Supreme Commander (96 page)

No decision was made that night. The next morning, December 20, Eisenhower met with Tedder, Smith, Strong, and Whiteley in the Trianon Palace. Smith brought up Whiteley’s proposal. It was obvious that giving Montgomery command of two American armies at the height of the battle would be a blow to American pride. The German penetration, on the other hand, was getting deeper every minute, and Bradley’s communication lines to Hodges, which ran through the Ardennes, had been cut. Bradley still had auxiliary circuits available, but it was not certain that they would suffice, and in any case his major preoccupation was Patton’s attack. Eisenhower decided that national pride would have to suffer and declared that he would make the command shift.

He called Bradley on the telephone and told him what he was going to do. Bradley accepted it. The Supreme Commander then told Bradley that he could fall all the way back to the Meuse if that was the line he could “hold the best and cheapest,” but that when Patton attacked it should be in great strength. After hanging up, Eisenhower placed a call to Montgomery to inform him of the command switch.

The telephone connection with Montgomery was unfortunately indistinct.
After failing to make himself understood, Eisenhower gave up and sent the orders by wireless.
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Montgomery, however, anxious to step forward and take control, heard what he wanted to hear and attached his own meaning to the garbled conversation. He told Brooke that Eisenhower had called. “He was very excited,” Montgomery said, “and it was difficult to understand what he was talking about; he roared into the telephone, speaking very fast.” The only thing that Montgomery understood was that Eisenhower was giving him command of everything north of the Ardennes. “This was all I wanted to know. He then went on talking wildly about other things.…”
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That both Montgomery and Bradley felt Eisenhower had a bad case of nerves strongly indicates that the Supreme Commander was probably indeed unsure of himself. But aside from the contrary evidence—no one at SHAEF thought so—Montgomery’s and Bradley’s reactions could be viewed more accurately as a reflection of their own nervousness. Bradley was upset, for obvious reasons. He had lost practically two divisions, one of his corps had been badly surprised, and the Germans had made a deep penetration into his line. It was difficult to keep up a brave or calm exterior in the face of such calamities. Eisenhower seemed to be blaming him for these developments when he took two armies away from Twelfth Army Group and gave them to Montgomery, and a number of staff officers at Bradley’s headquarters were furious. Under the circumstances, Bradley was not entirely objective in his estimate of Eisenhower. And Montgomery, though of course worried about a serious situation, could not totally repress a feeling akin to glee—everything he had predicted had come true, and now Eisenhower had to turn to him to set things right. He was inclined to exaggerate any slightly excited tone in Eisenhower’s voice, or even a rise in voice level on a poor telephone connection, and he thus interpreted it as panic. There was of course tension in the air; coupled with the previous relations between Montgomery and Eisenhower, sharp or loud words spoken in heat during moments of stress led to misunderstanding, not so much of what was said but of the emotion involved.

Within two hours of his conversation with Eisenhower, Montgomery had visited with Hodges and Simpson. A British officer who accompanied him said he strode into Hodges’ headquarters “like Christ come to cleanse the temple.” Montgomery reported to Brooke that neither Simpson nor Hodges had seen Bradley or any of his staff since the battle had begun and there were no reserves anywhere. Morale was
low, and Simpson and Hodges “seemed delighted to have someone to give them firm orders.”
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While Montgomery scurried about acting as though to retrieve the situation and rescue the Americans from their mistakes, Eisenhower continued to shape the battle. He informed the CCS of his command changes and added that he had instructed Montgomery and Bradley “to hold their flanks securely but with minimum forces, to gather all available reserves and to thrust with great force against the flanks of the penetration.” Weather had completely shut down air operations, so the Allied air forces were unable to do anything to help, but for once Eisenhower was thankful for bad weather—it prevented the Germans from flying reconnaissance missions and he thought that because of it the concentrations on their flanks could be carried out secretly.
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Eisenhower had set the forces in motion for his counterattack; now he had to wait for them to get in place, and not incidentally for the Germans to lose their momentum and slow down. Meanwhile he worked to smooth relations between his commanders. He realized that staff officers, especially junior ones, at Twelfth Army Group and Third Army had a strong antipathy toward SHAEF, a feeling based on the belief that Montgomery had too great an influence with Eisenhower. The situation was so bad that even before the German attack, the War Department had sent an observer to ETO to make a report. Montgomery, of course, felt Bradley and Patton had the inside track to Eisenhower.
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That both army groups were suspicious may only have indicated how well SHAEF was doing what it was supposed to do, but the situation was hardly helped when Bradley and Montgomery would barely speak to each other. More serious were the attitudes of Simpson and Hodges, who did not like Montgomery either but who would now have to take orders from him.

To cheer Bradley, and to make certain that no one interpreted the command shift as a criticism of his abilities, Eisenhower cabled Marshall on December 21, asking the Chief of Staff to promote Bradley to four-star rank. “While there was undoubtedly a failure, in the current operations to evaluate correctly the power that the enemy could thrust through the Ardennes,” he said, weather was a factor in the inability to see what was coming, and anyway “all of us, without exception, were astonished at the ability of the volksturm [sic] division to act offensively.” Bradley had “kept his head magnificently” and had proceeded “methodically and energetically.” Eisenhower said he retained
his confidence in Bradley and that there was no tendency in any quarter to blame him for the counteroffensive.
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Eisenhower then sent a cable to both Hodges and Simpson, congratulating them for what they had done so far and pointing out that “your good work is helping create a situation from which we may profit materially.” He asked them to remain calm, determined, and optimistic. Getting to the point, he added, “… now that you have been placed under the field marshal’s operational command I know that you will respond cheerfully and efficiently to every instruction he gives.”
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Montgomery had not been impressed with Hodges, and the field marshal called on the telephone to tell Smith that some changes in command might become necessary because of physical exhaustion. As a British soldier, however, he was unwilling to relieve U.S. commanders personally. Smith told Montgomery that if such a step had to be taken, Eisenhower would take it. Eisenhower then sent a message to Montgomery, pointing out that “Hodges is the quiet reticent type and does not appear as aggressive as he really is. Unless he becomes exhausted he will always wage a good fight.” Montgomery replied that Hodges was improving.
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Eisenhower wanted to encourage the men of the AEF as well as their commanders. On December 21 he told his staff to draft an Order of the Day, a brief one, not more than twenty-five words if possible. He said he did not want an order on a pessimistic note but one of encouragement that would point out the opportunity now available to the AEF. After making a number of changes in the draft, Eisenhower issued it on December 22. “We cannot be content with his mere repulse,” he said of the enemy. “By rushing out from his fixed defenses the enemy may give us the chance to turn his great gamble into his worst defeat.… Let everyone hold before him a single thought—to destroy the enemy on the ground, in the air, everywhere—destroy him!”
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The strategic situation was rapidly becoming more and more favorable to the Allies, but on the map, based on territory overrun, it still looked as if the Germans might win a great victory. Von Manteuffel’s forces continued to grind forward in the Ardennes. Because of this Eisenhower welcomed the moral support he received from the United States. On December 20 he learned that he had been promoted again, this time to the newly created rank of General of the Army (Marshall, MacArthur, and Arnold were the only other Army officers who received the right to wear five stars). Then, on December 22, Eisenhower
received a warm Christmas letter from Marshall. Marshall said that Eisenhower, through his leadership, wisdom, patience, and tolerance, had “made possible Allied cooperation and teamwork in the greatest military operation in the history of the world, complicated by social, economic and political problems almost without precedent.” Marshall concluded, “You have my complete confidence.” Eisenhower told Marshall that the letter “was the brightest spot in my existence” since the AEF reached the West Wall. “Short of a major defeat inflicted upon the enemy, I could not have had a better personal present.”
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By this time the spirit at SHAEF was almost buoyant. On December 23 St. Vith finally fell to the Germans, removing an important block on their right flank, but the 7th Armored made a successful withdrawal and soon returned to the battle. It had stalled an entire German corps that was flushed with earlier easy victories, choked one of the main enemy lines of communication, forced days of delay on the westward movement of troops and supplies, and given Montgomery and Bradley time to organize an effective defense.
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Bastogne, meanwhile, held. On December 19 Middleton had given Brigadier General Anthony C. McAuliffe command of the Bastogne forces, mainly consisting of the 101st Airborne. Middleton gave McAuliffe one standing order: “Hold Bastogne.” Despite intensive attack from three and sometimes more German divisions, the 101st held on, even after being encircled on December 21. The men were short of all supplies; the Germans were launching concentric attacks; the weather was bitterly cold. The attacks reached their peak on December 22. At noon on that day the Germans issued an ultimatum calling for “the honorable surrender of the encircled town.” McAuliffe sent back a one-word answer: “Nuts.”
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The leading German divisions, foremost of which was the 2d Panzer, which reached Celles some ten miles from the Meuse, had been immobilized since December 21. Von Manteuffel’s vague hopes of reaching Allied supply dumps and getting desperately needed fuel had not been realized. On December 22 Tedder, infected by the spirit of the ground soldiers around him, commented, “The fact that the Hun has stuck his neck out is, from the point of view of shortening the whole business, the best thing that could happen. It may make months of difference. But he might have waited until after Xmas!”
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The Bulge could be compared to a gigantic Kasserine. As in February of 1943, the Germans had made a bold bid to reverse the strategic situation. The daring of their attack caused some anxious moments, but they were never really strong enough to succeed. The key
problem was timing. At what point would the Germans decide they had had enough and start to pull back? At Kasserine the Allies had let an opportunity slip by because they delayed a day too long in starting the counterattack. Eisenhower realized the danger of piecemeal assault, of throwing divisions against the German flanks as soon as they were ready. If Bradley and Montgomery did that, each individual division would be destroyed by the powerful German Panzer armies and nothing would be accomplished.

At a meeting with his senior assistants at SHAEF on December 21, Eisenhower said he wanted Bradley informed that Patton’s attack should be limited in scope. He wanted Patton to break through to Bastogne and relieve the encircled troops there, but otherwise the Supreme Commander declared that Bradley should hold the attack in check and not let it spread, because “it was for the purpose of establishing a firm stepping off point for the main counter-offensive.” Eisenhower said that what he feared was having the impetuous Patton talk Bradley into allowing him to attack at once without waiting for a fully coordinated counteroffensive.
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Eisenhower was pleased to learn that Montgomery was gathering two corps, one British and one American, on the German’s northern flank. That would give him the force he wanted for a two-pronged attack.

The following day the defensive phase of the battle ended. The morning of December 23 broke clear and cold, with virtually unlimited visibility. For the first time since the counterattack had begun, SHAEF could get its planes into the air. That morning 241 C-47s, each carrying 1200 pounds of supplies, made air drops to the 101st in Bastogne, bringing mostly artillery ammunition, which had almost run out. At the same time fighter planes escorting the C-47s strafed the Germans in the Bastogne ring, while 82 P-47s hit them with fragmentation bombs, napalm, and machine gun fire. The German attacks continued until December 26, when Patton forced his way through to Bastogne and broke the encirclement, but for the 101st the crucial day was December 23. Eisenhower had sent the 11th Armored Division, which had just reached Europe and had been assigned to Sixth Army Group, on a forced march to the Meuse. On December 23 it took its place in the line.
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To the north, Montgomery was tidying up the battle front. He told Eisenhower he had reorganized First Army and it was “in good trim.… We will fight a good battle up here.” Actually First Army had not been reorganized so much as it had re-established communications
with its units, many of which had been cut off. Through great effort, Hodges had been able to direct a coherent defense that, at least as much as the more publicized struggle at Bastogne, had been responsible for stopping the Germans. Still, Montgomery was worried that he would not get enough support from Twelfth Army Group. Patton’s attack, he declared, would probably not be strong enough to “do what is needed … [and] I will have to deal unaided with both Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies.” On Christmas Day he decided to shorten his own front and asked Eisenhower to send him some reserves from Sixth Army Group. Bradley met with Montgomery on Christmas Day. The field marshal, it seemed to Bradley, had adopted a highly defensive attitude. Montgomery rubbed salt into the wounds, making no attempt to disguise his view that the American command had deserved the German counteroffensive. He told Bradley that if there had been a single thrust none of this would have happened, and “now we are in a proper muddle.” Montgomery reported that Bradley “looked thin, and worn and ill at ease” and said the American general agreed with everything he said. Montgomery noted of Bradley: “Poor chap; he is such a decent fellow and the whole thing is a bitter pill for him.”
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After the meeting Bradley wrote Hodges—who had already expressed his displeasure at the idea of giving up more ground—to outline his views. Bradley made it clear that as he had no control over First Army his letter should not be considered a directive. He then said he viewed with misgivings any plan to give up terrain which might be favorable for future operations, especially since he felt the Germans had suffered more than First Army and since Hodges had the greater strength in the area. Bradley then told SHAEF that he wanted First and Ninth Armies back.
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