Brothers in Arms (20 page)

Read Brothers in Arms Online

Authors: Odd Arne Westad

Tags: #Political Science, #International Relations, #General, #test

BOOK: Brothers in Arms
5.23Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
page_49<br/>
Page 49
Moreover, the ideological ties between the CCP and the Soviet Union weakened during this period. The policy differences between the two sides made the Soviet and Comintern leaders suspicious as to the nature of the CCP's Marxism. Following Lenin's theory on party-building, they believed that the CCP's rural base had resulted in an excessively large peasant component within the party and that this situation had become a serious ideological problem. During the first years of the anti-Japanese war, the Comintern leaders worried that the CCP's lack of theoretical understanding prevented it from carrying out the united-front policy on which Moscow insisted.

4

In the early 1940s, as differences in perceptions of the situation in China between the CCP and Moscow deepened, Stalin concluded that the CCP' s policies were not merely due to its leaders' inexperience. In typical fashion, Stalin used the categories of Lenin's class struggle theory to trace the origins of the CCP policies. In autumn 1940 he discussed his views of the CCP leaders with General Chuikov, who was on his way to China. Stalin said that the CCP consisted largely of peasants and tended to underestimate the strength of the working class. This inevitably would leave a strong peasant influence on CCP's policies and ideology, which would affect the party's efforts to promote international unity.
5
In handling the ideological dimension of their relationship with the Soviet Union, Mao Zedong and his associates confronted a very complicated problem. On one hand, the Chinese Communists firmly believed in the principles of Marxism-Leninism and believed that their own policies accorded with them. They showed great respect for Stalin and believed his position on theoretical issues to be authoritative. On the other hand, Chinese Communist leaders had learned from experience that dogmatic adoption of Soviet theory and policies could do great harm to their party both ideologically and organizationally. In terms of theory, unless the CCP modified the basic principles of Marxism and Leninism and ''sinified" them, it would not be able to establish ideological guidelines that would suit China's domestic conditions. In organizational terms, unless Mao and his colleagues purged the influence of Wang Ming and his associates, they could not put an end to inner-party conflicts. To Mao and his followers, by the early 1940s the political challenges to Mao's leadership from within the party were already equated with the ultimate failure of the Chinese Revolution.
Mao Zedong launched the Rectification Campaign of 1942 to 1944 to defeat his enemies within the party and to adjust his party' s relationship with Moscow. His campaign succeeded: Organizationally, he purged the influence of Wang Ming and his allies; ideologically, he established the authority of Mao Zedong Thought within the party. For Mao, the only inner-party political victory that re-

 

page_50<br/>
Page 50
mained after Rectification was to seek Stalin's acknowledgment that Mao Zedong Thought comported with Marxism-Leninism. Mao believed it crucial to gain Moscow's stamp of approval on the legitimacy of the Chinese Revolution that he led. The Soviet Union was Lenin's home, the birthplace of revolution, the leader of the international Communist movement. The Chinese Communists were idealistic and enthusiastic and if the Soviets had openly rejected their theory and beliefs, the consequences could have been very damaging.
The Soviet Union significantly influenced CCP policies during the War of Resistance against Japan. However, Moscow's direct contacts with the CCP during the war remained limited. The Soviet Union stayed out of the China theater, and the CCP could not determine when the Soviet Union would join the war in East Asia.

6
Meanwhile, the United States was playing an increasingly important role in China's war efforts and in Chinese domestic politics. This situation compelled the CCP to develop its relations with the United States. In the summer of 1944, with Moscow's acceptance, CCP leaders began to adopt a policy of active cooperation with the United States in China. They hoped to receive aid from Washington in exchange for their military cooperation with the U.S. army.
7

In sum, during the Sino-Japanese war, the CCP-Soviet relationship weakened substantially compared to what it had been in the 1920s and early 1930s. The Soviet Union, for its part, conducted foreign policy according to its own judgments with little effort to improve ties with the CCP. From the CCP leaders' perspective, while Soviet policies were very important to them, Soviet assistance was limited and not expected to increase soon. Instead, Mao and his associates worried that some of Moscow's instructions damaged the CCP's abilities to fight the Japanese and GMD attacks at the same time.
In the spring of 1945, as the European war neared its end and Moscow sign fled its intent to join the war against Japan, the CCP-Soviet relationship began to take a new turn. In February, at Yalta the Soviet Union finally had signed a secret agreement on the question of the Pacific war with the United States and Britain. Consequently, its policy toward China began to take firmer shape.
The Soviets had two objectives in their policy toward China at this time. One was to defeat Japan so as to eliminate its long-term threat to the Soviet border in East Asia. The other was to gain maximum influence in China through military participation in the war and to establish buffer zones along the Soviet border. On the basis of these long-term considerations, Stalin hoped that Chinese politics would be relatively stable and that he could maintain good relations with the GMD government. To achieve this goal, the Soviet Union tried to cooperate with the United States on Chinese issues including full recognition of the legitimacy of the GMD government and to use its diplomatic leverage to keep

 

page_51<br/>
Page 51
Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) neutral in the contest between the Soviet Union and the United States. This policy included de facto control of northeast China and limited support to the CCP. However, within its international policy framework, the Soviet Union did not view the CCP as an important factor. The CCP became relevant primarily when Stalin deliberated such questions as how to maintain Chinese political stability and how the party could be used to influence the GMD government.
In contrast to Stalin's passive attitude toward the CCP, the CCP leaders in early 1945 began to reconsider the role the Soviet Union would play in Chinese politics and how to develop their relations with Moscow. The main reason for this reconsideration was the CCP leaders' certainty that the Soviet Union soon would join the war against Japan.

8
Another reason was the sharp deterioration of the CCP's relations with the United States and by the fall of 1944 its difficulty in expanding its control southward because of stiff resistance from GMD troops.
9
Under these new circumstances, the CCP leaders sought ways to transform their ties to Moscow into a real alliance.

On April 18, 1945, thirteen days after the Soviet announcement suspending the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty, Mao Zedong approved an instruction for the JinChaJi regional party Bureau in North China to prepare for cooperation with the Soviet army. Mao's core idea was to shift the CCP's strategic focus from assisting the landing of U.S. forces on the southeast coast to assisting the Soviet forces in north and northeast China. For this purpose, his order required that in addition to military preparations, CCP organizations should emphasize the Soviet Union's important role in the war against Japan and purge unrealistic expectations about the United States among party cadres.
10
At the CCP Seventh Party Congress that summer, Mao warmly praised the great contributions of the Soviet Union in the war against fascism and claimed that the Pacific question could not be resolved without Soviet participation. He especially emphasized that the Soviet Union was the "best friend of the Chinese people."
11
Against this background, Mao for the first time revealed to the party his long-held plan for control of northeast China after a Japanese withdrawal.
12
To some degree, it could be said that the congress reaffirmed the CCP policy of seeking cooperation with the Soviet Union. After all, throughout the war against Japan, the CCP viewed Moscow as the main force against imperialism and foreign domination. Mao's speech helped boost morale for the revolutionary ranks, especially at a time when the CCP had come under great pressure from the United States. Still, Mao knew that the CCP could not rely on the Soviet Union to provide it with any substantial assistance.
13
During the congress, Mao cautioned the party to strive for self-reliance and not to expect too much

 

page_52<br/>
Page 52
from the Soviet Union, even as he showered praises on the Soviet leadership.

14
Obviously, at that time Mao could not determine how close and how broad his alliance with the Soviet Union would be.

After the Seventh Party Congress, in the summer of 1945, the news from the GMD-Soviet talks in Moscow showed Mao that cooperation would be very limited. On August 3 Wang Ruofei, who had been in charge of CCP foreign relations in Chongqing, reported on the current situation. He outlined the conditions the Soviet Union proposed for its participation in the war against Japan and warned his audience not to place much hope on the negotiations between the GMD government and the Soviet Union. Wang said that it was certain that the two would sign a treaty; although the treaty would serve the interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States, it would not be "a treaty under which the Soviet Union could freely support the CCP against the GMD." However, Wang still expressed the belief that one should not be too pessimistic and argued that there was a limit to the Soviet compromise. First, the Soviet Union would not allow the emergence of a pro-American fascist regime in China in the wake of Japanese defeat. Second, as a Marxist, Stalin could not restrict the CCP's development even though for various tactical reasons he was not willing to provide support to the CCP.
15
Wang's account of the international situation reflected the views of the CCP CC. The Soviet Union and the CCP shared the same goal of urging the GMD government to introduce democratic reforms and prevent the outbreak of civil war. Also, the Soviet Union was unlikely to attempt to restrict the CCP's struggle for its own political objectives. The key to attaining these objectives was to depend on its own resources while attempting to achieve a long-term alliance with Moscow.
As the war against Japan drew to a close, the CCP-Soviet relationship grew more complicated. The CCP's weight was by no means decisive in the Soviet framework for its China policy, which emphasized Moscow's ties with the United States and the GMD government. By contrast, the question of how to handle its relationship with the Soviet Union had become the key factor in CCP decision making. The CCP had to face the uncomfortable fact that it might be able to obtain only limited Soviet cooperation, since Stalin viewed China as peripheral in the confrontation between capitalism and revolution. But the CCP leaders still firmly believed that the common ideology of the CCP and the Soviet Union would constrain the extent of Soviet compromise with the United States and the GMD in China.
First Encounters
On August 14, 1945, Japan announced its surrender. Within hours Stalin ca-bled Mao suggesting that the CCP negotiate with the GMD and resolve their dif-

 

page_53<br/>
Page 53
ferences through mutual compromise.

16
Stalin's cables turned a new page in postwar. CCP-Soviet relations.

The problem the Soviet Union faced was how to translate its gains in the secret provisions of the Yalta and Sino-Soviet treaties into firm realities and how to protect its position in the new international structure. Stalin instructed Mao to negotiate so as to fulfill his promises to the United States and the GMD government made during the Yalta and Moscow negotiations. Both Washington and Jiang's government at Chongqing wanted Stalin to use his special relationship with the CCP to compel the party to accept the compromise between the Soviet Union and the United States that is, to unify China under Jiang Jieshi through political means.
After the Japanese surrender, the CCP leaders tried to estimate the general trends in the relationship between the Great Powers, putting less emphasis on their understanding of the secret deals at Yalta or the Sino-Soviet treaty. The establishment of the global antifascist alliance in 1941-1942 had had a tremendous influence on thinking in Yan'an. During the summer of 1942, Mao made a basic assessment about China's future in the postwar period, according to which the wartime U.S.-Soviet cooperation could be expected to continue after the defeat of the Axis powers. Affected by Great Power cooperation, CCP-GMD collaboration also could continue, and China could develop into a democratic republic, securing at least a period of peace. Although the relationship between the CCP and the GMD and that between the CCP and the United States changed over time, the CCP leaders did not change Mao's 1942 calculation until the end of the war.
17
According to Mao's assessment, two conditions were necessary for China to avoid civil war: continued cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States in the postwar period and a better military position for the CCP's forces. When Japan surrendered, CCP leaders still felt that these two conditions were not fully established. Internationally, the Soviet achievements in its war against Germany and its decision to participate in the war against Japan inspired the CCP. At the same time, however, while the United States increased its assistance to the GMD, the CCP could not obtain any direct aid from the Soviet Union. Domestically, the CCP could not yet prevent a GMD attack with its own resources. The Communists therefore took advantage of the sudden announcement of the Japanese surrender and the inability of the GMD forces to reach all areas affected by the surrender to expand their power and influence.
Regarding the relationship between the CCP and the GMD, Mao's main concern was how to prevent Jiang Jieshi from attacking his party. He still believed that the key to preventing an all-out conflict lay in an international compromise between the Soviet Union and the United States, with the two powers together

 

Other books

The Sauvignon Secret by Ellen Crosby
Caught in the Net by Breanna Hayse
Girl Out Back by Charles Williams
Unknown by Unknown
The Good Kind of Bad by Brassington, Rita
The Z Infection by Burgess, Russell