Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants (Law, Conflict and International Relations) (29 page)

This chapter considers the prospects for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) to have any serious impact on the country itself, against the backdrop of long-term reconstruction but limited efforts that might be construed as peacebuilding. It argues that, while Lebanon has undergone extensive reconstruction since the end of its brutal civil war, no serious peacebuilding efforts were undertaken. Indeed, many of the changes that a post-conflict society is expected to undergo, arising from demobilization of large numbers of fighters, and reform of the justice and security sector, did not take place. In this context, accountability for the abuses committed during the war and in the subsequent 15 years under Syrian occupation has yet to take place and seems unlikely. The STL is nonetheless often expected to operate as a mechanism analogous to ordinary transitional justice mechanisms, yet it does not have the remit to address the legacy of conflict and occupation. Instead, its mandate is limited to the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and related assassinations. It seems unlikely
that it can have the effect expected of transitional justice mechanisms generally, and ascribed by the advocates of the STL specifically, of promoting human rights and accountability, or even peacebuilding. Rather, after two decades of reconstruction, the tribunal is unlikely to contribute to peace and may run the risk of promoting conflict should it try defendants, whether in person or
in absentia
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A note on the place of a case study in Lebanon in a volume on transitional justice and peacebuilding; this might, and perhaps should, strike some readers as odd, given that Lebanon presents us with what one of our authors has termed a “no-no” case: no transitional justice, and no peacebuilding.
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First, the study of Lebanon’s experience provides a useful counterpoint to the study of countries in which one or more mechanism of each has been deployed over time, helping us to understand at least one possible result of failure to take either seriously. While every situation is different, given that we frequently scrutinize and criticize mechanisms that exist as though their absence
might
be a preferable option, there is much to be learned from study of their absence in Lebanon. Second, and perhaps more importantly, given the tendency towards proliferation of mechanisms of transitional justice, it is important to closely scrutinize them and ask whether they are genuinely dedicated to certain core goals of human rights and accountability, or whether they serve other, political purposes. Here, the STL looks like a transitional justice instrument, but it is worth asking, as with the use of certain transitional justice mechanisms in Colombia, whether that means that transitional justice is actually underway.
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Background: The Conflict and its Termination

Lebanon experienced a brutal civil war during 1975–90 and a brief resurgence of violence following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. The conflict was based on sectarian violence amongst militias and between the militias and the government, with significant regional dimensions. In 1976 Syria invaded Lebanon, with what it would later recast as an Arab Deterrent Force, or a peacekeeping force, and remained an occupying power. Israel also invaded southern Lebanon, in 1978, and put in place a “buffer zone” which remains today. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon peacekeeping force was put in place in southern Lebanon in 1978 to monitor Israeli withdrawal, and remains in place today.

Official estimates of casualties during the civil war are of about 145,000 deaths of which some 90 percent were civilians, 185,000 wounded, 2,000 women killed for having been raped, and 800,000 displaced.
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In addition to Lebanese citizens killed and displaced during the conflict, many disappeared and their numbers and fate have still not been determined, although official estimates stand at about 17,000.
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Others disappeared or have been held in Syrian prisons, many as political prisoners, although this is a charge that Syria denies.
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In 1989, the Ta’if agreement was negotiated by surviving members of the prewar Parliament, with brokerage by regional states, which proposed to heal national rifts and promote reconciliation (it was also titled the Charter of National
Reconciliation), develop administrative and political reforms, disarm militias, reaffirm sovereignty, and engage in “Lebanonization.”
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While it reinforced the need for Israeli withdrawal, it emphasized the importance of Syrian-Lebanese relations. Lebanon remained, following the end of the conflict, under heavy Syrian influence. While under the Ta’if agreement Syrian troops, then at a strength of 40,000, were to be redeployed to the Bekaa valley and removed, they remained in the country and were only fully removed in 2005 under heavy international pressure (UNSC resolution 1559).

The Hezbollah militia continues to maintain significant control in southern Lebanon and poor suburbs of Beirut and has not demobilized. In 2006, a short war between Israel and Hezbollah militants operating in southern Lebanon further devastated the country.

Meanwhile, the politics are shaped not only by confessionalism, discussed further below, but by rivalries between the 8 March and 14 March coalitions. These coalitions are particularly split over the creation and operation of the Special Tribunal. The 8 March coalition, comprised of the Shiite parties Amal and Hezbollah, allied with the Free Patriotic movement, refers to the date of a rally organized in 2005 to thank Syria for its involvement in the country. They view the creation of the tribunal as external interference in Lebanon. The 14 March coalition refers to the date in 2005 in which 1 million Lebanese protested in the streets, calling for Syrian withdrawal and an international investigation of the Hariri assassination. The coalition comprises the largely Sunni Future Movement founded by Hariri, several Christian parties, the Lebanese Forces (LF, formerly a militia within the Christian-dominated Lebanese Front, now a political party), and the Progressive Socialist Party, and supports the tribunal and rejects Syrian involvement in Lebanon.
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Challenges for Peacebuilding

The situation in Lebanon was somewhat unique in that much of the primary post-conflict economic reconstruction activities were not only internationally, but also internally, generated and regionally supported, particularly with the support of wealthy Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who was able to obtain a mix of grants and loans from oil-rich Gulf states alongside Western donors. The emphasis, however, has been less on peacebuilding and more on physical reconstruction, with Gulf donors and Hariri emphasizing infrastructure projects and Western donors emphasizing technical support to governance reform.
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If it is difficult, approximately 20 years after the Ta’if agreement, to characterize most activities seeking to rebuild Lebanon as peacebuilding rather than reconstruction, this may be in significant part due to the environment in which any peacebuilding might be attempted.

Governance, Sectarianism, and Clientelism

There are significant structural challenges to long-term peacebuilding in Lebanon.
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The country is technically a parliamentary democracy, with power-sharing in
governance.
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However, because of the dominance of political parties by particular sectarian groups traditionally and the consolidation of power in the hands of a few powerful politicians, political parties lack much significance. The prevalence of clientelism increases this phenomenon. While the Ta’if agreement sought to break clientelism by stipulating that voting be in governates, or large administrative units, elections have regularly violated its terms with district-based and uni-confessional voting. The Lebanese Constitution of 1926, as amended in 1990, stipulates the abolition of confessionalism in article 95, but has yet to be implemented.
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Power-sharing arrangements have been used repeatedly to address immediate crises of governance, often leaving underlying grievances unaddressed.

It is unclear whether peacebuilding in any traditional sense, including the (re)building of a strong and unitary state, is feasible in the country. Sectarian parties have an interest in a weak state so that they are able to pursue their own interests, according to some experts, and individuals define themselves as much or more through sectarian identities than as Lebanese.
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One observer, pointing out that state weakness left vacuums that were filled by Hezbollah, Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, and Christian factions, suggested that there were really many small strong states within a weak larger state.
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Further, each sectarian group has its own regional patrons, variously Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iran. These factors make state consolidation difficult.

The Regional Environment

Any efforts at building peace and promoting justice in Lebanon do not operate in a vacuum. Obviously, Lebanon is in an unstable region and subject to influences from regional powers noted above, even after the Syrian withdrawal from its territory. Israel only withdrew from a security zone that it occupied in the south of the country in 2000 and in 2006 fought a war with Hezbollah. The presence of a large number of Palestinian refugees living in poor conditions in refugee camps is a source of both political dispute and security concerns. Many observers suggest that genuine peace in Lebanon will not be feasible in the absence of a broader regional settlement, which would include a fair solution for Palestinians.
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Unfinished Demobilization of Combatants

The Ta’if agreement sparked new fighting between the Lebanese Forces (the largest militia) and the interim prime minister, General Michel Aoun, in 1990. There was provision for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), but its implementation was not internationally supported, and it did not extend to all fighting forces. A general amnesty, offering militia leaders posts in government, helped end the fighting, and some 50,000 fighters from 24 militias disarmed by April 1991. Some militias also had members integrated into the new Lebanon army, although all sought to integrate more members than was feasible. However, while there was widespread disarmament, there
was also variation in willingness to hand over or canton weapons. The Druze and Amal militias tended to comply with the process and also handed over heavy weaponry to the Syrians. Former Amal militia were heavily integrated into the state forces because of the group’s ties to the state and the rise of its leader, Nabih Berri, to be speaker of the Parliament.

Two critical exceptions are to be noted. Hezbollah, viewed by many as a liberator from Israeli occupation, was allowed to keep its arms. In addition, members of the LF were unable to take full advantage of DDR programs and very few were allowed to be integrated into the new army or civilian posts; instead, they tended to rely upon militia and family networks for reintegration. Many militia members did not seek inclusion in state forces because they had other opportunities, were established in legal businesses, or were engaged in smuggling, which in some cases increased organized criminal activity significantly.
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The lack of demobilization of Hezbollah enabled it to become a critical power-broker in post-Ta’if Lebanon, and it continues to hold significant power to influence and destabilize politics today.
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The lasting impact of the failure to engage in complete DDR in Lebanon, according to one observer, has been not only continued sectarianism, but continued “territorialization of security,” with factions controlling different sectors of the country and providing or undermining security. Such groups, including but not limited to Hezbollah, compete with one another and with the legitimate state security providers. The continued possibility of factional violence was demonstrated in the street fighting between Hezbollah and Amal militia members in May 2008.
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Sectarianism and the Security Forces

The possibility of security sector reform is limited, largely for the reasons that have been noted already. The state security forces, the ISF, do not control all the territory, and are widely viewed as being, like the judiciary, politics, and other aspects of public life, shaped by sectarianism and patronage.
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Militia members were to be incorporated into the ISF following rehabilitation, but in general they were simply incorporated without any rehabilitation process.
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The army is considered to be a more professional and truly national institution, but it too is affected by sectarianism.
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And, as one observer noted, without true disarmament of the more general population and militias, which would leave the security forces with the monopoly on weapons and use of force, reform will prove difficult.
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The army continues to respond to internal security issues rather than confining itself to external security because the ISF has lacked the capacity to control militias or larger demonstrations.
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Human Rights and Rule of Law

While the judiciary is formally independent, sectarian divisions are said to interfere in its management by the Supreme Judicial Council.
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The judiciary is
considered widely to be corrupt and subject to political manipulation.
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More generally, it is very slow and inefficient.
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However, there are exceptional judges who have displayed independence and professionalism and have applied international human rights and refugee law in their decisions.
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Thus, while most judges have the proper training, unlike in many countries where capacity-building is a necessary first step, the real challenge is the reform of the politicized environment in which they operate.
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There are some positive signs of the prospects for human rights and the rule of law, albeit limited ones. President Michel Suleiman has publicly stated an interest in promoting judicial reform and appointed as minister of the interior a former civil society activist, Ziad Baroud, who has promoted electoral reform. However, Suleiman and Baroud are considered by some observers as weak and/or exceptions to the rule, and reform will prove challenging given the sectarian nature of the polity, as well as the reliance of some judges on political patrons for their positions.
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The minister of justice, also a reformist, proposed the abolition of the death penalty in the summer of 2009, but it was politically controversial and was not presented to Parliament amid a broader cabinet crisis.
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The country also ratified the Optional Protocol to the Torture Convention in 2008, which obligates it to create a national office of prevention of torture within a year, which as of this writing has not been created.
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