Brothers in Arms (51 page)

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Authors: Odd Arne Westad

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4.
Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation
Sergel Goncharenko
None of the topics of the Sino-Soviet alliance has been as difficult to approach as military cooperation. Except for work done by a few Western scholars, this subject was either avoided or neglected for over thirty years. Even over the past few years, when Russian and Chinese scholars have begun to concentrate on general Sino-Soviet relations during the 1950s, the military aspect of the alliance has remained terra incognita.

1
One of the main reasons for this lack of interest has been the lack of reliable materials available for those interested in military affairs. Up until recently, officials in both China and the Soviet Union were uninterested in making all aspects of this sensitive issue public, and access to military archives in both countries remains problematic at best.

Officials feared that any information published on this cooperation could be dangerous to the present security of their countries. This exaggerated fear prevailed during the Cold War in both Beijing and Moscow, when adherence to Communist ideology induced both countries to confront the West. Even during the vigorous campaign of mutual accusations during the 1960s, when many other revealing details and sensitive facts of Sino-Soviet relations were revealed, both sides largely avoided discussing military affairs. It can be argued that, in Russia, only over the past few years have assessments of Sino-Soviet relations of the 1950s stopped bearing political significance.
This chapter reviews the Soviet military assistance to China during the 1950s based on the information that has become available since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The new sources even if incomplete show that the transfer of military technology from the Soviet Union to China up to about 1962 was more extensive than was earlier thought and that the cooperation was viewed as a success by both sides, until its usefulness was overtaken by the gradual worsen-

 

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ing of political relations in the late 1950s. The sources, mainly from the voluminous records of the Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, also show that the guidelines for transfers of military technology were sometimes surprisingly vague and that those carrying out the military assistance plans departments of the General Staff or the production centers for arms and technology under the various ministries for industry often had to reach their own conclusions as to what should be transferred to the Chinese, when, and how.
Background
One effect of the new attention being given to the Sino-Soviet alliance, including its military aspects, is that scholars have become more inclined to believe that the beginning of Sino-Soviet military cooperation during the 1950s was found in 1945, when the Soviet Union liberated Manchuria from Japanese occupation. As Niu Jun notes in chapter 1, Moscow's double-sided policy toward China became quite obvious: Stalin formally recognized the government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) while also providing aid to the Chinese Communists.
Stalin's limited cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aimed to make the Communists' armies stronger and to turn them into a force capable of opposing the United States and Japan during the early Cold War. Moscow was afraid that the United States intended to preserve Japan's influence in Manchuria, or to make this strategically important region some kind of U.S.-controlled buffer state.

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Arguably, chairman Mao Zedong's usefulness in 1945-1946 added to the CCP's ideological attraction for the Soviets. As the civil war in China commenced in 1946, Moscow contrasted itself and the CCP with the United States and Guomindang (GMD). Although Stalin initially very much doubted the CCP's chances for success, the Soviet Union did help the party create the Manchurian base that later became the "anvil of victory" for the Chinese Communists.
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Using the Soviet-Chinese treaty of August 14, 1945, and agreements with the GMD on the presence of Soviet troops in Löshun, Dalian, and on the Chinese-Chanchun Railway, Moscow actually protected northeast China from the intrusion of seaborne GMD troops and thus helped CCP General Lin Biao's rudimentary forces to survive. In 1946 the Soviet Union armed Chinese Communists with Soviet and captured Japanese weapons. It also assisted the CCP with setting up an economic and military infrastructure.
Soviet forces withdrew from Manchuria in May 1946. However, during 1946 and 1947 Lin Biao's army continued to receive modern arms from the Soviet Army. Documents available in Russian archives show that this aid was substantial and included machine-guns, mortars and artillery pieces, tanks, ships of the

 

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Sungai River Fleet, and, ultimately, aircraft.

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The aid helped to turn the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into a powerful factor that could provide the final victory of the Chinese Revolution.

Arms transfers were accompanied by a movement of regular CCP military units. By mid-December 1945, more than 334,000 troops were in the Northeast; by the second half of October 1947, the number had increased to 465,000. The judgment of Soviet historians, writing in the mid-1980s, that "the Manchurian revolutionary base greatly influenced the political struggle, the course of the civil war and social and economic transformations carried out there in the second half of the 1940s under the influence of the Soviet Union" seems a fair representation of the facts.
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It is, of course, impossible to believe this aid was given solely for foreign policy reasons. Moscow knew that its aid was being used mainly to transform the Chinese Communists' army into an offensive-type force capable of undertaking offensive operations in the course of the civil war. Moscow also knew that the ideological affinity between Chinese and Soviet Communists would provide the Soviets with leverage on how the aid was to be used in the future.
In an attempt to create a physical and ideological bridgehead on its East Asian frontiers, the Soviet leadership regarded Mao and the CCP not only as probable allies but also as ideological comrades-in-arms and fellow antagonists of the United States. But Stalin, distrusting Mao's competence as well as his unquestioning loyalty, continued to push the GMD for political and economic concessions. This duality gave Mao reason to accuse Stalin of duplicity as soon as criticism of the former leader had begun in the Soviet capital in the late 1950s. Mao said reproachfully on April 5, 1956, to Pavel Iudin, Soviet ambassador to China:
In 1947, when the armed struggle against Jiang Jieshi's forces was in full swing, when our troops were winning victory after victory, Stalin insisted upon conclusion of peace with Jiang Jieshi, as he doubted the forces of the Chinese revolution. That lack of faith also remained with Stalin during the first time after the creation of the People's Republic of China,
i.e.
already after the victory of the revolution.
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Nevertheless, despite Moscow's watchfulness, military cooperation between the Soviet Union and the CCP was well under way by 1949. Mao saw the political implications of this aid. In August 1948 he told Dr. A. Y. Orlov, his Soviet physician, that "We have to make sure that our political course completely coincides with that of the USSR." Soviet Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan's

 

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visit to Mao in Xibaipo in January-February 1949, made on Stalin's direct orders, furthered that coordination considerably.

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In a confidential talk with Mikoyan on February 4, Mao assessed the Soviet military aid to the Chinese Communists:

If there had not been any help from the Soviet Union, we would hardly have been able to gain today's victories. This does not mean that we should not rely upon our own forces. Nevertheless, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the military aid of the Soviet Union in Manchuria, that amounts to one fourth of your total aid, plays quite a considerable role.
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Soviet military aid during the civil war created vital psychological conditions for the coming alliance.
Treaties and Bilateral Relations
The 1950 Moscow agreements were set up to provide a legal basis for Sino-Soviet civilian and military cooperation. Both the treaty on friendship and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and China and the agreement on Lüshun and Dalian contained large military components. According to the treaty, the Soviet Union and China agreed to take all necessary joint measures to prevent any repetition of aggression and breach of peace by Japan or any other state that would directly or indirectly unite with Japan in aggressive acts. In case one party to the treaty was attacked by Japan or its allies, and was thus in a state of war, the other party would immediately render it military or any other assistance with all available means.
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With Japan as an ally of the United States, the treaty meant that Moscow acted as a guarantor of the political independence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and agreed to become a shield in case of possible aggression against China. In addition, the 1950 treaty's protocol established the principles for introduction of Soviet troops and military cargoes on the territory of the People's Republic in case of war in East Asia. This protocol was in force for several years; only in 1957 did the Far Eastern Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs propose to review that particular paragraph of the protocol, as it "was of a one-sided nature."
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Under these circumstances, the Soviet leadership could give up a part of the privileges they had acquired from the GMD regime in 1945. The Soviet government gave up its rights on joint management of the Manchurian railways and its properties. Further agreements envisaged the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the jointly used military navy base of Lüshun and its transfer to the Chinese government. But Stalin was in no hurry to withdraw the Soviet troops, and

 

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