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Authors: Odd Arne Westad

Tags: #Political Science, #International Relations, #General, #test

Brothers in Arms (135 page)

BOOK: Brothers in Arms
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tion; third, you looked so smart when you went all the way to Moscow desiring Stalin to sign an agreement so that [China] would regain authority over the [Manchurian] railroad." In Moscow it was [I. V.] Kovalev who took care of me with [N. T.] Fedorenko as my interpreter.
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I got so angry that I once pounded on the table. I only had three tasks here [in Moscow], I said to them, the first was to eat, the second was to sleep, and the third was to shit.
There was a [Soviet] adviser in [our] military academy who, in discussing war cases, would only allow [the Chinese trainees] to talk about those of the Soviet Union, not China's, would only allow them to talk about the ten offensives of the Soviet Army, not [ours] in the Korean War. Please allow us to talk about these cases! [Can you imagine] he wouldn't even allow us to talk about [our own war experiences]! For God's sake, we fought wars for twenty-two years; we fought in Korea for three years! Let [me ask] the Central Military Committee to prepare some materials concerning [our war experiences] and give them to Comrade Iudin, of course, if he is interested.
We did not speak out on some [controversial] issues because we did not want to cause problems in the Sino-Soviet relations. This was particularly true when the Polish Incident broke out. When Poland demanded that all of your specialists go home, Comrade Liu Shaoqi suggested, in Moscow, that you withdraw some. You accepted [Liu's] suggestion which made the Polish people happy because they then tasted some freedom. At that time we did not raise our problems with your specialists [in China] because, we believe, it would have caused you to be suspicious that we took the advantage [of your crisis situation] to send all the specialists home. We will not send your specialists home; we will not do so even if Poland does so ten more times. We need Soviet aid. Once I have persuaded the Polish people that [we all] should learn from the Soviet Union, and that after putting the antidogmatism campaign at rest, [they] ought to advocate a "learn from the Soviet Union" slogan. Who will benefit in learning from the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union or Poland? Of course, it will benefit Poland more.
Although we shall learn from the Soviet Union, we must first of all take into account our own experiences and mainly rely on our own experiences.
There should be some agreed limits on the terms of [Soviet] specialists. For instance, there have never been restrictions on your chief advisers in [our] military and public security branches, who can come and go without even notifying or consulting with us in advance. Presumably, if you leave your post, is it all right that another ambassador be sent [to China] without discussing it with us? No, absolutely not! How much informa-
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I. V. Kovalev, Stalin's representative to China from 1948 to 1950, accompanied Mao Zedong to visit the Soviet Union in Decemher 1949-February 1950; N. T. Fedorenko, a Soviet sinologist, in the early 1950s served as the cultural counselor at the Soviet embassy in Beijing.

 

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tion could your advisers to our ministry of public security obtain if they merely sit there totally uninformed by their Chinese colleagues?
Let me advise you [and your specialists] to pay more visits to each of our provinces so as to get in touch with the people and obtain firsthand information. This have I mentioned to Comrade Iudin many times: if not ten thousand times, at least one thousand times!
With some exceptions, though, most of the [Soviet] specialists are of a good quality. We have also made mistakes before: We did not take the initiative to pass on information to the Soviet comrades. Now we must correct these mistakes by adopting a more active attitude [toward the Soviet comrades]. Next time [we] ought to introduce to them China's general line. If the first time [we] fail to get the information through, [we] will try a second time, third time, and so forth. Indeed, it was [your] proposition for establishing a "cooperative" on nuclear submarines which led to these remarks. Now that we've decided not to build our nuclear submarines, we are withdrawing our request [for obtaining submarines from the Soviet Union]. Otherwise, we would have to let you have the entire coast, much larger areas than [what you used to control in] Lushan and Dalian. Either way, however, we will not get mixed up with you: We must be independent from one another. Since we will in the end build our own flotilla, it is not in our interest that [we] play a minor role in this regard.
Certainly [the arrangements] will be totally different in war time. Your army can operate in our [land], and our army can move to your places to fight. If your army operates on our territory, however, it must be commanded by us. When our army fights in your land, as long as it does not outnumber your army, it has to be directed by you.
These remarks of mine may not sound so pleasing to your ear. You may accuse me of being a nationalist or another Tito. My counter argument is that you have extended Russian nationalism to China's coast.
It was Comrade Khrushchev who had eliminated the four joint enterprises. Before his death, Stalin demanded the right to build a plant to manufacture canned food in our country. My response was that [we] would accept [the demand] as long as you provide us equipment, help us build it, and import all the products [from us]. Comrade Khrushchev praised me for giving [Stalin] a good answer. But why in the world do [you Russians] want to build a naval "cooperative" now? How would you explain to the rest of the world that you propose to build a naval "cooperative"? How would you explain to the Chinese people? For the sake of struggling against the imperialists, you may, as advisers, train the Chinese people. Otherwise, you would have to lease Lushan and other [ports] for ninety-nine years; but your "cooperative" proposal involves the question of ownership, as you propose that each side will own fifty percent of it. Yesterday you made me so enraged that I could not sleep at all last night. They (pointing at other CCP leaders present) are

 

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not angry. Only me alone! If this is wrong, it will be my sole responsibility. (Zhou Enlai: Our Politburo has unanimously agreed upon these points.)
If we fall to get our messages through this time, we may have to arrange another meeting; if not, we may have to meet every day. Still, I can go to Moscow to speak to Comrade Khrushchev; or we can invite Comrade Khrushchev to come to Beijing so as to clarify every issue.
(Peng Dehuai: This year Soviet Defense Minister Malinovskii cabled me requesting to build a long-wave radio station along China's coast to direct the [Soviet] submarine flotilla in the Pacific Ocean. As the project will cost a total of 110 million rubles, the Soviet Union will cover 70 million and China will pay 40 million.)
This request is of the same nature as the naval "cooperative" proposal which [we] cannot explain to the people. [We] will be put in a politically disadvantageous position if [we] reveal these requests to the world.
(Peng Dehuai: Petroshevskii [a Soviet military adviser] also has a rude attitude and rough style. He is not very pleased because some of our principles for army building do not completely follow the Soviet military codes. Once at an enlarged CMC meeting, when Comrade Ye Fei from the Fujian Military District pointed out that, as the Soviet military codes were basically to guide operations on flatlands, and as Fujian [province] had nothing but mountains, the Soviet codes were not entirely applicable [to Fujian's reality]. Very upset at hearing this, Petroshevskii immediately responded: "You have insulted the great military science by the great Stalin!" His remarks made everyone at the meeting very nervous.)
Some of the above-mentioned [controversial] issues have been raised [by us] before, some have not. You have greatly aided us but now we are downplaying your [role]; you may feel very bad about it. Our relationship, however, resembles that between professor and student: the professor may make mistakes, do not you agree that the student has to point them out? Pointing out mistakes does not mean that the [student] will drive the professor out. After all the professor is a good one.
You are assisting us to build a navy! Your [people] can serve as advisers. Why would you have to have fifty percent of the ownership? This is a political issue. We plan to build two or three hundred submarines of this kind.
If you insist on attaching political conditions [to our submarine request], we will not satisfy you at all, not even give you a tiny [piece of our] finger. You may inform Comrade Khrushchev that, if [he] still [insists on] these conditions, there is no point for us to talk about this issue. If he accepts our requirement, he may come [to Beijing]; if not, he does not have to come, because there is nothing for us to talk about. Even one tiny condition is unacceptable [for us]!
When this issue is involved, we will refuse to accept your aid for ten thousand years. However, it is still possible for us to cooperate on many other affairs; it is unlikely that

 

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we would break up. We will, from beginning to the end, support the Soviet Union, although we may quarrel with each other inside the house.
While I was in Moscow, I once made it clear to Comrade Khrushchev that you did not have to satisfy every one of our requests. Because if you hold back your aid from us, [you] in effect would compel us to work harder [to be self-reliant]; should we get everything from you, we will end up in a disadvantageous position.
It is, however, extremely important for us to cooperate politically. Because, if we undermine your political positions, you will encounter considerable problems; the same is true with us: if you undermine our [political] positions, we will be in trouble.
In wartime, you can utilize all our naval ports, military bases, and other [facilities]. [In return] our [military] can operate in your places including your port or bases at Vladivostok and shall return home when war is over. We may sign an agreement on wartime cooperation in advance which does not have to wait until war breaks out. Such an agreement must contain a stipulation that our [forces] can operate on your territory; even if we might not do so, such a stipulation is required, because it involves the issue of equality. In peacetime, however, such an arrangement cannot be accepted. In peacetime, you are only to help us construct [military] bases and build armed forces. We would not have accepted [your] proposition for building a naval "cooperative" even if it had been during Stalin's time. I quarreled with him in Moscow!
Comrade Khrushchev has established his credibility by having the [previous] "cooperative" projects eliminated. Now that such an issue involving ownership is raised again, we are reminded of Stalin's positions. I might be mistaken, but I must express my opinion.
You explained [to me] yesterday that [your proposition] was based on the consideration that [Russia's coastal] conditions were not as good for nuclear submarines to function fully as China's, thus hamstringing future development of nuclear submarines. You can reach [the Pacific] Ocean from Vladivostok through the Kurile Islands. The condition is very good!
What you said [yesterday] made me very uneasy and displeased. Please report all my comments to Comrade Khrushchev: You must tell him exactly what I have said without any polishing so as to make him uneasy. He has criticized Stalin's [policy] lines but now adopts the same policies as Stalin did.
We will still have controversies. You do not endorse some of our positions; we cannot accept some of your policies. For instance, your [leadership] is not pleased at our policy regarding "internal contradictions among the people," and the policy of "letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend."
Stalin endorsed the Wang Ming line, causing the losses of our revolutionary strength up to more than ninety percent. At the critical junctures [of our revolution], he wanted to hold us back and opposed our revolution. Even after [we] achieved victory, he remained

 

BOOK: Brothers in Arms
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