the less the universal will be the substance of something,
(20)
as ‘man’ is the substance of the individual man in whom it is present, so that the same result will follow once more; for the universal, e. g. ‘animal’, will be the substance of that in which it is present as something peculiar to it. And further it is impossible and absurd that the ‘this’, i. e. the substance, if it consists of parts, should not consist of substances nor of what is a ‘this’,
(25)
but of quality; for that which is not substance, i. e. the quality, will then be prior to substance and to the ‘this’. Which is impossible; for neither in formula nor in time nor in coming to be can the modifications be prior to the substance; for then they will also be separable from it. Further, Socrates will contain a substance present in a substance, so that this will be the substance of two things. And in general it follows, if man and such things are substance,
(30)
that none of the elements in their formulae is the substance of anything, nor does it exist apart from the species or in anything else; I mean, for instance, that no ‘animal’ exists apart from the particular kinds of animal, nor does any other of the elements present in formulae exist apart.

If, then, we view the matter from these standpoints, it is plain that no universal attribute is a substance, and this is plain also from the fact that no common predicate indicates a ‘this’,
(35)
but rather a ‘such’. If not, many difficulties follow and especially the ‘third man’.
⁶¹
[1039a]

The conclusion is evident also from the following consideration. A substance cannot consist of substances present in it in complete reality; for things that are thus in complete reality two are never in
complete reality one,
(5)
though if they are
potentially
two, they can be one (e. g. the double line consists of two halves—potentially; for the complete realization of the halves divides them from one another); therefore if the substance is one, it will not consist of substances present in it and present in this way, which Democritus describes rightly; he says one thing cannot be made out of two nor two out of one; for he identifies substances with his indivisible magnitudes.
(10)
It is clear therefore that the same will hold good of number, if number is a synthesis of units, as is said by some;
⁶²
for two is either not one, or there is no unit present in it in complete reality.

But our result involves a difficulty.
(15)
If no substance can consist of universals because a universal indicates a ‘such’, not a ‘this’, and if no substance can be composed of substances existing in complete reality, every substance would be incomposite, so that there would not even be a formula of any substance. But it is
thought
by all and was stated long ago
⁶³
that it is either only, or primarily,
(20)
substance that can be defined; yet now it seems that not even substance can. There cannot, then, be a definition of anything; or in a sense there can be, and in a sense there cannot. And what we are saying will be plainer from what follows.
⁶⁴