Method and Madness: The Hidden Story of Israel's Assaults on Gaza (14 page)

 
48.
  Noam Chomsky,
The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians
(Boston: 1983), Chapter 3; Norman G. Finkelstein,
Beyond Chutzpah: On the misuse of anti-Semitism and the abuse of history
(Berkeley: 2005; expanded paperback edition, 2008), pp. 337–41. For in-depth analysis, see Finkelstein,
Knowing Too Much
, Chapter 9 (“Israel versus the World”).

 
49.
  Finkelstein,
“This Time,”
pp. 40–44.

 
50.
  Finkelstein,
Knowing Too Much
, Chapter 9.

 
51.
  Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid,
Hamas: Ideological rigidity and political flexibility
, United States Institute of Peace Special Report (Washington, DC: June 2009), pp. 2–4. See also Khaled Hroub, “A ‘New Hamas’ through Its New Documents,”
Journal of Palestine Studies
(Summer 2006), Jeroen Gunning,
Hamas in Politics: Democracy, religion, violence
(New York: 2008), pp. 205–6, 236–37, Jerome Slater, “A Perfect Moral Catastrophe: Just War philosophy and the Israeli attack on Gaza,”
Tikkun
, March–April 2009 (a longer and fully footnoted version of this article is posted on
www.Tikkun.com
), subsection headed “A political settlement with Hamas?,” and Henry Siegman, “US Hamas Policy Blocks Middle East Peace,”
Noref Report
(September 2010). Hamas’s political evolution retraced the PLO’s, in which the call for a state in the whole of Palestine was superseded by a “phased” liberation of Palestine, starting with a state in the West Bank and Gaza, and finally acquiescence in a two-state settlement (Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela,
The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, violence, and coexistence
(New York: 2006), pp. 108–10).

 
52.
  Mouin Rabbani, “A Hamas Perspective on the Movement’s Evolving Role: An interview with Khalid Mishal, Part II,”
Journal of Palestine Studies
(Summer 2008).

 
53.
  Gianni Perrelli, “Con Israele non sarà mai pace” (Interview with Khalid Mishal),
L’espresso
(26 February 2009;
http://tinyurl.com/clcw8q
).

 
54.
  Jimmy Carter,
We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land: A plan that will work
(New York: 2009), pp. 137, 177. See also Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Hamas Would Honor Referendum on Peace with Israel,”
Reuters
(1 December 2010).

 
55.
  Khaled Hroub,
Hamas: Political thought and practice
(Washington, DC: 2000), p. 44 (see also ibid., p. 254); Sherifa Zuhur,
Hamas and Israel: Conflicting strategies of group-based politics
(Carlisle, PA: 2008), pp. 29–31 (this study was published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College). See also Gunning,
Hamas in Politics
, pp. 19–20.

 
56.
  “What Hamas Wants,”
Mideast Mirror
(22 December 2008).

 
57.
  Zuhur,
Hamas and Israel
, pp. ix, 14.

 
58.
  Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center,
The Six Months of the Lull Arrangement
(December 2008), pp. 2, 6, 7. See also point (3) of “Defense Minister Barak’s Discussions . . . ” (29 August 2008),
WikiLeaks
. According to Egyptians who brokered the June 2008 cease-fire, it provided for an immediate cessation of armed hostilities; a gradual lifting of the economic blockade that, after ten days, would allow for the passage of all products, except materials used in the manufacture of projectiles and explosives; and negotiations after three weeks for a prisoner exchange and the opening of Rafah crossing (see International Crisis Group,
Ending the War in Gaza
, p. 3; Carter,
We Can Have Peace
, pp. 137–38). After the abortive coup against Hamas in June 2007, Israel severely restricted entry of goods “not considered essential for the basic subsistence of the population.” It allowed passage of only a “humanitarian minimum”—a benchmark that was arbitrarily determined, not sanctioned by international law, and in fact fell below Gaza’s minimal humanitarian needs. When the June 2008 cease-fire went into effect, Israel permitted only a “slightly increased” movement of supplies into Gaza. Gisha (Legal Center for Freedom of Movement),
Red Lines Crossed: Destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure
(August 2009), pp. 11, 13, 41–42, 45–46, 50; see also Gisha, “Israel Reveals Documents Related to the Gaza Closure Policy” (21 October 2010).

 
59.
  Richard N. Haass and Martin Indyk, “Beyond Iraq: A new US strategy for the Middle East,” and Walter Russell Mead, “Change They Can Believe In: To make Israel safe, give Palestinians their due,” in
Foreign Affairs
(January–February 2009).

 
60.
  Mishal and Sela,
Palestinian Hamas
, p. 14.

 
61.
  Chomsky,
Fateful Triangle
, Chapters 3 and 5.

 
62.
  Yehuda Lukacs, ed.,
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A documentary record, 1967–1990
(Cambridge: 1992), pp. 477–79.

 
63.
  Yehoshaphat Harkabi,
Israel’s Fateful Hour
(New York: 1988), p. 101.

 
64.
  Avner Yaniv,
Dilemmas of Security: Politics, strategy and the Israeli experience in Lebanon
(Oxford: 1987), pp. 20–23, 50–54, 67–70, 87–89, 100–1, 105–6, 113, 143, 294n46. Robert Fisk,
Pity the Nation: The abduction of Lebanon
(New York: 1990), pp. 197, 232.

 
65.
  Saed Bannoura, “Livni Calls for a Large-Scale Military Offensive in Gaza,” IMEMC & Agencies (10 December 2008;
http://tinyurl.com/chqtk7
).

 
66.
  Uri Blau, “IDF Sources: Conditions not yet optimal for Gaza exit,”
Haaretz
(8 January 2009); Barak Ravid, “Disinformation, Secrecy, and Lies: How the Gaza offensive came about,”
Haaretz
(28 December 2008).

 
67.
  Nancy Kanwisher, Johannes Haushofer, and Anat Biletzki, “Reigniting Violence: How do cease-fires end?,”
Huffington Post
(6 January 2009;
http://tinyurl.com/dfujv3
). See also Johannes Haushofer, Anat Biletzki, and Nancy Kanwisher, “Both Sides Retaliate in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States
(4 October 2010).

 
68.
  Slater, “A Perfect Moral Catastrophe” (subsection headed “A cease-fire”).

 
69.
  Zvi Bar’el, “Crushing the Tahadiyeh,”
Haaretz
(16 November 2008); Uri Avnery, “The Calculations behind Israel’s Slaughter of Palestinians in Gaza,”
redress.cc
(2 January 2009;
http://tinyurl.com/a6pzlx
).

 
70.
  Amnesty International annual report 2009 entry for
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories
; see also Human Rights Watch,
Rockets from Gaza: Harm to civilians from Palestinian armed groups’ rocket attacks
(New York: August 2009), p. 2.

 
71.
  Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center,
Six Months
, p. 3.

 
72.
  “Hamas Wants Better Terms for Truce,”
Jerusalem Post
(21 December 2008); Bradley Burston, “Can the First Gaza War Be Stopped before It Starts?,”
Haaretz
(22 December 2008). Diskin told the Israeli cabinet that Hamas would renew the truce if Israel lifted the siege of Gaza, stopped military attacks, and extended the truce to the West Bank.

 
73.
  “Gaza Residents ‘Terribly Trapped,’”
BBC News
(4 November 2008;
www.bbc.co.uk
).

 
74.
  Gisha,
Red Lines
, pp. 5, 26, 33.

 
75.
  Sara Roy, “If Gaza Falls . . . ,”
London Review of Books
(1 January 2009).

 
76.
  International Crisis Group,
Ending the War in Gaza
, pp. 3, 10–11.

 
77.
  Burston, “Can the First Gaza War.”

 
78.
  Khalid Mishal, “This Brutality Will Never Break Our Will to Be Free,”
Guardian
(6 January 2009).

 
79.
  It was not the first time Israel sought to provoke Hamas after it mooted a modus vivendi. Two Israeli academic authorities on Hamas recalled that in September 1997, just days before an abortive Israeli assassination attempt on Khalid Mishal, “Jordan’s King Hussein delivered a message from the Hamas leadership to Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In it Hamas suggested opening an indirect dialogue with the Israeli government, to be mediated by the king, toward achieving a cessation of violence, as well as a ‘discussion of all matters.’ But the message was ignored or missed and, in any case, became irrelevant following the attempt” on the Hamas leader’s life (Mishal and Sela,
Palestinian Hamas
, p. 72; see also McGeough,
Kill Khalid
, esp. pp. 141, 146, 226).

  
1.
   
Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict
(25 September 2009), paras. 1, 151. Hereafter: Goldstone Report.

  
2.
   Ibid., paras. 144, 162; Bill Moyers,
Journal
(23 October 2009;
http://tinyurl.com/yllft94
). For the extended correspondence between Goldstone and the Government of Israel, see Goldstone Report, Annex II, pp. 434–50; see also Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, “The Goldstone Mission—FAQ” (
http://tinyurl.com/yjvunox
).

  
3.
   For a critical but ultimately positive assessment of the Report by “recognized experts” in the relevant bodies of international law, see
Report of an Expert Meeting which Assessed Procedural Criticisms Made of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (The Goldstone Report)
(London: 27 November 2009).

  
4.
   Goldstone Report, paras. 63, 1213–14.

  
5.
   Ibid., paras. 1215, 1892.

  
6.
   Ibid., paras. 1208, 1884.

  
7.
   Ibid., para. 1893.

  
8.
   Ibid., para. 1898. Goldstone afterwards recalled that, although initially fearful of traveling to Gaza—“I had nightmares about being kidnapped. You know, it was very difficult, especially for a Jew, to go into an area controlled by Hamas”—he was “struck by the warmth of the people that we met and who we dealt with in Gaza” (Moyers,
Journal
).

  
9.
   Goldstone Report, paras. 46, 50, 60, 937, 961, 987, 1006, 1171–75, 1935.

 
10.
  Ibid., paras. 75, 1334–35, 1936. The fact-finding committee chaired by Goldstone’s distinguished South African colleague John Dugard went somewhat further. It concluded that, during Israel’s “heinous and inhuman” attack, it was culpable for war crimes, such as “indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians,” “killing, wounding and terrorizing civilians,” “wanton destruction of property,” and the bombing and shelling of hospitals and ambulances and obstructing the evacuation of the wounded. It further found that Israel was guilty of crimes against humanity, including the intentional and “reckless” killing of civilians, “mass killings—‘extermination’—in certain cases,” and “persecution.” It did not, however, hold Israel culpable for the crime of genocide: “the main reason for the operation was not to destroy a group, as required for the crime of genocide, but to engage in a vicious exercise of collective punishment designed either to compel the population to reject Hamas as the governing authority of Gaza or to subdue the population into a state of submission.” Still, it found that “individual soldiers may well have had such an intent [i.e., to commit genocide] and might therefore be prosecuted for this crime.”
Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Committee on Gaza: No safe place
. Presented to the League of Arab States (30 April 2009), paras. 20, 22–23, 25–30 of Executive Summary; paras. 405, 485–91, 496–98, 500–4, 506–10, 519–20, 526–29, 540–47, 554–58, 572–73. Hereafter: Dugard Report.

 
11.
  Goldstone Report, para. 1895.

 
12.
  Ibid., paras. 108, 1691, 1953. The Dugard Committee held Hamas and other militant Palestinian groups culpable for war crimes, such as “indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on civilians” and “killing, wounding and terrorizing civilians,” although it entered the caveat that “there are a number of factors that reduce their moral blameworthiness but not their criminal responsibility”; among them, “Palestinians have been denied their right to self-determination by Israel and have long been subjected to a cruel siege by Israel,” “the scale of Israel’s action,” and “the great difference in both the weapons capability of the opposing sides and the use of their respective weaponry” (Dugard Report, paras. 21, 24, 35 of Executive Summary; paras. 457, 484, 495, 499, 575–77).