Supreme Commander (93 page)

By this time Montgomery and Brooke, who felt that Britain desperately needed an early end to the war and relief from the strains of full mobilization, were almost frantic about the way the battle was being fought. Eisenhower “has never commanded anything before in his whole career,” Montgomery complained to Brooke on November 17. “Now, for the first time, he has elected to take direct command of very large-scale operations and he does not know how to do it.”
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On November 24 Brooke wrote in his diary that he was upset about “the very unsatisfactory state of affairs in France, with no one running the land battle. Eisenhower, though supposed to be doing so,
is on the golf links at Rheims
—entirely detached and taking practically no part in the running of the war.”
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Three days later the CIGS added, “Ike is incapable of running a land battle and it is all dependent on how well Monty can handle him.…”
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Brooke thought Bradley much more capable than Eisenhower, for as he reminded Montgomery, “You have always told me, and I have agreed with you, that Ike was no commander, that he had no strategic vision, was incapable of making a plan or of running operations when started.”
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On November 26 Montgomery flew to England to consult with Brooke about what positions to take with Eisenhower. They decided there were three fundamental needs: to “counter the pernicious American strategy of attacking all along the line,” to change from three army groups to two, with one north of the Ardennes and the other south, and to get Bradley appointed as commander of the ground forces, with Montgomery taking the northern group (which would include Patton) and Devers the southern (Simpson’s Ninth Army would trade place with Patton’s Third). “Without some such change,” Brooke thought, “we shall just drift on and God knows when the war will end!” He did not explain how two armies, both deeply committed in battle, could suddenly trade places.
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Eisenhower then, at Montgomery’s request, went to Twenty-first Army Group Headquarters on November 28 to discuss future operations. The atmosphere was unpleasant, for Montgomery, reinforced by Brooke’s sentiments, could barely conceal his contempt for Eisenhower. The field
marshal did most of the talking. Eisenhower, patient as always, let him speak on without interruption, which unfortunately created the impression that Eisenhower agreed with what Montgomery was advocating, which was not at all the case. Montgomery reported to Brooke that Eisenhower had agreed that his plan had failed and “we had, in fact, suffered a strategic reverse,” and had further agreed to abandon “the doctrine of attack all along front and concentrate our resources on selected vital thrust.” Montgomery realized that he had not persuaded Eisenhower to appoint a single ground commander but did think he had convinced Eisenhower of the need to divide the theater into two parts, separated by the Ardennes, with Montgomery commanding in the north and Bradley in the south.

After reporting all this to Brooke, with some satisfaction, Montgomery began to have doubts about Eisenhower’s acceptance of his arguments. He wondered if Eisenhower had really agreed to all his proposals and on November 30 wrote Eisenhower “to confirm the main points that were agreed on during the conversations.…” He opened by saying, “We have … failed; and we have suffered a strategic reverse. We require a new plan. And this time
we must not fail
.” Montgomery repeated that he felt the Allies had to “get away from the doctrine of attacking” everywhere and concentrate on the main selected thrust, and that they had to divide the front into two parts, separated by the Ardennes. He then said that he and Bradley made a “good team,” and that things had not gone well “since you separated us. I believe to be certain of success you want to bring us together again; and one of us should have the full operational control north of the Ardennes; and if you decide that I should do that work—that is O.K. by me.…”
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By this time, Eisenhower was furious. On December 1 he wrote Montgomery to tell him that he did not at all concur with what the field marshal had said, nor had he agreed upon those points at their recent meetings. The only thing Montgomery’s letter contained, he said, was “your conception and opinions as presented to me the other evening.” Eisenhower said he did not know what Montgomery meant by strategic reverse. “We gained a great victory in Normandy,” he pointed out, and “Bradley’s brilliant break through made possible the great exploitation by all forces, which blasted France and Belgium and almost carried us across the Rhine.” Had the AEF not gone forward on a broad front, “we would now have the spectacle of a long narrow line of communication, constantly threatened on the right flank and weakened by detachments of large fighting formations.” Just in case Montgomery did not get the
point as to where Eisenhower gave credit for the Normandy victory, the Supreme Commander added, “… if we had advanced from the beginning [i.e., at Caen]
as we had hoped
, our maintenance services would have been in a position to supply us during the critical September days, when we actually reached the limit of our resources.”

Eisenhower said he did agree with Montgomery that it would be easier to have the battle front divided into two general sectors, but he thought the dividing line should be based on the natural lines of advance into Germany, rather than on the basis of rear areas. It should be divided, that is, by the Ruhr, not the Ardennes. Eisenhower said he had “no intention” of stopping Devers’ and Patton’s operations.

Montgomery had asked for a meeting between himself, Tedder, Bradley, and Eisenhower, and had asked that if the various chiefs of staff attended they “should not speak.” Eisenhower pointed out that “Bedell is my Chief of Staff because I trust him and respect his judgment. I will not by any means insult him by telling him that he should remain mute at any conference he and I both attend.”

He concluded, “I most definitely appreciate the frankness of your statements, and usual friendly way in which they are stated, but I beg of you not to continue to look upon the past performances of this great fighting force as a failure merely because we have not achieved all that we could have hoped. I am quite sure that you, Bradley, and I can remain masters of the situation and the victory we want will certainly be achieved.”
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It was by far the toughest letter Montgomery had received from Eisenhower to date, and the field marshal hastened to reply that he had given the Supreme Commander a false impression. He had not wanted to imply that he looked upon all of the past performances of the Allies in Europe as a failure, he declared, but only the November battles, which anyone would admit had not been successful. After receiving Montgomery’s note Eisenhower had a long talk with Smith and finally decided to be generous in his answer. “You have my prompt and abject apologies for misreading your letter,” he said on December 2. He blamed his misunderstanding on his haste in answering, and was sorry if he had given any offense, since he would never do anything “that upsets our close relationship.” He enclosed a report from General Strong, the SHAEF G-2, that pointed out the Germans were most upset by the offensives of the U. S. First and Ninth Armies, and told Montgomery, “You will find it most interesting indeed.…” A day earlier Eisenhower had wired Montgomery the information that since November 8 the Third
Army had captured more than 25,000 prisoners while First and Ninth Armies had captured 15,000 each. “I thought you would like to know this,” Eisenhower said.
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The Supreme Commander remained convinced that his policy was sound. On December 5 he told Marshall, “There can be no question of the value of our present operations.” The Germans were using divisions with only six weeks’ training which contributed to their high casualty rate and indicated an eventual if not immediate crack in the line. Eisenhower saw his problem as one of continuing the attacks as long as attrition worked in the Allies’ favor, “while at the same time preparing for a full-out, heavy offensive when weather conditions become favorable.” He was not overly optimistic about the immediate future, for he realized that “unless some trouble develops from within Germany, a possibility of which there is now no real evidence, he should be able to maintain a strong defensive front for some time, assisted by weather, floods and muddy ground.”
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On December 7 Eisenhower met with Bradley, Tedder, Smith, and Montgomery, at Maastricht. Montgomery felt he was an outsider, that SHAEF and Bradley were ganging up on him, as “they all arrived … and went away together.” Eisenhower began the meeting by reviewing operations since September. He thought the battle was going as well as could be expected and emphasized that the Germans were taking heavy losses. The enemy could not stand this for long, especially as a Russian winter offensive was expected, and therefore the AEF should continue to attack as long as dividends were being collected. As for crossing the Rhine, he reported that his staff informed him that owing to floods it might not be possible to get over the river in major force until May. He then asked Montgomery for his views.

Montgomery said there were two requirements for the immediate future, and neither of them centered on killing Germans. First, the Allies had to cut off the Ruhr from Germany, and then second, force the Germans into mobile warfare. The only place where mobile warfare could be waged, because of terrain, was north of the Ruhr. It was therefore necessary, Montgomery said, to put everything into a concentrated attack across the Rhine north of the Ruhr.

It was like the September disagreement all over again. Eisenhower agreed that the “main” object was to cut off the Ruhr and impose mobile warfare but said that the area on the line Frankfurt-Kassel, in central Germany, was well suited to armored vehicles. He therefore refused to halt Patton, as Montgomery wanted, and said that if Third Army
reached the Rhine he felt there would be great advantage in making a strong supporting thrust on the line Frankfurt-Kassel. By launching two attacks from widely separate points, the Allies would exploit the Germans’ greatest weakness, immobility.

Montgomery interrupted to say that he could not agree that a thrust from Frankfurt had any prospect of success. If it were mounted, he warned, it would only mean that neither his drive north of the Ruhr nor Patton’s to the south would be strong enough to succeed. He insisted that there was a fundamental difference between the way they looked at future operations.

Eisenhower would not agree that there were “fundamental differences.” He argued that the basic concepts were the same, with the main drive taking place north of the Ruhr. Their only difference, which could not be called fundamental, was on the strength of the secondary attack in the south.

Montgomery rejoined that this
was
a fundamental disagreement, then turned to the question of command. He repeated what he had been saying for a week—he should have command of all armies north of the Ardennes. Eisenhower said again that the dividing point should be the Ruhr, especially since the Allies did not intend to operate in the industrial jungle of the Ruhr itself. Montgomery insisted, with great intensity, that this was a second fundamental difference of view, and reiterated his demands for command of all operations north of the Ardennes. Eisenhower refused.

Tedder, Bradley, and Smith said little, but it was clear where their support lay. After the meeting Montgomery blamed the lack of support for his policies on them. “It is therefore fairly clear that any points I made which caused Eisenhower to wobble will have been put right by Bradley and Tedder on the three-hour drive back to Luxembourg,” he complained. He told Brooke that Eisenhower “has obviously been ‘got at’ ” by the three officers and added, “I personally regard the whole thing as quite dreadful.”

The relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery seemed to have reached a breaking point, but neither of the two men was willing to carry things to that extreme. Eisenhower did not need to do so in any case, for the power was his, and after listening to Montgomery he was free to do what he wanted. Montgomery did not want a break either, in part because he kept hoping he could persuade Eisenhower to follow what he viewed as a proper course, in part because he realized that Roosevelt and Marshall would never allow the CCS to fire Eisenhower.
In a showdown it would be the field marshal, not the Supreme Commander, who would be relieved.

After the Maastricht meeting Eisenhower and Montgomery had, according to Montgomery, “a very cheery lunch.” Montgomery continued, “Before he left I made it clear to Eisenhower that it was for him to command and for me to obey; but I was the Commander of the armed forces of one of the principal allies, and as such he must know what I thought about things. I said that in this case we differed widely and on fundamental issues. He said he quite understood and we parted great friends.”
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Montgomery had decided that he had done all he could, and it now was up to Brooke. The CIGS invited Eisenhower to London, and on December 12 Eisenhower and Tedder had dinner with Churchill and the BCOS. At Brooke’s urging Eisenhower presented his plan. “I disagreed flatly with it,” Brooke recorded in his diary later, “accused Ike of violating principles of concentration of force, which had resulted in his present failures.” Brooke became highly critical, and extremely loud, and then Churchill interrupted to say that he agreed with Eisenhower. Brooke sadly realized that he had failed “in getting either Winston or Ike to see that their strategy is fundamentally wrong. Amongst other things discovered that Ike now does not hope to cross the Rhine before May!” The last point was untrue; what Eisenhower had said was that his staff felt because of floods a
major
crossing might not be
possible
until May.
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In reporting on the same meeting to Marshall, Eisenhower said that Brooke had been “disturbed,” but after he, Eisenhower, explained everything Brooke “seemed to understand the situation better than he had before.” Eisenhower had misread Brooke’s reaction, but more important was his assurance to Marshall that in the face of all the pressure from Brooke and Montgomery he still felt it was “most vitally important when the time comes that … we should be on the Rhine at Frankfurt.” In other words, Marshall did not need to worry—Eisenhower would see to it that in the final campaign the Americans played a significant role.
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