Supreme Commander (78 page)

On July 18 Bradley’s First Army captured St. Lô. It had been a bitter, long, costly struggle. First Army suffered nearly 11,000 casualties in two weeks, but by taking St. Lô it opened an important road center to the south and east from the beachhead and provided maneuvering space for a drive to the south which Bradley was already planning. The Americans had a compact, powerful force with which to strike; although First Army had suffered 73,000 casualties, the losses had been replaced, and there were seventeen U.S. divisions in the field. By July 23 the Americans had landed a total of 770,000 troops in Normandy. The 101st and 82d
Airborne had been withdrawn from the Continent for refitting; together with three divisions moving from the United Kingdom to the Continent and two more ready divisions in the United Kingdom, they constituted a large, immediately available reserve force. The British and Canadians had suffered some 49,000 casualties but, like the Americans, had replaced most of them and by July 23 had landed 591,000 troops in France. The supply situation was basically good. Landing craft continued to bring material in over the beaches, and on July 19 the first supplies were brought in through Cherbourg.

The German situation, meanwhile, looked increasingly bad. Allied air superiority made it almost impossible for the enemy to move reinforcements and supplies to the battlefield. The FORTITUDE deception plan added to the enemy’s problems, for throughout June and two thirds of July the German high command assumed that a second landing would be made north of the Seine and therefore held the Fifteenth Army in the Pas de Calais area. The initiative belonged to the Allies, and the Germans, attempting a holding action everywhere, were consequently strong nowhere. They had committed their reserves piecemeal and could not move any large force to the front for a major counterattack. German replacements had not come forward, so although their total casualties were no greater than those of the Allies (116,863 by July 23), all German divisions were under strength. On July 25 the Germans had at most thirteen weak divisions to oppose seventeen full-strength American divisions, with seven infantry and five or six Panzer divisions against the seventeen British and Canadian divisions.

Even more than the Allies, the Germans suffered from divided counsel. Hitler insisted that every unit stand and fight, which at the tactical level kept troops in untenable positions. Von Rundstedt wanted to abandon the present lines and establish a defense line running roughly from Caen to Caumont, which would allow him to shorten his line and give his Panzers some rest, but Hitler forbade it and soon replaced Von Rundstedt with Generalfeldmarschall Guenther von Kluge. Rommel had been wounded on July 17 when an Allied fighter strafed the staff car in which he was riding; he was then implicated in the plot against Hitler and eventually committed suicide to avoid the shame of a trial. Von Kluge assumed Rommel’s duties in addition to his other responsibilities. Hitler, however, did not trust Von Kluge, the man he himself had chosen, and insisted on giving him only the minimum amount of information absolutely essential for carrying on the battle. Hitler feared that if Von
Kluge, or any of the field generals, knew about more than their own local situation, they would give the information to the Allies.
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The German defense was a shell. Hitler had gambled on pinning down the Allies, believing correctly that if they once broke out they would use their overwhelming air and transport superiority to launch a war of maneuver that would crush the Germans in France. In a sense the situation of 1940 had been reversed, with the Germans playing the role of the immobile French at the Maginot Line and the British and Americans ready to begin a blitzkrieg of their own. But the Allied blitzkrieg could not come until someone broke through the shell, as Eisenhower and his subordinates very well knew.

Eisenhower felt that his greatest single advantage over the Germans was the Allied air superiority, and he wanted to make sure that it was fully used in the breakout attempt. He had been harping on the theme of air-ground co-operation since the North African campaign, and he continued to do so in Normandy. The airmen were unhappy because of what they considered excessive demands on their planes by the ground generals, while the soldiers at the front complained both because the airmen were not doing enough and because when they did fly close support missions the bombs sometimes fell short, killing Allied soldiers on the battle line. The airmen countercharged that the soldiers did not set up clear bomb lines. Eisenhower deplored the growing antagonism, admitted that there had been errors on both sides, and said the mistakes should not “sour us or any of the Services.” Rather, they should serve as incentives to promote greater efficiency. “I am particularly anxious,” he told Smith, “that any such occurrences do not discourage ground forces from calling upon the air for maximum assistance, or the air from being ready to render such maximum assistance.”
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Bradley, a ground general, was still willing to work with the air forces, and he had a plan. He proposed to penetrate the enemy defenses west of St. Lô with VII Corps, pushing armored and motorized troops deep into the German rear toward Coutances. Essentially the plan was Bradley’s alone.
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Montgomery had approved of it but played no role in its preparation, while Eisenhower, who was flying frequently to Normandy to confer with his field commanders, did little more than nod his head in approval of it. Eisenhower did make a contribution to the plan by phasing forward additional units to build up Bradley’s strength, by speeding up deliveries of ammunition and equipment, and most of all, by co-ordinating the Allied air effort.

The plan, COBRA, hinged on air power. Bradley wanted a small
area (2500 by 6000 yards) saturated by bombs. Eisenhower saw to it that 1887 heavy and medium bombers and 559 fighter bombers, carrying more than 4000 tons of explosives, were made available to meet Bradley’s requirements. It was, in a way, a 1916-style operation, with bombers substituting for artillery. The big difference between it and a World War I operation, however, was not the presence of air forces, but rather the relative thinness of the German line in 1944 coupled with the presence of Allied tanks to exploit the hole blasted in the line.

One advantage artillery had over air was that the guns could fire in any weather. COBRA was due to start on July 21, and Eisenhower flew over to Normandy to witness the beginning. The sky was overcast and his B-25 was the only plane in the air. By the time he arrived it was raining hard. Bradley told him the attack had been called off and dressed him down for flying in such weather. Eisenhower tossed away his soggy cigarette, smiled, and said his only pleasure in being Supreme Commander was that no one could ground him. “When I die,” he added, looked at the steady rain, “they ought to hold my body for a rainy day and then bury me out in the middle of a storm. This damned weather is going to be the death of me yet.”
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Despite the disappointment, Eisenhower had great confidence in Bradley and felt little need to encourage him to greater efforts. In the only message he sent Bradley before COBRA, the Supreme Commander promised to take full personal responsibility for answering to the American people for the casualties that would necessarily be incurred. He reminded Bradley that “a break through at this juncture will minimize the total cost.” He wanted the Americans to “pursue every advantage with an ardor verging on recklessness.…” If both armies broke through, “the results will be incalculable.”
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The Supreme Commander did, however, feel that it was necessary to put pressure on Montgomery, and he did so in a variety of ways. In the end Montgomery reponded handsomely, showing that at least in this instance Eisenhower’s methods—cajoling, gentle persuasion, and pressure via third parties—worked better than threats or direct orders.

Eisenhower wanted Second Army to attack when COBRA began—in fact had promised Bradley that he would see to it that it did—and he flew to Montgomery’s headquarters to urge on the British general. What he wanted, as Smith noted, was “an all-out coordinated attack by the entire Allied line, which would at last put our forces in decisive motion. He was up and down the line like a football coach, exhorting everyone to aggressive action.”
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On July 24 Eisenhower talked to Montgomery’s
chief of staff, De Guingand, for an hour; the next day De Guingand phoned Eisenhower to assure him that Montgomery had strengthened his supporting attack. Eisenhower also talked to Churchill, who agreed to the necessity of “keeping the front aflame” and accepted Eisenhower’s conclusion that the British forces could and should be doing more. Churchill visited Montgomery in Normandy and told him as much.
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All of this was highly irritating to Montgomery and Brooke. “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does,” Brooke wrote to Montgomery. “It is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war.” The British officers agreed that Eisenhower had no notion of balance. If everybody was to attack, Montgomery argued, nobody would have the strength to make a decisive breakthrough or to exploit it. Eisenhower “evidently … has some conception of attacking on the whole front,” Brooke complained, “which must be an American doctrine judging by Mark Clark with Fifth Army in Italy.” Unfortunately, he continued, the idea of attack along the whole front appealed to Churchill too, so “Ike may … obtain some support in this direction.”
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While Eisenhower did everything possible to get Montgomery to move, he had at the same time to stall off Tedder, who was becoming almost obsessed by his countryman’s lack of action. Tedder called Eisenhower on the telephone the morning of July 25, the day COBRA began, demanding to know why Montgomery was not doing more and what Eisenhower was doing about it. Eisenhower said he had talked with Churchill and that they were satisfied that this time Montgomery’s attack would be in earnest. Tedder “rather un-huhed, being not at all satisfied, and implying the PM must have sold Ike a bill of goods.” Eisenhower told Butcher of the conversation and said he thought he could work things out satisfactorily, for “there’s nothing so wrong a good victory won’t cure.”
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To get away from the carping, and hopefully to enjoy seeing the beginning of the “great victory,” Eisenhower went to Normandy after talking to Tedder to watch the start of COBRA. The tremendous bombardment was impressive, but Eisenhower returned to London that evening glum, even depressed. There had been a series of bombardments from the American bombers that had fallen short, killing and wounding several hundred G.I.s. General Lesley McNair, commander of the Army Ground Forces, who had gone to the front lines to observe, had been killed. In addition the ground attack which began at 11
A.M
. seemed to be going slowly. The only encouraging note came when Bradley, who accompanied Eisenhower to the airstrip for the flight back to London,
said he was convinced that the next day his forces would make extraordinary advances. Eisenhower would not allow his hopes to rise—he had heard the same thing the first day of GOODWOOD. Worse than the slow progress on the ground were the short bombardments, which convinced Eisenhower that he could not use his air power to help the troops break out. He told Bradley he would no longer employ heavy bombers against tactical targets. “That’s a job for artillery,” he said to Bradley. “I gave them a green light this time. But I promise you it’s the last.”
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The next day news from the front filtered in slowly, and the over-all picture was unclear. Eisenhower dictated a letter to Marshall, telling him only that an offensive was under way on both flanks. If either went well, he added, “we will be in a much improved position.”
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He had lunch with Churchill, who said he would see to it that Montgomery launched a major attack. The Supreme Commander then dictated a note to Montgomery. Eisenhower said he had had no news at all about activities on Second Army’s front, but “I know the troops are fighting for all they are worth and I am certain the enemy will somewhere crack under the pressure.” Churchill, he added, thought so too.
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Montgomery was irritated at the thought that Eisenhower had complained about him to the Prime Minister, but there was little he could do about it except try to remove the reason for the complaint.
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This he did in exemplary fashion. On the morning of July 25 his Canadian forces started southward toward Falaise, attacking an area strongly held by Panzers. The Canadians suffered 1000 casualties and took little territory, but they did effectively screen the major offensive and delayed a German shift of reserves to the United States front. Still, neither Montgomery nor Brooke was at all happy with the way things were going. To Brooke it was “clear that Ike knows nothing about strategy. Bedell Smith, on the other hand, has brains, but no military education in its true sense.” Even Smith, however, failed to recognize Montgomery’s strategic genius, and thus lent his voice to the demands for all-out attacks everywhere.
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Whatever his own feelings, Montgomery could not ignore all this pressure, and on July 27 directed the Second Army to strike in the Caumont area and ordered all British and Canadian forces to attack to the greatest possible degree with the resources available. He declared that the enemy “must be worried, and shot up, and attacked, and raided, whenever and wherever possible.”
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By the evening of the second day of COBRA, meanwhile, the situation on Bradley’s front was beginning to clarify. Major General J. Lawton
Collins’ VII Corps was breaking through. The air attack had stunned the enemy, destroying his communications and rendering many of his weapons ineffective.
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The VII Corps was extremely strong, with two armored and four infantry divisions, and it began to overrun enemy positions. Gerow’s V Corps, on Collins’ left, and Troy Middleton’s VIII Corps, to the right, were also making progress. Before going to bed an elated Eisenhower wrote Bradley, “You have got the stuff piled up and we must give the enemy no rest at all until we have achieved our objective. Then we will crush him.”
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