Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-Combatants (Law, Conflict and International Relations) (28 page)

10
 Michael W. Doyle, “Peacebuilding in Cambodia: Legitimacy and Power,” in Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar (eds),
Peacebuilding as Politics
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 92.

11
 Ibid., p. 103.

12
 Ek Chanboreth and Sok Hach, “Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia,” Wolfensohn Center for Development Working Papers, No. 7, December 2008. Available at <
www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/12_cambodia_aid_chanboreth.aspx
>.

13
 It is highly unlikely that the country will continue this scale of growth. See World Bank,
Sustaining Rapid Growth in a Challenging Environment: Cambodia Country Economic Memorandum
, February 2009, p. ix.

14
 Ibid., p. xi.

15
 United Nations and Kingdom of Cambodia, United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2006–10, pp. 14–15.

16
 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, op. cit., Annex 2, Article V, para 1–2.

17
 Centre for International Cooperation and Security, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Human Security in Cambodia” (University of Bradford: July 2008), p. 10.

18
 Peter Bartu and Neil Wilford,
Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Cambodia
(New York: ICTJ, 2009), p. 6.

19
 Dylan Hendrickson, “Cambodia’s Security-sector Reforms: Limits of a Downsizing Strategy,”
Conflict, Security & Development
, vol. 1, no. 1 (2001), p. 74.

20
 Bartu and Wilford,
Transitional Justice and DDR
, op. cit., p. 13.

21
 Ibid., p. 14.

22
 Ibid.

23
 World Bank,
Implementation Completion Report
, Report No: 36269, May 22, 2006, p. 4.

24
 Ibid.

25
 Ibid., p. 6.

26
 World Bank press release, “Cambodia: World Bank Sanctions Thales Engineering and Consulting S.S. and Others in Demobilization Project,” 22 November 2004.

27
 World Bank,
Implementation Completion Report
, op. cit., p. 15.

28
 Bartu and Wilford,
Transitional Justice and DDR
, op. cit., p. 22.

29
 Hendrickson, “Cambodia’s Security-sector Reforms,” op. cit., p. 70.

30
 World Bank,
Implementation Completion Report
, op. cit., p. 2.

31
Kheang Un, “Patronage Politics and Hybrid Democracy: Political Change in Cambodia, 1993–2003,”
Asian Perspective
, vol. 29, no. 2 (2005), pp. 203–30.

32
 Joakim Öjendal and Mona Lilja, “Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-conflict Society?” in Joakim Öjendal and Mona Lilja (eds),
Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-conflict Society?
(Copenhagen: Nias, 2009), p. 7.

33
 Hendrickson, “Cambodia’s Security-sector Reforms,” op. cit., p. 79.

34
 Ibid., p. 72.

35
 Global Witness, “Cambodia’s Family Trees: Illegal Logging and the Stripping of Public Assets by Cambodia’s Elite,” June 2007, p. 6.

36
 Ibid, p. 14.

37
 Ibid., p. 73. Hendrickson, op. cit., and Global Witness, op. cit., p. 12.

38
 Hendrickson, op. cit., p. 72.

39
 Suzannah Linton, “Putting Cambodia’s Extraordinary Chambers into Context,”
Singapore Year Book of International Law
, vol. 11 (2007), p. 212.

40
 Ibid.

41
 Thomas Hammarberg, “Efforts To Establish a Tribunal Against the Khmer Rouge Leaders: Discussions between the Cambodian Government and the UN,” paper presented at a seminar organized by SIDA, Stockholm, 29 May 2001, p. 1–2.

42
 Ronald C. Slye, “The Cambodian Amnesties: Beneficiaries and the Temporal Reach of Amnesties for Gross Violation of Human Rights” (21 August 2003),
bepress Legal Series
, Working Paper 33, p. 26.

43
 Sok An, “Closing Remarks for the International Conference, Dealing with a Past Holocaust and National Reconciliation: Learning from Experiences,” available at <
www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/media/dealing_with_a_past_holocaust.pdf
> (last accessed 1 July 2011).

44
 Linton, “Putting Cambodia’s Extraordinary Chambers into Context,” op. cit., p. 213. Also see Law on the Outlawing of the “Democratic Kampuchea” Group (English translation based on the text published by the Phnom Penh Post, vol. 3, no. 14, 15–28 July 1994), available at <
www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/Law%20to%20Outlaw%20DK%20Group%201994.pdf
> (last accessed 1 July 2011).

45
 Law on the Outlawing of the “Democratic Kampuchea” Group, op. cit.

46
 Ibid.

47
 Ibid.

48
 Bartu and Wilford, “Transitional Justice and DDR,” op. cit., pp. 11, 15.

49
 Mark Freeman,
Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 152–53.

50
 Bartu and Wilford, “Transitional Justice and DDR,” op. cit., p. 15.

51
 Ibid.

52
 Ibid., p. 22.

53
 Human Rights Watch testimony to the Tom Lantos Commission, 10 September 2009.

54
 Linton, “Putting Cambodia’s Extraordinary Chambers into Context,” op. cit., p. 211.

55
 Royal Decree, NS/RKT/0996/72, unofficial translation provided by ECCC, available at <
www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/pardon_foriengsary.pdf
> (last accessed 2 September 2011).

56
 Seth Mydans, “An Amnesty in Cambodia,”
The New York Times
, 18 September 1996.

57
 Slye, “The Cambodian Amnesties,” op. cit., p. 5.

58
 Bartu and Wilford, “Transitional Justice and DDR,” op. cit., p. 16.

59
 Slye, “The Cambodian Amnesties,” op. cit., pp. 15–16.

60
 Ibid., p. 16.

61
 Case of Ieng Sary 002/19-09–2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC75), Ieng Sary’s Appeal against the Closing Order, 25 October 2010, para. 50.

62
Case of Ieng Sary, 002/19-09–2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC75), Decision on Ieng Sary’s Appeal against the Closing Order, 11 April 2011, paras 197–201.

63
 Case of Ieng Sary, 002/19-09–2007-ECCC/TC, Ieng Sary’s request to stay the commencement of the trial proceedings until the final determination of Ieng Sary’s preliminary objections regarding the royal pardon and amnesty and
ne bis in idem
, paras 1–17.

64
 Reuters, “Khmer Rouge Commanders Go On Trial in Cambodia,” Monday 27 June 2011.

65
 Christine Evans, “Preview of the Defense: Khieu Shamphan and Ieng Sary Respond,”
Cambodia Tribunal Monitor
, 23 November 2011.

66
 Freeman,
Necessary Evils
, op. cit., p. 132.

67
 Hammarberg, “Efforts To Establish a Tribunal Against the Khmer Rouge Leaders, op. cit., p. 2.

68
 World Bank,
Implementation Completion Report
, op. cit., p. 21.

69
 Phuong Pham
et al
., “So We Will Never Forget: A Population-based Survey on Attitudes about Social Reconstruction and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia” (Berkeley, CA: Human Rights Center, January 2009).

70
 Ibid., p. 28.

71
 Ibid., p. 29.

72
 General Assembly resolution 52/135 “Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia” 12 December 1999, UN doc A/RES/52/135.

73
 UN,
Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135
, paras 171, 178–79.

74
 Hammarberg, “Efforts to Establish a Tribunal Against the Khmer Rouge Leaders,” op. cit., p. 10.

75
 Ibid., p. 11.

76
 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on 27 October 2004, Chapter I, Article 1.

77
 Open Society Justice Initiative, “Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia” (Open Society Foundation: February 2012), pp. 17–18.

78
 Ibid., pp. 20–21; Open Society Justice Initiative, “Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia” (Open Society Foundation: June 2011), pp. 7–22 and Open Society Justice Initiative, “Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia” (Open Society Foundation: November 2011).

79
 United Nations, “Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,” New York, 30 March 2012.

80
 Ibid.

81
 ECCC, Internal Rules, Rule 23, 12 June 2007.

82
 UN,
Reports of the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge Trial
, UN doc. A/57/769, 21 March 2003; UN doc. A/58/617, 3 December 2003; UN doc. A/59/432, 12 October 2004; UN doc. A/60/565, 25 November 2005.

83
 See Johanna Herman, “Reaching for Justice: The Participation of Victims at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,” CHRC Policy Paper no. 5, September 2010, available at <
www.uel.ac.uk/chrc
>.

84
 Although ultimately only 66 were given the status of civil parties in the final judgment. This has now been changed so that the status of civil parties was decided before the second trial.

85
 ECCC, Internal Rules (Rev. 5), as revised on 9 February 2010.

86
 UN,
Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia
, op. cit., paras 212, 219.

87
 Suzannah Linton, “Comments on the Draft Agreement between the UN and Cambodia,”
Searching for the Truth
, issue 40 (2003), Magazine of Documentation Center of Cambodia, available online at <
www.dccam.org/Tribunal/Analysis/Comments_Regarding_Draft_Agreement.htm
> (last accessed 1 July 2011).

88
Phuong Pham
et al
., “So We Will Never Forget,” op. cit., p. 44.

89
 Kong Sothanarith, “Court Begins Reparations Campaign,” Voice of America, 20 February 2012.

90
 John D. Ciorciari, “The Duch Verdict,”
The Cambodia Tribunal Monitor
, 28 July 2010, available at <
http://cambodiatribunal.org/images/CTM/the%20duch%20verdict.pdf
> (last accessed 19 April 2011); James O’Toole, “Reparations Remain a Key Issue,”
The Phnom Penh Post
, 27 July 2010; Sam Rith, “KRT Civil Parties Plan Appeal,”
The Phnom Penh Post
, 24 August 2010.

91
 Open Society Justice Initiative, “Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia” (Open Society Foundation: February 2012), p. 13.

92
 ECCC, Internal Rules (Rev. 5), as revised on 9 February 2010.

93
 ECCC, Internal Rules (Rev. 6), as revised on 17 September 2010.

94
 FIDH and CHRAC, ‘The New ECCC Internal Rules: Effective Victim Participation and Reparation Advanced, but Implementation Not Yet Guaranteed,’ 14 October 2010, <
www.fidh.org/The-New-ECCC-International-Rules-Effective-Victim
> (accessed 31 March 2011).

95
 ECCC, Internal Rules (Rev. 6), Rule 12.

96
 Phuong Pham
et al
., “So We Will Never Forget,” op. cit., p. 44.

97
 DC-Cam website, History and Description of DC-Cam (no date), available at <
www.dccam.org/Abouts/History/Histories.htm
> (last accessed April 2011).

98
 Author interview, Phnom Penh, September 2009. For further information on the project, please see <
www.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/Genocide_Education.htm
> (last accessed April 2011).

99
 DC-Cam, “Complementary Justice: Designing a Mechanism for Memory and Reconciliation in Cambodia,”
Searching for the Truth
, English Edition, 1st Quarter (2011), pp. 1–9, available at <
www.dccam.org/Projects/Magazines/Image_Eng/pdf/1st_Quarter_2011.pdf
>.

100
 TPO, “Justice and Healing in Times of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” available at <
www.tpocambodia.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48&Itemid=60
>.

101
 Author interview, Phnom Penh, May 2010.

102
 Nigel Field
et al
., “Dealing with the Past: An Evaluation of the ICFC’s Justice and History Outreach Project,” August 2009, p. 6. Copy with author.

103
 Interview, Phnom Penh, September 2009, and see Mark Channsitha, “Evaluation Report for Youth for Peace 2008,” Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Phnom Penh, April 2008, p. 25. Copy with author.

104
 Field
et al
., “Dealing with the Past,” op. cit., p. 7.

105
 Channsitha “Evaluation Report,” op. cit., pp. 26–27.

106
 Field
et al
., “Dealing with the Past,” op. cit., p. 33.

107
 Kheang Un, “The Judicial System and Democratization in Post-Conflict Cambodia,” in Joakim Öjendal and Mona Lilja (eds),
Beyond Democracy in Cambodia: Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2009) pp. 70–100.

  7
Unfinished Business: Peacebuilding, Accountability, and Rule of Law in Lebanon

Chandra Lekha Sriram

Introduction

Much of the time, transitional justice measures are developed alongside the implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding efforts, and are expected by their framers and advocates to contribute to peace. The claim is that accountability measures can help to deter future violence and prevent revenge attacks, demonstrate and help to reinstall the rule of law and democracy, and contribute in so doing to longer-term stability. And indeed, transitional justice measures are expected to work alongside specific measures of peacebuilding, such as rule of law promotion, security sector reform, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants. Increasingly those developing such measures of peacebuilding are expected to take transitional justice measures into account.
¹
What happens, however, when a transitional justice measure is developed decades after the end of the conflict, where such standard measures of peacebuilding were not pursued, or are incomplete? Can a transitional justice mechanism have the desired effects? And what if that mechanism is not designed to address the wide range of past violations of international human rights or international humanitarian law, but a more recent, and far narrower, set of political crimes?