The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (193 page)

12
     Of household management we have seen
²⁵
that there are three parts—one is the rule of a master over slaves, which has been discussed already,
²⁶
another of a father, and the third of a husband. A husband and father, we saw, rules over wife and children, both free,
(40)
but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and more immature.
[1259b]
But in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns,
(5)
for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all.
²⁷
Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavour to create a difference of outward forms and names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan.
²⁸
The relation of the male to the female is of this kind, but there the inequality is permanent. The rule of a father over his children is royal,
(10)
for he rules by virtue both of love and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And therefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus ‘father of Gods and men’, because he is the king of them all. For a king is the natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder and younger,
(15)
of father and son.

13
     Thus it is clear that household management attends more to men than to the acquisition of inanimate things, and to human excellence more than to the excellence of property which we call wealth,
(20)
and to the virtue of freemen more than to the virtue of slaves. A question may indeed be raised, whether there is any excellence at all in a slave beyond and higher than merely instrumental and ministerial qualities—whether he can have the virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and the like; or whether slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities.
(25)
And, whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty arises; for, if they have virtue, in what will they differ from freemen? On the other hand, since they are men and share in rational principle, it seems absurd to say that they have no virtue. A similar question may be raised about women and children, whether they too have virtues: ought a woman to be temperate and brave and just,
(30)
and is a child
to be called temperate, and intemperate, or not? So in general we may ask about the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For if a noble nature is equally required in both,
(35)
why should one of them always rule, and the other always be ruled? Nor can we say that this is a question of degree, for the difference between ruler and subject is a difference of kind, which the difference of more and less never is. Yet how strange is the supposition that the one ought, and that the other ought not,
(40)
to have virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well? if the subject, how can he obey well? If he be licentious and cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty.
[1260a]
It is evident, therefore, that both of them must have a share of virtue, but varying as natural subjects also vary among themselves. Here the very constitution of the soul has shown us the way; in it one part naturally rules,
(5)
and the other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we maintain to be different from that of the subject;—the one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the irrational part. Now, it is obvious that the same principle applies generally, and therefore almost all things rule and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs;—the freeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the female,
(10)
or the man over the child; although the parts of the soul are present in all of them, they are present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature.
(15)
So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the moral virtues also; all should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfilment of his duty. Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for his function, taken absolutely, demands a master artificer, and rational principle is such an artificer; the subjects, on the other hand,
(20)
require only that measure of virtue which is proper to each of them. Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained,
²⁹
the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying. And this holds of all other virtues,
(25)
as will be more clearly seen if we look at them in detail, for those who say generally that virtue consists in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves. Far better than such definitions is their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias,
³⁰
enumerate
the virtues. All classes must be deemed to have their special attributes; as the poet says of women,

but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is imperfect, and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative to himself alone, but to the perfect man and to his teacher, and in like manner the virtue of the slave is relative to a master. Now we determined
³¹
that a slave is useful for the wants of life, and therefore he will obviously require only so much virtue as will prevent him from failing in his duty through cowardice or lack of self-control.
(35)
Some one will ask whether, if what we are saying is true, virtue will not be required also in the artisans, for they often fail in their work through the lack of self-control? But is there not a great difference in the two cases? For the slave shares in his master’s life; the artisan is less closely connected with him,
(40)
and only attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave. The meaner sort of mechanic has a special and separate slavery; and whereas the slave exists by nature, not so the shoemaker or other artisan.
[1260b]
It is manifest, then, that the master ought to be the source of such excellence in the slave, and not a mere possessor of the art of mastership which trains the slave in his duties.
³²
Wherefore they are mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we should employ command only,
³³
(5)
for slaves stand even more in need of admonition than children.

So much for this subject; the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, their several virtues, what in their intercourse with one another is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and escape the evil,
(10)
will have to be discussed when we speak of the different forms of government.
³⁴
For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole, women and children must be trained by education with an eye to the constitution,
³⁵
(15)
if the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues of the state. And they must make a difference: for the children grow up to be citizens, and half the free persons in a state are women.
³⁶

Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains,
(20)
let us
speak at another time. Regarding, then, our present inquiry as complete, we will make a new beginning. And, first, let us examine the various theories of a perfect state.

¹
Cp. Plato,
Politicus
, 258
E
-259
D
.

²
Cp. 1256
^a2
.

³
Od.
ix. 114, quoted by Plato,
Laws
, iii. 680
B
, and in
N. Eth.
x. 1180
^a
28.

⁴
Il.
ix. 63.

⁵
Cp. 1256
^b
20.

⁶
Cp. vii. 1332
^b
5.

⁷
Cp.
N. Eth.
v. 1134
^a
31.

⁸
Plato in
Pol.
258
E
-259
D
, referred to already in 1252
^a
7–16.

⁹
Hom.
Il.
xviii. 376.

¹⁰
i. e. mutual goodwill, which is held to be incompatible with the relation of master and slave.

¹¹
i. e. those stated in Il. 5–12, that the stronger always has, and that he never has, a right to enslave the weaker. Aristotle finds that these views cannot maintain themselves against his intermediate view, that the superior in
virtue
should rule.

¹²
Chap. 5.

¹³
Cp. 1254
^a
8.

¹⁴
Plato,
Polit.
258
E
-259
D
, referred to already in 1252
^a
7–16, 1253
^b
18–20.

¹⁵
Polit.
259
C
, 293
C.

¹⁶
Cp. vii. 1333
^b
38.

¹⁷
Of understanding the whole by the part, Cp. 1252
^a
17.

¹⁸
Chap. 4.

¹⁹
Cp. 1255
^b
38, 1333
^b
38.

²⁰
Cp. 1256
^b
32.

²¹
1256
^a
3.

²²
Cp. 1256
^b
10.

²³
1256
^a
15–1258
^a
18.

²⁴
tokos
, lit. ‘offspring’.

²⁵
1253
^b
3–11.

²⁶
1253
^b
14–1255
^b
39.

²⁷
Cp. ii. 1261
^a
39, iii. 1288
^a
12.

²⁸
Herod. ii. 172.

²⁹
Plato,
Meno
, 72 A-73
C
.

³⁰
Meno
, 71
E
, 72
A
.

³¹
1254
^b
16–39, Cf. 1259
^b
25 sq.

³²
Cp. 1255
^b
23, 31–35.

³³
Plato,
Laws
, vi. 777
E
.

³⁴
The question is not actually discussed in the
Politics.

³⁵
Cp. v. 1310
^a
12–36, viii. 1337
^a
11–18.

³⁶
Plato,
Laws
, vi. 781
A
.

1
     Our purpose is to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who are most able to realize their ideal of life.
(30)
We must therefore examine not only this but other constitutions, both such as actually exist in well-governed states, and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem; that what is good and useful may be brought to light. And let no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them we are anxious to make a sophistical display at any cost; we only undertake this inquiry because all the constitutions with which we are acquainted are faulty.
(35)

We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject. Three alternatives are conceivable: The members of a state must either have (1) all things or (2) nothing in common, or (3) some things in common and some not. That they should have nothing in common is clearly impossible,
(40)
for the constitution is a community, and must at any rate have a common place—one city will be in one place, and the citizens are those who share in that one city.
[1261a]
But should a well-ordered state have all things, as far as may be, in common, or some only and not others? For the citizens might conceivably have wives and children and property in common,
(5)
as Socrates proposes in the
Republic
of Plato.
¹
Which is better, our present condition, or the proposed new order of society?

2
      There are many difficulties in the community of women.
(10)
And the principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution evidently is not established by his arguments. Further, as a means to the end which he ascribes to the state, the scheme, taken literally, is impracticable, and how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely stated.
(15)
I am speaking of the premiss from which the argument of Socrates proceeds, ‘that the greater the unity of the state the better’. Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state?—since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state,
(20)
it becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the
family may be said to be more than the state, and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of the state. Again, a state is not made up only of so many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state. It is not like a military alliance.
(25)
The usefulness of the latter depends upon its quantity even where there is no difference in quality (for mutual protection is the end aimed at), just as a greater weight of anything is more useful than a less (in like manner, a state differs from a nation, when the nation has not its population organized in villages, but lives an Arcadian sort of life); but the elements out of which a unity is to be formed differ in kind. Wherefore the principle of compensation,
(30)
as I have already remarked in the
Ethics
,
²
is the salvation of states. Even among freemen and equals this is a principle which must be maintained, for they cannot all rule together, but must change at the end of a year or some other period of time or in some order of succession. The result is that upon this plan they all govern; just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange their occupations,
(35)
and the same persons did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters. And since it is better that this should be so in politics as well, it is clear that while there should be continuance of the same persons in power where this is possible, yet where this is not possible by reason of the natural equality of the citizens, and at the same time it is just that all should share in the government (whether to govern be a good thing or a bad
³
, an approximation to this is that equals should in turn retire from office and should, apart from official position, be treated alike.
⁴
[1261b]
Thus the one party rule and the others are ruled in turn, as if they were no longer the same persons.
(5)
In like manner when they hold office there is a variety in the offices held. Hence it is evident that a city is not by nature one in that sense which some persons affirm; and that what is said to be the greatest good of cities is in reality their destruction; but surely the good of things must be that which preserves them.
⁵
Again, in another point of view,
(10)
this extreme unification of the state is clearly not good; for a family is more self-sufficing than an individual, and a city than a family, and a city only comes into being when the community is large enough to be self-sufficing. If then self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the greater.
(15)