Supreme Commander (103 page)

At the end of the first week of 1945 pessimism was widespread in the Allied high command. The Bulge was being eliminated, but because of the deep snows, overcast skies, and freezing weather the AEF was unable to cut off any major German units in the Ardennes. Ground soldiers were deeply disappointed. The Germans, Eisenhower noted in a review he sent to the army group commanders, were “fighting with great stubbornness,” even the newly raised divisions composed of boys and old men who were “only vaguely acquainted with their tasks.” There were many instances of men who, “although wounded for two days, refuse to give up the fight.” There was a new fanaticism on the part of the enemy and Eisenhower had “no doubt that the Germans are making a supreme and all-out effort.…” He said that in his opinion the Ardennes and Alsace battles were “only episodes” and that the Allies must expect further action in other areas.
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Airmen were glum. Their theories about the effectiveness of bombing, based on Douhet, had proven unsound. The Germans, far from having their morale shattered as Douhet had predicted, were more determined than ever. Some fliers insisted this was because strategic bombing had not been given a real opportunity to show what it could do, but others were beginning to have their doubts. On January 7 Arnold wrote Spaatz, “We have a superiority of at least 5 to 1 now against Germany and yet, in spite of all our hopes, anticipations, dreams and plans, we have as yet not been able to capitalize to the extent which we should. We may not be able to force capitulation of the Germans by air attacks, but on the other hand, with this tremendous striking power, it would seem to me that we should get much better and much more decisive results than we are getting now.” Arnold said he was not criticizing, “because frankly I
don’t know the answer and what I am now doing is letting my thoughts run wild with the hope that out of this you may get a glimmer, a light, a new thought, or something which will help us to bring this war to a close sooner.”
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Marshall, who had not had any pet theories shattered and was consequently not as upset as Arnold, nevertheless was sufficiently concerned to query Eisenhower as to his plans. On January 8 he told Eisenhower that although he had given strict orders that no one should add to Eisenhower’s burdens by asking him questions, “it may be … that we now face a situation requiring major decisions in order to prevent this war from dragging on for some time.” He wanted Eisenhower’s broad estimate of the resources the AEF would require and the steps that needed to be taken “to bring this war in Europe to a quick conclusion.”

Eisenhower’s reply of January 15 was long and complex. He had studied the problem minutely and he too was concerned, although not as pessimistic as some of his superiors. The key to the situation, he felt, was what happened on the Russian front. If the Red Army offensive was weak and ineffective, the Germans could safely keep a hundred full-strength divisions on the AEF front; if the Russian offensive “really gets to rolling” the Germans would be hard put to maintain eighty under-strength divisions in the West. “I do not even mention a lack of Russian offensive,” Eisenhower added, “for without this a quick decision cannot be obtained. We would have to mobilize much French manpower and additional U.S. divisions.”

Eisenhower’s present strength was seventy-one divisions, but many of the U.S. divisions were seriously under strength in infantry. The French divisions had a low combat value. If schedules were met the AEF would have eighty-five divisions by May, of which eight would be French, but “French divisions are always a questionable asset.” It was because of these figures, which indicated that Eisenhower could never expect, no matter what happened in the East, to have overwhelming ground superiority, that he insisted on closing to the Rhine before crossing the river.

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Unless we get a good natural line for the defensive portions of our long front
,” Eisenhower emphasized by underscoring,
“we will use up a lot of divisions in defense.”
If his forces were up to the Rhine by spring, he said he would need to keep only twenty-five divisions on defense and in reserve, thus freeing sixty divisions for the offensive. But if the line were maintained as it currently existed, he would need to hold forty-five
on defense and in reserve, leaving only forty for the offensive. The reason for this was that the current line had few good natural defensive barriers, and nothing to compare with the Rhine as an obstacle. As things stood, the Germans could safely concentrate for counterattack behind the West Wall, then strike out against the AEF almost anywhere.

Eisenhower wanted to send thirty-five divisions on the major offensive north of the Ruhr. He also wanted to maintain flexibility and be able to reinforce success. If Bradley’s crossing in the Frankfurt area showed promise, Eisenhower was determined to give him more troops. In order to do this he needed a reserve of at least twenty divisions. There were two ways to get the reserve: by closing to the Rhine and then pulling units out of the line, or by raising more divisions in the United States and stepping up the program of rearming the French. For a variety of reasons, neither of the latter alternatives was feasible. “This fact brings up again the great desirability of destroying German forces west of the Rhine, and closing up to that river throughout our front.”

Throughout his review Eisenhower stressed the need for flexibility. “If we jam our head up against a concentrated defense at a selected spot,” he declared, “we must be able to go forward elsewhere. Flexibility requires reserves.” Flexibility was Eisenhower’s outstanding tactical quality. He never allowed his mind to become set or rigid, and he was usually successful at creating tactical situations that presented him with a number of alternatives. This in turn allowed him to exploit any lucky break. Flexibility was what set him apart from most planners, including his own G-3. One never knew what to expect in war, except that the unexpected was likely. Only those who were ready could take advantage of the breaks, and to be ready it was imperative to have reserves.
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On January 17 Eisenhower told Montgomery that he had finally made Brooke understand “what I have been talking about in saying we must secure a decent line on which to station defensive forces so as to permit the greatest possible concentration for our offensives.” Referring to Brooke’s and Montgomery’s desire to cross the Rhine north of the Ruhr as soon as Twenty-first Army Group reached the river, no matter where the line was elsewhere, Eisenhower added, “I like to be as bold as anyone else, but I know that we cannot go into a full blooded offensive and worry constantly about security.” A major aspect of Eisenhower’s operating strategy was his belief that Hitler would never willingly give up ground. Once the AEF was through the West Wall, the logical course for Von Rundstedt to follow would be to fall back across the Rhine, the last great defensive barrier between Eisenhower’s armies and Berlin. But Eisenhower
was certain that Hitler would force Von Rundstedt to fight in the area between the West Wall and the Rhine. This would give the AEF an opportunity to destroy the remaining German armored units, to kill or capture large numbers of German infantry, and, most important, to make the actual crossing of the Rhine easier. “We must substantially defeat the German forces west of the Rhine if we are to make a truly successful invasion with all forces available,” Eisenhower explained to Montgomery.
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The first step in the program was to eliminate the Colmar pocket. Eisenhower had a number of conferences with the French in a vain attempt to inspire them to action. They resulted in an argument with De Gaulle, who charged that Eisenhower had made unfair accusations against the French forces. Eisenhower denied the charge but he also decided that the French could never do the job by themselves. In mid-January, therefore, he sent five U.S. divisions and 12,000 service troops from SHAEF reserve to Sixth Army Group and placed a U.S. corps under General de Lattre to help him reduce the pocket. The attack began on January 20; by early February the pocket was gone.
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From January 14 to 20 Eisenhower was in his office every day, and each morning he met with Smith, Spaatz, Strong, and Whiteley. The result of these discussions was the final SHAEF plan to implement Eisenhower’s general concept of how the last campaign should proceed. Eisenhower himself dictated a seven-page cable on January 20 to the CCS outlining his intentions.

He said his operations would fall into three phases: first, the destruction of enemy forces west of the Rhine; second, crossing the river; third, the destruction of enemy forces east of the Rhine and an advance into Germany. He intended to put all the force he could into the crossing north of the Ruhr, then with what was left over launch a supporting attack in the south, but he wanted to retain enough flexibility to switch the main effort elsewhere if Montgomery encountered strong resistance.

Because he wanted to cross the Rhine where it would do the most good, at points from which his troops could overrun Germany, Eisenhower took up the three phases of his over-all plan in reverse order, starting with phase three. There were two main avenues of approach into Germany: north of the Ruhr across the plains of north Germany and on to Berlin; and from Mainz on the Rhine to Frankfurt on the Main River, then north to Kassel. An advance north of the Ruhr had the great advantage of denying to the Germans the manufactured goods coming from the cluster of industrial cities in the area. Montgomery’s troops
could cut the eastern exits from the Ruhr by enveloping the area, and the southern exits could be blocked by air action. A further advantage was that the area north of the Ruhr offered the most suitable terrain in Germany for mobile operations, and it was in this type of operation that the Allies had their greatest superiority.

The importance of the Ruhr could not be overemphasized. Eisenhower’s original directive had instructed him to undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany, and SHAEF had always considered the Ruhr to be that heart. As Smith put it after the war, the factories and blast furnaces of the Ruhr “pumped lifeblood into the [German] military system. Once the Ruhr was sealed off, the heart would cease to beat.”
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Because this was true, one trouble with an approach north of the Ruhr was that it was predictable to the Germans, and thus Eisenhower could expect Von Rundstedt to bend every effort to hold the Rhine north of the area. In order to meet and overcome the anticipated strong resistance Eisenhower needed to put powerful forces into the attack. The trouble was that the transportation network could only support thirty-five divisions across the Rhine on Montgomery’s front. This meant that Eisenhower could not be as strong at the crucial point as he would have liked, but it also meant that he would have a reserve to use elsewhere (assuming he had closed to the Rhine).
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Then Eisenhower turned his attention to consideration of operations from Frankfurt. He felt that once Bradley’s men had reached that city they could move almost at will straight north toward Kassel. There were valuable airfields around Frankfurt that could provide support for both Bradley and Montgomery, and Frankfurt was itself an industrial center, making it all in all a prize worth having. Eisenhower admitted that the advance from Frankfurt to Kassel would be over terrain less suitable for mobile warfare than the north German plain, “but once we reached the Kassel area there would be several possibilities of further developments,” such as a thrust northward to link up with Montgomery and seal off the Ruhr. Eisenhower had discussed, with Smith, Hannibal’s encirclement of the Romans at Cannae, and they had that historic operation in mind when they drew up this plan.
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From Kassel, Bradley could also move northeastward toward Berlin or straight east toward Leipzig. Getting to Kassel, in short, would give Eisenhower the flexibility he wanted.

In the back of Eisenhower’s mind, perhaps if only in his subconscious, was a desire to give Bradley the leading role in the campaign if the opportunity presented itself. An indication of this was his comment about the importance of Frankfurt. He said it ranked next to the Ruhr in the Germans’ minds, so they would put large forces in the area to defend it. This would give Bradley “an opportunity of destroying considerable German Forces” around Frankfurt. There would be even more German forces facing Montgomery, but Eisenhower never thought of this as an advantage. The Supreme Commander, in short, welcomed an enemy concentration against Bradley, for he felt that Bradley would do a good job of both killing Germans and exploiting a victory. “Bradley,” Eisenhower once said, “has never held back and never has ‘paused to regroup’ when he saw an opportunity to advance.” The officers at SHAEF who had influence with Eisenhower shared this view; as Whiteley put it after the war, “The feeling was that if anything was to be done quickly, don’t give it to Monty.” Morgan added, “Monty was the last person Ike would have chosen for a drive on Berlin—Monty would have needed at least six months to prepare.”
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Aside from the military necessity of gaining an easily defended line across the Rhine, in other words, Eisenhower was thinking of using Bradley for the last campaign, and he could only do so if Bradley were across the Rhine.
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Turning back to phase two, Eisenhower judged that there were three sites suitable for crossing the Rhine: north of the Ruhr, around Cologne, and south of Mainz. Since troops in a bridgehead at Cologne would have no place to go, Eisenhower eliminated that possibility. In the north, the assault would have to be on a narrow front and would be opposed by the heaviest concentrations of German troop strength. “To effect a crossing in the north it may, therefore, be necessary to divert enemy forces by closing and perhaps crossing the Rhine in the Frankfurt sector.…”

In analyzing phase one, closing to the Rhine, Eisenhower repeated his arguments in favor of bringing all his forces up to the river before crossing. “My superiority on land … is not … so very great,” he explained, and only by getting up to the Rhine “shall I be able to concentrate in great strength east of the river.” In order to bring this about, he intended
to begin immediately an offensive west of the Rhine. First he would destroy the enemy north of the Moselle and close to the Rhine north of Duesseldorf, staying on the defensive south of the Moselle until this was accomplished. He would then take up the attack in the south. Finally he would cross the Rhine in the north and the south, then deploy thirty-five divisions north of the Ruhr and as many divisions as were left over in the Frankfurt area.
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