Anzac's Dirty Dozen (41 page)

50
  L. McAulay,
The Battle of Long Tan: The Legend of Anzac Upheld
, Arrow Books, Sydney, 1987, pp. 24 & 40.

51
  I. McNeill & A. Ekins,
On the Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam
War 1967–1968
, The Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2003, pp.162, 164 & 536 n. 92.

52
  McNeill and Ekins,
On the Offensive
, p. 162.

53
  McNeill and Ekins,
On the Offensive
, pp. 163–64.

54
  P. Londey,
Other People's Wars: A History of Australian Peacekeeping
, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2004, p. 114.

55
  
RAAF News
, March 1986, p. 1; April 1986, p. 3.

56
  D. Stevens (ed.),
The Royal Australian Navy
, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, vol. 3, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, p. 245.

57
  P. Dennis et al.,
The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History
, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1995, p. 395.

58
  Department of Defence media release MECC 273/11, 2 July 2011, <
www.defence.gov.au/media/DepartmentalTpl.cfm?CurrentId=12073
>, (accessed 25 July 2011).

59
  Prime Minister Helen Clark, 27 April 2008, <
www.sydneyarchitecture.com/PYR/PYR11.htm
>, (accessed 21 September 2011).

60
  K. Hunter, ‘States of mind: Remembering the Australian–New Zealand relationship',
Journal of the Australian War Memorial
, 36, May 2002, <
www. awm.gov.au/journal/j36/nzmemorial.asp
>, (accessed 25 July 2011).

  4  Other people's wars

Craig Stockings

  
1
  ‘Other peoples wars', in
John Pilger's Australia
, Ovation Entertainment, 2010.

  
2
  For a survey of published accounts of this attitude or interpretation see D. McLean, ‘Australia and the Cold War: A historiographical review',
International History Review
, 23(2), June 2001, pp. 299–321.

  
3
  P. Keating,
Major Speeches of the First Year
, ALP, Canberra, 1993, p. 59.

  
4
  M. Lake et al.,
What's Wrong with Anzac?
, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2010, pp.164–65.

  
5
  The canal certainly did represent a key point of communications for Britain with its colonies before 1913, but after the outbreak of war it carried little trans-oceanic traffic. The passage to it via the Mediterranean route (Gibraltar–Port Said) was actually voluntarily abandoned by British shipping to Australia from as early as April 1940.

  
6
  D. Day,
The Politics of War
, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2003, pp. 17–18.

  
7
  Day,
The Politics of War
.

  
8
  See A. Meaher,
The Road to Singapore: The Myth of British Betrayal
, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2010.

  
9
  P. Calvocoressi, G. Wint & J. Pritchard,
Total War: The Causes and Course of the
Second World War
, vol. 2 , Penguin, New York, 1989 (2nd edn), pp. 266–76; and Day,
The Politics of War
, p. 16.

10
  S.F. Rowell,
Full Circle
, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1974, pp. 42–43; T.A. Gibson, ‘“Bayonets about the crown”: The record of the Australian Army in the Second World War',
Army Quarterly
, 56(1), April 1948, p. 167; G. Long,
To Benghazi
, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1961, pp. 34–35.

11
  D.M. Horner,
High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy 1939–1945
, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1982, p. 23.

12
  An expectation both in line with the principles of imperial defence and referred to with considerable regularity in the deliberations and reports of the Committee of Imperial Defence throughout the 1930s: ‘Report by Sir Maurice
Hankey, Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, on Certain Aspects of Australian Defence, November 1934', in J. Robertson & J. McCarthy,
Australian War Strategy 1939
–
1945
, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1985, p. 25 (document 17).

13
  Horner,
High Command
, pp. 24–25; Long,
To Benghazi
, pp. 37; Day,
The
Politics of War
, pp. 20–21.

14
  Military Board Report, ‘The raising of a special force for continuous service either in Australia or overseas, 13 September, 1939', in Robertson & McCarthy,
Australian War Strategy 1939
–
1945
, p. 27 (document 19); Minute, CGS to Adjutant General, ‘Designation of the Special Force', 26 September 1939, National Archives of Australian (NAA), series MP508/1, item 96/750/2; Draft Australian Army Order (AAO), ‘Second Australian Imperial Force', 24 November 1939, NAA MP508/1, 240/751/11.

15
  Memorandum, Secretary of the Army to Secretary Department of Defence Coordination, ‘AIF Army Personnel: Complete Records from Inception to Enlistment', 15 November 1941, NAA MP508/1, 304/750/17; Telegram, Army Headquarters to all Military District Headquarters, 8 October 1939, NAA MP508/1, 96/750/2; Minute, Adjutant General to CGS, ‘Organisation and Distribution of AIF', 9 November 1939 & Tables of Special Force District Quotas, NAA MP508/1, 96/750/3.

16
  J. Popple, ‘The first and the finest',
Australian Defence Force Journal
, 39, March–April 1983, pp. 35–36.

17
  Robertson,
Australia at War 1939
–
1945
, p. 40.

18
  Cable (no. 191 – Most Secret), Eden to Whiskard, 8 September 1939, in Robertson & McCarthy, A
ustralian War Strategy 1939
–
1945
, p. 26 (document 18).

19
  AHQ, Notes on formation and future employment of 2nd AIF, 28 November 1939, NAA MP729/7, 51/421/2, Part 1; Robertson,
Australia at War 1939
–
1945
, pp. 37–39.

20
  Day,
The Politics of War
, p. 22.

21
  ‘Agreed conclusions of discussions between officials, held at the War Office on 3rd November, 1939', in Robertson & McCarthy, A
ustralian War Strategy
1939
–
1945
, p. 33 (document 22); P. Badman,
North Africa 1940–1942: The
Desert War
, John Ferguson, Sydney, NSW, 1987, p. 12; Robertson,
Australia at
War
, pp. 37–39.

22
  Horner,
High Command
, pp. 28–29; Day,
The Politics of War
, p. 33.

23
  Notes of conference, Military Board and Blamey, 13 November 1939, NAA MP729/7, 51/421/2, Part 1; Cables (various), Menzies/Casey, 17–21 November 1939, NAA MP729/7, 51/421/2, Part 1.

24
  Horner,
High Command
, p. 29.

25
  Robertson,
Australia at War
, pp. 37–39; Minute, Secretary for Defence to Squires, 21 November 1939, NAA MP729/7, 51/421/2, Part 1.

26
  Casey to Menzies, 23 November 1939, NAA MP729/7, 51/421/2, Part 1.

27
  Cabinet Decision (Full Cabinet) ‘Despatch of 6th Division overseas', 28 November 1939, in Robertson & McCarthy,
Australian War Strategy
1939
–
1945
, p. 38 (Document 25); Horner,
High Command
, p. 30.

28
  See B. Farrell & G. Pratten,
Malaya 1942
, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2009; Day,
The Politics of War
, p. 32; Robertson,
Australia at War
, p. 40.

29
  Horner,
High Command
, pp. 32 & 37.

30
  Report, ‘The AIF's first year abroad', Australian War Memorial, series 54, item 524/7/1; Long,
To Benghazi
, pp. 68–69.

31
  G. Blainey, ‘We weren't that dumb', <
www.theaustralian.com.au/news/arts/we-werent-that-dumb/story-e6frg8nf-1225848127735
>, (accessed 23 February 2011).

32
  See J. Mordike,
An Army for a Nation
, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992.

33
  See C. Wilcox,
Australia's Boer War: The War in South Africa 1899–1902
, OUP, Melbourne, 2002.

34
  Quoted in R. Thompson,
Australian Imperialism in the Pacific: The Expansionist
Era 1820–1920
, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1980, p. 129.

35
  Blainey, ‘We weren't that dumb'.

36
  F. Bongiorno & G. Mansfield, ‘Whose war was it anyway? Some Australian historians and the Great War',
History Compass
, 6(1), 2007.

37
  Bongiorno & Mansfield, ‘Whose war was it anyway?'

38
  Blainey, ‘We weren't that dumb'.

39
  See P. Stanley, ‘Dramatic myth and dull truth: Invasion by Japan in 1942', in C. Stockings (ed.),
Zombie Myths of Australian Military History
, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2010.

40
  The British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve was a joint British, Australian and New Zealand military force created in the 1950s and based in Malaya. The idea of this force was to act as a point of forward defence and protect collective interests in south-east Asia from both internal and external communist threats. The Reserve was made up of an infantry battalion and a carrier group, supported by squadrons of aircraft.

41
  G. Woodard,
Asian Alternatives: Australia's Vietnam Decision and Lessons on
Going to War
, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2004.

42
  
The
Age
, 31 July 2002.

43
  Quoted in J. Beaumont et al.,
Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats: Australian
Foreign Policy-Making 1941–1969
, MUP, Melbourne, 2003, p. 151.

44
  Beaumont et al.,
Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats
, pp. 149–50.

45
  See G. Pemberton,
All the Way: Australia's Road to Vietnam
, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987; and the official history of the war, P. Edwards & G. Pemberton,
Crises and Commitments
, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992.

46
  See G. Sheridan,
The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US–Australian Alliance
under Bush and Howard
, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2006.

  5  ‘They also served': Exaggerating women's role in Australia's wars

Eleanor Hancock

  
1
  J. Damousi, ‘Why do we get so emotional about Anzac?', in M. Lake et al.,
What's Wrong with Anzac? The Militarisation of Australian History
, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2010, pp. 102, 106. For an earlier analysis of one of the commemorations that promoted this revival, as well as some of the problems it raised, see E. Reed,
Bigger than Gallipoli: War, History and Memory in Australia
, University of Western Australia Press, Perth, 2004, pp. 123–31, 164–65, 170–75.

  
2
  ‘Women and defence', in J. Beaumont (ed.),
Australian Defence: Sources and
Statistics
, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, vol. 6, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001, p. 357. Social changes did mean that some 1000 Australian women lived and worked in Vietnam during the Vietnam War in various capacities, plus about another 1000 military nurses: S. McHugh,
Minefields & Miniskirts: Australian Women and the Vietnam War
, Doubleday, Sydney, 1993, pp. ix, 102.

  
3
  This can be seen in the conflating of critical academic military history and uncritical popular history in M. Lake, ‘How do schoolchildren learn about the spirit of Anzac?', in Lake et al.,
What's Wrong with ANZAC?
, pp. 136–37. On this topic more widely see J.A. Lynn, ‘“Rally once again”: The embattled future of academic military history',
Journal of Military History
, 61(4), 1997, pp. 777–89.

  
4
  H. Reynolds, ‘Are nations really made in war?', in Lake et al.,
What's Wrong
with ANZAC?
, p. 43. On the wider implications of this, see R. White's stimulating observations, which need to be developed further: ‘War and Australian society', in M. McKernan & M. Browne (eds),
Australia: Two
Centuries of War & Peace
, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1988, pp. 391–95.

  
5
  ‘Introduction', B. Caine et al. (eds),
Australian Feminism: A Companion
, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1998, p. x.

  
6
  Reed,
Bigger than Gallipoli,
pp. 12–13, 71–82, 84, 86–90, 122–24, 143–51.

  
7
  Numbers taken from C. Kenny,
Captives: Australian Army Nurses in Japanese
Prison Camps
, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1986, p. xi. Of course those Australian women who had emigrated and lived in other countries at war, including civilian internees of the Japanese, did share such experiences. The ambiguous status of the civilian internees appears to have ensured that they have not gained the same national attention as the POW nurses: C. Twomey,
Australia's Forgotten Prisoners: Civilians Interned by the Japanese in
World War Two
, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2007, pp. 3–7, 15–17, 207.

  
8
  P. Adam-Smith,
Australian Women at War
, Thomas Nelson Australia, Melbourne, 1984, p. 14; S. de Vries,
Heroic Australian Women in War:
Astonishing Tales of Bravery from Gallipoli to Kokoda
, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2004, p. xxiii.

  
9
  See A.G. Butler on the qualities suiting women to nursing:
The Australian
Army Medical Services in the War of 1914–1918
, vol. 3, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1943, pp. 585–86; also L.A.G. Turner, ‘Captive women: Re-writing women into the Anzac myth', hons thesis, UNSW/ADFA, Canberra, 2000, pp. 5–7.