Brothers in Arms (52 page)

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Authors: Odd Arne Westad

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it was left to the post-Stalin leadership to sign an additional document (in October 1954) that confirmed the position of the parties on withdrawal and promised that it would be carried out. As late as 1955 proposals of the People's Republic for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Liaodong peninsula languished for several months in Moscow before being implemented in May of that year.

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The 1950 agreements also included substantial economic aspects, particularly Soviet credit to the People's Republic in the amount of $300 million. That credit was to be granted over a five-year term in equal portions to cover payments for the deliveries of equipment and machinery from the Soviet Union. The Chinese government agreed to make repayments over ten years, beginning from 1953. The Soviet Union and China also signed a strategically important agreement on construction of a railroad connecting both nations through Mongolia.
The military aspects of this treaty were directed against Japan and the United States, and may be seen to some extent as a mix of the threat perceptions of World War II and the early Cold War. Polarization was the main feature of postwar Asia and was driven largely by Soviet-U.S. rivalry. The Korean War cemented this polarization on one hand, the common objectives of the Soviet Union and China in the war and their practical military cooperation helped strengthen the alliance; on the other hand, the course of the war reinforced the view that the United States had substantial capabilities for making war even on the Asian continent. Moreover, the U.S.-Taiwan treaty on mutual defense and the creation of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 made the Soviet leaders believe that deepening the alliance with China was their only strategic choice in the region.
For China, the alliance with Moscow thus became a vital security guarantee. The alliance covered Beijing's back and took the People's Republic through the Korean War without the conflict spreading to its territory. After the war, the alliance provided protection and prestige as China shaped its image as a new political force during and after the 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian newly independent countries.
After Stalin
After Stalin's death in March 1953, Soviet foreign policy went through a series of rapid changes. For the alliance with China, the most important aspect of these changes was the rebirth of Lenin's eastern orientation in foreign affairs, with a special emphasis on China and India.
The policy debate within the Soviet leadership on the approaches to the world outside Europe coincided with a growing uncertainty among Soviet and Chinese military leaders as to the direction of their cooperation. With the end of the Korean War, some higher officers on both sides believed that Sine-Soviet military

 

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cooperation had to aim at a higher degree of integration and joint planning. In Moscow in 1953-1954, this debate became part of the more general debate on foreign affairs within the new leadership.
In general policy, two major approaches toward the development of relations with the outside world were in contention. Champions of the first approach, including the Soviet foreign minister, Viacheslav Molotov, while acknowledging the necessity of a "break" in the Cold War, still believed that Soviet foreign policy would have to be based on the idea of continuous and inevitable interbloc struggle. The Soviet Union was vulnerable, the bases of socialism had just been laid, and the party needed to substantiate its leading role in the socialist camp.
Supporters of the second approach, including the CPSU first secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, and the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Anastas Mikoyan, proceeded from more optimistic estimates and insisted that the European and Asian balance of power was favorable for the socialist camp. Soon after Stalin's death, they began emphasizing the possibility of peaceful coexistence and the existence of "peace zones" in the Third World. This latter understanding attracted serious attention in Soviet diplomacy from 1954 on and was highly relevant with regard to India, for instance. The two approaches battled for supremacy in Soviet foreign policy from 1953 to 1956-1957, and this battle helps explain both the frequently incoherent actions of Soviet diplomacy and its search for new ways to maneuver on the international arena. It was also revealed in full measure in Sino-Soviet military cooperation.
As Khrushchev's dominance grew, the new Soviet leadership commenced to shape up a new course in its relations with China and Yugoslavia, to look for dé-tente in relations with the West, and to reassess its views on the Third World. The leadership counted on Mao's help in keeping the socialist camp stable during this period of foreign policy transformation. Relations between Moscow and Beijing warmed considerably in the very first months after Stalin's death. It is significant that Khrushchev's first foreign trip as leader of the Soviet Union was to China in September 1954.
The Chinese leaders understood that the Soviet Union wanted to use Mao to strengthen its authority in the post-Stalin world and tried to use the opportunity to satisfy China's interests on a large number of issues, primarily economic ones. Already on May 26, 1953, China signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union on terms quite favorable for Beijing; negotiations over this agreement had long been at a standstill. By establishing a basis for modern Chinese industry, the Soviets also promoted the growth of China's defense power. The Soviet leaders understood well the strategic implications of their economic assistance.
The visit of the Chinese vice-premier, Li Fuchun, to the Soviet Union in May 1953 was also important in this regard. On May 15 Mikoyan and Li signed an

 

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agreement on aid to China in the building and reconstruction of 141 large enterprises, with the Soviet Union agreeing to deliver equipment and construction assistance to China by the end of 1959. The list of enterprises included several groups of metallurgic enterprises, nonferrous metals manufacturing enterprises, coal mines, oil refining, motor-car works, tractor plants, and electric power stations. In these negotiations the Chinese obtained several important breakthroughs with regard to Soviet commitments.
The new basic form of military cooperation between the two countries was set out in the Soviet government's memorandum to the People's Republic of August 10, 1954. It said that the Soviet Union was ready to perform design work, to deliver equipment, and to render assistance in construction of fifteen new defense enterprises and to help in construction of the next fourteen new industrial enterprises, including a plant producing up to 600 control devices for antiaircraft missiles per year. The Soviets also agreed to render assistance in design and delivery of equipment for heavy ground and air artillery, including new forms of artillery. In addition, Moscow delivered some of its own draft proposals regarding modernization of separate types of armaments (jet-propelled aircraft MiG-17s, antiaircraft guns, and tank diesel engines).

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In some cases Chinese plants were able to start production of such improved armaments before the arms industry in the Soviet Union itself.

Khrushchev's visit to China resulted in a series of new agreements. On October 12, 1954, he signed a protocol on increased Soviet equipment deliveries to Chinese industrial enterprises at a cost of more than 400 million rubles and also on rendering assistance in the construction of an additional fifteen enterprises. He also granted the People's Republic another long-term credit of 520 million rubles and signed a joint communiqué on Soviet withdrawal from the Lüshun naval base.
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In late 1954 Beijing made a series of other requests to the Soviet Union, among them for assistance in defense and fuel industries and for a group of highly qualified geologists to be sent to the People's Republic. These requests were set out in a letter addressed to Defense Minister Nikolai Bulganin and were passed by Zhou Enlai through the Soviet ambassador. Zhou's office played an important part in coordinating the planning of requests for aid, even if a number of direct channels did exist between Moscow and the individual ministries, not least through Soviet advisers working in Beijing.
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After the Twentieth CPSU Congress, in April 1956, Mikoyan visited China and signed new agreements on assistance in the development of advanced industries, including the construction of fifty-five new large enterprises.
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In his reports to Moscow on the preparations for this visit, Ambassador Iudin noted Beijing's positive reaction to Moscow's new initiatives. Iudin wrote on April 5:

 

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I visited Mao [on March 31, 1956,] and passed to him the letters of comrade N. S. Khrushchev regarding Soviet aid: 1) in construction of 51 enterprises and 3 scientific research institutes of military industry; 2) in construction of a railway from Urumchi to the Soviet-Chinese border. Mao asked to convey his deep gratefulness to CPSU and the Soviet Government.

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China used the aid granted by the Soviet Union to strengthen its defense potential. As the Chinese foreign minister, Chen Yi, put it in a conversation with Iudin on November 22, 1958:
We in China study the Soviet experience. Socialism in the USSR has already been built, while we are just in the process. Our Army must also study and adopt the rich fighting experience of the Soviet Army. The thing is that if there is a war in the Kuril Islands region, the Soviet Far East will be the front line, while we shall be the home front. At the same time if the war begins in Shandong province, then we shall be the front line, and you will be the home front.
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Chen and the other leaders regarded military cooperation with the Soviet Union as a vital component in their efforts to turn China into a powerful state with a developed modern industry. ''It is necessary to strengthen ties and cooperation between our armies in time of peace to be ready in case of war," Chen noted a week later. "China is a large but weak country. The Soviet Union has to render China assistance, while listening to some of the points that she makes."
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Up until 1958, the Soviet Union was willing to follow this model to a large extent. The main concern of the Soviet leaders was economic: How much could Moscow provide in terms of assistance without harming its own economic development? In terms of military production, therefore, the Soviets preferred to help the Chinese set up enterprises that could help China produce its own sophisticated weapons. This type of military cooperation was rather unusual for Soviet foreign assistance.
The political controversies that in the end destroyed the Sino-Soviet alliance started appearing in the late 1950s. For the military relationship, the most serious difference was the difference in approach to East-West détente. China pressed the Soviet Union to use its leadership and its power for active opposition to the United States and was annoyed when Moscow, quite to the contrary, proclaimed its policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West. The negative Soviet reactions to the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis and the 1959 Sino-Indian conflict have to be understood in light of these differences. Assessing these cases in its September 1963 statement, the Soviet government stressed that China had

 

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