Supreme Commander (83 page)

And when Eisenhower learned that supply service troops were engaged in black market activities in Paris on a grand scale, his patience was exhausted. He sent a firm order to Lee to stop the entry into Paris of every individual not absolutely needed there and told him to remove from the city every man whose presence was not essential. He made it explicit that essential duties “will not include provision of additional facilities, services and recreation for Line of Communication troops or Headquarters.” Eisenhower said the initial move had been made without his knowledge or consent. Presented with a
fait accompli
, however, he had to allow Lee to remain, if only because he did not want to waste more gasoline in moving his headquarters out. But he said the influx of supply personnel was “extremely unwise” and insisted that the situation be corrected as soon as possible. Lee and his headquarters nevertheless stayed in the hotels of Paris.
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With De Gaulle safely established in Paris, the only remaining step in his accession to political power was formal recognition of his provisional government by the British and Americans. Roosevelt still hesitated on this question, even though the French had gained de facto recognition through the device of a formal civil affairs agreement, concluded on August 26. The agreement declared that there would be two zones in France, a forward zone and a zone of the interior. In the former, Eisenhower’s powers would be practically complete, while in the zone of the interior the French authorities would have full power of administration, subject to Eisenhower’s military requirements. The French guaranteed the Allies’ rights to use ports, naval bases, and troop concentration points in the zone of the interior. There were two difficulties with this arrangement. First, it seemed too early to set up a zone of the interior, so that all of liberated France remained officially in the forward zone. Second, although the British ratified the agreement at the foreign minister level, the Americans did so only by an exchange of ratifications between Eisenhower and Koenig. The United States, in other words, held to its policy of dealing with the French at a military rather than a governmental level.
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Throughout September De Gaulle pressed Eisenhower on both issues. Eisenhower in turn told Roosevelt, through the American representative to the FCNL, Jefferson Caffery, that it was in the Allies’ interest to have a strong French government in power and warned that, if an early recognition was not forthcoming, forces of disorder would take advantage of the situation to endeavor to break down governmental authority in France, thereby creating an intolerable behind-the-lines problem for SHAEF. He also remarked that it would be a long cold winter and that SHAEF could provide only one third the amount of coal for civilian purposes that the Germans had allotted; better that a French government than SHAEF be blamed for this.

Whatever might be said about De Gaulle, Eisenhower added, there was no opposition leader in sight who had the slightest chance of overthrowing him, and if he were by some miracle overthrown chaos would follow. Eisenhower concluded by pointing out that if France fell into the orbit of “any other country” the rest of western Europe would follow. He did not believe that it would be in America’s interest to have the Continent dominated by any single power, since that would result in a super-powerful Europe, a shaken British Empire, and the United States as the only active forces at the end of the war. He asked if that were the case, would America “maintain the adequate military, naval, and air forces” which that situation would demand. Many of these
difficulties could be avoided, Eisenhower maintained, by recognizing and working with De Gaulle’s government.
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Even Secretary of State Hull had become convinced of the validity of this position, recommending to Roosevelt on September 17 and again on the twenty-first that the United States recognize De Gaulle’s government as the provisional government of France.
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On August 30 De Gaulle had proclaimed the establishment in Paris of the provisional government of the French Republic, and two weeks later he announced that elections would be held as soon as French sovereignty had been restored, her territories liberated, and—most important—the French prisoners of war and labor deportees returned to their homes.
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Still Roosevelt refused to commit himself. The United States made no decision in September. On October 14 Churchill suggested to Roosevelt that “we can now safely recognize General de Gaulle’s administration,” but the President would not co-operate. He said he preferred to wait until the French had set up a real zone of the interior and the Assembly had been made more representative.
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De Gaulle, meanwhile, had been making steady progress in discussions with Eiisenhower’s representatives about creating a zone of the interior, SHAEF being just as anxious to rid itself of political responsibility as the French were to assume it. On October 20 Eisenhower was able to tell the JCS he had reached a firm agreement on the boundaries of the zone of the interior and would announce it shortly.
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The announcement would leave Roosevelt’s French policy in a total shambles. The President’s own candidates for power in liberated France had long ago dropped by the wayside. Only De Gaulle was left, and Roosevelt could no longer ignore the reality. On October 23 the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and five other nations recognized the French provisional government headed by General de Gaulle. It had been a long, tortuous struggle for everyone involved, and it left a heritage of bitterness. De Gaulle had triumphed, partly with Churchill’s help but primarily on his own, and his great obstacle had always been the United States. France had been liberated, thanks in large part to the Army and Navy of the United States, but few Frenchmen, least of all De Gaulle, were filled with love and appreciation of the Yankees.
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But if the Franco-American relationship was cold, at least there was a relationship. The two sides talked to each other and could still cooperate on common objectives. More than any man on either side, Eisenhower could take the credit for this achievement. A man of fierce temper, he had, despite countless provocations, never lost it in De Gaulle’s presence. In fact, he had come to have a grudging admiration and even liking for the haughty Frenchman. Smith had handled most of the day-to-day details, and he still occasionally exploded when dealing with the French, but Eisenhower, who always accepted the burden of having the final confrontation with De Gaulle and who had to take most of the insults, never did. In 1942 Eisenhower had thought of the French as “those damn Frogs”; by late 1944, although he still found them troublesome, he respected them.

Because he did, and because they knew that he did, America’s French policy in World War II was not a total failure. Eisenhower had no training as a diplomat, and he hated to be in a position in which Churchill was pulling him one way, Roosevelt another, and the military requirements a third. But through a mixture of patience, common sense, and honesty he accomplished much. His dealings with the French marked one of his greatest achievements.

Winston Churchill once said that to govern is to choose. The dictum applies as well to a military commander. In mid-August 1944, after the victory at Falaise, Eisenhower had to make two fundamental, related choices. They were among the most fateful tactical decisions of the war. One, whether to attack the retreating Germans on a broad or a narrow front, is well known and has been thoroughly examined. It is, indeed, one of the most debated controversies of the entire war, attracting interest not only because of the nature of the issue involved but also because of the inherent drama in the conflict between the Supreme Commander and the senior British general on the Continent. The other, the decision whether or not to cross the Seine on the run, is less discussed, possibly because at the time no leader of any stature advocated anything else. It was, however, a decision with consequences that reverberated for the remainder of the campaign.

The original OVERLORD plan had assumed that the Germans would mount a defensive line at the Seine and that the AEF would pause when it reached the river to regroup, reinforce, and most of all to build up supply depots. But as early as August 7, while the Mortain counterattack was in progress, Eisenhower was already thinking more boldly. He told Marshall that one of his objectives was “to cross the Seine before the enemy has time to hold it in strength, destroy his forces between the Seine and Somme and secure the Seine ports.”
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Ten days later he reported to Marshall that the beating the Germans were taking at Falaise would enable the Allies to “dash across the Seine.”
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On August 19 Eisenhower made the irrevocable decision. The AEF would cross the Seine in strength. The next objective would be the German
border. Little soul-searching was involved in the decision and there were no critics of it. Pursuit of a defeated enemy was axiomatic.

Eisenhower was aware that crossing the Seine and driving through northwest France would bring problems in its wake. He was primarily concerned about the need for ports close to the front lines. “We are promised greatly accelerated shipments of American divisions directly from the U.S.,” he told Montgomery in explaining his decision to cross the river, “and it is mandatory that we capture and prepare ports and communications to receive them. This has an importance second only to the destruction of the remaining enemy forces on our front.” Eisenhower wanted Montgomery to move toward Pas de Calais so that he could capture the Channel ports for the AEF.
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Eisenhower’s emphasis on ports is explained by the fact that the AEF currently had only one major port, Cherbourg. Its total August discharge, when it did not work at full capacity, was 266,644 long tons of material. In addition, minor ports in Normandy in August contributed 40,291 long tons. More significant contributions were made at the beaches at Omaha and Utah, where unloading was much greater than anyone had dared hope for. In August Omaha discharged 348,820 long tons, while Utah handled 187,955 long tons.
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These figures would obviously decrease, however, with the coming of bad weather in late fall and winter. It was for this reason, not because of any current shortage in discharge facilities, that Eisenhower wanted more all-weather ports.

More important, he wanted ports nearer the front lines. Location was the crux of the problem. A division in active combat required 600 to 700 tons of supplies per day. The AEF had thirty-six divisions in action, so it needed 20,000 tons of supplies per day, or around 600,000 per month. Cherbourg alone could handle two thirds of the need (in November Cherbourg discharged 433,301 long tons), so Eisenhower’s problem was not so much the number of ports per se as it was moving supplies forward. His decision to take the Seine in full stride would obviously aggravate the problem. Not until Antwerp was captured and functioning would this difficulty be solved.

Even as the AEF reached the Seine there were supply shortages. Retail lines and pipe lines could not be pushed forward rapidly enough to keep up, so motor transport had to carry the entire burden. As a result, “motor transport facilities were strained to the breaking point attempting to meet even the barest maintenance needs of the armies.”
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Com Z could not establish stocks in advance depots. Added to these troubles for Com Z was Eisenhower’s decision to strengthen the attack south of
the Ardennes along the axis Reims-Verdun-Metz. Pre-OVERLORD planning had called for only a minor effort in this area, designed to protect the right flank of the forces attacking north of the Ardennes. The change in plan forced Com Z to open another major supply route.
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The closest student of the unglamorous but crucial subject of logistics, Roland G. Ruppenthal, sums up the consequences of Eisenhower’s decision thus: “From the point of view of logistics these decisions to cross the Seine and continue the pursuit, and to augment the forces employed south of the Ardennes, constituted a radical departure from earlier plans. They carried with them a supply task out of all proportion to planned capabilities. They were much more far-reaching in their effects than the alteration in plans of early August by which the bulk of the Third Army’s forces had been directed eastward rather than into Brittany. With the supply structure already severely strained by the speed with which the last 200 miles had been covered, these decisions entailed the risk of a complete breakdown.”
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