Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants (Law, Conflict and International Relations) (19 page)

43
 See Annan and Patel, “Critical Issues and Lessons in Social Reintegration,” op. cit., p. 10. However, there is an increased focus on community in what is termed Second Generation DDR programs (where the preconditions for traditional DDR are missing). See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Practices in Peace Operations
(New York: DPKO, 2010); Nat J. Colletta and Robert Muggah, “Context Matters: Interim Stabilization and Second Generation Approaches to Security Promotion,”
Conflict, Security & Development
, 9 (2009), p. 444.

44
 James Pugel, “Measuring Reintegration in Liberia: Assessing the Gap between Outputs and Outcomes,” in Robert Muggah (ed.),
Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 90; Ball and van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” op. cit., p. 3.

45
 Pugel, “Measuring Reintegration in Liberia,” op. cit., p. 90.

46
 World Bank,
Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program Final Report
, pp. 4, 50.

47
 For primarily quantitative studies, see, e.g., Humphreys and Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration,” op. cit.; Ana M. Arjona and Stathis Kalyvas, “Preliminary Results of a Survey of Demobilized Combatants in Colombia” (unpublished draft, 2006). For qualitative studies, see Rosalind Shaw, “Linking Justice with Reintegration? Ex-Combatants and the Sierra Leone Experiment” in Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf (eds),
Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence
(Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 111–34; Kimberly Theidon, “Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Excombatants in Colombia,”
International Journal of Transitional Justice
, vol 1. (2007), pp. 66–99.

48
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 4.30, pp. 14–15. Specker makes the same point. Specker, op. cit., pp. vi, 22.

49
 Nilsson, “Reintegrating Ex-Combatants,” p. 35. Jennings makes a similar critique, while also offering suggestions for how to evaluate reintegration. Jennings, “Unclear Ends,” op. cit., pp. 327–38.

50
 Muggah, “Introduction,” op. cit., p. 15.

51
 Humphreys and Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration,” op. cit., p. 549.

52
 Humphreys and Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration,” op. cit., p. 560.

53
 Peter Uvin,
Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why They Joined, Why They Left, How They Fared
(Washington, DC: The World Bank/Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, 2007).

54
 Jennings, “Unclear Ends,” op. cit., p. 338.

55
 Torjesen and MacFarlane, “Reintegration before Disarmament,” op. cit., p. 47.

56
 See Sarah Michael,
Reintegration Assistance for Ex-Combatants: Good Practices and Lessons for the MDRP
(Washington, DC: The World Bank Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, 2006), pp. ii, 2–3; but see Anna Borzello, “The Challenge of DDR in Northern Uganda: The Lord’s Resistance Army,”
Conflict, Security & Development
, 7 (2007), p. 403.

57
 Uvin,
Ex-Combatants in Burundi
, op. cit., p. 21.

58
 Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan, “Child Combatants in Northern Uganda: Reintegration Myths and Realities,” in Robert Muggah (ed.),
Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 112.

59
 Peter Barron, “Getting Reintegration Back on Track: Problems in Aceh and Priorities for Moving Forward,” Conference on Aceh at Harvard University, October 24–27, 2007, p. 9. He recommended basing payments on needs rather than on ex-combatant status. Ibid.

60
 Humphreys and Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration,” op. cit., p. 533.

61
 Humphreys and Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone,” op. cit., p. 60.

62
 Though it is important to acknowledge that those reintegration difficulties existed even though Sierra Leone had a truth commission and international-national criminal tribunal.

63
 United Nations, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice,” op. cit., para. 8.

64
 I use these terms differently from Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, who associate them with different transitional justice mechanisms: maximalist (trials), minimalist (amnesties), moderate (truth commissions), and holistic (a mix of mechanisms). Tricia D. Olsen,
Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter,
Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), p. 16–25.

65
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 6.20, pp. 5–7. As the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated, “the legal framework governing the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process of illegal armed groups should guarantee the rights to truth, justice and reparations.” UN Commission on Human Rights, “Study on the Right to the Truth, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 8 February 2006,” UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/91, para. 16 and n. 28.

66
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 6.20, pp. 19–20. On the use of amnesties, see Mark Freeman, “Amnesties and DDR Programs,” in Patel, de Greiff, and Waldorf,
Disarming the Past
, op. cit.

67
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 6.20, pp. 26–27.

68
 Duthie, “Transitional Justice and Social Reintegration,” op. cit., p. 230.

69
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 6.20, p. 2.

70
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 6.20, p. 4. Knight and Özerdem see DDR as creating a new social contract between ex-combatants and both the state and society. Knight and Özerdem, “Guns, Camps and Cash,” op. cit., pp. 506, 513.

71
 For a recent statement of his argument, see Pablo de Greiff, “Establishing Links between DDR and Reparations” in Patel, de Greiff, and Waldorf,
Disarming the Past
, op. cit.

72
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 6.20, p. 2.

73
 Muggah, Molloy, and Halty, “(Dis)integrating DDR in Sudan and Haiti?” op. cit., p. 207.

74
 Ibid., p. 218.

75
 Diplomat, interview by the author, Kigali, May 23, 2006.

76
 Theidon, “Reconstructing Masculinities,” op. cit., p. 2.

77
 De Greiff, “Establishing Links between DDR and Reparations,” op. cit., p. 148.

78
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 6.20, pp. 18–28.

79
 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding,” para. 20.

80
 Ibid., This echoes Roland Paris’sinfluential critique of liberal peacebuilding. Paris,
At War
’
s End
, op. cit.

81
 Sriram, “Justice as Peace?” op. cit.

82
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 6.20, pp. 25–26. Sriram and Herman correctly note that “it is not possible to formulate a template for sequencing DDR and transitional justice” given the wide variation in country contexts. Sriram and Herman, “DDR and Transitional Justice,” op. cit., p. 468.

83
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 6.20, p. 25. Though realistically, it recognizes that DDR and reparations programs are likely to remain uncoordinated in the near future because “while DDR is funded, reparations are not.” Ibid.

84
 This is discussed in greater detail in Patel, de Greiff, and Waldorf,
Disarming the Past
, op. cit. The best overview is Patel, “Transitional Justice and DDR,” op. cit. Nine individual case studies, commissioned by ICTJ, are available at <
http://ictj.org/our-work/research/disarmament-demobilization-and-reintegration
>.

85
 See United Nations, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice,” op. cit., para. 10.

86
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 2.20, p. 9.

87
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 6.20, p. 19.

88
 See Freeman, “Amnesties and DDR Programs,” op. cit.; Louise Mallinder,
Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the Peace and Justice Divide
(Oxford: Hart, 2008), pp. 379–402.

89
 Eric Witte, “Beyond ‘Peace vs. Justice’: Understanding the Relationship Between DDR Programs and the Prosecution of International Crimes,” in Patel, de Greiff, and Waldorf,
Disarming the Past
, op. cit., p. 88.

90
 On Colombia, see, e.g., Kimberly Theidon, “Transitional Subjects,” op. cit., pp. 70–73; Catalina Diaz, “Colombia’s Bid for Justice and Peace” (Nuremberg: Working Group on Development and Peace [FriEnt], 2007); Sergio Jaramillo, Yanet Giha, and Paula Torres,
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion Amidst the Conflict: The Case of Colombia
(New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009).

91
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 6.20, p. 8. See Patel, “Transitional Justice and DDR,” op. cit. p. 254.

92
 For more detail, see Lars Waldorf, “Ex-Combatants and Truth Commissions,” in Patel, de Greiff, and Waldorf,
Disarming the Past
, op. cit.

93
 Piers Pigou, “The Community Reconciliation Process of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation” (Dili: United Nations Development Programme Timor-Leste, 2004), pp. 50, 76–78.

94
 Pigou, “The Community Reconciliation Process,” op. cit., p. 66. Kelsall and Shaw made similar observations about local TRC hearings in Sierra Leone. Tim Kelsall, “Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone,”
Human Rights Quarterly
, 27 (2005), pp. 379–80; Shaw, “Linking Justice with Reintegration?” op. cit.

95
 Pigou, “The Community Reconciliation Process,” op. cit., p. 81.

96
 Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP), “Unfulfilled Expectations: Community Views on CAVR’s Community Reconciliation Process” (Dili: JSMP, 2004), p. 17.

97
 Keiran Mitton, “Engaging Disengagement: The Political Reintegration of Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front,”
Conflict, Security & Development
, 8 (2008), p. 205.

98
 Mitton, “Engaging Disengagement,” op. cit., p. 205. As Mitton makes clear, however, this effort at political reintegration was severely hampered by the failure of economic reintegration.

99
 This underscores the need to distinguish carefully between bottom-up local initiatives and top-down state informalism. See Lars Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional Justice,”
Temple Law Review
, vol. 79 (2006).

100
 Annan and Patel, “Critical Issues and Lessons in Social Reintegration,” op. cit., p. 11. Kees Kingma, “The Impact of Demobilization in Eritrea,” in Kees Kingma (ed.),
Demobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa
(London: Palgrave, 2000), p. 224. He linked these ceremonies to payments by ex-combatants to village elders. Ibid., pp. 223–24.

101
 Kees Kingma, “The Impact of Demobilization,” op. cit., p. 224.

102
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 4.30, p. 33.

103
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 2.30, p. 6.

104
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 6.20, p. 27. The exact same language is in Annan and Patel, “Critical Issues and Lessons in Social Reintegration,” op. cit., p. 12.

105
 See Department for International Development (DFID), “Non-state Security and Justice Systems” (London: DFID, 2004).

106
 Pablo de Greiff, “Establishing Links Between DDR and Reparations,” in Patel, de Greiff, and Waldorf,
Disarming the Past
, op. cit., p. 150.

107
 Annan and Patel, “Critical Issues and Lessons in Social Reintegration,” op. cit., p. 14.

108
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 6.20, p. 25.

109
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 6.20, p. 25.

110
 World Bank,
Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002), 20.

111
 Lars Waldorf, “Transitional Justice and DDR in Post-Genocide Rwanda” (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009).

112
 This is much less the case for female ex-combatants who often quietly self-demobilize to avoid shaming themselves and their families: for example, one talked about her “fear of people’s mouths.” Chris Coulter, “Reconciliation or Revenge: Narratives of Fear and Shame among Female Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone” (Uppsala: Department of Cultural Anthropology and Ethnology, 2006).

113
 Several studies, however, have raised questions about whether transitional justice mechanisms do, in fact, individuate guilt. See Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (eds),
My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

114
 See Humphreys and Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone,” op. cit., pp. 64–67; James Pugel, “Measuring Reintegration in Liberia,” op. cit., pp. 89–90.

115
 See Patel, “Transitional Justice and DDR,” op. cit. p. 250.

  5
Centralizing Legal Pluralism? Traditional Justice in Transitional Contexts

Rosemary Nagy

Introduction

While the parameters of transitional justice as a field of practice and normative inquiry are contested, it has nevertheless cohered as a mainstream norm over the last few decades, institutionalized in international law and transnational practice.
¹
I refer to this mainstreamed, international legalist paradigm as a centralizing force within transitional justice. That is, the increased judicialization of conflict management brings an array of transitional societies into the fold of international institutions, legal norms, and a global transitional justice industry. The advantages of this include universal standards of accountability and increased know-how through resource- and information-sharing. But international standardization has also produced “legal transplants” and “one-size-fits-all” solutions that lack social and cultural connections at the local level. Transitional justice in such instances not only fails to “deal with the past” sufficiently in terms of truth, justice, or reconciliation at the level of ordinary individuals; it is also ill-suited for building a sustainable, internal culture of peace from the “bottom up.”