Closing the Ring (52 page)

The President said we were all agreed on the importance of “Overlord,” but not about its date. If “Overlord” was to be carried out during May, one at least of the Mediterranean operations would have to go by the board. If however landing-craft and other equipment were retained in the Mediterranean, then it would have to be postponed till June or July. There were obvious dangers in delaying “Overlord.” If we launched expeditions in the Eastern Mediterranean, even with only two or three divisions, there was always the possibility of their developing into bigger commitments involving the dispatch of larger forces. If this happened, even the later date of “Overlord” would be prejudiced.

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Mr. Roosevelt then referred to my point about the thirty German and Bulgarian divisions which were contained in the Balkans. He recommended that we should intensify the process of keeping them pinned down by Commando forces. It was important to hold them in this area and prevent them from doing harm elsewhere. There was clearly general agreement that Tito should be supported, but that this should be done without subtracting from the “Overlord” Operation.

Stalin said that, according to his information, the Germans had eight divisions in Yugoslavia, five in Greece, and three in Bulgaria, and twenty-five divisions in France. He was not prepared to agree to any delay in “Overlord” beyond the month of May.

I said I could not agree to give any such undertaking. Nevertheless, I did not think there was any fundamental divergence in the views so far expressed. I was willing to do everything in the power of His Majesty’s Government to begin “Overlord” at the earliest possible moment, but I did not consider that the very great possibilities in the Mediterranean should be ruthlessly sacrificed and cast aside as if they were of no value, merely to save a month or so in the launching of “Overlord.” There was a large British army in the Mediterranean, and I could not agree that it should stand idle for nearly six months. It should be fighting the enemy with the greatest vigour alongside its American Allies. I had every hope that, together, British and American forces would destroy a large force of Germans in Italy, and, having advanced northward of Rome, would hold a considerable German army on the Italian Front. To be quiescent in Italy and remain inert for nearly six months would be an improper use of our forces and lay us open to the reproach that the Russians were bearing almost the entire burden of the land war. Stalin said that he had never contemplated a complete cessation of all operations in Italy during the winter.

I explained that if landing-craft were taken away from the Mediterranean this would mean a definite curtailment of our operations there. I reminded Stalin of the three conditions on which the success of “Overlord” depended. First, there must be a satisfactory reduction in the strength of the German fighter force in Northwest Europe between now and the assault. Secondly, German reserves in France and the Low Countries must not be more on the day of the assault than about twelve full-strength first-quality mobile divisions. Thirdly, it must not be possible for the Germans to transfer from other fronts more than fifteen first-quality divisions during the first sixty days of the operation. To obtain these conditions we should have to hold as many Germans as possible in Italy and Yugoslavia. If Turkey entered the war, this would be an added help, but not an essential condition. The Germans now in Italy had for the most part come from France. If we slackened off our pressure in Italy, they would go back again. We must continue to engage the enemy on the only front where at present we could fight them. If we engaged them as fiercely as possible during the winter months in the Mediterranean this would make the best possible contribution towards creating the conditions needed for a successful “Overlord.”

Stalin asked what would happen if there were thirteen or fourteen mobile German divisions in France and more than fifteen available from other fronts. Would this rule out “Overlord”?

I said, “No, certainly not.”

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I then turned the discussion back to Turkey. We had agreed to press her to enter the war by the end of the year. If she did, the only military operations needed would be to establish our planes on the Turkish airfields in Anatolia and capture the island of Rhodes. One assault division and some garrison troops would suffice. Once in possession of Rhodes and the Turkish air bases, we could starve out all the other Aegean islands at our leisure. These operations would not involve us in an unlimited liability, and could be regarded as a commitment of a strictly limited character. If our efforts to bring Turkey in were unsuccessful, that would be the end of the matter. Nevertheless, failure to bring Turkey in would also be a relief to the Germans. There was a further point about Turkey. If she came in and we captured Rhodes, and subsequently turned the Germans out of the other Aegean islands, our troops and air forces in Egypt could all move forward into action to the northward instead of remaining in their present defensive rôle.

The issue of Turkey should not be lightly turned aside. As the President and General Marshall had stated, the scale, nature, and timing of our operations all turned upon the availability of landing-craft and transportation of forces across the sea. I said I was prepared to go into this question at any time and at any length and in any detail, but if the small number of landing-craft involved could not be retained in the Mediterranean or found from some other theatre, no operations on any scale would be possible in the Mediterranean area, and this ban included an assault on the South of France. These arguments should be very carefully weighed before decisions were taken. I told Stalin that I agreed with him that a definite reference should be given to the Technical Military Committee, and I suggested that the terms of reference should be drawn up severally by the heads of the three Governments.

Stalin said that, on thinking it over, he did not feel that a Military Committee was necessary. In order to take decisions it was not necessary to go into detail. The issues at stake were the date of “Overlord,” the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief, and whether any supporting operations could be carried out in the South of France. All this had to be decided by the plenary Conference. Nor did he see any necessity for a Committee of the Foreign Secretaries. The appointment of these Committees would delay the completion of the Conference, and he, for his part, could not extend his visit to Teheran beyond December 1, or at the latest December 2.

The President said that he had drawn up tentative terms of reference in simple form for the Military Committee, if it was decided that this body should get to work. The terms were in two sentences, namely: “Paragraph 1. The Committee of three
Staffs will assume that Operation ‘Overlord’ is the dominating operation in 1944. Paragraph 2: The Committee will make recommendations as to subsidiary operations to be carried out, taking into most careful account any delay on Operation ‘Overlord.’ ” This was agreed.

Stalin said that the Soviet Government was vitally concerned with the date of “Overlord,” particularly because of the need for co-ordinating operations on the Russian Front. The President observed that the “Overlord” date had been fixed at the Quebec Conference, and it was only the important developments which had occurred since then that had caused any change to be contemplated.

Before we separated, Stalin looked at me across the table and said, “I wish to pose a very direct question to the Prime Minister about ‘Overlord.’ Do the Prime Minister and the British Staff really believe in ‘Overlord’?” I replied, “Provided the conditions previously stated for ‘Overlord’ are established when the time comes, it will be our stern duty to hurl across the Channel against the Germans every sinew of our strength.” On this we separated.

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Stalin was our host at dinner. The company was strictly limited—Stalin and Molotov, the President, Hopkins, Harriman, Clark Kerr, myself and Eden, and our interpreters. After the labours of the Conference, there was a good deal of gaiety, and many toasts were proposed. Presently Elliott Roosevelt, who had flown out to join his father, appeared at the door, and somebody beckoned him to come in. He therefore took his seat at the table. He even intervened in the conversation, and has since given a highly coloured and extremely misleading account of what he heard. Stalin, as Hopkins recounts, indulged in a great deal of “teasing” of me, which I did not at all resent until the Marshal entered in a genial manner upon a serious and even deadly aspect of the punishment to be inflicted upon the Germans. The German General Staff, he said, must be liquidated. The whole force of Hitler’s mighty armies
depended upon about fifty thousand officers and technicians. If these were rounded up and shot at the end of the war, German military strength would be extirpated. On this I thought it right to say: “The British Parliament and public will never tolerate mass executions. Even if in war passion they allowed them to begin, they would turn violently against those responsible after the first butchery had taken place. The Soviets must be under no delusion on this point.”

Stalin however, perhaps only in mischief, pursued the subject. “Fifty thousand,” he said, “must be shot.” I was deeply angered. “I would rather,” I said, “be taken out into the garden here and now and be shot myself than sully my own and my country’s honour by such infamy.”

At this point the President intervened. He had a compromise to propose. Not fifty thousand should be shot, but only forty-nine thousand. By this he hoped, no doubt, to reduce the whole matter to ridicule. Eden also made signs and gestures intended to reassure me that it was all a joke. But now Elliott Roosevelt rose in his place at the end of the table and made a speech, saying how cordially he agreed with Marshal Stalin’s plan and how sure he was that the United States Army would support it. At this intrusion I got up and left the table, walking off into the next room, which was in semi-darkness. I had not been there a minute before hands were clapped upon my shoulders from behind, and there was Stalin, with Molotov at his side, both grinning broadly, and eagerly declaring that they were only playing, and that nothing of a serious character had entered their heads. Stalin has a very captivating manner when he chooses to use it, and I never saw him do so to such an extent as at this moment. Although I was not then, and am not now, fully convinced that all was chaff and there was no serious intent lurking behind, I consented to return, and the rest of the evening passed pleasantly.

4
Teheran: The Crux

My Sixty-Ninth Birthday___I See Stalin Alone___I Explain the Difference of View Between the British and Americans___A Narrow Issue___The Great Battle Impending in Italy___An Amphibious Landing Near the Tiber___Stalin Emphasises the Need for “Overlord”___He Offers a Russian Offensive in May or June___The President’s Luncheon of “Three Only”___The President and I Promise a Date in May___Russia’s Claim to Warm-Water Ports___The Third Plenary Session___The Main Decisions Taken___The Communiqueé Agreed___Dinner at the British Legation, November
30___
Compliments All Round___Many Speeches___General Brooke’s Rejoinder to Stalin___Stalin Admires His Candour.

N
OVEMBER
30 was for me a crowded and memorable day. It was my sixty-ninth birthday, and was passed almost entirely in transacting some of the most important business with which I have ever been concerned. The fact that the President was in private contact with Marshal Stalin and dwelling at the Soviet Embassy, and that he had avoided ever seeing me alone since we left Cairo, in spite of our hitherto intimate relations and the way in which our vital affairs were interwoven, led me to seek a direct personal interview with Stalin. I felt that the Russian leader was not deriving a true impression of the British attitude. The false idea was forming in his mind that, to put it shortly, “Churchill and the British Staffs mean to stop ‘Overlord’ if they can, because they want to invade
the Balkans instead.” It was my duty to remove this double misconception.

The exact date of “Overlord” depended upon the movements of a comparatively small number of landing-craft. These landing-craft were not required for any operation in the Balkans. The President had committed us to an operation in the Bay of Bengal. If this were cancelled there would be enough landing-craft for all I wanted, namely, the amphibious power to land against opposition two divisions at a time on the coasts of Italy or Southern France, and also to carry out “Overlord” as planned in May. I had agreed with the President that May should be the month, and he had, for his part, given up the specific date of May 1. This would give me the time I needed. If I could persuade the President to obtain relief from his promise to Chiang Kai-shek and drop the Bay of Bengal plan, which had never been mentioned in our Teheran conferences, there would be enough landing-craft both for the Mediterranean and for a punctual “Overlord.” In the event the great landings began on June 6, but this date was decided much later on, not by any requirement of mine, but by the moon and the weather. I also succeeded when we returned to Cairo, as will be seen, in persuading the President to abandon the enterprise in the Bay of Bengal. I therefore consider that I got what I deemed imperative. But this was far from certain at Teheran on this November morning. I was determined that Stalin should know the main fact. I did not feel entitled to tell him that the President and I had agreed upon May for “Overlord.” I knew that Roosevelt wanted to tell him this himself at our luncheon which was to follow my conversation with the Marshal.

The following is founded upon the record made by Major Birse, my trusted interpreter, of my private talk with Stalin.

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I began by reminding the Marshal that I was half American and had a great affection for the American people. What I was going to say was not to be understood as disparaging to the Americans and I would be perfectly loyal towards them, but there were things which it was better to say outright, between two persons.