Supreme Commander (101 page)

The formal administrative arrangements worked well. The system that Smith devised insured that Eisenhower did not waste his time on trivia but enabled him to be involved in all important decisions. For the most part, Eisenhower knew what was going on, or if he did not Smith did. By checking with SGS they could both quickly find out what work had been done or needed doing. Eisenhower made mistakes, but except in rare instances it was not because he was unaware of what was happening.

A long message to Marshall in mid-January, 1945 illustrated the way the office worked. Marshall wanted to know Eisenhower’s future plans and needs so that he could be prepared for his meetings with the British Chiefs at Malta and Yalta. Eisenhower met with Smith and Brigadier General Arthur Nevins (the brother of historian Allan Nevins), chief of the Operations Section, G-3. After Eisenhower presented his thoughts Nevins drafted a message to Marshall. Eisenhower reviewed it, making a number of stylistic changes and several of substance. He then sent it back to Nevins with a covering memorandum, explaining why he had made the changes and adding, “Don’t hesitate in criticizing anything I have said.”
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Much of this kind of work was done informally. Here again Smith’s role was crucial. Eisenhower would send him a memorandum and expect him to follow up on it. On September 30, 1944, for example, the Supreme Commander reminded Smith that he was “terribly anxious about Antwerp.… Please have both G-3 and General Gale keep in the closest possible touch with all the planning on this affair so that we may always be in a position to do whatever we can to help.”
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Smith saw to it that SHAEF got in touch with Twenty-first Army Group about the situation, getting plans from Montgomery’s staff officers and talking to De Guingand himself on the telephone.

Eisenhower often made decisions and took action when he was visiting commanders in the field. Upon returning to his office he would
send a memorandum to Smith to inform him of what he had done and to insure that the action was made a part of the record. On December 15, 1944, for example, he told Smith he had just talked with General Lee of Com Z and ordered him to use civilians instead of soldiers in all static messes, barracks, and so on. He wanted Spaatz and Bradley to do the same thing, and asked Smith to see to it that SHAEF followed the same policy with regard to its orderlies and cooks.
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Like his Commander, Smith wore two hats. In addition to his SHAEF duties he was chief of staff to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations. Eisenhower used Smith as his executive agent for ETO business, consulted with him (as well as with the field commanders) on recommended promotions for the American Army, and apart from the supply responsibilities exercised by Lee, left much of the detail of running the theater to Smith. “Where a combat commander requests an officer by name for a key position,” Eisenhower instructed Smith in late September, “we will normally make a special effort to obtain this officer whether he is here or in the United States.”
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The same day Eisenhower told Smith that “when officers are relieved from duty because of failure in combat, all concerned … will be very careful not to hound tactical commanders for a mass of detail.” Smith should see to it, Eisenhower said, that the commanding officer give a written statement about the reasons for the removal and make a recommendation as to what type of work the officer in question could handle. That was all. “I do not want to appear too arbitrary or unjust,” Eisenhower said, “but we cannot have combat commanders working hours at a time to prepare long lists and detailed affidavits and reports.…”
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Some ETO matters, although detailed and often petty, Eisenhower could not escape. The American Army jealously guards the lines of responsibility, and on some issues the commanding general, and only the commanding general, must make the final decision. This especially applied to court-martial sentences. Eisenhower had to approve every sentence handed down by the military courts in ETO, from the firing squad (death was imposed once on a deserter) to a short prison sentence. Eisenhower ordinarily spent his Sunday mornings going over court-martial records with Brigadier General Edward C. Betts, the theater judge advocate. Betts had been professor of law at West Point, and Eisenhower relied heavily on his judgment in deciding whether or not to be lenient.

Eisenhower delegated much of the routine ETO administration to
General Lee but retained control over key problems that required War Department action, such as the ammunition shortage and the replacement problem. The latter was not something that suddenly arose during the Battle of the Bulge; two days before the German attack, for example, Eisenhower told Handy, “We are doing every possible thing to help strengthen our position in manpower.… You may be perfectly certain that we understand the seriousness of the problem at home, yet our replacement situation is exceedingly dark.”
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Eisenhower also used his influence when Lee could not get what ETO needed. In late October the War Department ordered the return to New York of ten tugs that were being used for unloading in ETO. Lee’s staff sent a routine message back asking for permission to retain the tugs for a month or so. Marshall turned down the request, saying that it appeared unwarranted because of the urgent requirements in the Southwest Pacific.

Eisenhower then met with Lee and his staff; after the meeting he sent a long cable to Somervell, asking him to intercede with Marshall. Eisenhower said the tugs were essential to improvement in SHAEF’s supply position and Lee had demonstrated an “undeniable need” for them. “I want to assure you personally of my sympathy with your gigantic problems and my earnest desire so to conduct our own logistical activities as to minimize wastefulness in the use of ships,” Eisenhower told Somervell, but “we have here a problem that has never before been met in warfare and therefore cannot be solved by mere application of rules applicable where conditions have not been so difficult nor the battle problem so gigantic.” The Supreme Commander promised that “this is the final message I will send on the subject of these tugs,” and he hoped Somervell would meet his “earnest request.” In this case even Eisenhower’s personal intervention was not enough; Somervell turned him down.
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One responsibility Eisenhower never delegated was promotions. He insisted that any time ETO sent to the War Department a recommendation for promotion to colonel or above it be cleared with him first, and he handled promotions with as much care as he did his relations with Montgomery. He took the problem seriously partly because it was difficult to retain balance between staff and line, partly because he realized Marshall had to depend on him for information on ETO officers, partly because as an old career soldier himself he felt promotion was a serious matter to be treated carefully, but chiefly because promotions—which are in effect assignments of greater responsibility—involve
a judgment on and prediction of leadership ability. To leave promotions to others, Eisenhower felt, would be to abdicate command responsibility.

Throughout the war Eisenhower kept a personal list of the officers he thought were doing well and deserved to be promoted. Before making a recommendation to Marshall, however, he checked his opinion of an officer with his senior subordinates. A memorandum he sent to Bradley, Smith, and Spaatz in late October was typical. He asked them to rate and then list in order of priority the twenty-five or thirty-five lieutenant generals and major generals they had observed during the war, both in France and the Mediterranean. He wanted the list so that when the time came, at the end of the war, to decide who should keep his stars in the Regular Army and who should be reduced to his permanent rank, he would be ready to present a validated opinion to Marshall.
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Eisenhower worked closely with Marshall on promotions. At the conclusion of the Bulge, for example, the Supreme Commander said he wanted to get more young men into command of the divisions and corps of ETO. Some of the older men currently in command would be retiring as soon as the shooting stopped; Eisenhower thought that, by putting generals in their early thirties in charge now, the men who would be senior in the Army after the war could gain valuable experience.
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Marshall agreed and complied. The Chief of Staff also asked Eisenhower’s opinion on promotions to three- and four-star rank. He was preparing a list to submit to Congress but he did not want the Army to appear greedy. Eisenhower argued that the Navy already had four full admirals and was going to nominate more; “in these circumstances you could make six or seven on your first list and be well on the conservative side considering the size of the Army.” He thought Bradley, Spaatz, Somervell, Handy, McNarney, and a senior officer from the Pacific ought to get four stars immediately, with other four-star rank promotions to follow.
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On February 1 Eisenhower made a list of the commanders he had worked with during the war. He intended to use it as a basis for either recommending promotions to Marshall or making promotions himself after the war. The list was based on value of service and qualifications for future usefulness. Bradley and Spaatz stood at the top, followed in order by Smith, Patton, Clark, Truscott, Doolittle, Gerow, Collins, Patch, Hodges, and Simpson. Eisenhower made comments on each officer (the list extended to thirty-eight generals). Bradley was
“quiet but magnetic leader; able, rounded field commander; determined and resourceful; modest.” Patton was a “dashing fighter, shrewd, courageous,” while Eisenhower thought Smith was “outstanding as C/S of Superior Hqs. Firm, loyal, highly intelligent.” Nearly all the comments were positive; some were just more enthusiastic than others.
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Eisenhower also evaluated every division commander coming into ETO. If he did not know the man he would discuss him with Bradley or Smith, and if any one of the three generals disapproved, Eisenhower would so inform Marshall and a new commander for the division would be appointed. Eisenhower made every decision on moving generals up from division to corps, or from corps to army, command.

The surest way for an American general in ETO to make a poor impression on Eisenhower was to try to boost or glorify himself. A flagrant example came during the Battle of the Bulge. A division commander wrote Eisenhower to ask that he be given command of a corps. He said his division had done well and he had proved himself capable of handling a corps, and added that he made his request to satisfy his “personal and professional pride.” On the day after Christmas Eisenhower dictated his reply. He began by saying he did not need to be reminded of the division’s record: “I make it my business to keep in as close contact with such things as is possible, for the reason that the positioning of higher commanders is one of my chief preoccupations and responsibilities.” Eisenhower confessed that he was “astonished” that anyone would feel it necessary to write to him on the subject.

“I would be truly disturbed,” Eisenhower continued, “if I should interpret literally your statement that personal and professional pride prompted your request.” The Supreme Commander felt that any man who had his country’s trust to the extent that he had fifteen thousand young Americans under his command had already received full acknowledgment of his abilities. He also thought that in a well-run division the relationship between the commander and his subordinates should be so close that “any thought of separation should arouse disappointment rather than anticipation.” Eisenhower concluded, “I assure you that no soldier can come out of this war with greater professional stature or personal reputation than that of a truly successful division commander.” The general did not get command of a corps.
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Another personal responsibility the Supreme Commander had was to keep in close touch with the Chief of Staff and his problems. Eisenhower met it through voluminous correspondence and through Marshall’s
fairly frequent trips to Europe. One thing the Chief was determined to accomplish after the war, before America settled into her anticipated postwar complacency, was a program of universal military training. He had officers in the War Department working on the project, but he wanted Eisenhower’s help too. In October he wrote Eisenhower to report on a survey that had been conducted with military personnel returned from overseas. The men had been invited to express freely any complaints they had. Marshall said the complaints were “too numerous and too serious to be considered as typical of the normal soldier’s discontent,” and added that he took them seriously. He realized that these enlisted men were also voters, and that a universal military training program would need strong support among veterans in order to get it through Congress. “A great deal of this is paralleled by the reaction of the enlisted men in the rear areas of the old AEF,” he said, referring to his World War I experience, “and which had something to do with the failure to establish universal military training at that time.…” Eisenhower sent a copy of Marshall’s letter on to Smith, with instructions to set up a staff under a brigadier general “responsible to me,” and put it to work improving conditions for enlisted men in ETO.
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The second major part of Marshall’s desired postwar program was the integration of the armed forces under a single Chief of Staff, with a single Secretary of Defense. The JCS, on Marshall’s urging, had set up in May 1944 a special board to study the reorganization of national defense and to make recommendations for a peacetime military establishment. Marshall talked to Eisenhower about the subject on one of his visits to Europe. Eisenhower accepted Marshall’s argument, and when the board came to ETO to interview senior officers, Eisenhower said he favored a single Department of Defense. The board made such a recommendation, but Admiral King would not accept it. King argued that centralized control was not necessary and that better results could be expected from friendly co-operation. Marshall replied that such co-operation “has been difficult and incomplete even in war, and will be infinitely more difficult in peace,” but he could not convince the admiral, and the problem had to be faced anew after the war.
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