Method and Madness: The Hidden Story of Israel's Assaults on Gaza (13 page)

  
1.
   Amira Hass,
Drinking the Sea at Gaza: Days and nights in a land under siege
(New York: 1996), p. 9.

  
2.
   Sara Roy,
Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict
(London: 2007), pp. 327–28. See also Galia Golan,
Israel and Palestine: Peace plans from Oslo to disengagement
(Princeton: 2007), p. 119.

  
3.
   Human Rights Watch, “‘Disengagement’ Will Not End Gaza Occupation” (29 October 2004). HRW’s
World Report 2006
reiterated this position:

             In August and September 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew approximately eight thousand settlers, along with military personnel and installations, from the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the northern West Bank near Jenin. While Israel has since declared the Gaza Strip a “foreign territory” and the crossings between Gaza and Israel “international borders,” under international humanitarian law (IHL), Gaza remains occupied, and Israel retains its responsibilities for the welfare of Gaza residents. Israel maintains effective control over Gaza by regulating movement in and out of the Strip as well as the airspace, sea space, public utilities and population registry. In addition, Israel declared the right to re-enter Gaza militarily at any time in its “Disengagement Plan.” Since the withdrawal, Israel has carried out aerial bombardments, including targeted killings, and has fired artillery into the northeastern corner of Gaza.

        For a detailed legal analysis, see Gisha (Legal Center for Freedom of Movement),
Disengaged Occupiers: The legal status of Gaza
(Tel Aviv: January 2007). The UN Human Rights Council Mission chaired by Richard Goldstone affirmed that Israel “exercised effective control over the Gaza Strip” and that “the circumstances of this control establish that the Gaza Strip remains occupied by Israel” (
Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict
(25 September 2009) (hereafter: Goldstone Report), paras. 187, 276–79).

  
4.
   Yoram Dinstein,
The International Law of Belligerent Occupation
(Cambridge: 2009), p. 277.

  
5.
   “One of the most important ‘achievements,’” of the Oslo Accord for Israel, and “of which Rabin was proud,” was “the exclusion of specific language freezing settlement construction in the period of the interim arrangement” (Yossi Beilin,
The Path to Geneva: The quest for a permanent agreement, 1996–2004
(New York: 2004), p. 278). On the issue of settlements, see also B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories),
Land Grab: Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank
(Jerusalem: May 2002). For the Oslo years generally, see Norman G. Finkelstein,
Knowing Too Much: Why the American Jewish romance with Israel is coming to an end
(New York: 2012), Chapters 5 and 9.

  
6.
   Jimmy Carter,
Palestine Peace Not Apartheid
(New York: 2006), pp. 159–60.

  
7.
   David Rose, “The Gaza Bombshell,”
Vanity Fair
(April 2008); Paul McGeough,
Kill Khalid: The failed Mossad assassination of Khalid Mishal and the rise of Hamas
(New York: 2009), pp. 349–82. See also International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Hamas Coup in Gaza” (June 2007).

  
8.
   Norman G. Finkelstein,
“This Time We Went Too Far”: Truth and consequences of the Gaza invasion
, revised and expanded paperback edition (New York: 2011), pp. 16–17.

  
9.
   “Cast Lead” refers to a line in a Hanukkah song.

 
10.
  For background and analysis, see Mouin Rabbani, “Birth Pangs of a New Palestine,”
Middle East Report Online
(7 January 2009;
http://tinyurl.com/a2bu6l
).

 
11.
  International Crisis Group,
Gaza’s Unfinished Business
(April 2009), p. 21; see ibid., pp. 27–28, for the post-invasion cease-fire terms.

 
12.
  
Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Committee on Gaza: No safe place
. Presented to the League of Arab States (30 April 2009), para. 411(3). The Committee was chaired by eminent South African legal scholar John Dugard.

 
13.
  Amnesty International,
Operation “Cast Lead”: 22 Days of death and destruction
(London: July 2009), p. 7; for details, see ibid., pp. 11ff. See also Goldstone Report, paras. 459, 653–703.

 
14.
  Amnesty International,
Operation “Cast Lead,”
pp. 1, 24; for details, see ibid., esp. pp. 24–27. See also Goldstone Report, paras. 704–885.

 
15.
  Human Rights Watch,
White Flag Deaths: Killings of Palestinian civilians during Operation Cast Lead
(New York: August 2009), pp. 2, 4, 10–15.

 
16.
  The State of Israel,
The Operation in Gaza, 27 December 2008–18 January 2009: Factual and legal aspects
(July 2009), para. 213; Asa Kasher, “A Moral Evaluation of the Gaza War,”
Jerusalem Post
(7 February 2010).

 
17.
  Anshel Pfeffer, “Israel Claims Success in the PR War,”
Jewish Chronicle
(31 December 2008); Hirsh Goodman, “Analysis: The effective public diplomacy ended with Operation Cast Lead,”
Jerusalem Post
(5 February 2009).

 
18.
  Anthony H. Cordesman,
The “Gaza War”: A strategic analysis
(Washington, DC: 2 February 2009; “Final Review Draft”), pp. 31–32, 68. For an extensive critique of this publication, see Finkelstein,
“This Time,”
Chapter 3.

 
19.
  Bradley Burston, “Why Does the World Media Love to Hate Israel?,”
Haaretz
(23 March 2009); Shlomo Avineri, “What Was the Computer Thinking?,”
Haaretz
(18 March 2009). Heeding such counsel, Israel in its official brief avoided mentioning Cast Lead apart from a parenthetical reference to “the ‘Gaza Operation,’ also known as ‘Operation Cast Lead’” (
Operation in Gaza
, para. 16).

 
20.
  Gideon Levy, “The Time of the Righteous,”
Haaretz
(9 January 2009).

 
21.
  Ethan Bronner, “Israel Reminds Foes That It Has Teeth,”
New York Times
(29 December 2008).

 
22.
  Benny Morris, “Why Israel Feels Threatened,”
New York Times
(30 December 2008).

 
23.
  Benny Morris,
Righteous Victims: A history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881–2001
(New York: 2001), p. 686.

 
24.
  Norman G. Finkelstein,
Knowing Too Much
, Chapter 7 (Johnson at p. 172).

 
25.
  “Memorandum for the Record” (1 June 1967),
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968
, vol. 19
, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967
(Washington, DC: 2004).

 
26.
  See Finkelstein,
Knowing Too Much
, Chapter 7 (esp. pp. 166–67).

 
27.
  Tom Segev,
1967: Israel, the war, and the year that transformed the Middle East
(New York: 2007), p. 293, my emphasis.

 
28.
  Zeev Maoz,
Defending the Holy Land: A critical analysis of Israel’s security and foreign policy
(Ann Arbor: 2006), p. 89.

 
29.
  Matthew Kalman, “Israel Set War Plan More Than a Year Ago,”
San Francisco Chronicle
(21 July 2006).

 
30.
  The Reut Institute,
Building a Political Firewall against Israel’s Delegitimization
(Tel Aviv: March 2010), para. 35.

 
31.
  Yaron London, “The Dahiya Strategy” (6 October 2008;
http://tinyurl.com/c7tdjv
). Gabriel Siboni, “Disproportionate Force: Israel’s concept of response in light of the Second Lebanon War,”
Institute for National Security Studies
(INSS) (2 October 2008). Giora Eiland, “The Third Lebanon War: Target Lebanon,”
Strategic Assessment
(November 2008). Amos Harel, “Analysis: IDF plans to use disproportionate force in next war,”
Haaretz
(5 October 2007). Joseph Nasr, “Israel Warns Hezbollah War Would Invite Destruction,”
Reuters
(2 October 2008).

 
32.
  London, “Dahiya Strategy.” Attila Somfalvi, “Sheetrit: We should level Gaza neighborhoods” (2 October 2008;
http://tinyurl.com/c264xn
).

 
33.
  “Israeli General Says Hamas Must Not Be the Only Target in Gaza,” IDF Radio, Tel Aviv, in Hebrew 0600 gmt (26 December 2008), BBC Monitoring Middle East; Tova Dadon, “Deputy Chief of Staff: Worst still ahead,”
ynetnews.com
(29 December 2008;
http://tinyurl.com/crwdbw
); “B’Tselem to Attorney General Mazuz: Concern over Israel targeting civilian objects in the Gaza Strip” (31 December 2008;
http://tinyurl.com/8gxwox
); Goldstone Report, para. 1204. For more on the Dahiya strategy and the quote from Channel 10 News, see Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI),
No Second Thoughts: The changes in the Israeli Defense Forces’ combat doctrine in light of “Operation Cast Lead”
(Jerusalem: November 2009), pp. 20–28.

 
34.
  Seumas Milne, “Israel’s Onslaught on Gaza is a Crime That Cannot Succeed,”
Guardian
(30 December 2008); Shay Fogelman, “Shock and Awe,”
Haaretz
(31 December 2010).

 
35.
  Amnesty International,
Operation “Cast Lead,”
p. 47.

 
36.
  Reuven Pedatzur, “The Mistakes of Cast Lead,”
Haaretz
(8 January 2009).

 
37.
  Morris, “Why Israel Feels Threatened”; Matt M. Matthews, “The Israeli Defense Forces Response to the 2006 War with Hezbollah,”
Military Review
(July–August 2009), p. 45.

 
38.
  B. Michael, “Déjà Vu in Gaza,”
ynetnews.com
(29 December 2008;
http://tinyurl.com/d2r2v4
).

 
39.
  Al Mezan Center for Human Rights,
Bearing the Brunt Again: Child rights violations during Operation Cast Lead
(September 2009), p. 28; Human Rights Watch,
Precisely Wrong: Gaza civilians killed by Israeli drone-launched missiles
(30 June 2009), pp. 14–17. HRW found that “no Palestinian fighters were active on the street or in the immediate area just prior to or at the time of the attack” on the college students.

 
40.
  International Crisis Group,
Ending the War in Gaza
(5 January 2009), p. 18.

 
41.
  Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, “Israel and Hamas Are Both Paying a Steep Price in Gaza,”
Haaretz
(10 January 2009); Ari Shavit, “Analysis: Israel’s victories in Gaza make up for its failures in Lebanon,”
Haaretz
(12 January 2009); Guy Bechor, “A Dangerous Victory,”
ynetnews.com
(12 January 2009;
http://tinyurl.com/c7gn7e
). Looking back a year later, Harel recalled that the Gaza invasion “was considered to be an effective remedy to the failures of the 2006 Second Lebanon War” (Amos Harel, “Israel Stuck in the Mud on Internal Gaza Probe,”
Haaretz
(30 January 2010)). For a critique of Shavit’s comments during the 2008–9 invasion (and his 2014 bestselling book), see Norman G. Finkelstein,
Old Wine, Broken Bottle: Ari Shavit’s Promised Land
(New York: 2014), Chapter 4.

 
42.
  Thomas L. Friedman, “Israel’s Goals in Gaza?,”
New York Times
(14 January 2009). See also Thomas L. Friedman, “War, Timeout, War, Time . . . ,”
New York Times
(25 June 2010).

 
43.
  Yair Evron, “Deterrence: The campaign against Hamas,”
Strategic Assessment
(February 2009), p. 81; International Crisis Group,
Gaza’s Unfinished Business
, p. 19n198.

 
44.
  International Crisis Group,
Gaza’s Unfinished Business
, pp. 7–8.

 
45.
  Gideon Levy, “The IDF Has No Mercy for the Children in Gaza Nursery Schools,”
Haaretz
(15 January 2009).

 
46.
  “Memorandum for the Record” (17 November 1968), n. 13,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968
. The quoted phrase is from key US presidential aide Walt W. Rostow.

 
47.
  International Crisis Group,
Gaza’s Unfinished Business
, p. 19.