Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants (Law, Conflict and International Relations) (18 page)

If transitional justice is supposed to assist the reintegration of ex-combatants, then we need to know more about the dynamics of reintegration and the obstacles it confronts. Several scholars have pointed to the need for better empirical studies to measure reintegration of ex-combatants.
¹¹⁴
We also need more empirical research into how transitional justice affects the reintegration of ex-combatants. A particularly salient issue at the moment is how International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants are impacting DDR programs and reintegration.
¹¹⁵
Once policymakers and practitioners have a solid evidence base, it will be easier to coordinate DDR and transitional justice in the field.

Notes

1
 Lars Waldorf would like to thank Ana Cutter Patel and Pablo de Greiff for involving him in the research project on Transitional Justice and DDR that they spearheaded at the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ).

2
 The term “post-conflict” will be used as shorthand for the period following a (formal or informal) peace accord. In fact, many post-conflict states exist in a limbo of what the anthropologist Paul Richards terms “no peace, no war.” Paul Richards, “New War: An Ethnographic Approach,” in Paul Richards (ed.),
No Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts
(Oxford: James Currey, 2005), pp. 13–14. Similarly, Robert Muggah points out that violence often increases after peace agreements. Robert Muggah, “No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-Conflict Contexts,”
Round Table
, 94 (2005), pp. 240–42.

3
 On liberal peacebuilding generally, see Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond (eds),
New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding
(Tokyo: United Nations University, 2010); and Roland Paris,
At War
’
s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). For the link between transitional justice and liberal peacebuilding, see Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice,”
Global Society
, vol. 21 (2007), pp. 579–91.

4
 ICTJ has sought to persuade policymakers that DDR and transitional justice are complementary peacebuilding processes. See Jeannie Annan and Ana Cutter Patel, “Critical Issues and Lessons in Social Reintegration: Balancing Justice, Psychological Well Being, and Community Reconciliation” (Bogota: CIDDR, 2009); Roger Duthie,
“Transitional Justice and Social Reintegration,” in Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration,
Background Studies
(Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2005); Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo de Greiff, and Lars Waldorf,
Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and Ex-Combatants
(New York: SSRC, 2010); and Ana Cutter Patel, “Transitional Justice and DDR,” in Robert Muggah (ed.),
Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). For a similar perspective from scholars not associated with ICTJ, see Chandra Lekha Sriram and Johanna Herman, “DDR and Transitional Justice: Bridging the Divide?”
Conflict, Security & Development
, 9 (2009), pp. 455–74.

5
 United Nations, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General,” UN Doc S/2004/616 (August 23, 2004), para. 21. For further reframing of the peace versus justice debate, see, e.g., Priscilla Hayner,
Negotiating Justice: Guidance for Mediators
(Geneva: The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2009).

6
 United Nations, “2005 World Summit Outcome,” UN Doc A/Res/61 (October 24, 2005). In his 2009 report on peacebuilding, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon reiterated “the interlinked and mutually reinforcing nature” of “development, peace and security and human rights.” United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict,” UN Doc A/63/881-S/2009/ 304 (New York: UN, 2009), para. 18.

7
 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),
IDDRS: Transitional Justice and DDR
, section 6.20, p. 1.

8
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 2.10, p. 4.

9
 For brief historical overviews of DDR, see Robert Muggah, “Introduction: The Emperor’s clothes?” in Robert Muggah (ed.),
Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 4–6; Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution
, 51 (2007), pp. 531–32.

10
 United Nations, “Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,” UN Doc A/59/565 (December 2, 2004), paras 227 and 228.

11
 Albert Carames, Vicenc Fisas, and Daniel Luz, “Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programmes Existing in the World during 2005” (Barcelona: Escola de cultura de pau, 2006), p. 9. Most DDR programs are run by national governments with funding from multi-lateral donors (particularly the United Nations and the World Bank) and bi-lateral donors.

12
 There is the risk that DDR programs create incentives for non-combatants to join armed groups in order to become eligible for DDR benefits. As the IDDRS puts it:

This reflects the negative experiences encountered with weapons buy-back programs.

13
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 4.30, p. 20. Anders Nilsson rightly notes that retroactive DDR may be needed for individuals or groups that self-demobilized. Anders Nilsson, “Reintegrating Ex-Combatants in Post-Conflict Societies” (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2005), p. 17. In Tajikistan, reintegration occurred without much disarmament or demobilization. Stina Torjesen and S. Neil MacFarlane, “Reintegration before Disarmament: The Case of Post-Conflict Reintegration in Tajikistan,” in Robert Muggah (ed.),
Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 47–66.

14
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 4.10, p. 3.

15
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 4.20, pp. 1–2.

16
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 1.20, p. 6.

17
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 1.20, p. 19. It is now generally recognized that “reintegration” is a somewhat misleading term, as many ex-combatants do not return to their home communities. This can be for any number of reasons: (1) some never left in the first place; (2) some search for economic betterment in urban areas; (3) some fear returning to communities they or their armed groups have harmed; or (4) some no longer have communities left to return to.

18
 DPKO,
IDDRS Operational Guidelines
(New York: UN, no date), sec. 2.30, p. 45. See DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 4.10, p. 10.

19
 See Nilsson, “Reintegrating Ex-Combatants,” pp. 15–17; Beatrice Pouligny, “The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary ‘Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration’ Programs” (Paris: CERI, 2004), p. 7.

20
 For overviews, see Luisa Maria Dietrich Ortega, “Transitional Justice and Female Ex-Combatants: Lessons Learned from International Experience” and Roger Duthie and Irma Specht, “DDR, Transitional Justice, and the Reintegration of Former Child Combatants” in Ana Cutter Patel, Pablo de Greiff, and Lars Waldorf,
Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and Ex-Combatants
(New York: SSRC, 2010). For specific case studies on gender and DDR, see Kathleen M. Jennings, “The Political Economy of DDR in Liberia: A Gendered Critique,”
Conflict, Security & Development
, 9 (2009); Kimberly Theidon, “Reconstructing Masculinities: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia,”
Human Rights Quarterly
, vol. 31 (2009).

21
 By contrast, the IDDRS explicitly states that weapons possession should not be an entry requirement for DDR programs, particularly for children. DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 4.10, pp. 9, 11.

22
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 4.10, p. 11.

23
 Nilsson, “Reintegrating Ex-Combatants,” p. 72.

24
 Muggah, “Introduction,” p. 3; see Leontine Specker, “The R-Phase of DDR Processes” (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2008), pp. v, 5–9.

25
 Mark Knight and Alpaslan Özerdem, “Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace,”
Journal of Peace Research
, 41 (2004), pp. 499–516.

26
 United Nations, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Report of the Secretary-General,” A/60/705 (New York: UN, 2006), p. 3.

27
 United Nations, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” op. cit., p. 9. These principles are fleshed out in considerable detail in DPKO, IDDRS, op. cit., sec. 2.10, pp. 8–15. Importantly, the
IDDRS
clarifies that “national ownership involves more than just central government leadership: it includes the participation of a broad range of State and non-State actors at national, provincial and local levels,” DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 2.10, p. 12.

28
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 1.10, p. 2.

29
 Robert Muggah, Mats Berdal, and Stina Trojesen, “Conclusions: Enter an Evidence-Based Security Promotion Agenda,” in Robert Muggah (ed.),
Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 277.

30
 Robert Muggah, Desmond Molloy, and Maximo Halty, “(Dis)integrating DDR in Sudan and Haiti? Practitioners’ Views To Overcoming Integration Inertia” in Robert Muggah (ed.),
Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 215.

31
 Muggah, “Introduction,” op. cit., p. 6.

32
 Kathleen Jennings, “Unclear Ends, Unclear Means: Reintegration in Postwar Societies— The Case of Liberia,”
Global Governance
, 14 (2008), p. 341. See Nicole Ball and Luc van de Goor, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues,
Dilemmas and Guiding Principles” (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006), p. 1.

33
 Most DDR programs focused on the more easily deliverable and measurable goals of disarmament and demobilization. See, e.g., Muggah, “No Magic Bullet,” op. cit., p. 246; Jennings, “Unclear Ends,” op. cit., pp. 333–34.

34
 As Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler contend, the larger the pool of unemployed young men, the greater the risk of conflict. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Military Expenditure in Post-Conflict Societies” (Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University, April 8, 2004).

35
 Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Lessons and Liabilities in Reconstruction,” in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.),
When States Fail: Causes and Consequences
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

36
 See DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 2.10, 6.

37
 Muggah, “Introduction,” op. cit., p. 3. In their study of DDR in Afghanistan, Bhatia and Muggah found that “repeated DDR activities failed to sufficiently account for the complex motivations and interests of commanders, rank and file and their layered relationships with communities. Instead, interventions advanced a simple economic bias treating beneficiaries as a homogenous caseload who would respond rationally to monetary incentives.” Muggah, “Introduction,” op. cit. p. 18; Bhatia and Muggah, “Demobilization in Afghanistan,” p. 154. On the motivations of militias and rebel groups more generally, see Chris Alden, Monika Thakur, and Matthew Arnold,
Militias and the Challenges of Post-Conflict Peace: Silencing the Guns
(London: Zed Books, 2011); Jeremy M. Weinstein,
Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

38
 Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone: Assessing Progress,” in Robert Muggah (ed.),
Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 56.

39
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 4.30, p. 3.

40
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 4.30, p. 3.

41
 DPKO,
IDDRS
, op. cit., sec. 2.20, p. 8. The Stockholm Initiative proposed creating a multi-donor trust fund that would support the needs of both ex-combatants and their receiving communities: Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration, “Final Report” (Stockholm: Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006), pp. 35–36. This assumes that international and national actors will be willing to provide a roughly equal measure of assistance to local communities and other war-affected groups (such as victims) even though they do not present short-term threats to security in the way that ex-combatants do. See Jennings, “Unclear Ends,” op. cit., p. 341.

42
 Annan and Patel, “Critical Issues and Lessons in Social Reintegration,” p. 10 (citing T. Bouta, “Assessment of the Ituri Disarmament and Community Reinsertion Program” (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2005)). Similarly, the inclusion of communities as beneficiaries in the DDR program in Timor-Leste “resulted in the setting of unclear goals, and less sure-footed implementation.” Gordon Peake, “What the Timorese Veterans say: Unpacking DDR in Timor-Leste” in Robert Muggah (ed.),
Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. 166.