Closing the Ring (45 page)

*  *  * *  *

The President was still unsure about going to Teheran, and strong pressure was being brought to bear on him in American political circles and his position under the United States Constitution was invoked. I fully appreciated his difficulties.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

30 Oct. 43

I will meet you in Cairo on the 20th as you suggest, and will, if you will allow me, assume responsibility for making all arrangements for your general security and comfort which would fall upon
us as the Occupying Power. Casey has been lent a beautiful villa, which I have seen myself, and am sure would be in every way suitable for you. It is a mile or two from the Pyramids, and surrounded by woods affording complete seclusion. It can be reached from the airfield in twenty minutes without going through any towns. The whole area can be easily cordoned off by British troops. There are some very interesting excursions into the desert which we could make together. I have no doubt Casey would be delighted to place the villa at your disposal. I should probably myself stay at the British Embassy in Cairo, which is perhaps twenty minutes away, but it may be that arrangements could be made for us both to be in the Pyramids area. I believe your Mr. Kirk also has a very fine house. Every facility exists in Cairo for the full Staffs to be accommodated and to meet for business, and they can easily come out to your villa whenever desired. If you like this plan, which, knowing the lay-out, I consider far the best, I will immediately make all preparations, and perhaps you would send an officer to make sure everything is arranged to your liking. …

  Our plans now began to take shape.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

31 Oct. 43

Hull’s departure from Moscow has meant two days’ delay in his getting home. It is essential I see him before I myself leave, as you can readily understand. I had hoped to get three days in North Africa before reaching Cairo. I can however do some of the North African and Italian business on the way back. Therefore I still hope to arrive Cairo by the 20th by flying there directly I reach the harbour. But if wind and weather are bad, I might not make Cairo until the 22d. I think my ship will take me to Oran.

Ever so many thanks for offering to make arrangements at Cairo, which we accept with pleasure. If any hitch develops there, we can of course meet in Alexandria, the Staff living ashore and we on our respective ships.

I am wiring Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] to prepare to meet us in the general neighborhood of Cairo about November 25.

Prime Minister to President

31 Oct. 43

Everything will be ready for Operation “Sextant”
²
from 20th
onward, and Colonel Warden will await Admiral Q and also Celestes
³
at rendezvous. No difficulty about accommodation for Staffs.

  Eden told me that there was no question of being able to move Stalin from the Teheran proposal. I made therefore every effort to smooth the way.

Prime Minister to General Ismay
(
Moscow
)

1 Nov. 43

Reason which prevents triple meeting at “Cairo Three” [Teheran] is said to be possible interruptions of flying over the mountains between Cairo and “Cairo Three,” thus putting Admiral Q [President Roosevelt] constitutionally out of touch for transmission of documents. Pray probe the weather facts on the spot, and also let me know whether there is a road from Teheran into Syria, and how long a motor-car would take to travel it with dispatches, which could be brought on by air once south of the mountains. If I could convince Admiral Q that there would be no interruption in the movement of dispatches, our original plan might again be valid.

I now tried a last expedient, namely, that the President and I should meet at Oran in our respective battleships, and that the two Staffs should have a preliminary consultation of four days at Malta. This failed, but the President decided to start in his battleship. He now proposed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet in Cairo before any contact was made with the Russians or the Chinese, whose presence in Cairo had been so strongly urged by him. But the first possible date for a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be November 22. The Americans were proposing that the Chinese delegation should arrive on that day, and their presence would inevitably lead to their being drawn into our discussions. I further learned indirectly that the President was simultaneously inviting Molotov to Cairo. I therefore sent the following messages to the President:

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

11 Nov. 43

There seems to have been a most unfortunate misunderstanding.
I thought from your telegram that the British and American Staffs would have “many meetings” before being joined by the Russians or Chinese. But now I hear from Ambassador Clark Kerr that on November 9 the United States Ambassador at Moscow delivered a message from you to Stalin inviting Monsieur Molotov to go to Cairo on November 22 with a military representative. November 22 is however the first day on which the Staffs can meet. I ask therefore that the date of the arrival of Molotov and his military representative shall be postponed till November 25 at the earliest.

2. I am very glad to hear also from Ambassador Clark Kerr that you contemplate going on November 26 to Teheran. I rather wish you had been able to let me know direct.

  I wished the proceedings to take three stages: first, a broad Anglo-American agreement at Cairo; secondly, a Supreme Conference between the three heads of the Governments of the three major Powers at Teheran; and, thirdly, on returning to Cairo, the discussion of what was purely Anglo-American business about the war in the Indian theatre and the Indian Ocean, which was certainly urgent. I did not want the short time we had at our disposal to be absorbed in what were after all comparatively minor matters, when the decision involving the course of the whole war demanded at least provisional settlement. It seemed also unsuitable that the Soviet should be formally brought into conference with the Chinese Government when they had not declared war against Japan.

“It is very difficult,” I wrote to Stalin on the 11th, “to settle things by triangular correspondence, especially when people are moving by sea and air.” Some of the difficulties, happily, cancelled each other out.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

12 Nov. 43

I have just heard that Uncle J. will come to Teheran. … I wired him at once that I had arranged the constitutional matter here, and therefore that I could go to Teheran for a short meeting with him, and told him I was very happy. Even then I was in doubt as to whether he would go through with his former offer to go to Teheran. His latest message has clinched the matter, and I think that now there is no question that you and I can meet him
there between the 27th and the 30th. Thus endeth a very difficult situation, and I think we can be happy.

In regard to Cairo, I have held all along, as I know you have, that it would be a terrible mistake if Uncle J. thought we had ganged up on him on military action. During the preliminary meetings in Cairo, the Combined Staffs will, as you know, be in the planning stage. That is all. It will not hurt you or me if Molotov and a Russian military representative are in Cairo too. They will not feel that they are being given the “run around.” They will have no Staff and no planners. Let us take them in on the high spots.

It is only five hours ago that I received Uncle J.’s telegram confirming Teheran. Undoubtedly Molotov and the military representative will return there with us between the 27th and the 30th, and when and after we have completed our talk with Uncle J. they will return with us to Cairo, possibly adding other military staff to the one representative accompanying Molotov on the first trip.

I think it essential that this schedule be carried out. I can assure you there will be no difficulties.

I am just off. Happy landing to us both.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

12 Nov. 43

I am very pleased that you have managed to arrange the constitutional matter and that our meeting is now definitely arranged. That is a great step forward.

2. The Chiefs of Staff are however very apprehensive about the arrangements which you have settled for military conversations, and I share their misgivings. I thought from your message that the British and American Staffs would have “many meetings” before being joined by the Russians or Chinese. I still regard this as absolutely essential in view of the serious questions which have to be settled. There is no objection to you and me seeing Molotov before our meeting with U.J., but the presence of a Soviet military observer so early in the Conference may cause grave embarrassment. His Majesty’s Government cannot abandon their rights to full and frank discussions with you and your officers about the vital business of our intermingled armies. A Soviet observer cannot possibly be admitted to the intimate conversations which our own Chiefs of Staff must have, and his exclusion may easily cause
offence. None of these objections would have applied to the formal Triple Staff Conference which I suggested should take place in due course.

  In the end this danger was removed by the President’s invitation to Chiang Kai-shek. Nothing would induce Stalin to compromise his relations with the Japanese by entering a four-Power conference with their three enemies. All question of Soviet representatives coming to Cairo was thus negatived. This was in itself a great relief. It was obtained however at a serious inconvenience and a subsequent cost.

Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill

12 Nov. 43

Although I wrote to the President that Monsieur Molotov would come to Cairo on November 22, now I must say however that for certain reasons of serious character Monsieur Molotov, to my regret, cannot come to Cairo. He will be able to come to Teheran at the end of November, and will arrive there together with me. Several military men will also accompany me.

It stands to reason that a meeting of the heads of only three Governments must take place at Teheran as it had been agreed There should be absolutely excluded the participation of the representatives of any other Powers.

I wish success to your meeting with the Chinese concerning the Far Eastern affairs.

  It was in this manner that our arrangements took final shape, and we started on our journeys.

END OF BOOK ONE

¹
I Was There
(Gollancz), page 227.

²
Our code-name for the Conference between Britain, the United States, and China.

³
“Your humble servant, yourself, and the Generalissimo respectively.”

*
Book Two
T
EHERAN TO ROME

1
Cairo

Voyage in the “Renown”___A Stay at Malta___Khartoum an Impossible Meeting-Place___We All Gather Around the Pyramids___I Meet Madame Chiang Kai-shek___The President Arrives___My Indictment of Our Military Conduct Since Salerno___Unreal Division of Forces and Responsibilities in the Mediterranean___The Shadow of “Overlord”___The First Plenary Meeting of the Cairo Conference, November
23___
Chiang Kai-shek’s Request for British Naval Support___Our Second Meeting, November
24___
Mr. Eden Joins Us after Conference with the Turks___The Question of the High Command___United States Proposal for One Supreme Commander Against Germany___Adverse Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff___I Support Them___Our Allies Remain Silent___A Family Party on Thanksgiving Day, November
25___
Off for Teheran, November
27.

O
N THE AFTERNOON
of November 12, I sailed in the
Renown
from Plymouth with my personal staff on a journey which was to keep me from England for nearly three months. With me came Mr. Winant, the American Ambassador, Admiral Cunningham, First Sea Lord, and General Ismay and other members of the Defence Office. I was feeling far from well, as a heavy cold and sore throat were reinforced by the consequences of inoculations against typhoid and malaria. I stayed in bed for several days. My Cabinet colleagues had expressed the kindly wish that my daughter Sarah should come with me, and it gave me pleasure to defer to their request. She was serving in the Air Force, and became my aide-de-camp.
We had an uneventful voyage across the Bay of Biscay, and I was able to go on deck as we passed the Straits of Gibraltar. While we stopped for a few hours at Algiers on the 15th, I had a long talk with General Georges about the French situation in Africa. As darkness fell, we resumed our course for Malta, which we reached on the 17th.