Closing the Ring (46 page)

Here I found Generals Eisenhower and Alexander, and other important personages. After the conclusion of the Tunisian campaign, I had suggested to the King that General Alexander should receive the distinction of the North Africa ribbon, with the numerals 1 and 8 upon it, representing the two victorious British armies of the campaign. I felt that as Eisenhower had been the Supreme Commander this was also his by right, and I sought and obtained the King’s approval. I had the honour of investing these two Commanders with this unique decoration. They were both taken by surprise, and seemed highly gratified when I pinned the ribbons on their coats. I arrived in Malta quite ill with a new cold and temperature, but I had sufficient strength to attend the dinner at the Governor’s war-time palace, the real one being uninhabitable from bombardment.

Although I continued to conduct business without cessation, I had to remain in bed all the time I was in Malta, except for a Staff conference and a final tour of the frightfully battered dockyard, where the whole of the people and workmen gathered with great enthusiasm. At midnight on November 19, we sailed again on our voyage to Alexandria.

A telegram had reached me from the President saying that his security advisers thought that Cairo was too dangerous for the Conference. They feared a German air attack from Greece or Rhodes, and suggested Khartoum instead. Roosevelt of course had nothing to do with this himself, as he was entirely indifferent to his personal safety. Khartoum would have been quite unequal to handling the great staffs we were bringing, amounting altogether to nearly five hundred. I therefore asked Ismay to examine the resources of Malta. He reported that owing to air damage the accommodation was not only inadequate for
our considerable gathering, but also extremely primitive. I therefore decided that we had better stick to Cairo, where all arrangements had been perfected. The eight squadrons of British aircraft based on Alexandria would certainly intercept and destroy any German attack. The enclave near the Pyramids which we were to occupy was to be guarded by more than a brigade of infantry, and there were upwards of five hundred anti-aircraft guns hard by. Accordingly I wirelessed the
Iowa
, which was bringing the President across the ocean:

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

21 Nov. 43

See St. John, chapter xiv, verses 1 to 4.

  On reading this through more carefully after it had gone I was a little concerned lest, apart from a shadow of unintended profanity, it should be thought I was taking too much upon myself and thus giving offence. However, the President brushed all objections aside and our plans continued unchanged. In the event no German airplanes ever came within several hundred miles of the Pyramids.

*  *  * *  *

The
Renown
reached Alexandria on the morning of November 21, and I flew at once to the desert landing-ground near the Pyramids. Here Mr. Casey had placed at my disposal the agreeable villa he was using. We lay in a broad expanse of Kasserine woods thickly dotted with the luxurious abodes and gardens of the cosmopolitan Cairo magnates. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Madame had already been ensconced half a mile away. The President was to occupy the spacious villa of the American Ambassador Kirk, about three miles down the road to Cairo. I went to the desert airfield to welcome him when he arrived in the “Sacred Cow” from Oran the next afternoon, and we drove to his villa together.

The Staffs congregated rapidly. The headquarters of the Conference and the venue of all the British and American Chiefs of Staff was at the Mena House Hotel, opposite the Pyramids, and I was but half a mile away. The whole place
bristled with troops and anti-aircraft guns, and the strictest cordons guarded all approaches. Everyone set to work at once at the various levels upon the immense mass of business which had to be decided or adjusted.

What we had apprehended from Chiang Kai-shek’s presence now in fact occurred. The talks of the British and American Staffs were sadly distracted by the Chinese story, which was lengthy, complicated, and minor. Moreover, as will be seen, the President, who took an exaggerated view of the Indian-Chinese sphere, was soon closeted in long conferences with the Generalissimo. All hope of persuading Chiang and his wife to go and see the Pyramids and enjoy themselves till we returned from Teheran fell to the ground, with the result that Chinese business occupied first instead of last place at Cairo. The President, in spite of my arguments, gave the Chinese the promise of a considerable amphibious operation across the Bay of Bengal within the next few months. This would have cramped “Overlord” for landing- and tank-landing-craft, which had now become the bottleneck, far more than any of my Turkey and Aegean projects. It would also have hampered grievously the immense operations we were carrying out in Italy. On November 29, I wrote to the Chiefs of Staff: “The Prime Minister wishes to put on record the fact that he specifically refused the Generalissimo’s request that we should undertake an amphibious operation simultaneously with the land operations in Burma.” It was not until we returned from Teheran to Cairo that I at length prevailed upon the President to retract his promise. Even so, many complications arose. Of this more anon.

I of course took occasion to visit the Generalissimo at his villa, where he and his wife were suitably installed. This was the first time I had met Chiang Kai-shek. I was impressed by his calm, reserved, and efficient personality. At this moment he stood at the height of his power and fame. To American eyes he was one of the dominant forces in the world. He was the champion of “the New Asia.” He was certainly a steadfast defender of China against Japanese invasion. He was a strong
anti-Communist. The accepted belief in American circles was that he would be the head of the great Fourth Power in the world after the victory had been won. All these views and values have since been cast aside by many of those who held them. I, who did not in those days share the excessive estimates of Chiang Kai-shek’s power or of the future helpfulness of China, may record the fact that the Generalissimo is still serving the same causes which at this time had gained him such wide renown. He has however since been beaten by the Communists in his own country, which is a very bad thing to be.

I had a very pleasant conversation with Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and found her a most remarkable and charming personality. I told her how much I had regretted that we could not find an occasion for a meeting at the time when we had both been in America together, and we agreed that no undue formalities should stand in the way of our talks in the future. The President had us all photographed together at one of our meetings at his villa, and although both the Generalissimo and his wife are now regarded as wicked and corrupt reactionaries by many of their former admirers, I am glad to keep this as a souvenir.

*  *  * *  *

During the outward voyage I had prepared what was in effect an indictment of our mismanagement of operations in the Mediterranean during the two months which had passed since our victory at Salerno. I gave this to the Chiefs of Staff, and they, while agreeing in principle, made a number of comments in detail upon it. The final version read as follows:

  For a year from Alamein and the landings in Northwest Africa the British and Americans have had virtually unbroken success in every theatre, and there is no doubt that our methods of war direction, through the Combined Chiefs of Staff working under the heads of the two Governments, have enabled our commanders in the field to gain resounding victories and achieve solid results. In all the history of alliances there never has been such harmony and mutual comprehension, not only in the high direction of the war,
but among the commanders and troops in the field. Our combined operations from the beginning of the Battle of Alamein to the end of the Battle of Naples and the deployment of the Army in Italy may well be regarded as an extremely well-managed and prosperous affair.

2. However, since then there has been a change. We have been overtaken and in a sense outrun by our own successes. Certain divergences of view, of emphasis rather than principle, have opened between the British and American Staffs. We must not allow ourselves to be prevented by victories already gained from subjecting ourselves severally and jointly to searching self-examination with a view to improving our methods and giving an increasingly high standard of service.

3. Since the successful landing and deployment of the Army in Italy in September, the war in the Mediterranean has taken an unsatisfactory course. Both the build-up and advance of the Army in Italy, making allowance for bad weather, must be considered extremely slow. There is not a sufficient preponderance over the enemy in the front line. Many of the divisions have been continuously in action since the landing without any spell of relief. At the same time, two of the best British divisions, the 50th and 51st, which stood in Sicily close to the battlefield, were first stripped of their equipment and have since been withdrawn to the United Kingdom. It has not been found possible to assist the forward movement of the Army to the extent that might have been hoped by making amphibious scoops along either coast. Some of the vitally needed landing-craft have been sent home, losing heavily from the weather on the way. A large number of others have been withdrawn and assembled in preparation for their homeward journey. These orders have now been arrested till December 15, but this is a useless date for Mediterranean purposes. The landing-craft have done nothing in October and November except assist in bringing vehicles ashore. At the same time the build-up of the Strategic Air Force in Italy has hampered the reinforcement of the fighting front. Thus the whole campaign on land has flagged. There is no prospect of Rome being taken in 1943. …

5. Side by side with this we have failed to give any real measure of support to the partisans and patriots in Yugoslavia and Albania. These guerrilla forces are containing as many [German] divisions as are the British and American armies put together. Hitherto
they have been nourished only by droppings from the air. It is now more than two months since we have had air and naval superiority in the mouth of the Adriatic, yet no ships with supplies have entered the ports taken by the partisans. On the contrary, the Germans are systematically driving them from these ports and acquiring mastery of the whole Dalmatian coast. It was not possible to prevent the Germans obtaining Corfu and Argostoli, and they actually hold these islands at the moment. Thus the Germans have weathered the difficulties caused by the Italian collapse and desertion, and with great severity are mopping up many of the patriot forces and cutting them off from the sea.

6. How has it happened? An imaginary line has been drawn down the Mediterranean which relieves General Eisenhower’s armies of all responsibility for the Dalmatian coast and the Balkans. These are assigned to General Wilson of the Middle East Command, but he does not possess the necessary forces. One Command has the forces but not the responsibilities, the other the responsibilities but not the forces. This can hardly be considered an ideal arrangement.

7. Most unfortunate of all has been the Dodecanese and the Aegean. Immediately after the fall of Italy a number of islands held by the Italians were occupied by us with Italian consent. Of these the two most important were Cos and Leros. We did not succeed in getting Rhodes, which is of course the master key to the Aegean. Hitler was not slow to recognise the naval and political importance of the fortress of Leros, which had fallen so cheaply into our hands, and with great stubbornness and tenacity he personally set himself to restore the situation in the Aegean. A very large proportion of the German air forces which would have been available to fight in Italy was moved into the Aegean theatre, and sea transport was improvised.
¹
It was evident early in October that attacks on Leros and Cos were imminent, and on October 4, Cos, where we had only one battalion, was retaken by the Germans. In spite of unexpectedly prolonged defence, Leros fell on November 16, the British losses in the whole business being about 5,000 and the enemy scoring his first success since Alamein. All this of course is outside the parish of the High North African Command. …

9. The Germans are now complete masters of the Eastern Aegean. Although already outmatched in the air in Italy, they have not hesitated to reduce their air-power there; and have transferred to the Aegean forces sufficient to dominate this theatre. Although the United States and British air forces in the Mediterranean have a first-line strength of over four thousand—i.e., practically equal to the whole of the German Air Force—the Germans have been able to reproduce in the Aegean theatre all the old technique of the days of our air nakedness, and with their Stuka dive-bombers have broken down the resistance of our best troops and sunk or damaged our ships. …

11. There are two causes for these misfortunes. The first has been mentioned—the artificial line of division between East and West in the Mediterranean, absolving the Western Commanders, who have the forces, of all responsibility for the vital interests at stake in the East. The second cause of course is the shadow of “Overlord.” The decisions at Quebec were taken before the consequences of the collapse of Italy were apparent and before the surrender of the Italian Fleet and the successful invasion of the mainland of Europe. Nevertheless, they have been maintained until a fortnight ago with inflexible rigidity. It has not been found possible to meet together earlier. We are now faced with the prospect that a fixed target date for “Overlord” will continue to hamper and enfeeble the Mediterranean campaign, that our affairs will deteriorate in the Balkans, and that the Aegean will remain firmly in German hands. All this is to be accepted for the sake of an operation fixed for May upon hypotheses that in all probability will not be realised at that date, and certainly not if the Mediterranean pressure is relaxed.

12. Nor must we overlook the discouraging and enfeebling effect upon the whole of the operations in the Mediterranean of the fact that it is now common knowledge in the armies that the theatre is to be bled as much as necessary for the sake of an operation elsewhere in the spring. The fact of troops and landing-craft being withdrawn from the very battlefield and of units being put under orders for home is in itself injurious. The intense desire to concentrate upon the enemy which carried us from Alamein and sustained us in Tunisia has been impaired. Yet in the Mediterranean alone are we in contact with the enemy and able to bring superior numbers to bear upon him now. It is certainly an odd
way of helping the Russians, to slow down the fight in the only theatre where anything can be done for some months.