Supreme Commander (98 page)

Even before receiving Eisenhower’s letter, Montgomery had begun to concede. De Guingand informed him of the depth of feeling on the matter at SHAEF, reporting that Smith “was more worried than I had ever seen him.” De Guingand also had told Montgomery of Eisenhower’s intention to turn the matter over to the CCS if necessary.
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Montgomery had seen Marshall’s message to Eisenhower (De Guingand had brought a copy), so he knew there was no possibility of Eisenhower’s giving in to his demands. He thereupon sent a note to the Supreme Commander saying he realized there were many factors Eisenhower had to consider
“beyond anything I realize.” He asked Eisenhower to tear up his letter requesting sole control of the ground forces.
¹¹

On January 1 Montgomery received Eisenhower’s stern letter of December 31. “Dear Ike,” he began his handwritten reply. “I have no comments on the outline plan and details can be worked out later on. You can rely on me and all under my command to go all out one hundred per cent to implement your plan.”
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He began his attack with 30 Corps on January 3. For over a month the Allies battered away at the salient. The Germans, schooled in winter warfare from the Russian front, waged a fighting retreat, and not until February 7 had the original line been restored. Eisenhower had hoped for better results, but these were satisfactory, for most of the German armor was destroyed in the process. The enemy had practically no mobility left, and once Eisenhower’s forces gained a breakthrough they would be able to dash through Germany at will. In that dash their commanding general would be Eisenhower.

Having dealt with Montgomery, Eisenhower next had to take on De Gaulle. The French President was upset about the situation on Sixth Army front. When Devers had begun his operations in Alsace-Lorraine in November, Eisenhower had told him to get and hold an easily defended flank on the Rhine River.
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After Devers broke through the Vosges Mountains he reasoned that the French First Army could quickly finish off the German forces in the Colmar pocket and had consequently sent the bulk of his forces north to assist Patton. He expected that as soon as the French eliminated the Colmar pocket he could leave all of Alsace-Lorraine to the French and employ the entire U. S. Seventh Army on and west of the Vosges. But the French were incapable of driving the Germans out of Colmar and when the Bulge began, as Eisenhower later explained to Marshall, “we had on our extreme right flank, instead of the strong, easily defended line we expected, a situation that was inherently weak from a defensive standpoint.” The U. S. VI Corps was east of the Vosges, while an American division had to be retained with the French First Army to hold the Germans at Colmar. The two northernmost corps of Seventh Army had not reached the Rhine—they were still in the Vosges. The danger was that the Germans would hit VI Corps’s exposed left flank and, at the same time, launch a secondary attack from the Colmar pocket. Eisenhower had sent a message of encouragement to General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, commanding the French First Army. “I request that you strike swiftly with your full
might in the cause of France and the United Nations,” Eisenhower said. It did little good—the Colmar pocket remained.
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Eisenhower wanted to pull some divisions out of Sixth Army Group in order to create a SHAEF reserve, and he decided that the way to do it was to fall back to the Vosges. He had instructed Devers to bring the bulk of VI Corps west, but Devers had been slow in carrying out the orders, and even asked for reinforcements himself. On New Year’s Day Eisenhower met with Smith and told him, “You must call up Devers and tell him he is not doing what he was told, that is, to get VI Corps back and to hold the Alsace Plain with rec and observational elements.” Eisenhower felt that the German divisions in that area were weak, and although they had started an attack that day against VI Corps, he thought it would be possible to hold the area with light elements. Smith did not agree with this view; he thought Devers should either try to hold where he was or fall back completely. “The bulk of VI Corps must come back,” Eisenhower explained, “but from this force mobile elements must be sent out to give warning of the enemy advance. The first principle when taking a defensive position is to reconnoitre as far as possible to your front.”
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The French were unhappy at the idea of withdrawing from the sacred soil of Alsace. On January 1 De Gaulle sent telegrams to Churchill and Roosevelt, protesting Eisenhower’s intentions, and wrote a letter to the Supreme Commander. De Gaulle said Eisenhower’s strategic reasons for retreating escaped him. “The French Government, for its part,” he continued, “obviously cannot let Strasbourg fall into enemy hands again without first doing everything possible to prevent it.” He declared he was ready to “push all French forces that were being mustered in this direction.”
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Eisenhower had General Bull, the SHAEF G-3, draft a reply to De Gaulle’s letter; in Eisenhower’s name, Bull said he too was concerned about the fate of the French citizens in Alsace if the Germans returned to the area, and was grateful to De Gaulle “for indicating that you share my views from the military point of view.”
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“Nothing of what you have been told from me and nothing I have written can make you think that from the military point of view ‘I approve of your views,’ ” De Gaulle replied. “I should tell you frankly that the truth is just the opposite.”
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French agitation grew. On January 2 General Juin, now Chief of Staff in the Ministry of Defense, had a stormy session with Smith. The next day Smith walked into Eisenhower’s office and exclaimed, “Juin said
things to me last night which, if he had been an American, I would have socked him on the jaw.”
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The French threatened to withdraw their forces from Eisenhower’s control. On the third, when Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch, commanding the U. S. Seventh Army, issued the orders for the withdrawal from Strasbourg, the French military governor of the city said he would not undertake such action without direct orders from De Gaulle.

The morning of January 3 Eisenhower met with his staff to discuss the situation. He was willing to leave light mobile elements north and west of Strasbourg, but he still wanted the bulk of the VI Corps withdrawn. Churchill flew to Versailles that day, accompanied by Brooke, to discuss Eisenhower’s problems with Montgomery. After lunch the Prime Minister and CIGS sat in on a meeting attended by Eisenhower, Smith, Whiteley, and Strong. De Gaulle had asked to see Eisenhower and was expected shortly. Brooke and the SHAEF officers approved of Eisenhower’s policy. When the meeting broke up Churchill stayed, and was present when De Gaulle stormed into the office.
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It would be fatal, De Gaulle immediately informed Eisenhower, to withdraw from Strasbourg without a fight. French public opinion would not stand for it. Eisenhower began to show De Gaulle on the map why it was necessary. “If we were at Kriegspiel I should say you were right,” De Gaulle cut in. “But I must consider the matter from another point of view. Retreat in Alsace … would be a national disaster.” Each man then threatened the other. De Gaulle said he would have to assume control of the French Army, removing it from SHAEF’s command. Eisenhower countered by saying that if the French Army did not obey his orders he would stop its flow of supplies.

Eisenhower slowly began to realize that De Gaulle’s real fear was that if Strasbourg were abandoned the French government “would lose control of the entire French situation and we would have a state bordering upon anarchy in the whole country.” He had wanted to handle the problem on a military basis only, but “when I found that execution of the original plan would have such grave consequences in France that all my lines of communication and my vast rear areas might become badly involved through loss of service troops and through unrest,” it became a matter of military necessity to hold Strasbourg. Having thus satisfied himself that he was making a military, not a political, decision, Eisenhower told De Gaulle he would hold Strasbourg, and immediately telephoned Devers to cancel the orders for the withdrawal.

When De Gaulle left, pleased with the result, Churchill—who according
to De Gaulle’s later account supported him, but who according to Eisenhower had merely watched the whole exchange—told Eisenhower, “I think you’ve done the wise and proper thing.”
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Strasbourg was held and, although VI Corps fell back almost twenty-five miles from the Rhine, the German attack failed. Later in January the French, after considerable urging from Eisenhower and with the substantial help of an American corps, began operations to eliminate the Colmar pocket. By February 9 they had done so and closed to the Rhine.

Following his confrontation with De Gaulle, Eisenhower may have hoped for a little quiet and a belated chance to enjoy the holiday season, but he was not to have it. On January 7 Montgomery held a press conference to explain the Battle of the Bulge. Eisenhower later recalled that it caused him “more distress and worry” than anything else that happened during the war.
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De Guingand saw a copy of what Montgomery was going to say in his prepared statement and asked him to call the conference off, or at least to tone down his remarks, but Montgomery said the British press had been critical of Eisenhower and Bradley and he had to set the record straight. In his statement Montgomery said that Von Rundstedt had sprung a tactical surprise and was heading for the Meuse. “As soon as I saw what was happening I took certain steps myself to ensure that if the Germans got to the Meuse they would certainly not get over the river. And I carried out certain movements so as to provide balanced dispositions to meet the threatened danger; these were, at the time, merely precautions, i.e., I was thinking ahead.” But, he said, despite his best efforts the situation was deteriorating. Then Eisenhower “placed me in command of the whole Northern front.” He brought the British forces into action and set them to fighting hard on the right flank of Hodges’ First Army. “You have thus the picture of British troops fighting on both sides of American forces who have suffered a hard blow. This is a fine Allied picture.” He then praised the fighting quality and spirit of the American G.I. and said the battle bore some similarity to El Alamein. It had been interesting, he said, “I think possibly one of the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled.”
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Montgomery’s statement, coupled with the fact that at the crucial moment Eisenhower had given command of two American armies to the field marshal, gave a totally false impression of how the battle had been fought. Bradley felt SHAEF was at fault for not having made clear the reason for the command shift and for not emphasizing that it was temporary. He issued a statement of his own, in which he declared—with
justice—that Von Rundstedt had been stopped
before
Montgomery took control of the northern flank. Patton made his feelings, which were strong, known to American reporters too, and a debate began in the British and American press over who had really won the battle.

The amity of the command was about to be destroyed; if it were, much of what Eisenhower had worked for over the past three years would go down the drain. The British press began to urge that Montgomery be made sole ground commander; when Bradley read a story to that effect he called on Eisenhower and demanded to know how the Supreme Commander intended to respond. Eisenhower impatiently indicated that he had no intention of doing anything, but Bradley was not satisfied with his brusque reply. “You must know,” Bradley declared, “after what has happened I cannot serve under Montgomery. If he is to be put in command of all ground forces, you must send me home, for if Montgomery goes in over me, I will have lost the confidence of my command.” Eisenhower sat up. “Well,” he said to Bradley, “I thought you were the one person I could count on for doing anything I asked you to.” Bradley would not be put off. “You can, Ike,” he replied. “I’ve enjoyed every bit of my service with you. But this is one thing I cannot take.” He would ask to be sent home rather than subordinate himself to Montgomery’s command.
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Bradley may have been wise in making his position so plain, for the storm was not yet over. The BCOS (not Montgomery) still wanted to prod Eisenhower on the question of a single ground commander, as well as on the nature of the spring offensive. The British Chiefs told Marshall, who passed it on to Eisenhower, that at the forthcoming CCS conferences, to be held at the end of January in Malta and Yalta, they wished to review the strategic situation in Europe. They indicated that they thought the AEF did not have enough strength to mount two major attacks; “hence, it is important to decide on one major thrust and to allocate overwhelming strength to this thrust to keep up the momentum.” They also insisted that “one man should be directly responsible” for the ground campaign, and argued that Eisenhower had too many responsibilities to do the job himself.

Eisenhower had been over both points innumerable times with Montgomery, and he was able to dispatch two long cables to Marshall on these points the day he received Marshall’s message, January 10. After covering all the familiar ground, he said if the CCS decided that his secondary attack should be launched farther north than he had planned, so that it would give more support to Montgomery, he would “accept
such a decision loyally and as always do my utmost to carry it out.” But he also made it clear he thought it would be a mistake. On command, he again pointed out that the Ruhr was the logical dividing point, “and in reaching this obvious conclusion I have submerged my own nationalistic tendencies [meaning he had left Simpson under Montgomery’s command] just as I have ignored the personal ambitions of any individual.”
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Using for support the experiences of recent weeks, and especially the German attack against Sixth Army Group, Eisenhower emphasized by underscoring that it was his conviction “
that in order to concentrate north of the Ruhr all the forces needed for a successful invasion of Germany, we must have throughout the rest of the front a very firm defensive line which can be held with minimum forces.
” That line was the Rhine, and Eisenhower intended to continue attacking on a broad front until the AEF was up to the Rhine everywhere.