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Authors: Odd Arne Westad

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that the United States did not have the resources to carry out large-scale military intervention and that its aid to the GMD government was limited.

84
The CCP strongly condemned the United States in part to show solidarity with the socialist bloc and in part to promote the anti-imperialist enthusiasm of the Chinese masses. Until uncovering what they viewed as a large subversive operation directed by U.S. intelligence services in Manchuria, which led to the arrest of U.S. consular officers at Shenyang in the winter of 1948-1949, some CCP leaders still felt it was possible to establish diplomatic relations with the United States.
85

However, CCP leaders reevaluated their aims following the Shenyang incident. In late 1948-early 1949 the party received information from a number of sources, including the Soviets, that the gist of the U.S. China policy was to "create an effective opposition"
within
the new government. Washington would recognize New China, but in return the new Chinese government should contain an opposition party acceptable to the United States and give the United States the right to station troops in Shanghai and Qingdao. Mao Zedong reacted strongly to these messages. He believed the CCP should be on guard and foil the American conspiracy.
86
On December 30 Mao published his article "To Carry Revolution through to the End." He pointed out that U.S. China policy already had changed from purely supporting Jiang Jieshi to continuing its aid to the GMD in its military resistance while trying to organize political opposition within the revolutionary ranks. The CCP and the Chinese people must act to foil this American "political program.''
87
On January 8, 1949, the CCP Politburo passed a resolution stressing the two-pronged strategy of the United States and the need to defeat this "imperialist conspiracy."
88
Nevertheless, after the PLA occupied Nanjing, Mao still permitted officers from the CCP Nanjing Military Area foreign affairs department to hold several talks with U.S. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart to explore the possibilities for establishing ties between New China and the United States. In the talks, Stuart said that Washington could not then recognize the CCP government. He also expressed his hope that the Chinese government would include as many democratic representatives as possible. During the talks, Stuart made no secret of having set up contacts with the CCP to other diplomats.
89
CCP leaders viewed Stuart's leaking of these contacts as arrogant and diplomatically irresponsible, and it prompted them to be even more cautious in their dealings with the United States. They knew how the Americans and their allies had tried to help the opposition defeat the Communist parties in Eastern Europe and that the primary reason for Communist success in those countries had been the military might of the Soviet Union. Stuart's behavior fitted all too well into this pattern and thereby helped push the Central Committee further toward the Soviet view of the world. Washington, Mao feared, hoped to create internal po-

 

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litical turmoil in China while posing as an external military threat. If Stuart's contacts had any effect on CCP foreign policy, then they added a stronger flavor of confrontation with the United States to the CCP's policy of alliance with the Soviet Union.
Civil War to Anti-American War: The Birth of the Alliance
After CCP forces crossed the Yangzi River, the formalization of the Sino-Soviet alliance was only a matter of time, as the Chinese party already had decided to seek such an alliance and Moscow had few reasons to hesitate. But the two sides' willingness to meet and to formalize the ties between them did not mean that problems could be resolved easily. During his final meetings with Mikoyan on February 7, Mao had suggested that the CCP send a high-level delegation to Moscow to seek advice on building a socialist state, to report on the political and military situation in China, and to negotiate further economic aid.

90
In May Mao Zedong asked Liu Shaoqi to head the delegation.

The CCP delegation left for Moscow on June 21 and had its first meeting with Stalin in the evening of June 27. The Soviet leader talked mainly about some issues raised during Mikoyan's visit to China signing an agreement for a future $300 million loan and providing military assistance in Xinjiang. Liu and other delegation members were alarmed by Stalin's approach, and wondered if he had not been informed of their intention to discuss the overall relationship between the two countries. Liu feared that the CPSU head deliberately avoided discussing issues of paramount importance.
In order to signal the CCP's intentions, Liu decided to provide Stalin with a written report that broadly outlined party policies, including its relationship to Moscow. He notified Beijing of this decision and his reasons for making it. Mao Zedong immediately came to Liu's aid by authorizing the publication of his article, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," which openly declared that the New China would "lean to one side."
91
Mao also sent an urgent telegram to the CCP authorities in Nanjing, instructing those in charge of contacts with Leighton Stuart that "we harbor no illusion of the U.S. imperialists ever changing their policy" and calling off all contacts with the U.S. envoy.
92
On July 11 Liu met with the CPSU Politburo and presented his written report to Stalin. The report dealt with four main problem areas: the current situation of the Chinese Revolution, the political and administrative framework for a new government (including the role of the Political Consultative Conference), the new government's diplomatic policies, and, finally, some issues of future Sino-Soviet relations. It comprehensively outlined the domestic and external policies after the establishment of a new national government and the basic principles the CCP suggested for its relations with the Soviet Union and the CPSU. In the

 

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report, Liu stressed that the CCP would accept all directions given by Stalin and the CPSU CC on these issues.

93

CCP leaders hoped to reach agreement with Moscow on a number of essential questions. They wanted Soviet help and advice in the formation of the new Chinese government and its major policies. They also wanted to achieve consensus with the Soviet Union on the international situation and foreign policy issues, and thereby secure the earliest possible diplomatic recognition from Moscow and other socialist capitals. They wanted Soviet aid to control Xinjiang and liberate Taiwan, agreements on economic and technological assistance, and revisions or, if possible, a complete renegotiation of the existing Sino-Soviet treaty.
94
Stalin readily agreed with the CCP delegation on most questions related to China's domestic policies. Regarding the relationship between the two parties, Stalin stressed that equal and mutually respectful principles should be observed. He said that the victory of the Chinese Revolution was "an achievement of the Chinese Marxists." He called Mao Zedong "a Marxist leader" and said that "the Soviets and Europeans" should learn from the Chinese Communists. He even apologized for interfering in CCP's policymaking in the post-World War II period. In addition, Stalin gave some form of assurance to nearly all CCP requests for economic, technological, and military aid.
95
Stalin's generosity came easy: He knew he had much to make up for and that most of the formal agreements would have to wait.
Stalin had, however, much advice on foreign policy questions. On one hand, he stated that the Soviet Union would extend immediate diplomatic recognition to New China in the wake of its establishment. On the other, he encouraged the CCP to take a strong position vis-à-vis the United States and other Western countries and not to establish diplomatic relations with them in a hurry. Regarding the Sino-Soviet treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the GMD, Stalin's attitude was quite complicated. He reaffirmed what Mikoyan had already told Mao Zedong, that the treaty was not an "equal" one, because the Soviet Union was dealing with the GMD and not the CCP at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, and that the problem could be resolved when Mao visited Moscow in the future. At the same time, however, Stalin's attitude on concrete questions such as the stationing of Soviet troops in Lüshun appeared ambiguous at best.
96
Liu Shaoqi's conversation with Stalin on the PLA's plans to attack Taiwan was even less encouraging to the CCP leaders. Stalin emphatically excluded any possibility that Soviet air and naval forces would participate in such an attack because of the risk of war with the United States. Both before and after the PLA crossed the Yangzi River, Stalin had warned the CCP CC to be vigilant about a

 

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possible American military intervention. This time he told Liu that the Truman administration contained some "lunatics" and that the Soviets had to be cautious.

97
The Chinese left with the impression that Stalin would spare no effort to avoid a military showdown with the United States, particularly in Asia not a welcome position for most Chinese Communists.

In all, however, Liu's Soviet trip was quite successful. It basically completed the preparation for forming an alliance with the Soviet Union on the eve of the People's Republic's founding. Stalin's promise to offer economic, technological, and military assistance and diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic constituted effective support to the CCP both at home and abroad. After Liu's visit to the Soviet Union, the only thing left was for Mao to visit Moscow and conclude the treaty. However, while the abolition of the old Sino-Soviet treaty and the conclusion of a new alliance treaty were both within easy reach in principle, they were difficult to achieve in practice.
The victory of the Chinese Revolution transformed international relations in East Asia. It not only destroyed the international order based on the Yalta agreements and the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty, but it also forced the established powers to face a new revolutionary state that had arisen from a civil war. In dealing with this new state, previous rules no longer applied, neither for the United States, nor for the Soviet Union. Under the previous order, by coordinating its policy with that of the United States, the Soviet Union had the potential to obtain economic and security advantages in East Asia. When the Chinese Revolution finally succeeded, the Soviet Union had to adjust its policy to the objectives of the Chinese Communists.
Second, the Soviet Union had to reconsider how to manage the benefits it had obtained under the previous international order. During the early Cold War, the strategic benefits to the Soviet Union of concluding an alliance with China were self-evident. Such alliance would not only form a giant security screen in the East for the Soviet Union, but it also would greatly encourage revolutionary movements in Asia. But Moscow also confronted the key problem whether it was willing to abandon the legal and economic rights it had obtained in China's Northeast. On this point, Stalin's attitude did not appear as forthcoming as his endowing Mao with the title of "Marxist leader."
The Chinese leaders' attitude on the question of replacing, or at least greatly modifying, the existing Sino-Soviet treaty also was quite complicated. During their youth, they all had progressed from being patriots, to revolutionaries, and then to devoted believers in communism. One of the most important reasons for them to "take the Russian road" had been the Soviet announcement on two separate occasions in 1919 and 1920 to abandon the territories occupied and the prerogatives grabbed by czarist Russia.
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To them, "the Russian road" did not only

 

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mean abolition of a social system in which people exploit people; it also symbolized the establishment of a new kind of international order. The conclusion of the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty did not change this belief of the CCP leaders, although they were definitely dissatisfied with the treaty.

99
Whatever praise appeared in CCP newspapers of the 1945 treaty was both limited and tactical merely applauding its positive significance in maintaining peace in East Asia.
100

When the CCP leaders decided to conclude an alliance treaty with the Soviet Union, they were not sure of Stalin's attitude. Soviet behavior gave them good reason to doubt whether Moscow actually would practice the "proletarian internationalism" it supported in public. Before the CCP crossed the Yangzi, it told non-Communist allies in China that "some foreign treaties would be abolished; some revised; and some kept."
101
The revision and maintenance was meant only to apply to the Sino-Soviet treaty. Obviously, the CCP leaders did not truly trust the Soviet Union, although they were ready to make some concessions out of more important considerations.
During his Moscow visit, Liu Shaoqi had proposed three alternatives to resolve the problem of the Sino-Soviet treaty: (1) keep the treaty and the new Chinese government would recognize it; (2) abolish the 1945 treaty and establish a new treaty; (3) the two governments exchange memoranda stating that they would maintain the treaty temporarily but would conclude another one at an appropriate time. Liu also mentioned Mongolia and the mining equipment the Soviet Union had removed from the Northeast after the Japanese defeat.
102
However, besides promising to conclude another treaty, Stalin did not clarify his views concerning the principles of the new treaty and other specific questions. The content of the new treaty later became the focus of the talks between Stalin and Mao.
Mao Zedong arrived in Moscow on December 16. That afternoon, however, his first talk with Stalin failed to achieve any concrete results. Stalin stated that the talks were not a proper time to challenge the legitimacy of the 1945 treaty. If Mao thought otherwise, the issue of the Kurile Islands, which the Soviet Union with U.S. support had taken from Japan in 1945, would be reopened. Stalin suggested instead that the two sides issue a statement on Lüshun while committing themselves to a fundational revision of the treaty within two years.
103
After this first talk, Mao questioned whether Stalin really intended to sign a new treaty.
On December 22 Mao proposed two alternatives to Stalin through Kovalev: One was to invite Zhou Enlai to come to Moscow to help resolve the problem of the Sino-Soviet treaty; the other was that both sides merely hold broad discussions about related problems but with no intention to arrive at any agreement.
104
However, during the Mao-Stalin talk on December 24, Stalin avoided mentioning Mao's alternatives. It was obvious that Stalin had
no
intention of solving the treaty issue then. The underlying reason must have been that the So-

 

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