The Sword And The Olive (65 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
Having failed to bring the situation under control at the outset, the Israelis fought back with a mixture of secret service methods, ordinary police methods, and riot police methods. The most visible were units of army and Frontier Guard troops—dressed in the same uniforms, the two had become all but interchangeable—battling demonstrators with truncheons and tear gas while obeying Rabin’s orders “to break arms and legs.” Similar units manned roadblocks, carried out spot searches, imposed curfews, and mounted patrols in the streets of towns, villages, and refugee camps. Other units raided various Palestinian organizations suspected of acting as cover for the PLO and searched the houses of leaders, arresting suspects and taking them to the headquarters of the military government for interrogation and, frequently enough, torture. Schools and universities were closed, merchants who refused to break the strikes were fined, and whole districts were subjected to repeated curfews that sometimes kept inhabitants confined to their homes for weeks on end.
More sinister than the overt activities, which soon developed a ritualistic character, were the covert ones. Using classic secret police methods, Shin Bet agents had been chasing and eliminating “terrorists” and “instigators” for years. Now they were joined by two units of “Arabists”—one for the West Bank, one for the Gaza Strip—whose task was to go after individual suspects and arrest or kill them. Dressed and acting as Arabs—although the local population once warned was usually able to make out fake Arabs in a crowd—they acted like death squads, arresting suspects and often killing them when they tried or did not try to flee. Counting from the beginning of the uprising to September 1993 the total number of Palestinians killed was around 1,200. Tens of thousands were wounded or imprisoned without trial in special camps in the Negev Desert. The disruption of economic activity by repeated curfews, the closure of markets and borders, the cutting of electricity and water, and periods during which Palestinians were forbidden to work in Israel caused living standards in the Occupied Territories to decline almost 40 percent.
13
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Never known for its discipline, the IDF’s traditional strengths—originating in the
Yishuv
’s prestate military organizations—had been initiative and aggressiveness in defeating larger Arab armies in short, sharp wars. Now those very qualities started turning against it in a prolonged conflict that demanded patience, professionalism, and restraint. At various times during the uprising Rabin, and after him Arens as well as their subordinates on the General Staff, experimented with different solutions to the problem. Sometimes they sought to break the demonstrations might and main; sometimes they considered a more relaxed, less brutal approach. Sometimes they brought in older reservists (the spectacle of heavily laden, often potbellied Israeli troops chasing graceful Palestinian youngsters was to become familiar around the world) in the hope that they would be less easily provoked. Sometimes they replaced them with border guards, who were supposedly more professional but, alas, more brutal than the rest.
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Sometimes they sought to break up strikes by intimidation, whereas they allowed others to unfold hoping that the other side would simply give up. Sometimes they deported “instigators” (deportation was frequently used as a weapon against Palestinians who, for lack of sufficient evidence, could not be put on trial) and sometimes they made “gestures” allowing them to return. And so on and so in an endless stop-and-go process characteristic of leaders at their wits’ end.
Yishuv
’s prestate military organizations—had been initiative and aggressiveness in defeating larger Arab armies in short, sharp wars. Now those very qualities started turning against it in a prolonged conflict that demanded patience, professionalism, and restraint. At various times during the uprising Rabin, and after him Arens as well as their subordinates on the General Staff, experimented with different solutions to the problem. Sometimes they sought to break the demonstrations might and main; sometimes they considered a more relaxed, less brutal approach. Sometimes they brought in older reservists (the spectacle of heavily laden, often potbellied Israeli troops chasing graceful Palestinian youngsters was to become familiar around the world) in the hope that they would be less easily provoked. Sometimes they replaced them with border guards, who were supposedly more professional but, alas, more brutal than the rest.
14
Sometimes they sought to break up strikes by intimidation, whereas they allowed others to unfold hoping that the other side would simply give up. Sometimes they deported “instigators” (deportation was frequently used as a weapon against Palestinians who, for lack of sufficient evidence, could not be put on trial) and sometimes they made “gestures” allowing them to return. And so on and so in an endless stop-and-go process characteristic of leaders at their wits’ end.
Beginning with the homemade mortars of 1948, the IDF has a record of technical ingenuity that often enabled it to upgrade existing weapons and develop original ones. Thus it came as no surprise that the defense industries were called upon to help cope with the
Intifada
too, resulting in all kinds of gadgets that seemed to come out of a disturbed child’s imagination. Particularly memorable was the
chatsatsit
(gravel thrower), a contraption mounted atop a half-track that pelted demonstrators with gravel in the manner of a machine gun. Then there was special paint that could be sprayed from helicopters, the idea being to mark demonstrators so they could be arrested later on. After several incidents in which Palestinians were electrocuted while carrying out orders from IDF soldiers to remove Palestinian flags hanging from electricity wires, RAFAEL, a world-class high-tech organization, was asked to design a nonconducting telescopic flag-removal pole; one does not know whether to laugh or to cry.
Intifada
too, resulting in all kinds of gadgets that seemed to come out of a disturbed child’s imagination. Particularly memorable was the
chatsatsit
(gravel thrower), a contraption mounted atop a half-track that pelted demonstrators with gravel in the manner of a machine gun. Then there was special paint that could be sprayed from helicopters, the idea being to mark demonstrators so they could be arrested later on. After several incidents in which Palestinians were electrocuted while carrying out orders from IDF soldiers to remove Palestinian flags hanging from electricity wires, RAFAEL, a world-class high-tech organization, was asked to design a nonconducting telescopic flag-removal pole; one does not know whether to laugh or to cry.
Early in the
Intifada,
Chief of Staff Shomron declared that the Palestinian outburst merely showed that the measures taken by the IDF were working(!) and that calm would be restored “within two or three weeks.”
15
His superior, Rabin, was even more sanguine. In a perfect demonstration of the Peter Principle, the former chief of staff and onetime prime minister spoke and acted as if he were still a young member of FOSH on a punitive expedition against some Arab village, insisting that “to see the white in the enemy’s eyes” was good for soldiers’ training and morale.
16
Having won so many victories and enjoyed such high prestige for so long, perhaps the IDF felt that it had nothing to learn from others. At any rate there is no indication that the significance of such difficult struggles as those in Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan had been grasped or even so much as studied; even though coping with
Intifada
constituted the army’s main activity between 1988 and 1995,
Maarachot
, its flagship publication, did not carry a single article about it. Given Israel’s own experience in confronting the British in 1946-1948, the relevant lessons were ready at hand. Begin, who as the leader of ETSEL did as much as anybody to make life unbearable for the British troops in Palestine, had written in
The Revolt:
Intifada,
Chief of Staff Shomron declared that the Palestinian outburst merely showed that the measures taken by the IDF were working(!) and that calm would be restored “within two or three weeks.”
15
His superior, Rabin, was even more sanguine. In a perfect demonstration of the Peter Principle, the former chief of staff and onetime prime minister spoke and acted as if he were still a young member of FOSH on a punitive expedition against some Arab village, insisting that “to see the white in the enemy’s eyes” was good for soldiers’ training and morale.
16
Having won so many victories and enjoyed such high prestige for so long, perhaps the IDF felt that it had nothing to learn from others. At any rate there is no indication that the significance of such difficult struggles as those in Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan had been grasped or even so much as studied; even though coping with
Intifada
constituted the army’s main activity between 1988 and 1995,
Maarachot
, its flagship publication, did not carry a single article about it. Given Israel’s own experience in confronting the British in 1946-1948, the relevant lessons were ready at hand. Begin, who as the leader of ETSEL did as much as anybody to make life unbearable for the British troops in Palestine, had written in
The Revolt:
The very existence of an underground, which oppression, hangings, torture and deportations fail to crush or to weaken, must, in the end, undermine the prestige of a colonial regime that lives by the legend of its omnipotence. Every attack which it fails to prevent is a blow at its standing. Even if the attack does not succeed, it makes a dent in that prestige, and that dent widens into a crack which is extended with every succeeding attack.
17
By the time the Palestinian revolt got under way, however, Begin had turned himself into a living mummy, and few if any members of the IDF’s General Staff had read his book. Like their colleagues around the developed world on both sides of the Iron Curtain, IDF commanders thought of war primarily in terms of a struggle between the armed forces of opposing states. Also like colleagues around the world, they were hardheaded strategists who carried out the instructions of political masters and paid little attention to the
moral
implications of a prolonged struggle against much weaker opponents. Yet experience would soon prove that the IDF was no more capable of standing up to this kind of warfare than were most other modern armies. In fact it was considerably less so, given that the intensity of “operations” against largely unarmed demonstrators was always rather low and the number of military dead during the entire six years between the outbreak of
Intifada
and the signing of the first Oslo Agreement limited to a few dozen.
moral
implications of a prolonged struggle against much weaker opponents. Yet experience would soon prove that the IDF was no more capable of standing up to this kind of warfare than were most other modern armies. In fact it was considerably less so, given that the intensity of “operations” against largely unarmed demonstrators was always rather low and the number of military dead during the entire six years between the outbreak of
Intifada
and the signing of the first Oslo Agreement limited to a few dozen.
On the first day of the uprising unfortunate Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip were complaining that they had been left without clear orders. On that day a young lieutenant named Offer, together with three men, found himself amid rioting crowds, opened fire, and killed a demonstrator. His reward for doing as best he could in this hair-raising situation was to be sent home in disgrace by the CO Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Yitschak Mordechai, who felt that the troops had erred in judgment (they had entered a house while trying to arrest a stone-throwing demonstrator) and used excessive force while trying to extricate themselves. Yet Offer’s men, feeling he had been unjustly treated, demanded his reinstatement in writing ; when this was refused several other officers in the company resigned.
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(He was fortunate to be let off lightly. The longer the uprising lasted, the more IDF personnel caught in similar situations were abandoned by superiors, subordinates, and colleagues. Rather than being relieved, they were put on trial and punished if found guilty.)
18
(He was fortunate to be let off lightly. The longer the uprising lasted, the more IDF personnel caught in similar situations were abandoned by superiors, subordinates, and colleagues. Rather than being relieved, they were put on trial and punished if found guilty.)
Like armed forces caught in similar situations elsewhere, the IDF was at risk of committing crimes by using “excessive” force against lightly armed or unarmed opponents. Like armed forces elsewhere, it tried to cope by developing extremely detailed rules of engagement that spelled out what the troops could and could not do. Depending on circumstances—whether, for example, they were being pelted with rocks or Molotov cocktails, by “adults” older than twelve or by children, at close range or at long range—truncheons, tear gas, rubber bullets, plastic bullets, and live ammunition were to be used. In turn, ammunition was to be fired first into the air, then at demonstrators’ legs, and straight ahead only as a last resort to kill. Demonstrators and rioters were to be handled firmly and dispersed with the appropriate amount of force; random brutality and unnecessary friction with the local population were to be avoided. Provided they were old enough and of the proper sex those who resisted were to be taught a lesson; once resistance ceased captured Palestinians were not to be mishandled. “Our Jewish moral legacy” and “respect for human honor and human life” were to be maintained at all times.
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And so on in literally thousands of
tadrichim
(briefings), some in writing but the vast majority oral, which, circumstances permitting, were held each time a unit went into action.
19
And so on in literally thousands of
tadrichim
(briefings), some in writing but the vast majority oral, which, circumstances permitting, were held each time a unit went into action.
In practice, needless to say, the rules of engagement were constantly broken. Sometimes this was deliberate, the handiwork of such scoundrels who are always present in any army and enjoy that kind of thing. More often it was a question of soldiers and even recruits being sent into the territories with short notice and poor training; once there they vented frustrations on hapless Arabs. Now they opened fire at the wrong persons under the wrong circumstances and in the wrong manner; now they administered beatings, either “authorized” or “extracurricular”; now they inflicted humiliations such as forbidding captives to relieve themselves or making them hop around on one leg and sing Israeli songs while cursing their own Palestinian leadership; now they invented ingenious forms of torture, as when one party of soldiers used a bulldozer to bury captured demonstrators (they came out alive). Perhaps more often still, the
chariggim
(excesses) were the result of stress as the troops panicked and used “excessive force” in situations they considered life-threatening—but that their superiors, prompted by the growing presence of reporters and TV cameras, thought should have been handled with greater care.
chariggim
(excesses) were the result of stress as the troops panicked and used “excessive force” in situations they considered life-threatening—but that their superiors, prompted by the growing presence of reporters and TV cameras, thought should have been handled with greater care.
As it happened the late eighties were the years when cable TV entered Israel. In a country where citizens traditionally were limited to two Hebrewlanguage, government-supervised channels (one is government-owned), by 1996 an estimated 800,000 households were exposed to numerous American, British, German, French, Italian, and Russian programs; news in Turkish and Arabic is even available. Owing to diplomatic considerations the IDF’s censorship authority over foreign correspondents has always been limited. During the Gulf War it was not even able to prevent pictures of neighborhoods hit by Scuds from being broadcast, thus potentially aiding the Iraqis in aiming their missiles more accurately. Now, with cellular telephones and video cameras and satellite dishes proliferating among the media and the general population (including the Occupied Territories, often the site of some of the best material), it lost much of what power remained.
Moreover, the Israeli media were galvanized by foreign competition. To be sure, 1988 saw the passing of a new and comprehensive censorship law. It obliged “any person who prints or publishes material relevant to the security of the state, whether in Israel or abroad,” “to submit it to the censor in advance... even if the information in question has already been published before.”
20
Yet a year later the case of
Schnizter v. The State of Israel
resulted in a landmark ruling. Not only did the High Court rule that the IDF censor came under its own jurisdiction (i.e., the office did not enjoy the “executive prerogative” claimed); his authority to prevent publication was limited to cases in which there was “fair certainty” that state security would be endangered.
21
Since then, although the censor’s formal powers have not been curtailed, he has become much more careful in exercising them. Conversely the media insist on their own right to publish, repeatedly threatening to take him to court if necessary.
20
Yet a year later the case of
Schnizter v. The State of Israel
resulted in a landmark ruling. Not only did the High Court rule that the IDF censor came under its own jurisdiction (i.e., the office did not enjoy the “executive prerogative” claimed); his authority to prevent publication was limited to cases in which there was “fair certainty” that state security would be endangered.
21
Since then, although the censor’s formal powers have not been curtailed, he has become much more careful in exercising them. Conversely the media insist on their own right to publish, repeatedly threatening to take him to court if necessary.
Even in the age of satellite dishes and video cameras it is obvious that the vast majority of
chariggim
were never reported. Often this was because brutality had become routine; often it was not considered sufficiently newsworthy or perhaps the right witness was absent or those involved on the Israeli side swore to maintain silence. Of the thousands of published reports (Israeli publications and non-Israeli groups concerned with human rights) only very few were ever properly investigated. Only a handful of investigations led to trial and the rare conviction. Yet each trial was fully covered by the national and international media. The accused contended they just followed orders from superiors; the superiors in turn disclaimed responsibility, testifying that the accused had exceeded or misinterpreted orders. Since 1987 there has been only
one
case in which an officer, Maj. (res.) Gideon Levite, voluntarily chose to stand by his men and was convicted alongside them. All the rest, including Major Levite’s own commander, Lt. Col. Efrayim Fein, wriggled out as best they could, usually with success since to date, no officer higher than colonel has been convicted of maltreating Arabs.
chariggim
were never reported. Often this was because brutality had become routine; often it was not considered sufficiently newsworthy or perhaps the right witness was absent or those involved on the Israeli side swore to maintain silence. Of the thousands of published reports (Israeli publications and non-Israeli groups concerned with human rights) only very few were ever properly investigated. Only a handful of investigations led to trial and the rare conviction. Yet each trial was fully covered by the national and international media. The accused contended they just followed orders from superiors; the superiors in turn disclaimed responsibility, testifying that the accused had exceeded or misinterpreted orders. Since 1987 there has been only
one
case in which an officer, Maj. (res.) Gideon Levite, voluntarily chose to stand by his men and was convicted alongside them. All the rest, including Major Levite’s own commander, Lt. Col. Efrayim Fein, wriggled out as best they could, usually with success since to date, no officer higher than colonel has been convicted of maltreating Arabs.
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