The Sword And The Olive (46 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
The Reckoning: repatriated Israeli POWs in hospital, November 1973.
CHAPTER 14
THE RECKONING
I
N 1973, as in 1967 and 1956, the factor that more than any other shaped the war was the surprise achieved by one side—in this case, the Arabs. As pointed out in several studies,
1
there was no lack of advance warning: The concentration of 300,000 men with thousands of tanks and guns as well as heavy bridging equipment simply could not escape notice. And neither was there a lack of other indications, from canal-crossing exercises to heightened states of alert to the sudden departure of the Soviet dependents less than forty-eight hours before the offensive. The alarms being sounded by individual officials at various levels were, however, all misinterpreted, ignored, or suppressed. Though subject to various degrees of nervousness, those who mattered—Dayan, Tsur (Dayan’s deputy), and Elazar—were misled by Zeira, who thought he knew there would be no war. Even then, however, it is difficult to imagine that one officer alone could have had such an influence had not many of his underlying assumptions been shared by the rest.
2
Relatively ignorant about military matters and feeling isolated among her own defense experts, Ms. Meir, according to her own account,
3
acquiesced.
N 1973, as in 1967 and 1956, the factor that more than any other shaped the war was the surprise achieved by one side—in this case, the Arabs. As pointed out in several studies,
1
there was no lack of advance warning: The concentration of 300,000 men with thousands of tanks and guns as well as heavy bridging equipment simply could not escape notice. And neither was there a lack of other indications, from canal-crossing exercises to heightened states of alert to the sudden departure of the Soviet dependents less than forty-eight hours before the offensive. The alarms being sounded by individual officials at various levels were, however, all misinterpreted, ignored, or suppressed. Though subject to various degrees of nervousness, those who mattered—Dayan, Tsur (Dayan’s deputy), and Elazar—were misled by Zeira, who thought he knew there would be no war. Even then, however, it is difficult to imagine that one officer alone could have had such an influence had not many of his underlying assumptions been shared by the rest.
2
Relatively ignorant about military matters and feeling isolated among her own defense experts, Ms. Meir, according to her own account,
3
acquiesced.
Compared to 1967 the IDF in 1973 started the war while holding excellent lines that were easy to defend—but that (thanks to the fact there no longer was any space separating the opponents) enabled the Arabs to take it by surprise. Once that surprise had been overcome, on the Golan Heights it was able to exploit its forte and engage on maneuver warfare vis-à-vis the Syrians and Iraqis. Not so in the Sinai, where the existence of the Bar Lev Line caused that advantage to be thrown away. The original decision, made in 1968, to hold on to the waterline was probably justified on political grounds; however, when the full-scale Egyptian attack came in 1973 it proved disastrous. On the one hand the line was occupied only by half as many men as it had been during the War of Attrition and with hardly any tanks or artillery to back up the
meozim
. On the other hand, IDF forces were frittered away in an effort to rescue the troops in their fortifications.
meozim
. On the other hand, IDF forces were frittered away in an effort to rescue the troops in their fortifications.
The effects of surprise also explain why, on both fronts during the first few days, IDF command and control was as bad as it could be. This caused entire units (Barak in the north, the advanced regular armored brigade in the south) to be sacrificed as other units stood by and did nothing (the two other regular armored brigades in the Sinai on October 6), acted on their own initiative (7th Armored in the north), or wasted time in purposeless maneuvering (Sharon’s division on October 8). In the north, where personal relations among commanders were good, order was restored from October 8 on. Not so in the south, where Elazar’s distrust of his subordinates resulted in a sort of “reverse optional control” as commanders, compelled to wait for his orders, positioned themselves too far to the rear while their units went on the offensive and consequently lost touch.
4
Ultimately it took the failure of a major counteroffensive to bring the IDF to its senses. Even so, Bar Lev, Adan, and Sharon continued to quarrel until the end of the war—and beyond.
4
Ultimately it took the failure of a major counteroffensive to bring the IDF to its senses. Even so, Bar Lev, Adan, and Sharon continued to quarrel until the end of the war—and beyond.
Some of the problems were due to the fact that Israel had a surplus of supposedly excellent generals who were veterans of 1967. Whereas one reservist, Major General Lanner, had given a sterling performance, back in Tel Aviv, Elazar found himself surrounded by characters like Yadin, Rabin, Weizman, and Zeevi, former commander of the central front who had just doffed his uniform but came back to serve as a “special assistant” to the chief of staff. They crowded into the
Bor
(literally hole, the central command bunker), filling it with cigarette smoke and making it almost impossible for Elazar to perform his duties. Others appointed themselves as unofficial “eyes” for GHQ and hitched rides to the fronts. Gonen’s position was the worst of all. The jumped-up 1967 colonel was considered a first-class fighter who, however, was still thinking like a division commander. Unfortunately he had under him not one but
two
generals (Adan and Sharon) who at one point had been superiors and over whom he was able to exercise little authority. Of the two, Sharon was not only a notoriously difficult subordinate but also affiliated with the opposition Likud Party, which meant that he could not be dismissed without risking a major political uproar. To the extent that henceforward no reservist was allowed to command a unit larger than a brigade, the lesson was learned. However, as we shall see, when Israel next went to war (in 1982) its top-level command structure was in some ways even more rickety than before.
Bor
(literally hole, the central command bunker), filling it with cigarette smoke and making it almost impossible for Elazar to perform his duties. Others appointed themselves as unofficial “eyes” for GHQ and hitched rides to the fronts. Gonen’s position was the worst of all. The jumped-up 1967 colonel was considered a first-class fighter who, however, was still thinking like a division commander. Unfortunately he had under him not one but
two
generals (Adan and Sharon) who at one point had been superiors and over whom he was able to exercise little authority. Of the two, Sharon was not only a notoriously difficult subordinate but also affiliated with the opposition Likud Party, which meant that he could not be dismissed without risking a major political uproar. To the extent that henceforward no reservist was allowed to command a unit larger than a brigade, the lesson was learned. However, as we shall see, when Israel next went to war (in 1982) its top-level command structure was in some ways even more rickety than before.
Though the 1973 lines were easier to defend, they did not permit Israel to use its position between the Arab countries to the same extent as in 1967. The fronts were now much farther away, allowing only a few units to be transferred from the Golan Heights to the Sinai while hostilities lasted. Even the air force discovered that it was unable to operate as a unified force and during the initial days found itself trying to stem the Arabs on two fronts simultaneously; later it was virtually split into independent forces, each half concentrating on a front. In this way much of the advantage of occupying additional space was wasted, the more so because the attempt to hold on to every last inch of territory took away available room for maneuver.
The confusion at the front was matched by the disorder in the emergency depots. For example, one of Sharon’s armored battalions found that not one of its half-tracks would start. By the time the war ended it had still not received the mortars that figured on the tables of organization and that would have been, had they been available, a great help in combating the Egyptian infantry.
5
One armored battalion went to war with twenty-five tanks, a mere two half-tracks, and practically none of its soft vehicles;
6
yet another did so without turret-mounted machine guns and, pushing toward the canal on October 8, was reduced to using Uzis instead.
7
Nevertheless, having worked through the night of October 6-7, the IDF rank and file mobilized more quickly than expected. In spite of shortages in everything from small arms (which were often inferior to those carried by the Arabs) through night-vision equipment, they fought very well, and calculations have shown that, on a man-to-man basis and in comparison to the 1967 war, the gap between them and their enemies had widened.
8
Particularly on the nearby Syrian front, it was a question of hold on or die; in the event of defeat the Israeli public, kept ignorant of whatever it was Peres in 1967 had thought could deter the Arabs, expected no mercy from their enemies. Though obviously not everybody could be equally heroic, the spirit of the times was exemplified by General Eytan. Forced to evacuate Nafeq on October 7, he swore he would not leave the Golan Heights alive.
9
5
One armored battalion went to war with twenty-five tanks, a mere two half-tracks, and practically none of its soft vehicles;
6
yet another did so without turret-mounted machine guns and, pushing toward the canal on October 8, was reduced to using Uzis instead.
7
Nevertheless, having worked through the night of October 6-7, the IDF rank and file mobilized more quickly than expected. In spite of shortages in everything from small arms (which were often inferior to those carried by the Arabs) through night-vision equipment, they fought very well, and calculations have shown that, on a man-to-man basis and in comparison to the 1967 war, the gap between them and their enemies had widened.
8
Particularly on the nearby Syrian front, it was a question of hold on or die; in the event of defeat the Israeli public, kept ignorant of whatever it was Peres in 1967 had thought could deter the Arabs, expected no mercy from their enemies. Though obviously not everybody could be equally heroic, the spirit of the times was exemplified by General Eytan. Forced to evacuate Nafeq on October 7, he swore he would not leave the Golan Heights alive.
9
Though the IDF found its organization and equipment deficient in some respects, in others it had the advantage. The all-tank doctrine with which it entered the war proved a disaster, but after the first few days it was spontaneously abandoned as individual commanders and units adapted to fighting in an environment that was filled chock-a-block with antitank weapons. Once the initial problems had been overcome, on both fronts the IDF showed itself more adept in maneuver warfare than its enemies. Tank for tank, APC for APC, and gun for gun its heavy weapons proved as good as those of the enemy or better,
10
and although Egyptian bridging equipment was easier to handle and repair, that developed by the IDF compensated by carrying the much greater weight of Western-built tanks. The war also provided the IDF with a host of technical and tactical lessons that it incorporated during the following years.
10
and although Egyptian bridging equipment was easier to handle and repair, that developed by the IDF compensated by carrying the much greater weight of Western-built tanks. The war also provided the IDF with a host of technical and tactical lessons that it incorporated during the following years.
What was true on the ground was even more true in the air and at sea. Thanks in large part to its superior U.S. aircraft, the IAF was able to keep absolute command of the air over Israel proper. This advantage was not as complete over the Golan Heights and the Sinai; on both fronts the short distances enabled air strikes and heliborne strikes against the Israeli ground forces to take place, though their effect was limited. Nevertheless, the IAF was unable to significantly dent the Syrian and Egyptian antiaircraft defenses. Attempts to carry out its missions in the teeth of those defenses proved well-nigh suicidal; during the war it lost as much as one-quarter of its strength. Once the first few desperate days were over, the IAF accordingly found itself constrained to change its objectives, as in the case of Syria, or else was limited to using those rare opportunities when the Arabs left their missile cover. Only during the last few days of the war was it able to play a greater role, and then it was largely thanks to the operations of Sharon’s and Adan’s forces on the ground.
In view of these considerations, perhaps the most impressive performance took place at sea. Much that happened remains classified; in particular, it is hard to believe that the Israeli submarines stayed in port and did not operate against enemy bases, particularly for intelligence-gathering purposes. Though the Soviet-made Styx missiles had twice the range of the Israeli Gavriel, the Israelis’ better electronics, a well-thought-out doctrine, and thorough training gave them a decisive edge over their enemies, enabling them to sink several Syrian vessels without loss to themselves. Yet the Israelis, not having stationed major warships in the Red Sea and without a long-range airborne strike capability at their disposal, were helpless in front of the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Bab al Mandeb. This was a shortcoming that they took to heart and set out to correct in the years to come.
Overall the balance of strength in this war was much worse than in 1956—when the Israelis fought on a single front and enjoyed superiority over the Egyptian forces in the Sinai—and not too different from what it had been in 1967 (although, of course, both sides had reinforced their forces very considerably).
11
Losses also increased to 2,800 killed and 8,300 wounded, as against 980 and 4,500 in 1967 and 190 and 900 in 1956. The average number of dead amounted to a little more than one hundred per day compared to fifteen in 1947-1948. However, the War of Independence had been fought by a population one-fifth as large, leading to the surprising conclusion that despite the vast advance in the quality of weapons and the amount of firepower, the intensity of the two conflicts in terms of daily losses per capita was not radically different. Calculated on the basis of Israelis killed in action per Arab division encountered, the figures for the three campaigns were 76:1 in 1956, 98:1 in 1967, and 200:1 in 1973 (against the PLO and Syrians during the first week in Lebanon they were to be around 113:1). By this rough measure it is clear that militarily speaking the October War was by far the most difficult and costliest ever fought by the IDF.
11
Losses also increased to 2,800 killed and 8,300 wounded, as against 980 and 4,500 in 1967 and 190 and 900 in 1956. The average number of dead amounted to a little more than one hundred per day compared to fifteen in 1947-1948. However, the War of Independence had been fought by a population one-fifth as large, leading to the surprising conclusion that despite the vast advance in the quality of weapons and the amount of firepower, the intensity of the two conflicts in terms of daily losses per capita was not radically different. Calculated on the basis of Israelis killed in action per Arab division encountered, the figures for the three campaigns were 76:1 in 1956, 98:1 in 1967, and 200:1 in 1973 (against the PLO and Syrians during the first week in Lebanon they were to be around 113:1). By this rough measure it is clear that militarily speaking the October War was by far the most difficult and costliest ever fought by the IDF.
Yet once again statistics cannot convey the shock to Israel, which for the first time since 1948 saw its armed forces reeling and unable to decisively defeat the enemy. The public felt betrayed, and its belief in the IDF’s superiority was shattered. This feeling was reflected in spontaneous antigovernment demonstrations as well as horrible jokes, such as the one that had children welcoming their father, just back from the front, with the words
od avinu chai
(and yet our father lives, a traditional Hebrew phrase referring to the Lord). Before the war Israelis had become overconfident and even arrogant, but not, it must be stated, without encouragement from the Western world, much of which liked to see the Arabs beaten and humiliated. They referred to the enemy as
Arabushim
(roughly translatable as despicable Arabs), and adopted Dayan’s so-called bird theory, which, following his early experiences with the Syrians at Degania, envisaged the Arab armies scattering after a few bangs, like birds. Once again it was a poet, Jonathan Gefen, who best described the atmosphere that characterized the years before the war and the shock that followed:
12
od avinu chai
(and yet our father lives, a traditional Hebrew phrase referring to the Lord). Before the war Israelis had become overconfident and even arrogant, but not, it must be stated, without encouragement from the Western world, much of which liked to see the Arabs beaten and humiliated. They referred to the enemy as
Arabushim
(roughly translatable as despicable Arabs), and adopted Dayan’s so-called bird theory, which, following his early experiences with the Syrians at Degania, envisaged the Arab armies scattering after a few bangs, like birds. Once again it was a poet, Jonathan Gefen, who best described the atmosphere that characterized the years before the war and the shock that followed:
12
I am going to look at the sea, hoping
It is still great and blue, at least the sea.
Lonely and defeated I returned from the desert
Everything that was close seems so far away.
I am going to look at the sea.
III
RUNNING OUT OF STEAM, 1974-1997
T
HE END OF THE October War saw the IDF in a state of considerable demoralization. Public faith in it, as well as its own self-image, suffered badly. Commanders accustomed to being treated as demigods suddenly saw their professional expertise questioned and their social status steeply declining. The title of the very first book published about the war said it all:
Ha-mechdal
(The Oversight). The cover showed a weeping Ms. Meir, and the term
mechdal
gave rise to a family of related terms such as
mechdalnik
(an officer who by virtue of his affiliation with the IDF was regarded as sharing responsibility for the
mechdal
) and
mechdalit
(the car IDF officers drove). Previously any attempt to criticize the IDF had resulted in protest, as in 1971 when a play named
Malkat Ambatia
(Bathroom Queen) caused its audience to run wild and had to be withdrawn. Now, however, and for the first time in Israel’s history, it became possible for people to make a name for themselves by touring the country and explaining all the things that the IDF had
not
done right.
HE END OF THE October War saw the IDF in a state of considerable demoralization. Public faith in it, as well as its own self-image, suffered badly. Commanders accustomed to being treated as demigods suddenly saw their professional expertise questioned and their social status steeply declining. The title of the very first book published about the war said it all:
Ha-mechdal
(The Oversight). The cover showed a weeping Ms. Meir, and the term
mechdal
gave rise to a family of related terms such as
mechdalnik
(an officer who by virtue of his affiliation with the IDF was regarded as sharing responsibility for the
mechdal
) and
mechdalit
(the car IDF officers drove). Previously any attempt to criticize the IDF had resulted in protest, as in 1971 when a play named
Malkat Ambatia
(Bathroom Queen) caused its audience to run wild and had to be withdrawn. Now, however, and for the first time in Israel’s history, it became possible for people to make a name for themselves by touring the country and explaining all the things that the IDF had
not
done right.
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