The Sword And The Olive (57 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
In February 1983 the Kahn Commission investigating the horrific events at the Sabra and Shatilla camps published its report.
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No evidence was found that IDF senior officers had known of the massacre, let alone conspired with Phalange commanders to carry it out; indeed Sharon later successfully sued
Time
for claiming he had done so. Still, the commission maintained that they ought to have foreseen it and, since they as representatives of the occupation force were responsible for whatever went on in the Beirut area, prevented it from taking place. Amos Yaron, the commander on the spot, was asked to resign, as were the chief of intelligence (Major General Saguy) and Ariel Sharon. As for Eytan, his term of office was about to end. Therefore the commission, though treating him with undisguised contempt, did not demand his resignation.
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No evidence was found that IDF senior officers had known of the massacre, let alone conspired with Phalange commanders to carry it out; indeed Sharon later successfully sued
Time
for claiming he had done so. Still, the commission maintained that they ought to have foreseen it and, since they as representatives of the occupation force were responsible for whatever went on in the Beirut area, prevented it from taking place. Amos Yaron, the commander on the spot, was asked to resign, as were the chief of intelligence (Major General Saguy) and Ariel Sharon. As for Eytan, his term of office was about to end. Therefore the commission, though treating him with undisguised contempt, did not demand his resignation.
To replace Sharon, Begin selected Moshe Arens, a longtime Likud member with no military experience to speak of. By profession he was an aviation engineer who had once received the Israel Defense Award for his role in developing the Kfir; as such he was the only true technocrat ever to hold the defense portfolio. Eytan’s deputy, Maj. Gen. Moshe Levy, succeeded him. Previously known mainly for his tall stature, his principal qualification (like Gur before him) was his slight involvement in the current debacle. Moreover, whereas Sharon and Eytan had constantly been at loggerheads, the dry, humorless Arens and the bland, undemonstrative Levy made a good team. Though it took time, they started guiding Israel back to something resembling sanity.
In May, after weeks of negotiations, a last-ditch attempt was made to salvage what could be salvaged by signing a peace agreement with Lebanon’s new president, Amin Gemayel (who happened to be Bashir’s brother). Though Sharon described it as “a tremendous achievement,” within days it turned out not to be worth the paper on which it was written; later it was formally disavowed by the Lebanese government. All the while, guerrilla warfare in Lebanon was picking up. Except in the Beqa Valley, much of the terrain occupied by the IDF was either built up or mountainous and densely wooded, dotted with villages perched on the hills and winding tracks that led among them. From Galilee to Beirut it was more than sixty miles, hopelessly exposed to mines and ambushes with small arms, antitank rockets, and mines.
According to one source, the first three weeks of the war had cost the IDF 260 dead and 1,270 wounded.
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Now Lebanon’s civil war, dormant since the invasion, flared up as Druze, Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, and Palestinians infiltrating back from Damascus battled each other and the IDF. Even when hostilities were not directed against them, Israeli soldiers often got caught in the crossfire while fulfilling their duty as an occupation force and protecting one side against another. “They all hate each other and they all hate me,” one sad Israeli commentary went. Casualties mounted by the week, including a particularly horrible episode when sixty or so people, thirty of them Israelis, were killed when their Tyre headquarters was demolished by a car bomb.
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Now Lebanon’s civil war, dormant since the invasion, flared up as Druze, Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, and Palestinians infiltrating back from Damascus battled each other and the IDF. Even when hostilities were not directed against them, Israeli soldiers often got caught in the crossfire while fulfilling their duty as an occupation force and protecting one side against another. “They all hate each other and they all hate me,” one sad Israeli commentary went. Casualties mounted by the week, including a particularly horrible episode when sixty or so people, thirty of them Israelis, were killed when their Tyre headquarters was demolished by a car bomb.
A confirmed hawk, Arens tried to defend the IDF’s continued presence in Lebanon as best he could, arguing that any change in deployment ought to be coordinated with the Lebanese government (whose power, however, was confined almost entirely to the presidential palace) and the United States.
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In September 1983 he was forced to give way, recalling the IDF out of Beirut back to central Lebanon, where it occupied a new line from the mouth of the Awali River to Mount Dov on the Syrian border. Just more than a year had passed since Begin, posing as a conquering hero, had visited Beirut. By now he was a cripple—he had fallen in the bathroom and broken his hip—and recently widowed. Always something of a manicdepressive, now he fell victim to the blackest of black moods. He resigned, hid himself in a residence near Jerusalem, and hardly left it until he died.
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In September 1983 he was forced to give way, recalling the IDF out of Beirut back to central Lebanon, where it occupied a new line from the mouth of the Awali River to Mount Dov on the Syrian border. Just more than a year had passed since Begin, posing as a conquering hero, had visited Beirut. By now he was a cripple—he had fallen in the bathroom and broken his hip—and recently widowed. Always something of a manicdepressive, now he fell victim to the blackest of black moods. He resigned, hid himself in a residence near Jerusalem, and hardly left it until he died.
The retreat to the Awali still left some 1,200 square miles, with a population of more than 500,000, under Israeli control. Though the army did its best to protect its soldiers by providing their vehicles with additional armor—this was the period when the first reinforced APCs and NAGMASHot (
noset geyasot meshuryenet
, the heavy armored personnel carriers mounted on tank chassis) were coming into service—there was no way to cope with the increasing guerrilla attacks along the lines of communications. Like late-twentieth-century armies elsewhere, the IDF floundered, vainly trying to sort out combatants from noncombatants and hitting thin air when it tried to bring tormentors to heel. Like late-twentieth-century armies elsewhere, too, the heavy-handed punitive operations it sometimes mounted left a legacy of hatred and, if anything, played into the opposition’s hands. By the time Shimon Peres, appointed prime minister in winter 1984, finally decided to put an end to the agony the number of dead had risen to more than 650, with almost 3,000 wounded. The cost of the adventure was estimated at $2-5 billion
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—this at a time when the country’s GNP amounted only to about $23 billion. All supposedly in a good cause, and all to absolutely no avail.
noset geyasot meshuryenet
, the heavy armored personnel carriers mounted on tank chassis) were coming into service—there was no way to cope with the increasing guerrilla attacks along the lines of communications. Like late-twentieth-century armies elsewhere, the IDF floundered, vainly trying to sort out combatants from noncombatants and hitting thin air when it tried to bring tormentors to heel. Like late-twentieth-century armies elsewhere, too, the heavy-handed punitive operations it sometimes mounted left a legacy of hatred and, if anything, played into the opposition’s hands. By the time Shimon Peres, appointed prime minister in winter 1984, finally decided to put an end to the agony the number of dead had risen to more than 650, with almost 3,000 wounded. The cost of the adventure was estimated at $2-5 billion
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—this at a time when the country’s GNP amounted only to about $23 billion. All supposedly in a good cause, and all to absolutely no avail.
As Ben Gal wrote in retrospect, of all Israeli wars the one in Lebanon was probably the best prepared, down to the most minute detail.
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Every tank was ready to start; every inch of the terrain had been reconnoitered many times; even the characteristics of every Syrian antiaircraft missile were sufficiently well known for a counter to be readied and put into action with flawless precision. As Ben Gal also wrote, however, of all Israeli wars, it was based on the most profound misunderstanding of what the IDF could and could not achieve. For the first time it had entered the capital of an Arab country. This done, however, there could be no question of imposing a political settlement; indeed during the days before his death Bashir Gemayel had been quarreling with Begin and Sharon over precisely this issue.
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Economically speaking, so strong are Lebanon’s ties with the rest of the Arab world that trade never halted even during the worst days of the war. The country simply could not afford to make a separate peace with Israel. This is true regardless of who rules and regardless of the ruler’s relations with the factions.
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Every tank was ready to start; every inch of the terrain had been reconnoitered many times; even the characteristics of every Syrian antiaircraft missile were sufficiently well known for a counter to be readied and put into action with flawless precision. As Ben Gal also wrote, however, of all Israeli wars, it was based on the most profound misunderstanding of what the IDF could and could not achieve. For the first time it had entered the capital of an Arab country. This done, however, there could be no question of imposing a political settlement; indeed during the days before his death Bashir Gemayel had been quarreling with Begin and Sharon over precisely this issue.
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Economically speaking, so strong are Lebanon’s ties with the rest of the Arab world that trade never halted even during the worst days of the war. The country simply could not afford to make a separate peace with Israel. This is true regardless of who rules and regardless of the ruler’s relations with the factions.
Furthermore, though there had always been some terrorism in the Occupied Territories, in Lebanon the IDF for the first time came up against true guerrilla warfare. Given Lebanon’s fragmented political system, the ubiquitous militias, the nature of the terrain, and the long border with Syria, it ought to have been clear from the beginning that the country was ideal for guerrilla tactics. Had not Machiavelli written that decentralized states were easy to overrun but difficult to hold?
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The Israelis were blind to the political realities of the country and their own unpopularity in the Arab world. So much so that these difficulties were not foreseen, and no available source gives any reason to believe they were seriously considered.
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The Israelis were blind to the political realities of the country and their own unpopularity in the Arab world. So much so that these difficulties were not foreseen, and no available source gives any reason to believe they were seriously considered.
In 1985, Peres, along with Rabin as minister of defense, finally ended the agony by recalling the IDF from Lebanon. However, the question of renewed rocket attacks and border raids remained unanswered. The solution was to leave Israel a narrow strip of land, some three to six miles wide, as a security zone. As before 1982, part of the job of defending the strip was entrusted to approximately 2,000 local militiamen paid, trained, and equipped by Israel. They were supported by a number of strongholds that Israel retained, each providing shelter to one company. Behind them the full resources of Northern Command with its artillery and tanks as well as the air force and navy were deployed, called upon as occasion demanded. The border was strongly fortified. A security fence runs along its entire length even today, liberally fitted with searchlights, radar, and other kinds of electronic sensors.
Though Palestinian guerrillas had been returning to Lebanon in small numbers, the main PLO forces in the country were gone. This scarcely took the pressure off the IDF, however, for Shiite militias moved in—first Amal and then, increasingly, Hizbullah (Party of God). The last in particular was a political movement as well as a military one. It operates a network of religious and welfare institutions over much of Lebanon and even has representatives in the Lebanese parliament; hence there could be no question of eradicating it simply by attacking its 400 or so
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hard-core fighters concentrated in the south. Furthermore, as long as it directed its efforts against Israel, Hizbullah could count on Syrian support. Behind Syria again stood Iran, which provided money and arms to the tune of $50-100 million per year.
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hard-core fighters concentrated in the south. Furthermore, as long as it directed its efforts against Israel, Hizbullah could count on Syrian support. Behind Syria again stood Iran, which provided money and arms to the tune of $50-100 million per year.
Considered a native Lebanese movement, Hizbullah’s declared objective has always been to remove the Israeli presence from “conquered” Lebanese soil. Considered a proxy for Syria and Iran, its objectives presumably were more far-reaching. Over time, that prevented Israel from putting an end to the matter by withdrawing completely. In plain words, the Syrians were using Hizbullah to press for the return of the Golan Heights. Hence there exists no guarantee that it would halt attacks even if the last inch of Lebanese territory were evacuated; indeed its leaders have consistently refused to promise anything of the sort.
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Moreover, given its dependence on the Syrians and the weakness of its own armed forces, the Lebanese government cannot be trusted to maintain peace.
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Moreover, given its dependence on the Syrians and the weakness of its own armed forces, the Lebanese government cannot be trusted to maintain peace.
Unable to withdraw, the IDF did about as well as could be expected. During the seventies PLO guerrillas crossed the border many times to plant mines and ambush patrols. At least once they mounted a major hostage-taking operation, seizing a school in the town of Maalot and holding it until they were ousted with considerable loss of life. Since the security zone was established, however, there have been no penetrations into Israel proper, and very few guerrillas are even able to reach as far as the fence itself. Recognizing this fact, guerrillas on several occasions have used motorized hang gliders for transportation. Since there is no way to return, those who make it across are doomed; presumably for this reason the number of these incidents has remained small.
The IDF’s efforts to protect Israeli territory were thus largely successful. However, the IDF could not prevent Hizbullah from harassing the “Army of Southern Lebanon”—as the militias were grandiloquently called—and IDF troops in the security zone. In addition to the usual fire from small arms, bazookas, and antitank missiles, there were mines—autonomous and remote-controlled—as well as car bombs and booby traps of every kind. To counter this the IDF over years developed extremely detailed procedures, with every move carried out exactly to regulations to forestall the formation of yet another commission of investigation, which seemed immediately to follow every snafu. IDF companies reacting to the approach of a car on a dirt road in Lebanon are akin to players in a ballet. Like pirouetting ballerinas troops take up positions in preparation for the attack, which rarely occurs. Yet such precautions only minimize the damage Hizbullah causes and do not silence it.
Strongly supported from the air—over time there was a growing tendency to rely on attack helicopters rather than the faster, less maneuverable fighter-bombers—the IDF on occasion took the initiative. Brilliant intelligence enabled the IDF to pinpoint leaders and target them at home or while they rode in cars. Several were killed or captured by commando teams; however, invariably the results were disappointing as new leaders replaced the old. More often the IDF would retaliate by “returning fire to the sources of fire,” as the standard formula has it. Since southern Lebanon is a heavily populated area, civilian casualties ensued (the more so because guerrillas often operated bases near or inside villages to obtain shelter). When civilians were killed, as inevitably they would be, Hizbullah retaliated by firing Katyusha rockets at Israeli settlements, which thus were held hostage.
On two occasions—summer 1993 and spring 1996—Israel sought to answer the Katyushas by deploying massive firepower against the guerrillas. Both times some of the world’s most modern weapons systems were put on display. On the ground, RPVs, artillery radar, and laser range finders fed coordinates directly to computers that now equipped every big gun, enabling them to locate Katyusha launch sites while the rockets were still in the air and to shift from one target to the next in seconds. At sea, Israeli missile boats shelled the coastal highway. The performance of IAF attack helicopters—including now the Apache—was even more impressive; they launched missiles through windows in high-rises amid a densely populated city. To the initiated the firepower put on display during “Operation Grapes of Wrath” (April 1996) was nothing short of awe-inspiring, the more so because it was carried out uninterrupted day and night. In the air and on the ground, in many ways it was more sophisticated than anything the Coalition forces deployed as recently as 1991 in the Persian Gulf.
Had the targets been Syrian armored divisions attempting to drive down from the Golan Heights into the Jordan Valley, no doubt they would have been annihilated. After sixteen days during which 13,000 rounds were fired and hundreds of strikes by fighter-bombers and attack helicopters took place, between six (says Hizbullah) and fifty (says the IDF) persons were killed.
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Meanwhile the Katyushas, though perhaps no longer as numerous or well-aimed as during the first days of the operation, kept coming, bringing life along the border to a halt, demolishing hundreds of houses, and causing damage of approximately $30 million. Above all, Israel did not succeed in using the operation to achieve its declared aim of pressing the population of southern Lebanon to press the Lebanese government to press the Syrians to press the guerrillas (the formula known as “circular pressure,” dreamed up by Rabin before his assassination). On the contrary, if anything it was Prime Minister Peres who came under domestic and international pressure after a round missed its target and hit a UN compound serving as an assembly point for refugees, killing some 100 people and forcing Israel to call a halt.
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Meanwhile the Katyushas, though perhaps no longer as numerous or well-aimed as during the first days of the operation, kept coming, bringing life along the border to a halt, demolishing hundreds of houses, and causing damage of approximately $30 million. Above all, Israel did not succeed in using the operation to achieve its declared aim of pressing the population of southern Lebanon to press the Lebanese government to press the Syrians to press the guerrillas (the formula known as “circular pressure,” dreamed up by Rabin before his assassination). On the contrary, if anything it was Prime Minister Peres who came under domestic and international pressure after a round missed its target and hit a UN compound serving as an assembly point for refugees, killing some 100 people and forcing Israel to call a halt.
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