Supreme Commander (84 page)

The problem of supply transport increased as the lines of communication extended farther and farther eastward. The effectiveness of the Transportation Plan now began to work against the Allies, as they drove forward through precisely those parts of France where their bombers had previously destroyed the railroads. Repair facilities were unequal to the task of keeping pace with the advance. Air supply could help, but delivery never matched promises. And in any case, there was no consistent policy with regard to air transport. Half the time, it seemed, the cargo aircraft were being held in readiness for a paratrooper operation that never materialized while the rest of the time paratrooper operations could not be planned because the cargo planes were engaged in carrying supplies to the front.
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The burden therefore fell on the trucks, and they were unable to deliver the daily maintenance requirements, let alone to stock advance supply depots.

Before D-Day, Com Z had planned to support twelve divisions in an offensive across the Seine on D plus 120; at D plus 90 (September 4), however, Com Z was already supporting sixteen divisions at a distance of a hundred and fifty miles beyond the Seine. Planners had not contemplated reaching the German border until D plus 330; the armies were actually there on D plus 100. Motor transport was not adequate to meet these unexpectedly early supply needs. Even on the basis of the conservative pre-OVERLORD plans, a motor transport deficiency had been predicted. And in addition, of course, Com Z had been forced to assume the job of bringing supplies into Paris.

To meet the immediate needs, expediency became the rule. Incoming divisions and other combat elements were immobilized because their trucks were needed to haul supplies from the ports to the front. Com Z ignored the armies’ needs for replacement equipment and carried forward only immediately usable goods. “Right now we are operating on the basis of having today’s supplies only with each division,” Eisenhower told Marshall on August 24, “and are accumulating no fat.”
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For a while everyone could rob Peter to pay Paul, and combat units in Third Army gleefully hijacked supplies from First Army to keep moving. The trouble was that First Army units were doing the same thing. Entire truck companies were “diverted.” These and other irregular practices, while they worked temporarily and provided vast amusement, “prevented an orderly and business like organization of the Communications Zone. They left deep scars and had a prolonged effect on its efficiency and on its ability to serve the armies.”
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By mid-September the trucks were badly worn. So were combat vehicles. The AEF had entered the Continent with new equipment and during the battle in Normandy maintenance had been relatively simple. But in August and early September the troops made a grueling run across northern France without adequate maintenance. Forward reserves of spare parts were non-existent. There was no depot system outside of the Normandy base area. Even after the armies reached the German border and had to halt the offensive because of supply shortages, there was no time for Com Z to recover and establish an orderly system of supply lines based on forward depots because the daily needs of the combat forces, even in fairly fixed positions, remained constant and heavy.
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Eisenhower’s decision to drive on to the German border without a pause, in other words, carried with it some hidden costs. His hope was that the Germans would surrender before they became excessive. He was to be disappointed.

Some of the problems involved were clear at the time, others would only appear later. In a way, Eisenhower’s decision to bound across the Seine was like his decision in November 1942 to dash into Tunisia with whatever he could scrape up rather than to wait and build a decent supply base and line of communication. In both cases the results were the same—he got his men far forward, but when they reached their uttermost lines and had to stop and wait for supplies, they had not succeeded in crushing the enemy. Now another major battle had to be fought first, and before the Allies were strong enough to fight they had to straighten out their supply situation. But, given the atmosphere in which Eisenhower
made his choice, it is difficult to imagine any military man pausing for this reason. With practically no coherent enemy force between the Seine and the German border, Eisenhower would have been thought mad had he stopped at the river.

Almost everyone at SHAEF and in the AEF generally felt that if the Allies could keep the pressure on the Germans unconditional surrender was imminent. The overriding necessity was to prevent the enemy from regrouping or strengthening his defenses. The SHAEF G-2 summary of August 23 declared, “The August battles have done it and the enemy in the West has had it. Two and a half months of bitter fighting have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach.” First Army G-2 reflected the same thoughts. The Combined Intelligence Committee was certain that the German strategic situation had deteriorated to the point “that no recovery is now possible.” Patton believed that he could cross the German border in ten days, then drive on almost at will. Only Patton’s G-2, Colonel Oscar W. Koch, saw things differently. He warned that “the enemy … has been able to maintain a sufficiently cohesive front to exercise an overall control of his tactical situation.… Barring internal upheaval in the homeland and the remoter possibility of insurrection within the Wehrmacht, it can be expected that the German armies will continue to fight until destroyed or captured.” Koch pointed out that the German retreat, although continuing, “has not been a rout or mass collapse,” and warned that the enemy had certain advantages. The weather would soon deteriorate, which would take away some of the sting of Allied air power. In addition, German supply lines were shortening while those of the Allies lengthened. Finally, the Allied advance into Germany would have to be through relatively narrow corridors, and poor terrain would join poor weather as a major German ally.
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Colonel Koch’s realism was rarely seen those balmy August days. Eisenhower had shared it to a certain extent, as when he warned reporters on August 20 that his forces had advanced so rapidly and supply lines were so strained that “further movement in large parts of the front even against very weak opposition is almost impossible.”
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But over the next ten days the troops kept moving, and Eisenhower began to allow himself to think that expedients would suffice until the Germans collapsed. On August 31 he told Marshall one of his worries was a “suspicion that the fanatics of that country [Germany] may attempt to carry on a long and bitter guerrilla warfare. Such a prospect is a dark one and I think we should do everything possible to prevent its occurrence.” He thought Alexander ought to be prepared to thrust his forces into Vienna
and the surrounding mountains “to defeat any [German] hope … for making that country one of guerrilla action.” Churchill and Roosevelt were due to meet soon at the Second Quebec Conference, and Eisenhower said he hoped sincerely that much good would come out of the conference, “because as signs of victory appear in the air, I note little instances that seem to indicate that Allies cannot hang together so effectively in prosperity as they can in adversity.”
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One of the signs of friction among the Allies was a clamoring for the credit of victory. Eisenhower had long planned to set up a forward headquarters on the Continent, make it large enough to handle his communications needs, and take personal command of the land battle when Bradley had his own army group. In mid-August SHAEF Public Relations Division announced that the Twelfth Army Group had been activated and that Bradley was now equal to Montgomery. London newspapers deplored Montgomery’s apparent demotion. SHAEF was upset as it was not true that Bradley was equal to Montgomery, for until Eisenhower assumed direct command in the field Montgomery would continue to direct the land battle, giving general directives to Bradley. SHAEF PR officials therefore denied that Bradley was equal to Montgomery, without bothering to explain that he would be shortly. At this point the American press began to grumble, some newspapers demanding an apology from their counterparts in London for saying that it was a “demotion” for Montgomery to be placed on an equal footing with Bradley. The Washington
Times-Herald
began to write about “British dominance” of the AEF, and other American papers complained that since the British held the principal air, sea, and ground commands Eisenhower was a mere figurehead.
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No one was more upset than Marshall. On August 17 he told Eisenhower that “The Secretary [Stimson] and I and apparently all Americans are strongly of the opinion that the time has come for you to assume direct exercise of command of the American Contingent.” Marshall said the reaction to British criticism in the United States had been serious and would, he feared, be injected into congressional debate. “The astonishing success of the campaign up to the present moment has emphatic expressions of confidence in you and in Bradley,” he explained. “The late announcement … has cast a damper on the public enthusiasm.”
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Eisenhower was at Bradley’s headquarters when Marshall’s message arrived. Both generals were “somewhat taken aback” at the extreme reaction
and at the apparent misunderstanding in the War Department of ultimate command arrangements. Eisenhower had no intention of taking command of “the American Contingent,” for example. Far more serious was the bickering over credit. “It seems that so far as the press and the public are concerned,” Eisenhower complained, “a resounding victory is not sufficient; the question of ‘how’ is equally important.”

Since the question of how had been opened, however, Eisenhower decided to make his and Bradley’s case (London papers were saying Montgomery was responsible for all ground operations and was the tactical genius who brought about the victory). “In the first place,” Eisenhower explained, “I have always been directly responsible for approving major operational policies and principal features of all plans of every kind.” Because of the extent of his responsibilities, Eisenhower always had to be close to a major communications network so that he could send and receive messages from all over the world, and therefore could not go to the Continent until such time as proper arrangements had been made. Meanwhile it was essential to have one man co-ordinate the land battle. Eisenhower had given that job to Montgomery because of his “experience and seniority,” but the British general always operated “under plans of campaign approved by me.”

Eisenhower had planned to give Bradley his own army group when there were enough American troops on the Continent to justify it. He also planned to take personal command of the land battle at such time as he could establish a headquarters in France. Between the time that the American army group was formed and SHAEF moved to the Continent, Montgomery would continue to co-ordinate activities. He did not actually command Bradley in the true sense of the word, and in any case Eisenhower himself kept a tight grip on developments by making frequent trips to France and establishing a small forward headquarters there. “There has been no major move made of which I have not been cognizant or which has been contrary to the general purposes I have outlined,” he declared. He was “exceedingly sorry” if Bradley’s reputation had suffered. “As for myself, I am indifferent to what the New York
Times
or any newspaper may say about my conduct of this operation.”

In conclusion, Eisenhower asked Marshall to inform General Surles, head of public relations in the War Department, who could presumably inform the public, that “No major effort takes place in this theater by ground, sea, or air except with my approval and that no one in this Allied command presumes to question my supreme authority and responsibility for the whole campaign.”
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SHAEF officers were meanwhile looking around in liberated France for a suitable site for a headquarters for Eisenhower. Toward the end of August they decided that Jullouville, just south of Granville at the Cotentin Peninsula, would be satisfactory. On September 1 SHAEF became operational on the Continent. SHAEF Main remained in Bushey Park. Four days later another American army, the Ninth, was activated under Lieutenant General William H. Simpson and assigned to Twelfth Army Group. Simpson took command of all forces in the Brittany Peninsula. Eisenhower, meanwhile, assumed command of the two army groups and Montgomery’s co-ordination of the land battle terminated. To soften the blow to Montgomery and the British public, on September 1 Churchill promoted Montgomery to the rank of field marshal.

Two weeks later Eisenhower added another army group to his command. The DRAGOON forces contained one French and one American army, organized into Sixth Army Group. Once they made contact with Patton’s right wing, they were scheduled to come under SHAEF’s control. Devers commanded the group. Eisenhower had not been consulted on Devers’ selection but he assured Marshall that the rumor that he was opposed to Devers was untrue. He did not know Devers well, he said, but all reports indicated that he was doing a fine job.
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The DRAGOON forces made rapid progress after the initial landing, driving north along the Rhône Valley route, and on September 15, the link-up having been achieved, Eisenhower assumed command of Sixth Army Group.

The complexities of paratrooper organization brought about another command change. Parachute and glider troops used in airborne operations were part of the ground force organization, while the aircraft which carried the troops, furnished escorts, and resupplied the airborne units were under air force command. The problem was further complicated because both U.S. and British air and ground forces were involved.
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After lengthy discussion the solution was to form the First Allied Airborne Army (August 16) and put it under the command of Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton. First Allied Airborne Army included the American and British airborne divisions plus the IX Troop Carrier Command. August was a frustrating month for Brereton, for whenever he planned a drop he found that the ground armies had overrun the objective before he could execute the operation. To add to his problems, Troop Carrier Command was involved in supplying the forward troops, so he could not count on having his planes ready when he needed them.
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