Method and Madness: The Hidden Story of Israel's Assaults on Gaza (17 page)

 
15.
  
Report of the Committee of Independent Experts in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Established Pursuant to Council Resolution 13/9
(18 March 2011)
.

 
16.
  Amnesty International,
Amnesty International’s Updated Assessment
; B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories), “Goldstone Then and Now” (5 April 2011).

 
17.
  Amnesty International,
Amnesty International’s Updated Assessment
.

 
18.
  UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
Protection of Civilians Weekly Report
(1–8 January 2009); Amnesty International,
Operation “Cast Lead”: 22 Days of death and destruction
(2009), p. 20.

 
19.
  Amira Hass, “What Led to IDF Bombing House Full of Civilians during Gaza War?,”
Haaretz
(24 October 2010).

 
20.
  State of Israel,
Gaza Operation Investigations: An update
(January 2010), pp. 41–44. Although critical evidence belied the Israeli version of what happened (Anshel Pfeffer, “UN Insists Israel Bombed Flour Mill during Cast Lead,”
Haaretz
(4 February 2010); Human Rights Watch, “
I Lost Everything,”
pp. 5, 83–86), Israel stuck to its original story (
Gaza Operation Investigations: Second update
(July 2010), paras. 141–45).

 
21.
  State of Israel,
Gaza Operation Investigations: Second update
, para. 123.

 
22.
  Ibid., para. 68.

 
23.
  “Hamas Confirms Losses in Cast Lead for First Time,”
Jerusalem Post
(1 November 2010).

 
24.
  “Judge Goldstone’s Notes,” para. 24.

 
25.
  Yaakov Lappin, “IDF Releases Cast Lead Casualty Number,”
Jerusalem Post
(26 March 2009).

 
26.
  Palestinian Center for Human Rights, “Confirmed Figures Reveal the True Extent of the Destruction Inflicted upon the Gaza Strip” (12 March 2009); Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, “Cast Lead Offensive in Numbers” (2 August 2009); “B’Tselem’s Investigation of Fatalities in Operation Cast Lead” (9 September 2009).

 
27.
  The overall veracity of Israeli figures could be tested on the basis of the “under 16” sub-classification. Whereas Israel alleged that 89 Palestinians under age 16 were killed, B’Tselem reported that 252 Palestinians under 16 were killed and that it “has copies of birth certificates and death certificates along with other documents regarding the vast majority of the minors who were killed.” See also PCATI,
No Second Thoughts
, pp. 9–11. This study showed that Israel abruptly altered the figures it tabulated for Palestinian deaths, and it concluded that “the casualty estimates provided by other sources (around 1,400 killed) are more credible than those provided by the IDF spokesperson.”

 
28.
  
http://tinyurl.com/yhddnjt
.

 
29.
  Human Rights Watch, “
I Lost Everything
,” p. 7.

 
30.
  Human Rights Watch,
Rain of Fire: Israel’s unlawful use of white phosphorus in Gaza
(New York: March 2009).

 
31.
  “UK Officer Slams ‘Pavlovian’ Criticism of IDF after Gaza War,”
Haaretz
(22 February 2010).

 
32.
  See Norman G. Finkelstein,
“This Time We Went Too Far”: Truth and consequences of the Gaza invasion
, revised and expanded paperback edition (New York: 2011), Chapter 3.

 
33.
  In mid-2012, another Israeli soldier, who killed two women waving a white flag, was convicted of “illegal use of weapons” and sentenced to 45 days in prison.

 
34.
  B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories),
Void of Responsibility: Israel military policy not to investigate killings of Palestinians by soldiers
(Jerusalem: September 2010); Yesh Din,
Exceptions: Prosecution of IDF soldiers during and after the second intifada
(Tel Aviv: September 2008). For official Israeli claims intended to boost the credibility of its investigations, see Finkelstein,
“This Time,”
p. 282n79.

 
35.
  See
Chapter 2
above.

 
36.
  “Dershowitz: Goldstone follow-up commission head a ‘bigot,’”
Jerusalem Post
(2 November 2010); Benjamin Weinthal, “Tomuschat, Head of Goldstone Follow-up Committee, Resigns,”
Jerusalem Post
(3 December 2010). Tomuschat was replaced by Judge Mary McGowan Davis of the New York State Supreme Court. Although she wasn’t a pushover, her follow-up report still bent over backwards for Israel. For example, it gives guarded praise to the preposterous Turkel Report that exonerated Israel of any wrongdoing in its assault on the Gaza Freedom Flotilla (
Report of the Committee of Independent Experts
, para. 39). For a detailed analysis of the Turkel Report, see Finkelstein,
“This Time,”
Appendix 2; see also Chapter 4 below.

 
37.
  Ethan Bronner and Jennifer Medina, “Past Holds Clue to Goldstone’s Shift on the Gaza War,”
New York Times
(19 April 2011).

 
38.
  “Thanks to the Critics,”
Haaretz
(27 July 2010).

 
39.
  “Dershowitz is Not Welcome Here!,”
Cape Times
(24 March 2011).

 
40.
  Hina Jilani, Christine Chinkin, and Desmond Travers, “Goldstone Report: Statement issued by members of UN mission on Gaza war,”
Guardian
(14 April 2011).

 
41.
  Roger Cohen, “The Goldstone Chronicles,”
New York Times
(7 April 2011); Akiva Eldar, “What Exactly Did Goldstone ‘Retract’ from His Report on Gaza?,”
Haaretz
(12 April 2011).

 
42.
  “NY Times: We turned down a different version of Goldstone retraction,”
Haaretz
(5 April 2011).

 
43.
  
Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Committee on Gaza: No safe place
. Presented to the League of Arab States (30 April 2009), paras. 556, 573. For more on this report, see Finkelstein,
“This Time,”
Chapter 3; see also endnotes to Chapters 1 and 2 above.

 
44.
  John Dugard, “Where Now for the Goldstone Report?,”
New Statesman
(6 April 2011).

  
1.
   “The Rubble that Was Gaza,”
World Food Program News
(25 January 2009;
http://tinyurl.com/27xk5cy
). See also European Commission,
Damage Assessment and Needs Identification in the Gaza Strip, Final Report
(March 2009), pp. xv, 93.

  
2.
   Desmond Travers, “Operation Cast Lead: Legal and doctrinal asymmetries in a military operation,”
An Cosantóir
, Irish Defense Forces Review (2010), pp. 103–5.

  
3.
   Oxfam, “Gaza Weekly Update” (30 May–5 June 2010); Human Rights Watch, “Israel: Full, impartial investigation of flotilla killings essential” (31 May 2010); World Health Organization, “Medical Supplies Blocked from Entering Gaza” (1 June 2010); International Committee of the Red Cross, “Gaza Closure: Not another year!” (14 June 2010).

  
4.
   The most authoritative legal analysis is a document prepared by an investigative mission mandated by the UN Human Rights Council,
Report of the International Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law, Including International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, Resulting from the Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian Assistance
(27 September 2010). Hereafter:
Report of the Fact-Finding Mission
. The mission was headed up by a retired Judge of the International Criminal Court and included the former Chief Prosecutor of the United Nations-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone. It concluded that “the blockade was inflicting disproportionate damage upon the civilian population in the Gaza Strip and as such the interception could not be justified and therefore has to be considered illegal” (para. 53); “one of the principal motives behind the imposition of the blockade was a desire to punish the people of the Gaza Strip for having elected Hamas. The combination of this motive and the effect of the restrictions on the Gaza Strip leave no doubt that Israel’s actions and policies amount to collective punishment as defined by international law” (para. 54).

  
5.
   The passengers initially used water hoses to repel the assault, which the International Maritime Organization has “recommended as a means to prevent an attempted boarding by pirates and armed robbers” (
Report of the Fact-Finding Mission
, p. 25n68).

  
6.
   Israeli vilification focused on
Mavi Marmara
passengers belonging to the sponsoring Turkish group IHH (İnsani Yardım Vakfı, or The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief), which was alleged to be a terrorist organization or accused of having close links with terrorist organizations. See Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center,
Conspicuous among the Passengers and Organizations aboard the
Mavi Marmara
Were Turkish and Arab Islamic Extremists Led by IHH
(26 September 2010), paras. 2, 9, 11. But in the Israeli information packet distributed just before the commando assault, IHH was benignly described as “a Turkish pro-Palestinian human rights organization with a strong Muslim orientation . . . which provides humanitarian relief into areas of war and conflict.” Military Strategic Information Section, International Military Cooperation Department, Strategic Division, Israel Defense Forces, “Free Gaza Flotilla” (27 May 2010).

  
7.
   
Report of the Fact-Finding Mission
, paras. 112–14. A semi-official Israeli publication did not dispute that “gas, stun, and smoke grenades were fired from the [Israeli] boats” immediately as they approached the
Mavi Marmara
, while a largely apologetic
New York Times
reconstruction conceded that “the crack of an Israeli sound grenade and a hail of rubber bullets from above were supposed to disperse activists”
before
the commandos hit the deck of the
Mavi Marmara
. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center,
Preparations Made by IHH for Confrontation with the IDF and the Violence Exercised by That Organization’s Operatives
(15 September 2010), para. 11; Sabrina Tavernise and Ethan Bronner, “Days of Planning Led to Flotilla’s Hour of Chaos,”
New York Times
(4 June 2010).

  
8.
   One passenger on the
Mavi Marmara
had apparently been convicted and served prison time for his involvement in the 1996 hijacking of a Russian ferryboat. (The hijackers were demanding the release of Chechen prisoners.)

  
9.
   Hugh Pope, “Erdogan is Not the Bogeyman,”
Haaretz
(18 June 2010); International Crisis Group,
Turkey’s Crises over Israel and Iran
(8 September 2010), p. 7;
Report of the Fact-Finding Mission
, para. 129. The passengers had to break into medical supplies earmarked for Gaza in order to treat the wounded.

 
10.
  
Report of the Fact-Finding Mission
, paras. 101, 116, 165. Israel has not produced any evidence substantiating its claim that passengers fired live ammunition at the commandos, while its public statements on this point have been riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions (ibid., p. 26n70).

 
11.
  Ibid., paras. 125–26.

 
12.
  Robert Booth, “Gaza Flotilla Activists Were Shot in Head at Close Range,”
Guardian
(4 June 2010);
Report of the Fact-Finding Mission
, paras. 118, 120, 170. About 50 passengers suffered injuries. Israel reported six to ten commandos injured, two seriously.

 
13.
  Ben Knight, “Claim and Counterclaim after Deadly Flotilla Raid,”
ABC News
(1 June 2010).

 
14.
  Nahum Barnea, “The Test of the Result,”
Yediot Ahronot
(1 June 2010); Ben Kaspit, “It’s Not Enough to Be Right,”
Maariv
(1 June 2010); Amos Harel, “Straight into the Trap,”
Haaretz
(1 June 2010); Mordechai Kedar, “A War for World’s Future,”
ynetnews.com
(31 May 2010;
http://tinyurl.com/2bzf5qb
); Mickey Bergman, “The IDF Soldiers Were Sent on a Mission That Defies Logic,”
Huffington Post
(1 June 2010); Yaakov Katz, “Duped,”
Jerusalem Post
(4 June 2010). Flotilla passengers anticipated that “if we fail to stop, they will probably knock out our propellers or rudders, then tow us somewhere for repair” (Henning Mankell, “Flotilla Raid Diary,” in Moustafa Bayoumi, ed.,
Midnight on the Mavi Marmara: The attack on the Gaza freedom flotilla and how it changed the course of the Israel/Palestine conflict
(New York: 2010), p. 22).