Anzac's Dirty Dozen (44 page)

  
2
  For example, the two volumes of the official history published to date both devote lengthy chapters to ‘landmark' battles: see Ian McNeill,
To Long Tan:
The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966
, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1993; and Ian McNeill and Ashley Ekins,
One the Offensive: The Australian
Army in the Vietnam War 1967–1968
, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2003.

  
3
  Craig Stockings (ed.),
Zombie Myths of Australian Military History: The 10
Myths That Will Not Die
, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2010, p. 195.

  
4
  McNeill,
To Long Tan
, pp. 305–75.

  
5
  AWM 98, item 115, HQ AFV – Intelligence Phuoc Tuy – Ralliers and agents. Interrogation report, 25 August 1969, Subject: Executive Officer, 274 Regiment. This file cites a typical example of the detailed planning that went into VC/PAVN operations. In this case, 274 Regiment received orders to attack the US base at Long Binh in December 1968 and executed its orders on 21 February 1969 after nearly two months of planning, preparations and
rehearsals.

  
6
  This and other statistical data in this chapter is drawn from the ‘1ATF Contact Database 1966–1971', created by Dr Andrew Ross. The database holds information on approximately 4500 combat incidents of 1ATF in Vietnam between 1966 and withdrawal of the force in 1971. The data is drawn primarily from 1ATF ‘Combat After Action Reports' held in AWM series 103, HQ 1ATF (Nui Dat) records, and AWM series 95, Australian Army Commanders' diaries, and other series. We estimate that the database contains over 95% of 1ATF recorded contacts. Of the 4500 combat incidents recorded, 3909 are contacts or other battles, about 250 are mine incidents, 200 are friendly fire incidents and the remainder miscellaneous. The term ‘casualties' includes both killed and wounded.

  
7
  S. Karnow,
Vietnam: A History
, 2nd edn, Pimlico, London, 1994, p. 548. Giap was speaking about the Tet Offensive of 1968, but the point also applies to other PAVN offensives and major battles.

  
8
  The Division in Battle, Pamphlet no. 11,
Counter Revolutionary Warfare
, Military Board, Army Headquarters, Canberra, 1966, p. 25.

  
9
  McNeill,
To Long Tan
, pp. 366–67.

10
  McNeill,
To Long Tan
, pp. 356–57.

11
  
Counter Revolutionary Warfare
, p. 58. The doctrine stated prophetically that ‘in this battle for the allegiance of the people the results of well directed propaganda, publicity and psychological operations (psyops) may sometimes outweigh the results achieved by successful military operations'.

12
  Some debate still surrounds the enemy's military objectives. Some see the battle as an attempted annihilation ambush, while others see it as an encounter between D Company 6RAR and the enemy force as it prepared for an assault against the Nui Dat base. This debate is briefly discussed in McNeill,
To Long
Tan
, but it is also addressed in B. Buick (with G. McKay),
All Guts and No
Glory: The story of a Long Tan Warrior
, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000; and B. Grandin,
The Battle of Long Tan as Told by the Commanders to Bob Grandin
, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2004. For an imagined account of the battle from the enemy perspective see Dave Sabben,
Through Enemy Eyes
, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2005.

13
  Australian Archives A4531, item 201/2/1 part 1, Saigon – Vietnam elections – 1966, Cablegram, Australian Embassy Saigon to Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 13 September 1966.

14
  H.G. Summers Jr.,
On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War
, Random House, New York, 1982, p. 1.

15
  Analysis of the ‘1ATF Contact Database 1966 to 1971'.

16
  ‘1ATF Contact Database'.

17
  
Counter Revolutionary Warfare
, p. 37.

18
  ‘1ATF Contact Database'.

19
  Analysis of 1ATF Intelligence Summaries (INTSUMs) and the ‘1ATF Intelligence Database'.

20
  1ATF Intelligence Summaries (INTSUMs); ‘1ATF Intelligence Database'.

21
  D. Hackworth
, About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior
, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1989, p. 669.

22
  Of the enemy weapons captured by Australian and New Zealand forces in
contacts, 748 were AK47s and 731 were other weapons including M16s, carbines and sub-machine guns, rifles, pistols, RPG launchers and machine guns: see ‘1ATF Contact Database'.

23
  In early 1968, 2RAR, 3RAR and 7RAR were invited by HQ 1ATF to give a critical appraisal of the performance of infantry weapons in Vietnam. The results of this appraisal are found in AWM103, item R1000/1/8, HQ 1ATF Weapons – General – Review of infantry weapons.

24
  HQ 1ATF Weapons – General – Review of infantry weapons. The COs of 2RAR/NZ (ANZAC), 3RAR and 7RAR each commented on the rifle's ‘popularity' with 1ATF soldiers, its ‘excellence', reliability, accuracy and penetrating ability. See also I. Kuring
, Red Coats to Cams: A History of
Australian Infantry 1788–2001
, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2004, p. 399. The L1A1 7.62mm Self Loading Rifle (or SLR) was in service with the Australian Army for about 25 years.

25
  T. Page and J. Pimlott (eds),
Nam: The Vietnam Experience 1965–1975
, Hamlyn, London,1988, p. 64.

26
  AWM95, item 7/2/54, Australian Army Commander's Diaries, Vietnam – 2RAR/NZ (ANZAC) – Narrative, Annexes, 1–31 May 1970, p. 123, Routine Orders for 2 RAR/NZ, May 1970.

27
  ‘1ATF Contact Database'. This represents the lowest figure for failure in contact. Many M60 problems were not necessarily reported in contact reports.

28
  AWM95, item 7/4/53, Australian Army Commander's Diaries, Vietnam – 4RAR/NZ (ANZAC) – Map, 1–30 September 1971, Contact report, D Company 4RAR/NZ, 21 September 1971.

29
  R.A. Hall,
Combat Battalion: The Eighth Battalion in Vietnam
, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000, pp. 160–165.

30
  G. Lockhart,
The Minefield: An Australian Tragedy in Vietnam
, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2007, p. 216.

31
  Hall,
Combat Battalion
, pp. 110–111.

10  The myth that Australia ‘punches above its weight'

Albert Palazzo

  
1
  The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Australian Army, the Department of Defence or the Australian Government.

  
2
  P. Kelly, ‘Punching above our weight,'
Policy
, 20(2), Winter 2004, pp. 29–34; M. Thomson, ‘Punching above our weight: Australia as a middle power',
Strategic Insights
, 18, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005, p. 2; P. Cook, ‘Trade, equity and development', address to the Australian APEC Study Centre, Melbourne, 18 June 2000; G. Evans, ‘The world after Wilenski: An Australian who mattered', inaugural Peter Wilenski Memorial Lecture, Canberra, 1995.

  
3
  For examples see: P. Cosgrove, ‘Year sees a versatile force punch way above its weight',
The Australian
, 12 November 2004; ‘Address by the Chief of Army Lieutenant General P.F. Leahy to the Defence Management Seminar', 24 September 2004; A. Houston, ‘The future of airpower: RAAF response to the
ADF NCW Roadmap', 2004 Air Power Conference CAF Keynote Speech, 16 September 2004; D. Hurley, ‘Managing in crisis: The road to recovery,' 27 October 2008; & Brigadier C.W. Orme, ‘Size and complexity: A soldier's perspective', address to Institute of Public Administration, 14 September 2006.

  
4
  ‘1 RAR Band',
Australian Army Band Corps
, 2010; ‘Punching above their weight',
Navy News,
10 June 2010; APA-H,
Career News
, Summer 2008;
JLU(S) Newsletter
, 1(3), July 2009; ‘Australian business wins more JSF contracts',
On Target
, 37, January 2004; and RAAPC,
Integrity Times
, Spring 2004.

  
5
  ‘Putting the tiger in the shed: Dechaineux Rests',
Trade
, June 2005.

  
6
  See ‘Punching above our weight: Australia once again ranked 6th at Cannes; NZ placed equal 9th',
Campaign Brief
, 29 June 2010, <
www.campaignbrief.com/2010/06/punching-above-our-weight-aust.html
>, (accessed 18 May 2011); A. Kennedy, ‘Locals on talent path',
The Morning Bulletin
, 6 June 2011, <
www.themorningbulletin.com.au/story/2010/06/24/locals-on-talent-path
>, (accessed 6 June 2011); Department of Industry Tourism and Resources,
Punching above its Weight: Australia's Cement Industry 2006–2012
, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2006.

  
7
  The Anzac legend and the cult of the ‘digger' have been dealt with in the previous volume: see C. Stockings (ed.),
Zombie Myths of Australian Military
History
, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2010.

  
8
  Thomson, ‘Punching above our weight'.

  
9
  P. Cosgrove, ‘One mission accomplished: What's next?'
The Sydney Papers
, 12(3), Winter 2000, pp. 94–105.

10
  For a brief discussion of Australia's role in East Timor see D. Horner,
Making
the Australian Defence Force
, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001, pp. 7–39; also, B. Breen,
Mission Accomplished: East Timor
, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000.

11
  For examples see Australian National Audit Office,
Management of Australian
Defence Force Deployments to East Timor
, Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, 2002, pp. 89–90; B. Breen and G. McCauley,
The
World Looking over their Shoulders: Australian Strategic Corporals on Operations
in Somalia and East Timor
, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2008, pp. 164–67.

12
  
Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force
, Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, para 1.15.

13
  J.R Ballard,
Triumph of Self-Determination: Operation Stabilise and United
Nations Peacemaking in East Timor
, Praeger, Westport, 2008, pp. 67–69; Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,
East Timor: Final
Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee
, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2000, pp. 49–51.

14
  Ballard,
Triumph of Self-Determination
, p. 67.

15
C.A. Collier, ‘A new way to wage peace: US support to Operation Stabilise',
Military Review
, January–February 2001, pp. 2–9; see also D. Stevens,
Strength
through Diversity: The Combined Naval Role in Operation STABILISE
, Sea Power Centre Australia, Canberra, 2007.

16
  A. Ryan,
‘Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks': Australian Defence Force
Participation in the International Force East Timor
, Land Warfare Studies
Centre, Canberra, 2000, pp. 75–76.

17
  
East Timor: Final Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
References Committee
, p. 51.

18
  Ballard,
Triumph of Self-Determination
, p. 70.

19
  See Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade,
From
Phantom to Force: Towards a More Efficient and Effective Army
, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2000.

20
  Horner,
Making the Australian Defence Force
, p. 11.

21
  Horner,
Making the Australian Defence Force
, pp. 35-40.

22
  T. Allard, ‘Experts of stealth leave their mark',
The Age
, 25 April 2003.

23
  On Iraqi military incompetence see K.M. Woods et. al.,
The Iraqi Perspectives
Report
, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2006, pp. 39–48.

24
  
The Australian Experience of Airpower
, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2007, p. 161; P. Cosgrove, ‘Fighting fists forged in Falconer',
The Australian
, 20 June 2003; Allard, ‘Experts of stealth leave their mark'; and ‘Colonel John Mansell provides an overview of Australian Special Forces contribution to Operation Falconer', Defence Media Release, 9 May 2003.

25
  Figures are for April 2003 and compiled from A. Belasco,
Troop Levels in
the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues
, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 2009, p. 64;
Operations in
Iraq: Lessons for the Future
, [UK] Ministry for Defence, London, 2003, p. 84;
The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003
, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2003; & United Nations Population Data Base, <
unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2006/Table05.pdf
>, (accessed 15 June 2011).

26
  D. Fickling, ‘Australia criticised for troops pullout',
Guardian
, 18 April 2003; M. Wilkinson, ‘Bush wants Canberra role in Iraq,'
Sydney Morning Herald
, 1 May 2003.

27
  
Australian Defence Forces Deployed to Support the Rehabilitation of Iraq:
Report of the Delegation 22 to 28 October 2005
, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Canberra, 2006, pp. 25–26. Prior to the establishment of the Training Team, Australia provided some trainers who served embedded in the US training organisation.