Closing the Ring (50 page)

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I then explained that it would be quite impossible to transfer any divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom over and above the seven mentioned. Shipping would not run to it. Thirty-five Anglo-American divisions would be assembled in the United Kingdom for the initial assault. Thereafter the British could do no more than maintain in Northern France their sixteen divisions, but the United States would continue to pump in further troops until the Expeditionary Force in Northern France amounted all told to fifty or sixty divisions. Both the British and American divisions, if line of communication troops, corps troops, flak, etc., were taken into account, amounted gross to about forty thousand men each. There were already very considerable Anglo-American air forces in the United Kingdom, but even so the United States Air Force was going to be doubled, or perhaps trebled, in the next six months. Thus there would be a tremendous weight of air-power concentrated in an area from which the enemy could be easily reached. All the forces and equipment were being built up according to a prearranged schedule, which would be shown to the Soviet authorities if they so desired.

Stalin asked me about the operation against the South of France. I said it had not yet been planned in detail, but the idea was that it might be done in conformity or simultaneously
with “Overlord.” The assault force would consist of troops now in Italy. I added that it would also be necessary to examine the President’s idea of moving northeast from the head of the Adriatic.

Stalin next asked how many Anglo-American troops would have to be allotted if Turkey came into the war.

Observing that I spoke for myself alone, I said that two or three divisions at the most would be required to take the islands in the Aegean, and that, in addition, we should probably have to give Turkey about twenty squadrons of air forces and several regiments of flak to defend herself. Both the air forces and the flak could be provided without prejudice to other operations.

Stalin thought it would be a mistake to send part of our forces to Turkey and elsewhere and part to Southern France. The best course would be to make “Overlord” the basic operation for 1944, and, once Rome had been captured, to send all available forces in Italy to Southern France. These forces could then join hands with the “Overlord” forces when the invasion was launched. France was the weakest spot on the German Front. He did not himself expect Turkey to agree to enter the war.

I asked whether the Soviet Government was not very anxious to get Turkey into the war. We had tried once and failed. But was it not intended that we should renew the effort?

“I am all in favour of trying again,” said Stalin. “We ought to take them by the scruff of the neck if necessary.”

I then said that I entirely agreed with Marshal Stalin’s observations about the undesirability of dispersion, but all that I suggested was that a handful of divisions—say two or three—would be very well employed in making contact with Turkey, while the air forces which would come into play were those which were already defending Egypt and would merely be advancing their line. Thus there was no appreciable diversion of effort, either from the Italian Front or from “Overlord.”

Stalin thought it would be well worth while to take the islands if this could be done with three or four divisions.

What I particularly dreaded, I said, was an interval of six months’ inactivity between the capture of Rome and “Overlord.” We ought to be fighting the enemy all the time, and the operations which I had suggested, although admittedly of a secondary character, should be the subject of careful consideration.

Stalin repeated that “Overlord” was a very serious operation, and that it was better to help it by invading the South of France. He would even prefer to assume a defensive rôle in Italy and forgo the capture of Rome for the present if this would admit the invasion of Southern France by, say, ten divisions. Two months later, “Overlord” would follow, and the two invasions could then join hands.

I replied that we should be no stronger if we pulled out of the advance on Rome, and once we had taken the city we should be in a much stronger position through having destroyed or badly mutilated ten or eleven German divisions. Moreover, we required the airfields north of Rome for the bombing of Germany. It would be impossible for us to forgo the capture of Rome. To do so would be regarded on all sides as a crushing defeat, and the British Parliament would not tolerate the idea for a moment.

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The President now suggested that the timing of operations required the most careful consideration. Any operation undertaken in the Eastern Mediterranean would probably put off “Overlord” until June or July. He himself was opposed to such a delay if it could possibly be avoided. He therefore suggested that the military experts should examine the possibility of operations against Southern France on the timing put forward by Stalin—i.e., two months before “Overlord,” the governing factor being that “Overlord” should be launched at the prescribed time.

Stalin said that the experience gained by the Soviets during the last two years of fighting was that a big offensive, if undertaken from only one direction, rarely yielded results. The better course was to launch offensives from two or more directions simultaneously. This compelled the enemy to disperse his forces, and at the same time gave an opportunity for the attacks, provided they were close enough to each other, to make contact and increase the power of the offensive as a whole. He suggested that this principle might well be applied to the problem under discussion.

I did not disagree in principle with these views. The suggestions that I had made for minor help to Yugoslavia and Turkey did not, I said, conflict in any way with that general conception. At the same time, I wished it to be placed on record that I could not in any circumstances agree to sacrifice the activities of the armies in the Mediterranean, which included twenty British and British-controlled divisions, merely in order to keep the exact date of May 1 for “Overlord.” If Turkey refused to come into the war, it could not be helped. I earnestly hoped that I should not be asked to agree to any such rigid timing of operations as the President had suggested. Would it not be right for the Conference to meditate over all that had been said and to continue their discussions on the following day? The President agreed, and suggested that the Staffs should set to work the following morning.

Stalin then observed that he had not expected that military questions would be discussed at the Conference, and he had not brought his military experts with him. Nevertheless, Marshal Voroshilov would do his best.

I asked how it was proposed to discuss the question of Turkey. The problem was probably as much political as military. The questions to which the Conference should address itself were as follows: (
a
) What do we want Turkey to do? (
b
) What are we prepared to offer her to bring her into the war? (
c
) What will be the consequences of any such offer?

Stalin agreed. Turkey was an ally of England and on terms of friendship with the United States. It was for them to persuade her to take the proper course. When I said that Turkey would be mad if she declined Russias invitation to come in on the winning side, and at the same time lost the sympathy of Great Britain, Stalin rejoined that a number of people preferred to be mad, and all neutrals regarded those who were waging war as fools to fight when they might be doing nothing.

I concluded the meeting by saying that, although we were all great friends, it would be idle for us to delude ourselves that we saw eye to eye on all matters. Time and patience were necessary. Here ended our first talk.

¹
Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins
, page 777.

²
Ibid.
, 778.

3
Conversations and Conferences

A Talk with Stalin About Germany___Poland and Her Frontiers___Roosevelt’s Plan for the “Four Policemen”___I Present the Stalingrad Sword of Honour by the King’s Command___Our Second Plenary Session___Stalin Asks Who Will Command “Overlord”___I State the British View About “Overlord” and Italy___Argument About the Date of Crossing the Channel___The Importance of Not Wrecking the Italian Campaign___Stalin’s Direct Question to Me___Discussion at Dinner___I Declare Against Mass Executions of Germans.

T
HE FORMAL CONFERENCES
were interspersed with what may be thought to be even more important talks between Roosevelt, Stalin, and myself at luncheons and dinners. Here there were very few things that could not be said and received in good-humour. On Sunday night the 28th, President Roosevelt was our host for dinner. We were a party of ten or eleven, including the interpreters, and conversation soon became general and serious.

After dinner on this first evening, when we were strolling about the room, I led Stalin to a sofa and suggested that we talk for a little on what was to happen after the war was won. He assented with good-humour, and we sat down. Eden joined us. “Let us,” said the Marshal, “first consider the worst that might happen.” He thought that Germany had every possibility of recovering from this war, and might start on a new one within a comparatively short time. He feared the revival of German nationalism. After Versailles peace had seemed assured, but Germany had recovered very quickly. We must therefore establish a strong body to prevent Germany starting a new war. He was convinced that she would recover. When I asked “How soon?” he replied, “Within fifteen to twenty years.” I said that the world must be made safe for at least fifty years. If it was only for fifteen to twenty years, then we should have betrayed our soldiers.

Stalin thought we should consider restraints on Germany’s manufacturing capacity. The Germans were an able people, very industrious and resourceful, and they would recover quickly. I replied that there would have to be certain measures of control. I would forbid them all aviation, civil and military, and I would forbid the General Staff system. “Would you,” asked Stalin, “also forbid the existence of watchmakers’ and furniture factories for making parts of shells? The Germans produced toy rifles which were used for teaching hundreds of thousands of men how to shoot.”

“Nothing,” I said, “is final. The world rolls on. We have now learnt something. Our duty is to make the world safe for at least fifty years by German disarmament, by preventing rearmament, by supervision of German factories, by forbidding all aviation, and by territorial changes of a far-reaching character. It all comes back to the question whether Great Britain, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. can keep a close friendship and supervise Germany in their mutual interest. We ought not to be afraid to give orders as soon as we see any danger.”

“There was control after the last war,” said Stalin, “but it failed.”

“We were inexperienced then,” I replied. “The last war was not to the same extent a national war, and Russia was not a party at the Peace Conference. It will be different this time.” I had a feeling that Prussia should be isolated and reduced; that Bavaria, Austria, and Hungary might form a broad, peaceful, unaggressive confederation. I thought Prussia should be dealt with more sternly than the other parts of the Reich, which might thus be influenced against throwing in their lot
with her. It must be remembered that those were war-time moods.

“All very good, but insufficient,” was Stalin’s comment.

Russia, I continued, would have her army, Great Britain and the United States their navies and air forces. In addition, all three Powers would have their other resources. All would be strongly armed, and must not assume any obligation to disarm. “We are the trustees for the peace of the world. If we fail, there will be perhaps a hundred years of chaos. If we are strong, we can carry out our trusteeship. There is more,” I went on, “than merely keeping the peace. The three Powers should guide the future of the world. I do not want to enforce any system on other nations. I ask for freedom and for the right of all nations to develop as they like. We three must remain friends in order to ensure happy homes in all countries.”

Stalin asked again what was to happen to Germany.

I replied that I was not against the toilers in Germany, but only against the leaders and against dangerous combinations. He said that there were many toilers in the German divisions who fought under orders. When he asked German prisoners who came from the labouring classes (such is the record, but he probably meant “Communist Party”) why they fought for Hitler, they replied that they were carrying out orders. He shot such prisoners.

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I suggested that we should discuss the Polish question. He agreed and invited me to begin. I said that we had declared war on account of Poland. Poland was therefore important to us. Nothing was more important than the security of the Russian western frontier. But I had given no pledges about frontiers. I wanted heart-to-heart talks with the Russians about this. When Marshal Stalin felt like telling us what he thought about it, the matter could be discussed and we could reac, some agreement, and the Marshal should tell me what w necessary for the defence of the western frontiers of Russia. After this war in Europe, which might end in 1944, the Soviet Union would be overwhelmingly strong and Russia would have a great responsibility in any decision she took with regard to Poland. Personally I thought Poland might move westward, like soldiers taking two steps “left close.” If Poland trod on some German toes, that could not be helped, but there must be a strong Poland. Poland was an instrument needed in the orchestra of Europe.

Stalin said the Polish people had their culture and their language, which must exist. They could not be extirpated.

“Are we to try,” I asked, “to draw frontier lines?”

“Yes.”

“I have no power from Parliament, nor, I believe, has the President, to define any frontier lines. But we might now, in Teheran, see if the three heads of Governments, working in agreement, could form some sort of policy which we could recommend to the Poles and advise them to accept.”