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Authors: Odd Arne Westad

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place to the effect that the Chinese Communist Party was going along the Yugoslav path, that Mao Zedong is a "Chinese Tito." I told Mao Zedong that there were no such moods and conversations in our party.
The bourgeois press around the world, continued Mao Zedong, particularly the right socialists, had taken up the version of "China's third way," and extolled it. At that time, noted Mao Zedong, Stalin, evidently, did not believe us, while the bourgoisie and laborites sustained the illusion of the "Yugoslav path of China," and only Jiang Jieshi alone "defended'' Mao Zedong, shrieking that the capitalist powers should not in any circumstance believe Mao Zedong, that "he will not turn from his path,"
etc.
This behavior of Jiang Jieshi is understandable, since he knows us too well, he more than once had to stand in confrontation to us and to fight with us.
The distrust of Stalin to the CCP, Mao Zedong continued further, was apparent also during the time of Mao Zedong's visit to the Soviet Union. One of our main goals for the trip to Moscow was the conclusion of a Chinese-Soviet treaty on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance. The Chinese people asked us whether a treaty of the USSR with the new China will be signed, why until now legally there continues to exist a treaty with the supporters of the Guomindang,
etc.
The issue of the treaty was an extremely important matter for us, which determined the possibilities for the further development of the PRC. At the first conversation with Stalin, Mao Zedong said, I brought a proposal to conclude a treaty along government lines, but Stalin declined to answer. During the second conversation I returned once again to that issue, showing Stalin a telegram from the CC CCP with the same type of proposal about a treaty. I proposed to summon Zhou Enlai to Moscow to sign the treaty, since he is the minister of foreign affairs. Stalin used this suggestion as a pretext for refusal and said that "it is inconvenient to act in this way, since the bourgeois press will cry that the whole Chinese government is located in Moscow." Subsequently, Stalin refrained from any meetings with me. From my side there was an attempt to phone him in his apartment, but they responded to me that Stalin is not home, and recommended that I meet with [Anastas] Mikoyan. All this offended me, Mao Zedong said, and I decided to undertake nothing further and to wait it out at the dacha. Then an unpleasant conversation took place with [I. V.] Kovalev and [N. T.] Fedorenko, who proposed that I go on an excursion around the country. I sharply rejected this proposal and responded that I prefer "to sleep through it at the dacha." Some time later, continued Mao Zedong, they handed me a draft of my interview for publication which had been signed by Stalin. In this document it was reported that negotiations are being held in Moscow on concluding a Soviet-Chinese treaty. This already was a significant step forward. It is possible that in Stalin's change of position, said Mao Zedong, we were helped by the Indians and the English, who had recognized the PRC in January 1950. Negotiations began right after this, in which Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Bulganin, Kaganovich, and Beriia took part. During the negotiations, at Stalin's initiative there was undertaken an attempt by the Soviet Union to assume sole ownership of the Chinese

 

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Changchun (i.e., Harbin) Railway. Subsequently, however, a decision was made about the joint exploitation of the Chinese Changchun (i.e., Harbin) Railway, besides which the PRC gave the USSR the naval base in Port Arthur, and four joint stock companies were opened in China. At Stalin's initiative, said Mao Zedong, Manchuria and Xinjiang were practically turned into spheres of influence of the USSR. Stalin insisted on the fact that in these regions only Chinese people and Soviet citizens be permitted to live. Representatives of other foreign states, including Czechs, Polish people, and Englishmen who were living permanently in those regions, should be evicted from there. The only ones whom Stalin skipped over through his silence were Koreans, of whom there are counted one and a half million in Manchuria. These types of pretensions from Stalin's side, said Mao Zedong, were incomprehensible to us. All this also was fodder for the bourgeois press and representatives of capitalist states. In fact, continued Mao Zedong, in the course of the negotiations around this treaty, there was the most genuine trading going on. It was an unattractive way to pose the issue, in which Stalin's distrust and suspicion of the CCP was clearly expressed.
We are glad to note, said Mao Zedong, that the Chinese Changchun (i.e., Harbin) Railway and Port Arthur have been returned to China, and the joint stock companies have ceased to exist. In this part of the conversation Mao Zedong stressed that Khrushchev did not attend these negotiations and that Bulganin's participation in them was minimal. Stalin's distrust of the CCP was apparent in a number of other issues, including Kovalev's notorious document about anti-Soviet moods in the leadership of the CCP. Stalin, in passing this document to the CC CCP, wanted, evidently, to stress his mistrust and suspicions.
Over the course of the time I spent in Moscow, said Mao Zedong, I felt that distrust of us even more strongly and therefore I asked that a Marxist representative of the CC CPSU be sent to China in order to become acquainted with the true situation in China and to get to know the works of the Chinese theoreticians, and simultaneously to examine the works of Mao Zedong, since these works in the Chinese edition were not reviewed by the author in advance, while the Soviet comrades, counter to the wish of the author, insisted on their publication.
Mao Zedong reminded me that upon my (Iudin's) arrival in China he had persistently and specially recommended to me to complete a trip around the whole country. In relation to this I told Mao Zedong about a conversation which I had with Stalin, in the presence of several members of the Politburo, upon my return from the trip to China. Stalin at that time asked me whether the ruling Chinese comrades are Marxists. Having heard my affirming response, Stalin said, "That's good! We can be calm. They've grown up themselves, without our help."
Mao Zedong noted that in the very posing of this question Stalin's distrust of the Chinese Communists was also made apparent. Important things which, evidently, to some extent strengthened Stalin's belief in the CCP were your (Iudin's) report

 

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about the journey to China and the Korean War performance of the Chinese People's Volunteers.
In such a way, said Mao Zedong, if we look historically at the development of the Chinese Revolution and at Stalin's attitude to it, then it is possible to see that serious mistakes were made, which were especially widespread during the time of the Comintern's work. After 1945, during the period of the struggle with Jiang Jieshi, because of the over-estimation of the forces of the Guomindang and the underestimation of the forces of the Chinese Revolution, Stalin undertook attempts at pacification, at restraining the development of the revolutionary events. And even after the victory of the revolution Stalin continued to express mistrust of the Chinese Communists. Despite all that, said Mao Zedong, we have stood firmly behind the revolutionary positions, for if we had permitted vacillations and indecisiveness, then, no doubt, long ago we would not have been among the living.
Then Mao Zedong moved on to a general evaluation of Stalin's role. He noted that Stalin, without a doubt, is a great Marxist, a good and honest revolutionary. However, in his great work in the course of a long period of time he made a number of great and serious mistakes, the primary ones of which were listed in Khrushchev's speech. These fundamental mistakes, said Mao Zedong, could be summed up in seven points:
1. Unlawful repressions.
2. Mistakes made in the course of the [world] war, moreover, in particular in the beginning, rather than in the concluding period of the war.
3. Mistakes which dealt a serious blow to the union of the working class and the peasantry. Mao Zedong observed that this group of mistakes, in particular the incorrect policy in relation to the peasantry, was discussed during Comrade Khrushchev's conversation with Zhu De in Moscow.
4. Mistakes in the nationality question connected to the unlawful resettlement of certain nationalities and others. However, overall, said Mao Zedong, nationality policy was implemented correctly.
5. Rejection of the principle of collective leadership, conceit, and surrounding himself with toadies.
6. Dictatorial methods and leadership style.
7. Serious mistakes in foreign policy (Yugoslavia, etc.).
Mao Zedong further stressed a thought to the effect that overall in the Communist movement great victories were won. The single fact of the growth of the Socialist camp from 200 million people to 900 million people speaks for itself. However, in the course of successful forward advance in some certain countries, in some certain parties these or other mistakes arose. Mistakes similar to these and others, he said, can arise in the future too. I [Iudin] observed that it would be better not to repeat mistakes like Stalin's. To this Mao Zedong answered that, evidently, there will be these types of mistakes again. The appearance of these mistakes is entirely explicable from the point of view of dialectical

 

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