The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (195 page)

6
     The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato’s later work, the
Laws
, and therefore we had better examine briefly the constitution which is therein described. In the
Republic
,
(30)
Socrates has definitely settled in all a few questions only; such as the community of women and children, the community of property, and the constitution of the state. The population is divided into two classes—one of husbandmen, and the other of warriors;
³²
from this latter is taken a third class of counsellors and rulers of the state.
³³
But Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and artisans are to have a share in the government,
(35)
and whether they, too, are to
carry arms and share in military service, or not. He certainly thinks
³⁴
that the women ought to share in the education of the guardians, and to fight by their side. The remainder of the work is filled up with digressions foreign to the main subject,
(40)
and with discussions about the education of the guardians. In the
Laws
there is hardly anything but laws; not much is said about the constitution.
[1265a]
This, which he had intended to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually brings round to the other or ideal form. For with the exception of the community of women and property, he supposes everything to be the same in both states;
(5)
there is to be the same education; the citizens of both are to live free from servile occupations, and there are to be common meals in both. The only difference is that in the
Laws
, the common meals are extended to women,
³⁵
and the warriors number 5000,
³⁶
but in the
Republic
only 1000.
³⁷

The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; they always exhibit grace and originality and thought; but perfection in everything can hardly be expected.
(10)
We must not overlook the fact that the number of 5000 citizens, just now mentioned, will require a territory as large as Babylon, or some other huge site,
(15)
if so many persons are to be supported in idleness, together with their women and attendants, who will be a multitude many times as great. In framing an ideal we may assume what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities.
³⁸

It is said that the legislator ought to have his eye directed to two points—the people and the country.
³⁹
But neighbouring countries also must not be forgotten by him,
⁴⁰
(20)
firstly because the state for which he legislates is to have a political and not an isolated life.
⁴¹
For a state must have such a military force as will be serviceable against her neighbours, and not merely useful at home.
(25)
Even if the life of action is not admitted to be the best, either for individuals or states,
⁴²
still a city should be formidable to enemies, whether invading or retreating.

There is another point: Should not the amount of property be defined in some way which differs from this by being clearer? For Socrates says that a man should have so much property as will enable him to live temperately,
⁴³
which is only a way of saying ‘to live well’; this is too general a conception.
(30)
Further, a man may
live temperately and yet miserably. A better definition would be that a man must have so much property as will enable him to live not only temperately but liberally;
⁴⁴
if the two are parted, liberality will combine with luxury; temperance will be associated with toil. For liberality and temperance are the only eligible qualities which have to do with the use of property.
(35)
A man cannot use property with mildness or courage, but temperately and liberally he may; and therefore the practice of these virtues is inseparable from property. There is an inconsistency, too, in equalizing the property and not regulating the number of the citizens;
⁴⁵
the population is to remain unlimited,
(40)
and he thinks that it will be sufficiently equalized by a certain number of marriages being unfruitful, however many are born to others, because he finds this to be the case in existing states.
[1265b]
But greater care will be required than now; for among ourselves, whatever may be the number of citizens, the property is always distributed among them, and therefore no one is in want; but,
(5)
if the property were incapable of division as in the
Laws
, the supernumeraries, whether few or many, would get nothing. One would have thought that it was even more necessary to limit population than property; and that the limit should be fixed by calculating the chances of mortality in the children, and of sterility in married persons.
(10)
The neglect of this subject, which in existing states is so common, is a never-failing cause of poverty among the citizens; and poverty is the parent of revolution and crime. Pheidon the Corinthian, who was one of the most ancient legislators, thought that the families and the number of citizens ought to remain the same,
(15)
although originally all the lots may have been of different sizes: but in the
Laws
the opposite principle is maintained. What in our opinion is the right arrangement will have to be explained hereafter.
⁴⁶

There is another omission in the
Laws
: Socrates does not tell us how the rulers differ from their subjects; he only says that they should be related as the warp and the woof,
(20)
which are made out of different wools.
⁴⁷
He allows that a man’s whole property may be increased fivefold,
⁴⁸
but why should not his land also increase to a certain extent? Again, will the good management of a household be promoted by his arrangement of homesteads? for he assigns to each individual two homesteads in separate places,
⁴⁹
(25)
and it is difficult to live in two houses.

The whole system of government tends to be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but something in a mean between them, which is usually called a polity, and is composed of the heavy-armed soldiers. Now, if he intended to frame a constitution which would suit the greatest number of states, he was very likely right,
(30)
but not if he meant to say that this constitutional form came nearest to his first or ideal state; for many would prefer the Lacedaemonian, or, possibly, some other more aristocratic government. Some, indeed, say that the best constitution is a combination of all existing forms, and they praise the Lacedaemonian
⁵⁰
because it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy,
(35)
and democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the council of elders the oligarchy, while the democratic element is represented by the Ephors; for the Ephors are selected from the people. Others, however, declare the Ephoralty to be a tyranny,
(40)
and find the element of democracy in the common meals and in the habits of daily life. In the
Laws
⁵¹
it is maintained that the best constitution is made up of democracy and tyranny, which are either not constitutions at all, or are the worst of all.
[1266a]
But they are nearer the truth who combine many forms; for the constitution is better which is made up of more numerous elements. The constitution proposed in the
Laws
has no element of monarchy at all; it is nothing but oligarchy and democracy, leaning rather to oligarchy. This is seen in the mode of appointing magistrates;
⁵²
for although the appointment of them by lot from among those who have been already selected combines both elements, the way in which the rich are compelled by law to attend the assembly
⁵³
and vote for magistrates or discharge other political duties,
(10)
while the rest may do as they like, and the endeavour
⁵⁴
to have the greater number of the magistrates appointed out of the richer classes and the highest officers selected from those who have the greatest incomes, both these are oligarchical features. The oligarchical principle prevails also in the choice of the council,
⁵⁵
for all are compelled to choose,
(15)
but the compulsion extends only to the choice out of the first class, and of an equal number out of the second class and out of the third class, but not in this latter case to all the voters but to those of the first three classes; and the selection of candidates out of the fourth class is only compulsory
on the first and second. Then, from the persons so chosen,
(20)
he says that there ought to be an equal number of each class selected. Thus a preponderance will be given to the better sort of people, who have the larger incomes, because many of the lower classes, not being compelled, will not vote. These considerations,
(25)
and others which will be adduced
⁵⁶
when the time comes for examining similar polities, tend to show that states like Plato’s should not be composed of democracy and monarchy. There is also a danger in electing the magistrates out of a body who are themselves elected;
⁵⁷
for, if but a small number choose to combine, the elections will always go as they desire.
(30)
Such is the constitution which is described in the
Laws
.

7
     Other constitutions have been proposed; some by private persons, others by philosophers and statesmen, which all come nearer to established or existing ones than either of Plato’s. No one else has introduced such novelties as the community of women and children,
(35)
or public tables for women: other legislators begin with what is necessary. In the opinion of some, the regulation of property is the chief point of all, that being the question upon which all revolutions turn. This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions.
(40)
[1266b]
He thought that in a new colony the equalization might be accomplished without difficulty, not so easily when a state was already established; and that then the shortest way of compassing the desired end would be for the rich to give and not to receive marriage portions, and for the poor not to give but to receive them.

Plato in the
Laws
⁵⁸
was of opinion that,
(5)
to a certain extent, accumulation should be allowed, forbidding, as I have already observed,
⁵⁹
any citizen to possess more than five times the minimum qualification. But those who make such laws should remember what they are apt to forget
⁶⁰
—that the legislator who fixes the amount of property should also fix the number of children; for,
(10)
if the children are too many for the property, the law must be broken. And, besides the violation of the law, it is a bad thing that many from being rich should become poor; for men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir up revolutions. That the equalization of property exercises an influence on political society was clearly understood even by some of the old legislators.
(15)
Laws were made by Solon and others prohibiting an
individual from possessing as much land as he pleased; and there are other laws in states which forbid the sale of property: among the Locrians, for example, there is a law that a man is not to sell his property unless he can prove unmistakably that some misfortune has befallen him.
(20)
Again, there have been laws which enjoin the preservation of the original lots. Such a law existed in the island of Leucas, and the abrogation of it made the constitution too democratic, for the rulers no longer had the prescribed qualification. Again, where there is equality of property, the amount may be either too large or too small,
(25)
and the possessor may be living either in luxury or penury. Clearly, then, the legislator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties, but at moderation in their amount. Further, if he prescribe this moderate amount equally to all, he will be no nearer the mark; for it is not the possessions but the desires of mankind which require to be equalized,
⁶¹
and this is impossible, unless a sufficient education is provided by the laws.
(30)
But Phaleas will probably reply that this is precisely what he means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in states, not only equal property, but equal education. Still he should tell precisely what he means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in having one and the same for all, if it is of a sort that predisposes men to avarice,
(35)
or ambition, or both. Moreover, civil troubles arise, not only out of the inequality of property, but out of the inequality of honour,
(40)
though in opposite ways.
[1267a]
For the common people quarrel about the inequality of property, the higher class about the equality of honour; as the poet says—

There are crimes of which the motive is want; and for these Phaleas expects to find a cure in the equalization of property, which will take away from a man the temptation to be a highwayman, because he is hungry or cold. But want is not the sole incentive to crime;
(5)
men also wish to enjoy themselves and not to be in a state of desire—they wish to cure some desire, going beyond the necessities of life, which preys upon them; nay, this is not the only reason—they may desire superfluities in order to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied with pain, and therefore they commit crimes.

Now what is the cure of these three disorders? Of the first, moderate possessions and occupation; of the second, habits of temperance; as to the third, if any desire pleasures which depend on themselves,
(10)
they will find the satisfaction of their desires nowhere but in philosophy; for all other pleasures we are dependent on others. The fact is that the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity. Men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold; and hence great is the honour bestowed,
(15)
not on him who kills a thief, but on him who kills a tyrant. Thus we see that the institutions of Phaleas avail only against petty crimes.

There is another objection to them. They are chiefly designed to promote the internal welfare of the state. But the legislator should consider also its relation to neighbouring nations, and to all who are outside of it.
⁶³
(20)
The government must be organized with a view to military strength; and of this he has said not a word. And so with respect to property: there should not only be enough to supply the internal wants of the state, but also to meet dangers coming from without. The property of the state should not be so large that more powerful neighbours may be tempted by it,
(25)
while the owners are unable to repel the invaders; nor yet so small that the state is unable to maintain a war even against states of equal power, and of the same character. Phaleas has not laid down any rule; but we should bear in mind that abundance of wealth is an advantage. The best limit will probably be, that a more powerful neighbour must have no inducement to go to war with you by reason of the excess of your wealth,
(30)
but only such as he would have had if you had possessed less. There is a story that Eubulus, when Autophradates was going to besiege Atarneus, told him to consider how long the operation would take, and then reckon up the cost which would be incurred in the time. ‘For’, said he, ‘I am willing for a smaller sum than that to leave Atarneus at once.’
(35)
These words of Eubulus made an impression on Autophradates, and he desisted from the siege.

The equalization of property is one of the things that tend to prevent the citizens from quarrelling. Not that the gain in this direction is very great. For the nobles will be dissatisfied because they think themselves worthy of more than an equal share of honours; and this is often found to be a cause of sedition and revolution.
⁶⁴
(40)
And the avarice of mankind is insatiable; at one time two obols was pay enough; but now, when this sum has become customary, men always want more and more without end; for it is of the nature of desire not to be satisfied, and most men live only for the gratification of it.
[1267b]
The beginning of reform is not so much to equalize property as to train the nobler sort of natures not to desire more,
(5)
and to prevent the lower
from getting more; that is to say, they must be kept down, but not ill-treated. Besides, the equalization proposed by Phaleas is imperfect; for he only equalizes land,
(10)
whereas a man may be rich also in slaves, and cattle, and money, and in the abundance of what are called his movables. Now either all these things must be equalized, or some limit must be imposed on them, or they must all be let alone. It would appear that Phaleas is legislating for a small city only, if, as he supposes,
(15)
all the artisans are to be public slaves and not to form a supplementary part of the body of citizens. But if there is a law that artisans are to be public slaves, it should only apply to those engaged on public works, as at Epidamnus, or at Athens on the plan which Diophantus once introduced.

From these observations any one may judge how far Phaleas was wrong or right in his ideas.
(20)