The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (135 page)

14
     It is clear also from these very facts what consequence confronts those who say the Ideas are substances capable of separate existence,
(25)
and at the same time make the Form consist of the genus and the differentiae. For if the Forms exist and ‘animal’ is present in ‘man’ and ‘horse’, it is either one and the same in number, or different. (In formula it is clearly one; for he who states the formula will go through the same formula in either case.
(30)
) If then there is a ‘man-in-himself’ who is a ‘this’ and exists apart, the parts also of which he consists, e. g. ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’, must indicate ‘thises’, and be capable of separate existence, and substances; therefore ‘animal’, as well as ‘man’, must be of this sort.

Now (1) if the ‘animal’ in ‘the horse’ and in ‘man’ is one and the same, as you are with yourself, (
a
) how will the one in things that exist apart be one, and how will this ‘animal’ escape being divided even from itself?

Further, (
b
) if it is to share in ‘two-footed’ and ‘many-footed’, an impossible conclusion follows; for contrary attributes will belong at the same time to it, although it is one and a ‘this’.
[1039b]
If it is not to share in them, what is the relation implied when one says the animal
is two-footed or possessed of feet? But perhaps the two things are ‘put together’ and are ‘in contact’,
(5)
or are ‘mixed’. Yet all these expressions are absurd.

But (2) suppose the Form to be different in each species. Then there will be practically an infinite number of things whose
substance
is ‘animal’; for it is not by accident that ‘man’ has ‘animal’ for one of its elements. Further, many things will be ‘animal-itself’. For (i) the ‘animal’ in each species will be the substance of the species; for it is after nothing else that the species is called; if it were,
(10)
that other would be an element in ‘man’, i. e. would be the genus of man. And further, (ii) all the elements of which ‘man’ is composed will be Ideas. None of them, then, will be the Idea of one thing and the substance of another; this is impossible. The ‘animal’, then, present in each species of animals will be animal-itself. Further, from what is this ‘animal’ in each species derived, and how will it be derived from animal-itself? Or how can this ‘animal’, whose essence is simply animality,
(15)
exist apart from animal-itself?

Further, (3) in the case of sensible things both these consequences and others still more absurd follow. If, then, these consequences are impossible, clearly there are not Forms of sensible things in the sense in which some maintain their existence.

15
     Since substance is of two kinds, the concrete thing and the formula (I mean that one kind of substance is the formula taken with the matter,
(20)
while another kind is the formula in its generality), substances in the former sense are capable of destruction (for they are capable also of generation), but there is no destruction of the formula in the sense that it is ever in course of being destroyed (for there is no generation of it either; the being of house is not generated, but only the being of
this
house), but without generation and destruction formulae are and are not; for it has been shown
⁶⁵
that no one begets nor makes these.
(25)
For this reason, also, there is neither definition of nor demonstration about sensible individual substances, because they have matter whose nature is such that they are capable both of being and of not being; for which reason all the individual instances of them are destructible.
(30)
If then demonstration is of necessary truths and definition is a scientific process, and if, just as knowledge cannot be sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance, but the state which varies thus is opinion, so too demonstration and definition cannot vary thus, but it is opinion that deals with that which can be otherwise than as it is, clearly there can neither be definition of nor
demonstration about sensible individuals.
[1040a]
For perishing things are obscure to those who have the relevant knowledge, when they have passed from our perception; and though the formulae remain in the soul unchanged, there will no longer be either definition or demonstration.
(5)
And so when one of the definition-mongers defines any individual, he must recognize that his definition may always be overthrown; for it is not possible to define such things.

Nor is it possible to define any Idea. For the Idea is, as its supporters say, an individual, and can exist apart; and the formula must consist of words; and he who defines must not invent a word (for it would be unknown),
(10)
but the established words are common to all the members of a class; these then must apply to something besides the thing defined; e. g. if one were defining you, he would say ‘an animal which is lean’ or ‘pale’, or something else which will apply also to some one other than you. If any one were to say that perhaps all the attributes taken apart may belong to many subjects,
(15)
but together they belong only to this one, we must reply first that they belong also to both the elements; e. g. ‘two-footed animal’ belongs to animal and to the two-footed. (And in the case of eternal entities
⁶⁶
this is even necessary, since the elements are prior to and parts of the compound; nay more, they can also exist apart, if ‘man’ can exist apart.
(20)
For either neither or both can. If, then, neither can, the genus will not exist apart from the various species; but if it does, the differentia will also.) Secondly, we must reply that ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’ are prior in being to ‘two-footed animal’; and things which are prior to others are not destroyed when the others are.

Again, if the Ideas consist of Ideas (as they must, since elements are simpler than the compound), it will be further necessary that the elements also of which the Idea consists, e. g. ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’,
(25)
should be predicated of many subjects. If not, how will they come to be known? For there will then be an Idea which cannot be predicated of more subjects than one. But this is not thought possible—every Idea is thought to be capable of being shared.

As has been said,
⁶⁷
then, the impossibility of defining individuals escapes notice in the case of eternal things, especially those which are unique,
(30)
like the sun or the moon. For people err not only by adding attributes whose removal the sun would survive, e. g. ‘going round the earth’ or ‘night-hidden’ (for from their view it follows that if it stands still or is visible,
⁶⁸
it will no longer be the sun; but it is strange if this is so; for ‘the sun’ means a certain
substance
); but also by the mention of attributes which can belong to another subject;
e. g. if another thing with the stated attributes comes into existence, clearly it will be a sun; the formula therefore is general.
[1040b]
But the sun was supposed to be an individual, like Cleon or Socrates. After all, why does not one of the supporters of the Ideas produce a definition of an Idea? It would become clear, if they tried, that what has now been said is true.

16
     Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances,
(5)
most are only potencies—both the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately; and when they
are
separated, then too they exist, all of them, merely as matter) and earth and fire and air; for none of them is a unity, but as it were a mere heap, till they are worked up and some unity is made out of them.
(10)
One might most readily suppose the parts of living things and the parts of the soul nearly related to them to turn out to be both, i. e. existent in complete reality as well as in potency, because they have sources of movement in something in their joints; for which reason some animals live when divided. Yet all the parts must exist only potentially, when they are one and continuous by nature—not by force or by growing into one,
(15)
for such a phenomenon is an abnormality.

Since the term ‘unity’ is used like the term ‘being’, and the substance of that which is one is one, and things whose substance is numerically one are numerically one, evidently neither unity nor being can be the substance of things, just as being an element or a principle cannot be the substance, but we ask what, then,
(20)
the principle is, that we may reduce the thing to something more knowable. Now of these concepts ‘being’ and ‘unity’ are more substantial than ‘principle’ or ‘element’ or ‘cause’, but not even the former are substance, since in general nothing that is common is substance; for substance does not belong to anything but to itself and to that which has it, of which it is the substance. Further, that which is one cannot be in many places at the same time,
(25)
but that which is common is present in many places at the same time; so that clearly no universal exists apart from its individuals.

But those who say the Forms exist, in one respect are right, in giving the Forms separate existence,
if
they are substances; but in another respect they are not right, because they say the one over many is a Form.
(30)
The reason for their doing this is that they cannot declare what are the substances of this sort, the imperishable substances which exist apart from the individual and sensible substances. They make them, then, the same in kind as the perishable things (for this kind of substance we know)—‘man-himself’ and ‘horse-itself’, adding to the sensible things the word ‘itself’. Yet even if we
had not seen the stars, none the less, I suppose, would they have been eternal substances apart from those which we knew; so that now also if we do not know what non-sensible substances there are, yet it is doubtless necessary that there should
be
some.
[1041a]
—Clearly, then,
(5)
no universal term is the name of a substance, and no substance is composed of substances.

17
     Let us state what, i. e. what kind of thing, substance should be said to be, taking once more another starting-point; for perhaps from this we shall get a clear view also of that substance which exists apart from sensible substances. Since, then, substance is a principle and a cause,
(10)
let us pursue it from this starting-point. The ‘why’ is always sought in this form—‘why does one thing attach to some other?’ For to inquire why the musical man is a musical man, is either to inquire—as we have said—why the man is musical, or it is something else.
(15)
Now ‘why a thing is itself’ is a meaningless inquiry (for [to give meaning to the question ‘why’] the fact or the existence of the thing must already be evident—e. g. that the moon is eclipsed—but the fact that a thing is itself is the single reason and the single cause to be given in answer to all such questions as ‘why the man is man, or the musician musical’,
⁶⁹
unless one were to answer ‘because each thing is inseparable from itself, and its being one just meant this’; this, however, is common to all things and is a short and easy way with the question).
(20)
But we
can
inquire why man is an animal of such and such a nature. This, then, is plain, that we are not inquiring why he who is a man is a man. We are inquiring, then, why something is predicable of something (that it is predicable must be clear; for if not, the inquiry is an inquiry into nothing). e. g. why does it thunder? This is the same as ‘why is sound produced in the clouds?’ Thus the inquiry is about the predication of one thing of another.
(25)
And why are these things, i. e. bricks and stones, a house? Plainly we are seeking the cause. And this is the essence (to speak abstractly), which in some cases is the end, e. g. perhaps in the case of a house or a bed,
(30)
and in some cases is the first mover; for this also is a cause. But while the efficient cause is sought in the case of genesis and destruction, the final cause is sought in the case of being also.

[1041b]
The object of the inquiry is most easily overlooked where one term is not expressly predicated of another (e. g. when we inquire ‘what man is’), because we do not distinguish and do not say definitely that certain elements make up a certain whole. But we must articulate
our meaning before we begin to inquire; if not, the inquiry is on the border-line between being a search for something and a search for nothing. Since we must have the existence of the thing as something given, clearly the question is
why
the matter is some definite thing; e. g. why are these materials a house? Because that which was the essence of a house is present. And why is this individual thing,
(5)
or this body having this form, a man? Therefore what we seek is the cause, i. e. the form, by reason of which the matter is some definite thing; and this is the substance of the thing. Evidently, then, in the case of
simple
terms no inquiry nor teaching is possible; our attitude towards such things is other than that of inquiry.
(10)

Since that which is compounded out of something so that the whole is one, not like a heap but like a syllable—now the syllable is not its elements,
ba
is not the same as
b
and
a
, nor is flesh fire and earth (for when these are separated the wholes, i. e. the flesh and the syllable, no longer exist, but the elements of the syllable exist, and so do fire and earth); the syllable,
(15)
then, is something—not only its elements (the vowel and the consonant) but also something else, and the flesh is not only fire and earth or the hot and the cold, but also something else:—if, then, that something must itself be either an element or composed of elements, (1) if it is an element the same argument will again apply; for flesh will consist of this and fire and earth and something still further,
(20)
so that the process will go on to infinity. But (2) if it is a compound, clearly it will be a compound not of one but of more than one (or else that one will be the thing itself), so that again in this case we can use the same argument as in the case of flesh or of the syllable. But it would seem that this ‘other’ is something, and not an element,
(25)
and that it is the
cause
which makes
this
thing flesh and
that
a syllable. And similarly in all other cases. And this is the
substance
of each thing (for this is the primary cause of its being); and since, while some things are not substances, as many as are substances are formed in accordance with a nature of their own and by a process of nature, their substance would seem to be this kind of ‘nature’,
⁷⁰
which is not an element but a principle.
(30)
An
element
, on the other hand, is that into which a thing is divided and which is present in it as matter; e. g.
a
and
b
are the elements of the syllable.