The Sword And The Olive (50 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
At a higher level, the combination of war losses and rapid expansion naturally meant additional opportunities for promotion. The average age at which officers occupied their designated slots dropped still farther—not necessarily a good thing for an army where officers were already younger than almost everywhere else, probably leading to a drop in quality.
37
Thus in the United States an officer would probably get his first battalion (or equivalent) at the age of thirty-seven or so after having gone through command and general staff college; IDF battalion commanders were appointed in their late twenties often
without
having spent a year attending POUM (Pikkud U-mateh, the IDF Command and General Staff College). An officer might command a brigade while in his early to mid-thirties, a division short of forty, and—unless promoted to major general and thus to a seat on the General Staff—be out at forty-two or forty-three when colleagues elsewhere were yet lieutenant colonels. As long as they
did
stay in the army, officers’ time was spent fighting guerrillas along the borders and terrorists inside the Occupied Territories. Consequently officers never had the time to reflect and study; indeed their careers were over almost before they began.
37
Thus in the United States an officer would probably get his first battalion (or equivalent) at the age of thirty-seven or so after having gone through command and general staff college; IDF battalion commanders were appointed in their late twenties often
without
having spent a year attending POUM (Pikkud U-mateh, the IDF Command and General Staff College). An officer might command a brigade while in his early to mid-thirties, a division short of forty, and—unless promoted to major general and thus to a seat on the General Staff—be out at forty-two or forty-three when colleagues elsewhere were yet lieutenant colonels. As long as they
did
stay in the army, officers’ time was spent fighting guerrillas along the borders and terrorists inside the Occupied Territories. Consequently officers never had the time to reflect and study; indeed their careers were over almost before they began.
Unlike predecessors who had started careers in prestate days, Israeli officers during this period spent their entire professional lives in the IDF. Systematically rotated, developed, and—if the necessary time was available and their progress not too rapid—taught, they were probably more professional than their predecessors. But they also developed the shortcomings of professionalism, including specialization and a certain narrow-mindedness.
38
The perfect example, of course, was Eytan, for whom wider cultural horizons simply do not exist. For the reasons just outlined and for others rooted in culture and tradition the IDF had never been a studious army.
39
To be sure, it did not develop a genial, easygoing, wine-drinking,
Papa Joffre
-type officer. Yet had its members included as intellectual an officer as Moltke—who at one point supplemented his income by translating Gibbons into German—then probably he would never have risen to senior rank.
38
The perfect example, of course, was Eytan, for whom wider cultural horizons simply do not exist. For the reasons just outlined and for others rooted in culture and tradition the IDF had never been a studious army.
39
To be sure, it did not develop a genial, easygoing, wine-drinking,
Papa Joffre
-type officer. Yet had its members included as intellectual an officer as Moltke—who at one point supplemented his income by translating Gibbons into German—then probably he would never have risen to senior rank.
As always, a special chapter in the history of the IDF during these years tells of female soldiers. In the 1967 war one woman was killed. In 1973 there were a handful of female casualties as the base at Bir Gafgafa, some fifty miles behind the Suez Canal, was hit by Egyptian surface-to-surface missiles. Those episodes apart, in both wars the vast majority of Israeli women conscripts served as they always had. The
pkiddot plugatiyot
(company clerks) cleaned briefing rooms and served cookies in the rear;
40
there could be no question of having them join male units going into combat. A small number of reservists apart, Israeli women who were neither conscripts nor members of the standing army remained home. They did their jobs, looked after their families, and—according to legend—welcomed their returning menfolk with the words
yaale ve-yavo
(mount and enter, an adaptation of a traditional Jewish blessing). As the IDF remained mobilized during the months after the war, a handful of women were taken on as bus and lorry drivers. However, since time was relatively short and special qualifications were needed the size of the effort to substitute them for men was limited.
pkiddot plugatiyot
(company clerks) cleaned briefing rooms and served cookies in the rear;
40
there could be no question of having them join male units going into combat. A small number of reservists apart, Israeli women who were neither conscripts nor members of the standing army remained home. They did their jobs, looked after their families, and—according to legend—welcomed their returning menfolk with the words
yaale ve-yavo
(mount and enter, an adaptation of a traditional Jewish blessing). As the IDF remained mobilized during the months after the war, a handful of women were taken on as bus and lorry drivers. However, since time was relatively short and special qualifications were needed the size of the effort to substitute them for men was limited.
During the period of postwar reconstruction the IDF, desperately short of manpower, took another look at what it could and could not do with women. The number in each age group that was drafted rose sharply, from 50 percent in 1974 to 70 percent in 1993;
41
whereas in 1976 women could occupy only 210 out of 796 military occupation specialties, four years later the figure stood at 296.
42
As before, women continued to be administered by CHEN so that there could be no question of straightforward integration. Yet the MOS now open to women included drivers, maintenance personnel, radar operators, and instructors in a variety of fields from which they had heretofore been excluded. Traditionally the only female conscripts in charge of males were those who served in the IDF’s education corps, teaching basics to underprivileged youths, one notable exception being Esther Shuchamarov, an Olympic-class athlete who was actually allowed to act as a MADASit (physical training instructor). Now, however, they were also supposed to teach such subjects as firing a rifle, driving a tank, and even operating an artillery piece.
41
whereas in 1976 women could occupy only 210 out of 796 military occupation specialties, four years later the figure stood at 296.
42
As before, women continued to be administered by CHEN so that there could be no question of straightforward integration. Yet the MOS now open to women included drivers, maintenance personnel, radar operators, and instructors in a variety of fields from which they had heretofore been excluded. Traditionally the only female conscripts in charge of males were those who served in the IDF’s education corps, teaching basics to underprivileged youths, one notable exception being Esther Shuchamarov, an Olympic-class athlete who was actually allowed to act as a MADASit (physical training instructor). Now, however, they were also supposed to teach such subjects as firing a rifle, driving a tank, and even operating an artillery piece.
These were the years when the U.S. armed forces, on orders from Congress, were preparing to take in women and accordingly conducted large-scale studies of the differences—if any—between them and men. Dutifully—and in contrast to work done in the fifties and sixties that often claimed to have discovered marked differences in the mental capacities of men and women—they concluded that the minds of the two sexes were the same; it was only in regard to physical strength, especially upper body strength, that differences existed.
43
Whether the IDF, before expanding the number of MOS open to women, also carried out similar studies is not known, but doing so would have been entirely out of character. Among the establishment, mostly of Ashkenazi origin, there never was any doubt that in regard to mental and technical qualities women were as capable of handling rifles, tanks, and other kinds of equipment as men.
43
Whether the IDF, before expanding the number of MOS open to women, also carried out similar studies is not known, but doing so would have been entirely out of character. Among the establishment, mostly of Ashkenazi origin, there never was any doubt that in regard to mental and technical qualities women were as capable of handling rifles, tanks, and other kinds of equipment as men.
Still, the use of women as instructors for men was not without its problems. For one thing even their supporters admitted that physically they were not up to par, thus imposing limitations in such jobs as artillery instruction, where the work is often hard and the loads heavy. Conversely, when they
were
used the result was to put an unfair burden on male comrades who had to do more than their fair share. Furthermore, for a nineteen- or twenty-year-old female NCO to gain the respect of conscripts—more than half of them from Sephardic backgrounds and thus still more or less influenced by their elders’ ideas about a woman’s place—was much harder than for male counterparts and often led to lax discipline if not to outright rebellion.
44
Last but not least the women, though they had been properly prepared for their jobs, never received basic training equal to that of their charges. Nor would they ever command units or go into combat. They knew it and so did the recruits. Thus being taught by females might be compared to taking driving lessons from an instructor who was experienced on simulators but never actually drove a car.
were
used the result was to put an unfair burden on male comrades who had to do more than their fair share. Furthermore, for a nineteen- or twenty-year-old female NCO to gain the respect of conscripts—more than half of them from Sephardic backgrounds and thus still more or less influenced by their elders’ ideas about a woman’s place—was much harder than for male counterparts and often led to lax discipline if not to outright rebellion.
44
Last but not least the women, though they had been properly prepared for their jobs, never received basic training equal to that of their charges. Nor would they ever command units or go into combat. They knew it and so did the recruits. Thus being taught by females might be compared to taking driving lessons from an instructor who was experienced on simulators but never actually drove a car.
As Margaret Mead once wrote, in any society it is what the men do that matters. Conversely, the very fact that a field is occupied or a job is done predominantly by women will lead to a decline in social prestige,
45
and, after a while, ability to command material rewards and attract first-class people. In the IDF, women had traditionally been members of their own separate corps. As a result, they were seldom promoted beyond the rank of major and were excluded from most command jobs, let alone combatrelated ones. Since the IDF was overwhelmingly combat-oriented this segregation and discrimination worked in its favor; they were precisely the factors that permitted IDF to use women
and
avoid the consequences of Mead’s law. In the mid- to late seventies, however, there were clear signs that the IDF’s position in the eyes of Israeli society was no longer as secure as before. Primarily due to the fallout from the October War, it was probably not unrelated to the expansion of female roles.
45
and, after a while, ability to command material rewards and attract first-class people. In the IDF, women had traditionally been members of their own separate corps. As a result, they were seldom promoted beyond the rank of major and were excluded from most command jobs, let alone combatrelated ones. Since the IDF was overwhelmingly combat-oriented this segregation and discrimination worked in its favor; they were precisely the factors that permitted IDF to use women
and
avoid the consequences of Mead’s law. In the mid- to late seventies, however, there were clear signs that the IDF’s position in the eyes of Israeli society was no longer as secure as before. Primarily due to the fallout from the October War, it was probably not unrelated to the expansion of female roles.
Naturally some parts of the IDF suffered more than others. Probably the least affected was the air force, with its combination of strong professionalism and high technology. In the summer of 1981 it provided a dazzling display of new capabilities, using F-15s and F-16s to bomb and destroy the nuclear reactor the Iraqis were constructing near Baghdad.
46
Needless to say there were no women among the pilots, nor any women in the various
sayarot
(commando units) that had carried out the Entebbe raid and similar operations. The prestige of the
sayarot
and their ability to attract top-notch manpower was if anything enhanced by the fact that many of their officers found themselves on the fast lane to promotion; indeed they turned into a hotbed for future chiefs of staff.
47
Elsewhere, however, the growing presence of women; the drop in quality, cohesion, and experience that was the inevitable outcome of overly rapid expansion; and the ensuing organizational problems probably led to a force that, on a man-for-man basis, was not quite as good as its predecessor and certainly did not enjoy as high prestige.
46
Needless to say there were no women among the pilots, nor any women in the various
sayarot
(commando units) that had carried out the Entebbe raid and similar operations. The prestige of the
sayarot
and their ability to attract top-notch manpower was if anything enhanced by the fact that many of their officers found themselves on the fast lane to promotion; indeed they turned into a hotbed for future chiefs of staff.
47
Elsewhere, however, the growing presence of women; the drop in quality, cohesion, and experience that was the inevitable outcome of overly rapid expansion; and the ensuing organizational problems probably led to a force that, on a man-for-man basis, was not quite as good as its predecessor and certainly did not enjoy as high prestige.
Though he would be the last man to tolerate anybody criticizing the instrument he commanded, Eytan as chief of staff was clearly aware of some of these problems. While continuing to expand the IDF during the three and a half years that led up to the Lebanon War, he did what he could to restructure the somewhat dilapidated force he inherited from Gur. By Israeli standards, if not by those in many other armies, discipline was tightened. Units were made to train until they knew their weapons and missions by heart, even at the cost of sleep deprivation, which in turn led to growing numbers of accidents.
48
To show his determination to kick the army into shape Eytan insisted that uniforms be kept neat. He also sent out military police to make sure that soldiers wore their berets—a hopeless task, as it turned out, that ended in a compromise permitting personnel to carry them on the left shoulder. Since IDF officers seldom wear caps Eytan himself took the field in a slouch hat that became his trademark. Thus attired, he sought to set a personal example of parsimony by going out into the firing range to gather up the cartridges of spent artillery rounds. He even picked discarded crusts of bread from dustbins, had them fried, and forced his subordinates to eat them.
49
Although typical of the man, the performance did not win friends in the media or public.
48
To show his determination to kick the army into shape Eytan insisted that uniforms be kept neat. He also sent out military police to make sure that soldiers wore their berets—a hopeless task, as it turned out, that ended in a compromise permitting personnel to carry them on the left shoulder. Since IDF officers seldom wear caps Eytan himself took the field in a slouch hat that became his trademark. Thus attired, he sought to set a personal example of parsimony by going out into the firing range to gather up the cartridges of spent artillery rounds. He even picked discarded crusts of bread from dustbins, had them fried, and forced his subordinates to eat them.
49
Although typical of the man, the performance did not win friends in the media or public.
In May 1980 Weizman resigned. Along with Dayan, who had served as Begin’s foreign minister but left seven months earlier, he played a key role in negotiating the Camp David peace agreements with Egypt and the subsequent retreat from Sinai. As both men saw it, the accord left Israel in a stronger position than ever and should have opened the way to negotiations with Syria and the Palestinians; not so Begin who, taking the opposite tack, saw them as a means of holding on to the rest of the Occupied Territories. The prime minister’s understanding of military matters was rudimentary, and he could not devote more than one day a week to them. Still he decided not to appoint a successor, serving as his own minister of defense and relying on a deputy, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Moredechai Tsippori, to do the day-to-day work. Inevitably the change meant that Eytan drew closer to the prime minister. Though their backgrounds were as different as could be—Begin the would-be aristocratic lawyer from Warsaw, Eytan the peasant from the Valley of Esdraelon—the two worked well together, and Eytan even felt that Begin liked him.
50
50
A year later the defense portfolio went to Sharon. Having left the army for politics in 1974, Sharon had done much to fuse Begin’s Cherut Party with some other right-wing parties, building Likud and helping it win the 1977 elections.
51
His reward was the ministry of agriculture, a position that to the uninitiated might look relatively unimportant but one that he used to build as many Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories as possible and, in general, to strengthen Israel’s hold on them.
52
Always distinguished by his brutal determination—the man who did not stop at the red light, as the title of his biography has it—in the meantime he had grown even more formidable. He was certainly not an easy person to stand up to, and in the end he was able to pressure a reluctant Begin into entrusting the defense post to him.
53
51
His reward was the ministry of agriculture, a position that to the uninitiated might look relatively unimportant but one that he used to build as many Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories as possible and, in general, to strengthen Israel’s hold on them.
52
Always distinguished by his brutal determination—the man who did not stop at the red light, as the title of his biography has it—in the meantime he had grown even more formidable. He was certainly not an easy person to stand up to, and in the end he was able to pressure a reluctant Begin into entrusting the defense post to him.
53
With Sharon at the helm, the IDF’s might peaked. As to organization and to quality of manpower, the officer corps specifically included, it may no longer have been quite as good as previously. Yet thanks partly to U.S. aid and partly to Israel’s own efforts, quantitatively speaking the losses suffered in the October War had been made good several times over. An enormous military machine was built; it has been remarked that to equal Israel on a per-capita basis China, for example, would have had to deploy no fewer than 1 million tanks.
54
According to one set of figures, during the period 1954-1979 the ratio between the annual defense outlay of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan (the three so-called confrontation states) and that of Israel changed from 3:1 to 1.25:1.
55
According to another, as late as 1973 the relation between Israel’s accumulated military capital and that of the same three countries had been as high as 1:3. From then on it began to tilt in Israel’s favor, reaching 1:1.17 in 1979 and 1:1.1 in 1984.
56
54
According to one set of figures, during the period 1954-1979 the ratio between the annual defense outlay of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan (the three so-called confrontation states) and that of Israel changed from 3:1 to 1.25:1.
55
According to another, as late as 1973 the relation between Israel’s accumulated military capital and that of the same three countries had been as high as 1:3. From then on it began to tilt in Israel’s favor, reaching 1:1.17 in 1979 and 1:1.1 in 1984.
56
Moreover, and in contrast to the situation before 1973 (let alone before 1967), when only parts of the IDF had been equipped with modern arms, technologically this army was up to par in most respects and, as the Lebanese campaign would soon show, ahead of the pack in some. And its reach was no longer limited to the country’s immediate borders. A long-range strike capability had been built. The navy with its larger missile boats and submarines was now capable of launching commando operations not just against nearby ports but against targets more than a thousand miles away. Still more important was the IAF’s newly acquired airlift capability. Although its exact size is classified, already in 1976 it was massive enough for Air Force Commander Benjamin Peled to suggest that paratroopers be sent to “conquer” Uganda or, at least, the city of Entebbe.
57
57
Considering the extremely difficult circumstances under which it had been constructed from 1973 on, this army was probably about as good as it could have been made. Some of its components, notably the air force and
sayarot
, were superb. Though the IDF was massively supported by U.S. technology and money, in large part its excellence was due to Israel’s own efforts and, in particular, its burgeoning defense industries. Accordingly, before continuing with our history of the IDF proper, it is necessary to give a short account of the evolution of those industries.
sayarot
, were superb. Though the IDF was massively supported by U.S. technology and money, in large part its excellence was due to Israel’s own efforts and, in particular, its burgeoning defense industries. Accordingly, before continuing with our history of the IDF proper, it is necessary to give a short account of the evolution of those industries.
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