Read Brothers in Arms Online

Authors: Odd Arne Westad

Tags: #Political Science, #International Relations, #General, #test

Brothers in Arms (136 page)

BOOK: Brothers in Arms
4.49Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
ads
page_355<br/>
Page 355
doubtful about us. At the same time, he boasted that it was because of the direction of his theories that China's [revolution] succeeded. [We] must do away with any superstition about him. Before I die, I am prepared to write an article on what Stalin had done to China, which is to be published in one thousand years. (Iudin: The Soviet central leadership's attitude toward the policies of the Chinese central leadership is: it is completely up to the Chinese comrades how to resolve the Chinese problems, because it is the Chinese comrades who understand the situation best. Moreover, we maintain that it is hasty and arrogant to judge and assess whether or not the CCP's policies are correct, for the CCP is a great party.)
Well, [we] can only say that we have been basically correct. I myself have committed errors before. Because of my mistakes, [we] had suffered setbacks, of which examples included Changsha, Tucheng, and two other campaigns.
21
I will be very content if I am refuted as being basically correct, because such an assessment is close to reality.
Whether a [joint] submarine flotilla will be built is a policy issue: only China is in a position to decide whether we should build it with your assistance or it should be "jointly owned." Comrade Khrushchev ought to come to China [to discuss this issue] because I have already visited him [in Moscow].
[We] should by no means have blind faith in [authorities]. For instance, one of your specialists asserted on the basis of a book written by one [of your] academy scholars that our coal from Shanxi [province] cannot be turned into coke. Well, such an assertion has despaired us: We therefore would have no coal which can be turned into coke, for Shanxi has the largest coal deposit!
Comrade Xining [transliteration], a Soviet specialist who helped us build the Yangzi River Bridge [in Wuhan], is a very good comrade. His bridge-building method has never been utilized in your country: [You] never allowed him to try his method, either to build a big or medium or even small-sized bridge. When he came here, however, his explanation of his method sounded all right. Since we knew little about it, [we] let him try his method! As a result, his trial achieved a remarkable success which has become a first-rate, world-class scientific invention.
I have never met with Comrade Xining, but I have talked to many cadres who participated in the construction of the Yangzi River Bridge. They all told me that Comrade Xining was a very good comrade because he took part in every part of the work, adopted a very pleasant working style, and worked very closely with the Chinese comrades. When the bridge was built, the Chinese comrades had learned a great deal [from him]. Any of you who knows him personally please convey my regards to him.
21
Mao commanded these military operations during the CCP-Guomindang civil war in 1927-1934.

 

page_356<br/>
Page 356
Please do not create any tensions among the specialists regarding the relations between our two parties and two countries. I never advocate that. Our cooperation has covered a large ground and is by far very satisfactory. You ought to make this point clear to your embassy staff members and your experts so that they will not panic when they hear that Comrade Mao Zedong criticized [Soviet leaders].
I have long before wanted to talk about some of these issues. However, it has not been appropriate to talk about them because the incidents in Poland and Hungary put your [leadership] in political trouble. For instance, we then did not feel it right to talk about the problem concerning the experts [in China].
Even Stalin did improve himself: He let China and the Soviet Union sign the [alliance] treaty, supported [us] during the Korean War, and provided [us] with a total of 141 aid projects. Certainly these achievements did not belong to him but to the entire Soviet central leadership. Nevertheless, we do not want to exaggerate Stalin's mistakes.
Source:
Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan,
322-33
XII. Head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern Department, Mikhail Zimyanin, on Sino-Sovlet Relations, September 15, 1959
Before Nikita Khrushchev's visit to Beijing in October 1959, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko ordered the head of his ministry's Far Eastern department, Mikhail Zimyanin, to prepare a comprehensive report on Sino-Soviet relations since 1950. Khrushchev was given the report on September 28, on the flight back to Moscow from his visit to the United States. Khrushchev arrived in Beijing on September 30. This is the final part of Zimyanin's report.
The victory of the people's revolution in China and the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic marked the start of a qualitatively new stage in relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and China, based on a commonality of interests and a unity of goals in constructing a socialist and Communist society in both countries. . . .
When discussing the overall success of the development of Soviet-Chinese relations during the first three years after the formation of the PRC, we must not overlook several negative features of these relations connected with the violation of the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People's Republic, as reflected in bilateral agreements

 

page_357<br/>
Page 357
signed between the Soviet Union and PRC, including, for example, agreements to prohibit foreigners from entering Manchuria and Xinjiang (February 14, 1950), to establish Soviet-Chinese joint-stock companies, and to set the rate of exchange for the ruble and yuan for the national bank (June 1, 1950), as well as other such documents.
Beginning in 1953, the Soviet side took measures to eliminate everything that, by keeping the PRC in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the USSR, had impeded the successful development of Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of full equality, mutuality, and trust. Over time, the above-mentioned agreements were annulled or revised if they did not accord with the spirit of fraternal friendship. The trip to China by a Soviet party and state delegation headed by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev in October 1954 played an important role in the establishment of closer and more trusting relations. As a result of this visit, joint declarations were signed on Soviet-Chinese relations and the international situation and on relations with Japan. In addition, a communiqué and additional agreements were signed on: the transfer to the PRC of the Soviet stake in Soviet-Chinese joint-stock companies responsible for scientific-technical cooperation, the construction of a Lanzhou-Urumchi-Alma Ata railroad, the construction of a Tianjin-Ulan Bator railroad, and so forth.
The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] was of exceptionally great importance for the further improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations. It created an atmosphere conducive to a more frequent and more amicable exchange of candid views. The Chinese friends began to speak more openly about their plans and difficulties and, at the same time, to express critical comments (from a friendly position) about Soviet organizations, the work of Soviet specialists, and other issues in Soviet-Chinese relations. The CCP CC [Chinese Communist Party Central Committee] fully supported the CPSU's measures to eliminate the cult of personality and its consequences. It is worth noting, however, that the CCP CC, while not speaking about this directly, took a position different from ours when evaluating the activity of J. V. Stalin. A bit later the Chinese comrades reexamined their evaluation of the role of J. V. Stalin, as reflected in Mao Zedong's pronouncements when he was visiting Moscow. For example, he said: ". . . Overall, in evaluating J. V. Stalin, we now have the same view as the CPSU." In a number of discussions Mao Zedong gave a critical analysis of the mistakes of J. V. Stalin.
Soon after the Twentieth CPSU Congress, a campaign was launched in China to combat dogmatism, and a course was proclaimed to "let a hundred flowers bloom." In connection with this the Chinese press began, with increasing frequency, to express criticism of specific conditions and of works by Soviet authors in the fields of philosophy, natural history, literature, and art. This inevitably gave strong impetus to hostile statements by rightist forces who denounced the Soviet Union and Soviet-Chinese friendship. The rightists accused the Soviet Union of failing to uphold principles of equality and mutuality, and they alleged that Soviet assistance was self-interested and of inferior quality.

 

page_358<br/>
Page 358
They also asserted that the Soviet Union had not provided compensation for equipment taken from Manchuria, and they insisted that the Soviet Union was extracting money from China in return for weapons supplied to Korea, which were already paid for with the blood of Chinese volunteers. In addition, they lodged a number of territorial demands against the USSR.
The airing of these types of statements during the struggle against rightists can in no way be justified, even if one takes account of the tactical aims of our friends, who were seeking to unmask the rightists and deliver a decisive rebuff against them for all their statements. It is also worth noting that the Chinese friends, despite crushing the rightist elements, did not offer any open condemnation of statements expressed by them about so-called territorial claims on the USSR. The Soviet government's declaration of October 30, 1956, was received with great satisfaction in China.
22
In January 1957 a government delegation headed by Zhou Enlai visited the Soviet Union, leading to the signature of a joint Soviet-Chinese declaration. The declaration emphasized the complete unity of the USSR and PRC as an important factor in unifying the whole socialist camp, and it exposed the groundlessness of far-fetched claims about a "straggle between the CPSU and CCP for the right to leadership of world Communism." In accordance with the declaration, the Soviet Union devised and implemented concrete measures aimed at the further development of Soviet-Chinese friendship and cooperation on the basis of equality, mutual interest, and complete trust.
In 1957 a series of consultations took place between the CPSU CC and the CCP CC on common, concrete matters pertaining to the international situation and the Communist movement. The Chinese friends actively participated in the preparations and conduct of the Moscow conference of officials from Communist and workers' parties in November 1957. While the Chinese delegation was in Moscow, Mao Zedong spoke approvingly about the positive experience of such consultations and the constant readiness of the Chinese comrades to undertake a joint review of these and other matters.
The steps to reorganize the management of the national economy in the USSR were greatly welcomed in the PRC. The CCP CC fully supported the decisions of the June [1957] and other plenary sessions of the CPSU CC, although the Chinese press did not feature an official commentary or reactions to the decisions of these sessions. After details about the activity of the Anti-Party faction had been explained to the CCP CC, the friends began to speak more resolutely about these matters. "If Molotov's line had prevailed within the CPSU," Mao declared in Moscow, "that would have been dangerous not only for the USSR, but for other socialist countries as well."
Taking account of the divisive activity of revisionists and the surge of imperialist propaganda, which tried to use several ideological campaigns in China in 1957 and, in par-
22
Declaration endorsing the principle of equality in relations between the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

 

BOOK: Brothers in Arms
4.49Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
ads

Other books

Darcy's Passions by Regina Jeffers
Deadline by Campbell Armstrong
Chateau of Secrets: A Novel by Melanie Dobson
In an Uncertain World by Robert Rubin, Jacob Weisberg
Thick as Thieves by Catherine Gayle
Dark Wolf by Christine Feehan
Barracuda by Mike Monahan
How to Piss in Public by McInnes, Gavin