Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants (Law, Conflict and International Relations) (24 page)

47
 See the online discussion on the challenges of calculating the number of persons tried on the Transitional Justice Listserve of April 20–21, 2010 (on file with author).

48
 See Klaas de Jonge, “PRI’s Research on Rwanda,” May 2010, available at <
www.penalreform.org/publications/pri%E2%80%99s-research-gacaca-klass-de-jonges-commentary
>, p. 6, accessed 20 July 2010.

49
 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity,” op. cit., p. 82.

50
 PRI,
The Contribution of the Gacaca Jurisdictions To Resolving Cases Arising from the Genocide
, p. 49.

51
 Rettig, “Gacaca,” op. cit., pp. 22–50, 40; Susan M. Thomson, “Resisting Reconciliation: State Power and Everyday Life in Post-Genocide Rwanda” (Doctoral dissertation, Dalhousie University, 2009), ch. 6.

52
 Human Rights Watch,
There Will be No Trial
(2007), available at <
www.hrw.org/en/
node/10839/section/1
>, accessed 17 August 2011.

53
 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity,” op. cit., p. 37; Thomson, “Resisting Reconciliation,” op. cit., 170ff.

54
 Buckley-Zistel, “We are Pretending Peace,” op. cit. See also Ingelaere, “Do We Understand Life after Genocide?” op. cit.

55
 UNDP, “Turning Vision 2020 into Reality: From Recovery to Sustainable Human Development” (National Report, Rwanda, 2007), available at <
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/africa/rwanda/name,3322,en.html
>, accessed 10 December 2010.

56
 See Scott Strauss,
The Order of Genocide
(Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2006); Lee Ann Fujii,
Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda
(Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2009).

57
 Peter Uvin,
Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda
(West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998), p. 68. For the relationship between acute and structural violence in other contexts, see Paul Farmer,
Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights and the New War on the Poor
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003); Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” op. cit.

58
 Filip Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship,”
African Affairs
, vol. 103 (2004), pp. 177–210, 210. See also Nyamwasa
et al
., “Rwanda Briefing,” op. cit.

59
 Human Rights Watch,
Uprooted and Forgotten: Impunity and Human Rights Abuses in Northern Uganda
(19 September 2005), available at <
www.hrw.org/reports/2005/09/19/uprooted-and-forgotten
>, p. 14, accessed 17 August 2011.

60
 Ibid., p. 33.

61
 The Amnesty Act applies to all rebel groups. The Ministry of Internal Affairs lists 21,783 reporters from 27 rebel groups for 2000–06; 12,119 of these were from the LRA, available at <
www.mia.go.ug/page.php?1=reporters&&2=Reporters%20Granted%20Amnesty
>, accessed 31 January 2010.

62
 It has now emerged that Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo invited President Museveni to seek ICC intervention. Although Moreno-Ocampo has stated that he has the authority to investigate any crimes, not just LRA crimes, no action has been taken in this regard. The main justification has been that UPDF crimes simply do not compare to those of the LRA in terms of gravity. Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark (eds),
Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa
(London: Royal African Society, March 2008), p. 43.

63
 For a qualitative discussion, see Tim Allen,
Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord
’
s Resistance Army
(London; New York: Zed Books, 2006),
ch. 5
. While Pham
et al
. found that 84% of their respondents supported international involvement in accountability, there was a vast difference of opinion in Acholi and non-Acholi districts. Acholi respondents favored “peace with amnesty,” while non-Acholi respondents preferred “peace with trials and punishment.” Phuong Pham
et al
.,
Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based Survey of Attitudes About Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda
(July 2005), available at <
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A1AABC919BF22E384925704A0022B98D-hrc-uga-25jul.pdf
>, pp. 33–34, accessed 17 August 2011.

64
 Isaac Vuni, “Ugandan LRA Fails To Sign Final Peace Deal at Riikwnbwa,”
Sudan Tribune
(13 April 2008), available at <
www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26734
>, accessed 7 May 2009; IRIN, “LRA Sticks to its Guns, Yet Ready To Sign Peace Deal,” (27 March 2008), available at <
www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=77481
>, accessed on 7 May 2009.

65
 For example, Lucy Hovil and Joanna Quinn.
Peace First, Justice Later: Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda
, Refugee Law Project Working Paper No. 17. Kampala, Uganda: Refugee Law Project, 2005.

66
 Pham
et al
.,
Forgotten Voices
, op. cit., p. 4.

67
 J. N. Clark, “The ICC, Uganda and the LRA: Re-Framing the Debate,”
African Studies
, vol. 69, no. 1 (2010), pp. 141–60.

68
 Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice
(September 2007), available at <
www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09–73422BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf
>, p. 1, accessed 17 August 2011.

69
 Issaka K. Souaré, “The International Criminal Court and African Conflicts: The Case of Uganda,”
Review of African Political Economy
, vol. 36, no. 121 (2009), pp. 369–88, 376.

70
 Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC,
Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice
, op. cit., p. 3.

71
 In contrast, the War Crimes Division will be eligible to try any crimes committed since 1987. However, as Quinn notes in this volume, the GOU’s commitment to accountability is on paper only.

72
 See Adam Branch, “Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention,”
Ethics & International Affairs
, vol. 21, no. 2 (2007), pp. 179–98, 188–89.

73
 Sverker Finnström, “Reconciliation Grown Bitter? War, Retribution, and Ritual Action in Northern Uganda,” in Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf (eds),
Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 135–56, 151.

74
 Ibid., pp. 151–53. Notably, though, Finnström does not address gendered or social inequalities that might exist at the local level.

75
 Erin Baines, “Complex Political Perpetrators: Reflections on Dominic Ongwen,”
Journal of Modern African Studies
, vol. 47, no. 2 (2009), pp. 163–91, 181.

76
 Ibid., p. 183.

77
 See the chapter by Quinn, “The Supposed Accountability/Peacebuilding Dilemma in Uganda,” in this volume.

78
 The National Reconciliation Bill provides for the institution of a “National Reconciliation Forum,” which functions basically as a truth commission. It would operate in conjunction with the Amnesty Commission, Human Rights Commission, Equal Opportunities Commission, and traditional justice institutions and religious representatives. The 2009 draft bill is available at <
www.iccnow.org/documents/TRC_Bill_-for_Uganda_2009.pdf
> (accessed 19 November 2010).

79
 Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC,
Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice
, op. cit., p. 8.

80
 “Report on the Proceedings of the JLOS Transitional Justice Working Group Roundtable Discussions,” Cape Town, South Africa, jointly hosted by CSVR, IJR and the Beyond Juba Project (2–5 February 2009), available at <
www.beyondjuba.org/conferences_seminars.php
>, accessed 7 February 2010.

81
 Beyond Juba Project, “Tradition in Transition,” Working Paper No. 1 (July 2009), available at <
www.beyondjuba.org/working_papers/BJP.WP1.pdf
>, accessed 17 August 2011.

82
 James Ojera Latigo, “Northern Uganda: Tradition-based Practices in the Acholi Region,” in Luc Huyse and Marc Salter (eds),
Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences
(Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2008), pp. 85–120, 112.
Emphasis added
. Latigo dismisses gender inequality in this single sentence.

83
 Tim Allen, “Ritual (Ab)use? Problems with Traditional Justice in Northern Uganda,” in Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark (eds),
Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa
(Royal African Society, 2008), pp. 47–54, 52–53.

84
 See Kamari Maxine Clarke,
Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 21; Finnström, “Reconciliation Grown Bitter?” op. cit., p. 147.

85
 Allen, “Ritual (Ab)use?” op. cit., p. 51.

86
 Ibid., p. 50.

87
 Erin K. Baines, “The Haunting of Alice: Local Approaches to Justice and Reconciliation in Northern Uganda,”
International Journal of Transitional Justice
, vol. 1, no. 1 (2007), pp. 91–114, 106; Joanna R. Quinn, “Accountability and Reconciliation: Traditional Mechanisms of Acknowledgement and the Implications of the Juba Peace Process,” paper presented at Reconstructing Northern Uganda, University of Western Ontario, London 9 April 2008, p. 15.

88
 Joanna R. Quinn, “Tradition?! Traditional Cultural Institutions on Customary Practices in Uganda,” paper presented at International Studies Association, New York, 16 February 2009, p. 19.

89
 Ibid., p. 22.

Part II

Country Case Studies

  6
Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice in Cambodia: Attempts At DDR and the Rise of Victim-Centered Justice

Johanna Herman

Introduction

After a 30-year wait, the top leaders of the Khmer Rouge are finally facing justice at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). As the negotiations, preparations, and creation of this formal transitional justice mechanism took place, there was a great deal of international support for peacebuilding activities in the country. This peacebuilding assistance followed three decades of conflict in Cambodia during 1967–99.
¹
The Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, gained control of the country in 1975–78 and carried out mass human rights abuses, including the forced evacuation of the cities, overwork, starvation, and killing of “enemies of the revolution” through purges.
²
It is estimated that up to 2 million Cambodians were killed during this period.
³
This was followed by the invasion of the country by Vietnam in 1978 and a decade of civil war and attempts at political settlement. The Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (Paris Peace Agreements) were signed in Paris in 1991, and elections were successfully carried out in 1993, although the Khmer Rouge did not participate and carried on fighting. The fragility of the peace process was demonstrated by the 1997 coup by co-Prime Minister Hun Sen, which also led to factional fighting. The remaining Khmer Rouge leaders were finally captured in December 1998 and March 1999.
⁴

Over the past 15 years, the country has entered a period of stability with strong economic growth. However, there are still a number of concerns. Despite the huge amounts of foreign assistance provided to the country, there is still widespread corruption, impunity for human rights abuses, restriction of freedom of expression, and growing power of the Prime Minister and Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). Freedom House, for instance, has stated that “authoritarianism has become normalized in Cambodia.”
⁵
There was little attempt at accountability for crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge until the establishment of the ECCC, which delivered its first verdict in July 2010.

This chapter examines the relationship between peacebuilding and transitional justice activities in Cambodia and the inclusion of victims’ rights at the ECCC.
⁶
It first looks at how there have been a number of unsuccessful attempts at disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and the amnesties of the
1990s. It then explores the establishment of the ECCC and the participation of victims as an important innovation within an internationalized tribunal, examining also the evolution of victim reparations at the court. This particular aspect might be the lasting legacy of the ECCC.

Peacebuilding in Cambodia

The United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was the first UN mission, established in October 1991, to assist the Cambodian parties in maintaining the ceasefire of 1 May 1991. It was succeeded in February 1992 by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), as agreed in the Paris Peace Agreements, and established by Security Council Resolution 745. Its mandate was as follows: supervise the ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign military assistance and of foreign forces; regroup, canton, and disarm all armed forces of the Cambodian parties; ensure 70 percent demobilization; control and supervise the activities of the administrative structures, including the police; ensure respect of human rights; and organize and conduct free and fair elections. In total US $1.6 billion was spent on both UN missions.
⁷
UNTAC supported the elections in May 1993, which were won by the royalist political party Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC). UNTAC’s support is often seen as an example of a successful UN mission assisting the transition to civil rule.
⁸