The Sword And The Olive (61 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
As it had done in previous wars, Israel pressed the West for more weapons during the 1991 Gulf War. Most visible were the Patriot antiaircraft missiles used to intercept incoming Scuds (with mixed results). Partly because German firms had apparently been involved in building poison-gas plants for Saddam Hussein, partly because arming Israel was a politically acceptable way for Germany to help pay for the Gulf War, Israel also succeeded in getting aid from that quarter. Besides the transfer of Fuchs poison-gas identification and decontamination vehicles, it led to the construction of three submarines at no cost to Israel (at $250 million each, that’s no mean advantage). The land forces acquired the U.S.-built MRLS (multiple rocket launching system), a weapon specifically designed for breaking up massed armored assaults. Last but not least, Israel’s antiaircraft radar system was modernized and a permanent link was established between the IAF operations center and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Space Command early-warning center at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. Should another missile attack take place from the direction of Iraq, this link should increase warning time from two to approximately seven minutes.
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Thus, overall the decade after 1985 witnessed two conflicting trends. With Rabin and Arens at the helm, the IDF continued transforming from the lean, superbly motivated fighting army of a small country bent on survival into an organization bloated with surplus manpower, supernumerary officers, and inflated headquarters. In the wake of its failure to prevail in Lebanon, this army lost much of its aura: It was no longer as highly respected and found its ability to attract top-level manpower increasingly in doubt. Yet the period also witnessed a tremendous enhancement of Israel’s military and technological capabilities, whether imported or homegrown. As in modern armed forces elsewhere, the occasional voice warned against overreliance on technology but was left a cry in the wilderness.
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And as in other modern forces, the result has been to shift the balance from fighters in favor of technicians.
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And as in other modern forces, the result has been to shift the balance from fighters in favor of technicians.
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These twin developments took place against the background of an improving international situation as well as very great cuts in military procurement on both sides of the former Iron Curtain. Although Israel’s military industries went through their period of downsizing and reorganization, globally speaking the effect was to make the IDF perhaps the most modern armed force, behind only that of the United States. Relative to the country’s size and resources the IDF continued to command a vast pool of free manpower and to attract a very large share of GDP—to say nothing of the greatest amount of free financial aid provided to any country since Lend Lease and the Marshall Plan. Yet the next two tests came, and the IDF failed to defend the country against Saddam’s missiles and against the much smaller but potentially far more dangerous threat posed by the Palestinian uprising.
CHAPTER 19
IMPOTENT AT THE GULF
F
OR DECADES ON END Iraq participated in most of Israel’s wars. In 1936 a force of Iraqi volunteers helped organize the Palestinian revolt. In 1948 a division-sized Iraqi expeditionary force entered the West Bank and could only be prevented from reaching the Plain of Sharon, and thus cutting Israel in half, by dint of desperate fighting. Similarly in 1967 an Iraqi Tu-16 bombed targets inside Israel; Iraqi units were on their way across Jordan when they were met and forced to turn back by the IAF. Iraqi units remained in Jordan until 1970, when they withdrew; however, in 1973 the lead brigade of a 60,000-strong Iraqi expeditionary force clashed with the Israelis on the Golan Heights, suffering losses but helping to halt the IDF’s advance on Damascus. During the next seven years there was much speculation concerning the creation of a so-called eastern front consisting of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. Had it come about, it would have deployed military resources more than equal to those of the coalition that faced Israel in the 1973 October War.
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In the event the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War nullified any such plans. So long as it lasted, Israel was more secure than at any time in history.
OR DECADES ON END Iraq participated in most of Israel’s wars. In 1936 a force of Iraqi volunteers helped organize the Palestinian revolt. In 1948 a division-sized Iraqi expeditionary force entered the West Bank and could only be prevented from reaching the Plain of Sharon, and thus cutting Israel in half, by dint of desperate fighting. Similarly in 1967 an Iraqi Tu-16 bombed targets inside Israel; Iraqi units were on their way across Jordan when they were met and forced to turn back by the IAF. Iraqi units remained in Jordan until 1970, when they withdrew; however, in 1973 the lead brigade of a 60,000-strong Iraqi expeditionary force clashed with the Israelis on the Golan Heights, suffering losses but helping to halt the IDF’s advance on Damascus. During the next seven years there was much speculation concerning the creation of a so-called eastern front consisting of Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. Had it come about, it would have deployed military resources more than equal to those of the coalition that faced Israel in the 1973 October War.
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In the event the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War nullified any such plans. So long as it lasted, Israel was more secure than at any time in history.
In late spring 1988 the situation changed. After eight years of war in which it suffered horrendous casualties to superior Iraqi firepower and saw its cities bombarded by Iraqi missiles, Iran, ruled by the Mullahs, appeared ready to give up. A cease-fire was signed, confirming Iraq’s original goals by giving it control over the entire Shatt al Arab Channel instead of drawing the border along the middle of the waterway, which according to the Iranians was the rightful thing under international law. This freed the hands of Saddam Hussein, whose military machine according to the best available estimates now consisted of as many as 1.25 million men, 60-65 divisions, 6,000 tanks, 5,000-8,000 APCs, 4,500-5,000 artillery barrels, more than 700 combat aircraft, and almost 500 helicopters of which some 200 were armed.
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To be sure, not all of the equipment was up to date, and much of the Iraqi force consisted of low-grade infantry units suitable only for stationary defense. Yet despite the protracted war with Iran it was considered to be, if not really up to NATO or Warsaw Pact standards, then at any rate tough and experienced in the conduct of defensive operations in particular.
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To be sure, not all of the equipment was up to date, and much of the Iraqi force consisted of low-grade infantry units suitable only for stationary defense. Yet despite the protracted war with Iran it was considered to be, if not really up to NATO or Warsaw Pact standards, then at any rate tough and experienced in the conduct of defensive operations in particular.
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Impotent at the Gulf: Israelis wearing gas masks inside “sealed room.” The newspaper headline reads: “US bombing Iraq and Kuwait.”
What was more, following the destruction of his nuclear reactor by the IAF in 1981, the Iraqi dictator was known to have engaged in an extensive, very expensive effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction. In their war against Iran the Iraqis had repeatedly resorted to poison gas. Then and later they also used it against Iraq’s Kurdish population, spraying it over villages and killing hundreds if not thousands. Even more serious, there were signs that Baghdad was attempting to revive its nuclear program. Though Iraq consistently denied any intention to build nuclear weapons, and though the country is in fact a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, understandably these denials were not given much credence in Israel or elsewhere.
Just what Saddam Hussein intended to do with his steadily growing military might was not clear. Certainly Israel was only one factor in his calculations and by no means the most important; after all, Iraq has other concerns closer at hand including, besides Iran and the Gulf countries with Saudi Arabia at their head, the long-standing Kurdish ulcer that from time to time threatened to deprive it of some of its most important oil-producing provinces. Whatever Saddam’s intentions, in April there was a fierce verbal clash with Israel when he used the occasion of Baath Party Day to announce that “if Israel attacked a certain metal-working plant of ours” he in turn would “burn half of Israel.”
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The threat must have referred to a possible repetition of the 1981 reactor attack, the “burning” to the use of chemical weapons Iraq was known to be producing on a large scale. For what it was worth, Shamir as Israeli prime minister responded by reassuring Saddam that he had no intention of attacking Iraq.
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In truth a 1981-style attack would not have been practical at the time. The Iraqis never rebuilt their reactor for the production of plutonium; their effort to produce enriched Uranium-235 was dispersed at several sites and carefully concealed. Moreover, this time the vital element of surprise was lacking.
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The threat must have referred to a possible repetition of the 1981 reactor attack, the “burning” to the use of chemical weapons Iraq was known to be producing on a large scale. For what it was worth, Shamir as Israeli prime minister responded by reassuring Saddam that he had no intention of attacking Iraq.
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In truth a 1981-style attack would not have been practical at the time. The Iraqis never rebuilt their reactor for the production of plutonium; their effort to produce enriched Uranium-235 was dispersed at several sites and carefully concealed. Moreover, this time the vital element of surprise was lacking.
So far as Israel was concerned, there matters rested. No more than its counterparts in other countries did the IDF intelligence service—headed at the time by Maj. Gen. Amnon Shachak, the subsequent chief of staff—succeed in keeping abreast of Saddam’s plans for occupying Kuwait. If anything the feeling was that Iraq’s need for economic recovery “was bound to inject a measure of moderation into [its] foreign policy”; it was expected to be “largely preoccupied with domestic problems” while “moderat[ing] its position on the Arab-Israeli conflict.”
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More than its counterparts in other countries, however, Israel could justify complacency by the fact it does not share a border with Iraq and that the latter, so long as it stayed out of Jordan, was not considered a “confrontation state.” The gulf is approximately a thousand miles away, so that a clash there need not affect Israeli interests directly.
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More than its counterparts in other countries, however, Israel could justify complacency by the fact it does not share a border with Iraq and that the latter, so long as it stayed out of Jordan, was not considered a “confrontation state.” The gulf is approximately a thousand miles away, so that a clash there need not affect Israeli interests directly.
As the diplomatic process for building a coalition against Iraq got into gear and as U.S. and other armed forces poured into the Persian Gulf region, some precautions were taken. In particular, additional gas masks were purchased from abroad. King Hussein of Jordan was permitting Iraqi aircraft to overfly his country and mount reconnaissance flights along Israel’s eastern border, so the IAF stepped up patrols. That apart, life went on more or less as usual. During autumn 1990, Israel’s attention was distracted first by a series of bloody terrorist knife attacks and then by a major clash on Jerusalem’s Temple Mount. In the latter no fewer than nineteen protesting Palestinians lost their lives and another 100 or so were wounded, the former being the largest single-day figure during the
Intifada
till then.
Intifada
till then.
As 1990 drew to an end, indications that an eventual war in the Persian Gulf would involve Israel multiplied. In the face of mounting international pressure Saddam Hussein regarded an attack on Tel Aviv as his best means for breaking up the Coalition, now formalized and gathering against him; his spokesmen insisted that in case conflict broke out, Iraqi missiles would “definitely” be launched against Israel.
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The atmosphere in Israel grew increasingly nervous; by October popular pressure forced the government to start distributing gas masks even though the minister of defense and the IDF high command felt that was premature.
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In a country supposedly accustomed to living under an existential threat, the extent to which people had become estranged from the deadly serious business of war was revealed when orthodox Jews successfully insisted that they should not be obliged to cut off their beards but be provided with special gas masks instead.
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The atmosphere in Israel grew increasingly nervous; by October popular pressure forced the government to start distributing gas masks even though the minister of defense and the IDF high command felt that was premature.
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In a country supposedly accustomed to living under an existential threat, the extent to which people had become estranged from the deadly serious business of war was revealed when orthodox Jews successfully insisted that they should not be obliged to cut off their beards but be provided with special gas masks instead.
In other respects, too, preparations for the attack did not proceed as smoothly as they should have. In Beer Sheba, so nervous was the population in its attempt to lay hands on gas masks that female soldiers responsible for distributing them were beaten.
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Not only was IDF intelligence unable to provide the government with hard data on the size and nature of the threat (e.g., how many missiles Saddam possessed and whether he had chemical warheads for them) ;
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it turned out that authorities had overlooked the problem of protecting the young. In the end it was necessary to improvise by designing a sort of incubator suit, made of plastic sheets and provided with a filter.
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Not only was IDF intelligence unable to provide the government with hard data on the size and nature of the threat (e.g., how many missiles Saddam possessed and whether he had chemical warheads for them) ;
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it turned out that authorities had overlooked the problem of protecting the young. In the end it was necessary to improvise by designing a sort of incubator suit, made of plastic sheets and provided with a filter.
As the clock ticked toward war, the mood inside Israel grew increasingly weird. The
Intifada
having already caused tourism to fall, now many foreign residents also left. Furthermore, an IDF “closure” prevented the Palestinians from leaving the Occupied Territories, thus slowing or even halting many kinds of economic activities. In a country noted for its exceptional dynamism and bustling atmosphere a strange quiet prevailed. Meanwhile a survey showed that the public shelters built throughout the country beginning in the fifties were all but useless. Not only were they too far away to be reached by the population in case of a missile alarm, but they could not be rendered gasproof and thus constituted death traps rather than refuges. Though all private houses built since the late sixties had to be constructed with shelters, they too had not been designed to withstand gas.
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Intifada
having already caused tourism to fall, now many foreign residents also left. Furthermore, an IDF “closure” prevented the Palestinians from leaving the Occupied Territories, thus slowing or even halting many kinds of economic activities. In a country noted for its exceptional dynamism and bustling atmosphere a strange quiet prevailed. Meanwhile a survey showed that the public shelters built throughout the country beginning in the fifties were all but useless. Not only were they too far away to be reached by the population in case of a missile alarm, but they could not be rendered gasproof and thus constituted death traps rather than refuges. Though all private houses built since the late sixties had to be constructed with shelters, they too had not been designed to withstand gas.
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Acting on instructions from their government, people went to work preparing so-called sealed rooms. The idea was that poison gas is heavier than air; therefore, in case of attack it was necessary to gather in the highest possible room, out of the wind’s way, and hermetically sealed against the outside. To accomplish this the population was told to use masking tape and plastic sheets for their windows; any cracks between doors and floors were to be closed with the aid of wet rags. The rooms were to be provided with food, water, and children’s games, and occupants were to don gas masks when ordered to do so. How valuable these preparations would have been if put to the test nobody knows. Perhaps the best that can be said is that so long as preparations were made they gave the population the feeling that there was
something
it could do.
something
it could do.
Meanwhile Western statesmen and politicians, seeking to prevent any crack in the Coalition, avoided Jerusalem as if it had already come under attack. For the same reason the Israelis were unable to coordinate with the United States or even to obtain precise information as to the latter’s military plans for dealing with the threat. In the absence of reliable information about Iraqi capabilities, speculation abounded; each day produced a fresh crop of experts, some in uniform and others not. Some, on the basis of calculations taken from the Iran-Iraq War, forecasted thousands of casualties in the event of a major Iraqi chemical attack; others insisted that not one of Saddam’s missiles would get through the hail of U.S. firepower directed against them.
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