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Authors: Odd Arne Westad

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page_46<br/>
Page 46
104. Jones and Kevill,
China and the Soviet Union,
33.
105. Mao Zedong's talk with Venezuelan guests, December 5, 1961, quoted in Yang Kuisong,
On the Causes of the Changes in Mao Zedong's View of the Soviet Union.
Paper presented at a Cold War International History Project conference, Hong Kong, January 1996, 30.
106. It is difficult to say how much of Mao's emphasis on the threat of war in 1964-65 was related to his perception of external circumstances (first and foremost the U.S. intervention in Vietnam) and how much was related to the need to mobilize support for his domestic policies. See, for instance, the CCP Central Committee directive on preparations for war, April 12, 1965, cited in
History of the Chinese Communist Party: A Chronology of Events
(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1991), 316; and Mao's talk to first secretaries of party committees in greater administrative areas, October 10, 1965, cited in ibid., 318.
107. Chen Xiaolu, "Chen Yi and China's Diplomacy," in Michael H. Hunt and Niu Jun, eds.,
Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1920s-1960s: Personalities and Interpretative Approaches
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program, n.d. [1994]); Zhang Baojun, "1969 nian qianhou dang dui waijiao lue de zhongda tiaozheng" [Important adjustments in the party's foreign affairs strategy around 1969],
Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu
1 (1996): 61-7. There are several important debates going on among Chinese scholars on Mao's policies toward the Soviet Union in 1968-69; see, for instance, Niu Jun,
1969 nian ZhongSu bianjie chongtu yu Zhongguo waijiao zhanlüe de tiaozheng
[The 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict and changes in China's foreign policy strategy]. Paper presented at a Cold War International History Project/Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiusuo conference, Beijing, October 1997, or Yang Kuisong,
1969: ZhongSu zhanzheng jijiang baofa?
[1969: Was a Sino-Soviet war about to break out?]. Unpublished.
108. Record of conversation, Mao Zedong-Pham Van Dong, November 17, 1968, in Odd Arne Westad et al., eds.,
77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977,
Cold War International History Project Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1998), 142-55.
109. Some of the new research carried out in the People's Republic tends to underline this view; see, for instance, Xue Yu, "Dui liushiniandai ZhongSu lunzhan zhong ruogan wenti de zai sikao" [Rethinking some issues of the Sino-Soviet polemics of the 1960s],
Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu
2 (1996): 69-78.

 

page_47<br/>
Page 47
1.
The Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance
Nlu Jun
The Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s had a long and complex prehistory. It was based on a thirty year relationship between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties and on the cooperation and conflicts between the leaders of those two parties.
This chapter explores the reasons behind the formation of the alliance, particularly during the five years prior to Mao's departure for Moscow. It studies internal and external factors shaping the alliance, Chinese and Soviet intentions in forming it, and the evolution of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Soviet policies. The purpose is to put our new understanding of the alliance and its functions into a historical perspective.
For many years, scholars have studied the alliance and issues related to it. However, during the Cold War period, analysis of the alliance's origins produced more questions than answers. In recent years, because the Chinese government allowed the publication of many historical documents and Russia partially opened the diplomatic archives of the former Soviet Union, historians have begun to reconsider old conclusions. This literature, though still in its infancy, has produced some important works.

1

By using previously unavailable historical records, these studies have offered many valuable reinterpretations of the motivations of the Chinese and Soviet leaders in formulating and developing policies. By focusing on motives and patterns of action, we are getting closer to seeing the issues of the Sino-Soviet relationship from within, and not only through Western lenses. In sum, the recent opening of historical archives and the appearance of these thought-provoking studies have enabled us to start considering more systematic and critical explanations of the policies of both countries.

 

page_48<br/>
Page 48
The War Against Japan
To understand post-World War II relations between the CCP and the Soviet Union, it is first necessary to review briefly their relationship before and during China's war against Japan in 1937-45. As a branch of the Communist International (Comintern), the CCP from its beginning stood on the side of the international Communist movement led by the Soviet Union and received support and assistance from both the Soviet Union and Comintern. Until the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, the belief in a common Communist ideology dominated the CCP's relations with the Soviet Union. However, during the war, important changes took place in this relationship.
From 1937 on, the CCP Central Committee (CC) and the Soviet Union/Comintern frequently disagreed over how the CCP should carry out the policy of a united front during the anti-Japanese war. The difference between the CCP and the Soviet Union took the form of intraparty conflicts from the day when Mao's rival, Wang Ming, arrived in Yan'an from Moscow on November 29, 1937.

2
This conflict lasted until the CCP-Guomindang (GMD) battles at Wannan in 1941 in which the CCP suffered great losses. In the Jinnan battle following the Wannan incident, the Soviet military advisor, General I. V. Chuikov, supported GMD attempts to drive CCP troops out of the region. Deeply dissatisfied with this attitude, the CCP leaders criticized the Soviet representative. Mao instructed Zhou Enlai to tell the Soviet advisor "not to speak irresponsibly."
3

After the outbreak of the Soviet-German war in June 1941, the CCP leaders rejected Moscow's demands that the Chinese Communist forces be redeployed to attack Japanese troops in North China. The Comintern leaders criticized the CCP for this decision, and Wang Ming used the opportunity to restart the debate within the CCP over the validity of Mao Zedong's political line. Because of Mao's gradually increasing importance to the Chinese Communists as a military strategist, political leader, and symbol Soviet and Comintern criticism could not change CCP policies at that time. Wang found himself thoroughly defeated in the debate.
As soon as this new confrontation between Mao Zedong and Wang Ming started within the CCP, the differences between Moscow and the CCP headquarters in Yan'an became difficult to manage, even though the Soviet Union and Comintern still backed most aspects of the CCP's political line. The problem was that the starting point of Mao's policy considerations was how to defend the party in a complicated environment, whereas the primary concern of the Soviet Union and the Comintern was how to further Soviet strategies and interests. Once the CCP leaders decided that they could give priority to their own views and concepts, some of their policies necessarily would diverge from Moscow's.

 

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