Supreme Commander (82 page)

There was also a political problem. So far De Gaulle had been able to maintain himself as the symbol around which all patriotic Frenchmen could rally, and the Resistance had held together only because its members all shared the fundamental aim of ridding France of the Germans. The presence of the Nazis was the organization’s cement, and the conflicting groups in the Resistance and the FCNL would fall apart as soon as the Germans left. The Communists had
a strong position within the Resistance, especially in the cities, and although they could easily profess their loyalty to a De Gaulle in far-off Algiers, a De Gaulle in Paris would be another matter. This does not mean that political lines were sharply drawn within all areas of the Resistance, but a large, vociferous, and influential group within the Paris Resistance was already preparing to contest De Gaulle’s leadership. Both De Gaulle and the Allies had long recognized this problem, and therefore material supplied to the FFI had been dropped in rural areas rather than near urban centers, only partly to escape German detection, more particularly to inhibit the development of the Communists within the cities. As a result, few of the FFI within Paris were armed.
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In July, nonetheless, rumors of unrest in Paris and thoughts of a possible uprising similar to that of the Poles in Warsaw, caused great concern at SHAEF. Koenig ordered the Resistance to cease immediately any activities that might cause social or political convulsion, or might lead to German reprisals. His orders were not obeyed. On August 19 small local FFI groups in Paris, without central direction or discipline, took possession of police stations, national ministries, newspaper buildings, and the seat of the municipal government in Paris. They issued a call for a general uprising. That evening the German commander of the city, General Dietrich von Choltitz, asked for an armistice. Together with some Resistance representatives, he arranged for a truce until noon, August 23.
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From De Gaulle’s point of view this was the most serious possible development. He would have been willing to consent to Eisenhower’s plan to by-pass Paris as long as the Germans controlled the city, but he would not allow Paris to fall into the hands of the local Resistance. Acutely conscious of the dictum that he who holds Paris holds France, keenly aware of the Parisian’s revolutionary instincts and his readiness to respond to the cry, “
Aux barricades
!” De Gaulle was determined to get regular French troops into Paris immediately.

Thanks to his own foresight, and Eisenhower’s co-operation, a force was at hand. Before Eisenhower left Algiers in late 1943 he had made an agreement with De Gaulle—a French division would participate in OVERLORD and, by implication at least, liberate Paris. The division selected was Brigadier General Jacques Philippe Leclerc’s 2d French Armored Division, and it entered France in late July as a part of Patton’s Third Army. It had since been switched to Hodges’ First Army as a part of Gerow’s V Corps. Although it was near Argentan, more than a hundred miles from Paris (American troops were within twenty-five
miles of the capital), it could still be the first Allied division into Paris.

On August 21 De Gaulle, accompained by Koenig, called on Eisenhower. They asked him to liberate Paris at once, and to use Leclerc’s unit for that purpose. Eisenhower replied that he would not change his plan to by-pass Paris, but when the time came to take the city he promised that he would give Leclerc the honor of entering Paris first. De Gaulle found this thoroughly unsatisfactory. Although Koenig had promised that French military forces would obey the Supreme Commander’s orders De Gaulle, after leaving the meeting, wrote a letter to Eisenhower in which he politely threatened that if Eisenhower did not send troops to Paris at once he would have to do so himself. Leclerc, in other words, would follow the orders of his government, not those of the Supreme Commander.
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Eisenhower scribbled a memorandum to Smith at the top of De Gaulle’s letter: “I talked verbally to Koenig on this. It looks now as if we’d be compelled to go into Paris. Bradley and his G-2 think we can and
must
walk in.”
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But Eisenhower was only beginning to change his mind and had not yet made a final decision. The French, meanwhile, were growing more excited by the minute. Representatives from the Resistance had come from Paris to beg of Eisenhower, Bradley, Leclerc, or anyone they could find in authority that the Allies enter Paris immediately. They implied, falsely, that they controlled the city, but they said the Germans could not be trusted, might break the tenuous armistice at any time, and were capable of destroying the city. Leclerc pleaded with Gerow for permission to strike out toward the city; when Gerow refused, Leclerc started units toward Paris anyway.

Eisenhower was under pressure for a decision from all sides, from De Gaulle, from Leclerc, from the Resistance representatives, even from his own commanders. Paris was a magnet, attracting everyone toward her. France, it was felt, would not be free until Paris was free. Combat soldiers, American and British as well as French, could hardly wait to get into the city and sample its pleasures. Every division, corps, and army commander in Europe wanted the honor of liberating the city.

For Eisenhower, however, there were other pressures. He had held the alliance together so far by stoutly refusing to make any decision on political grounds. He had worked long and hard to gain British trust and had succeeded only by convincing them that all his actions were based on the Allies’ military needs, not American or any other political objectives. To violate that rule now for De Gaulle’s sake would open a
Pandora’s box. If the French could use their military formations independently of SHAEF for political purposes, so could the British, the Poles, and everyone else. Before he could allow Leclerc to dash for Paris he would have to find a military reason—really, a rationalization—for doing so.

By August 22 Eisenhower was beginning to formulate a satisfactory reason. He later told Marshall that, although it would be desirable to defer capture of the city for supply reasons, “I do not believe this is possible. If the enemy tries to hold Paris with any real strength he would be a constant menace to our flank. If he largely concedes the place, it falls into our hands whether we like it or not.”
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Eisenhower’s inclination was reinforced when Resistance representatives convinced him that they held the city by a thread, that Von Choltitz would withdraw if regular troops appeared in Paris, and that guerrilla warfare would begin if they did not. Sending troops into Paris thus became a matter of military reinforcement of success, and Eisenhower was able to think of the liberation as a military, not a political, move. Late on August 22, therefore, he decided to send Leclerc, along with the American 4th Division and a British contingent, into Paris.
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He also ordered 23,000 tons of food and 3000 tons of coal dispatched to the city immediately.
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In his orders, Eisenhower emphasized that “no advance must be made into Paris until the expiration of the Armistice [noon, August 23] and that Paris was to be entered only in case the degree of the fighting was such as could be overcome by light forces.” He did not “want a severe fight in Paris,” nor did he “want any bombing or artillery fire on the city if it can possibly be avoided.”
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Leclerc and the other Allied forces entered the city on August 25. De Gaulle was with them. There was only scattered German resistance in Paris. Von Choltitz surrendered to Leclerc and the commander of the Paris FFI, who accepted his surrender in the name of the provisional government of France, not as representatives of SHAEF. De Gaulle appointed Koenig the military governor of the city (Eisenhower gave an identical job to Gerow), and the Gaullists moved immediately to take control of the government buildings. De Gaulle also ordered Leclerc to hold a parade on August 26, a parade that De Gaulle intended to lead.
Gerow meanwhile had already ordered Leclerc to move his division in pursuit of the retreating Germans, and in addition was fearful of the possible bloodshed involved in a parade. This was not only because of the number of Resistance members who were now armed in Paris but also because there were pockets of German troops in the city who had not yet surrendered. Gerow told Leclerc to “disregard” De Gaulle’s orders, but instead Leclerc ignored Gerow.
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On August 26, after relighting the flame at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, De Gaulle led the parade down the Champs Elysées. It was one of the great scenes of the war. Nearly two million people were there, on the streets, at the windows, on the roofs, hanging on flagpoles and lampposts. De Gaulle marched. Occasionally there were spurts of gunfire, but no one, least of all De Gaulle, paid any attention. Finally he stopped, turned, looked at the crowd, drew himself to his full height, and in a hoarse, off-key voice, with his tears soaking the sacred soil of France, began to sing “La Marseillaise.”

The same day Eisenhower visited Bradley at his command post near Chartres. The lure of Paris had become too much for him to resist, and he suggested to Bradley that they enter the city the next morning. It would be a Sunday, Eisenhower reminded Bradley, and “everyone will be sleeping late. We can do it without any fuss.” He radioed Montgomery to ask him to join the party, but Montgomery replied that he was too busy.
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Sunday brought a beautiful, sunny morning, adding to the general air of gaiety and the exultant feeling of liberation. No one, it turned out, had slept late. Bicycles crowded the road. Gay and cheering Parisians quickly recognized Eisenhower and Bradley and surrounded them, holding up their fingers in Churchill’s V sign, waving enthusiastically, and occasionally grabbing and kissing the generals. One huge Frenchman slathered Eisenhower on both cheeks as the crowd squealed in delight. Bradley had better luck; he got caught by one of Paris’ beautiful girls.
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The American generals called on De Gaulle at the Prefecture of Police. He had surrounded himself with the traditional Republican Guards, resplendent in their Napoleonic tunics and black patent leather hats. But despite the show, De Gaulle was worried. He told Eisenhower he had to have food and other supplies immediately. He also needed thousands of uniforms, for he wanted to bring the FFI into the regular army. He would require help in disarming unruly members of the FFI whom he expected, correctly as it turned out, to resist being incorporated into a disciplined establishment. He had to establish his own authority
in order to preserve stability in the capital, and he asked Eisenhower for a show of force.

Eisenhower turned to Bradley to ask what could be done. Bradley was already planning to attack eastward out of Paris, and he said he could march his men straight through the city rather than around its outskirts. Eisenhower thereupon decided to have two American divisions march through the city on their way to battle. This not only gave De Gaulle his show of force, but it also reminded the Parisians that the city had been liberated by “the grace of God and the strength of Allied arms.” The parade became, in Eisenhower’s words, “possibly the only instance in history of troops marching in parade through the capital of a great country to participate in pitched battle on the same day.”
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By August 28 Paris was militarily secure, and on that day Gerow called on Koenig to formally turn over the capital to him. Koenig flatly informed Gerow, “The French authorities alone have handled the administration of the city of Paris since its liberation.… Acting as the military governor of Paris since my arrival, I assumed the responsibilities … the 25th of August, 1944.”
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Eisenhower was inclined to be charitable about the situation. “I guess we should not blame the French for growing a bit hysterical under the conditions,” he told Marshall, “and I must say that they seem now to be settling down in good order.”
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Hardly had the front line troops moved out of Paris than the rear-echelon people began to move in. First, there were the French. De Gaulle asked Eisenhower for help in moving some three thousand administrative officers from Algiers to Paris. SHAEF officials bluntly informed him that such a “mass immigration” was impossible. Eisenhower asked De Gaulle to establish a priority for necessary personnel. The issue was soon worked out, and on September 11 Eisenhower ordered that the hundred most important officials be brought in by air. The total movement was not completed until November. British and American businessmen, especially newspaper publishers who wanted to reopen their Paris offices, meanwhile plagued Eisenhower with requests for permission to enter the city.
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Far more important, however, was the way in which Headquarters, Communications Zone (Com Z, under General Lee), moved into the city. Eisenhower had reserved the city and its hotels, at least in his own mind, for the use of combat troops on furlough. He had frequently expressed his view that no major headquarters should be located in or near the temptations of a large city. During the early days of September, nevertheless, without Eisenhower’s knowledge, Lee moved his entire
enormous headquarters into Paris. His advance parties requisitioned most of the hotels and buildings previously occupied by the Germans and also took schools and additional billets. Koenig, when he learned that 8000 officers and 21,000 men were settling in Paris, pointed out that they would require more hotels than the city possessed, and the French began to complain that U. S. Army demands were in excess of those made by the Germans.
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The GIs were also unhappy. “Field forces in combat have always begrudged the supply services their rear-echelon comforts,” Bradley wrote after the war, “but when the infantry learned that Com Z’s comforts had been multiplied by the charms of Paris, the injustice rankled all the deeper and festered there throughout the war.” The field commanders were furious also because Lee’s move took place just at a time when transportation was short.
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Led by Patton, they charged that Lee had used up precious gasoline in order to enjoy the hotels of Paris, and that by moving when he did he was out of touch with the supply situation at a time when fuel conservation was critical. Eisenhower then reiterated that he prohibited the establishment of any Allied headquarters within the area of Paris without his specific approval, but it was already too late for that.
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