The Sword And The Olive (41 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
As the PLO increased the size of the parties it sent across, the IDF’s countermeasures expanded. Along the river itself stretches of vegetation were cut away or burned, thus depriving the guerrillas of much-needed cover. Eventually the entire border was protected by minefields, a dirt road that showed footprints of those who tried to cross it, and a
gader maarechet
(security fence) that sounded the alarm when touched or cut. In later years the fence was reinforced by adding closed-circuit TV cameras and various kinds of electronic sensors. As a result of the fencing effort an Israeli firm, Magal Ltd., would grow into the world’s largest manufacturer of security fences.
gader maarechet
(security fence) that sounded the alarm when touched or cut. In later years the fence was reinforced by adding closed-circuit TV cameras and various kinds of electronic sensors. As a result of the fencing effort an Israeli firm, Magal Ltd., would grow into the world’s largest manufacturer of security fences.
Still, after some three years of skirmishing, the decisive blow that put an end to
tkufat ha-mirdafim
(the period of pursuits) was delivered not by the IDF but by the Jordanian army. Ever since the Six Day War the PLO had been building its forces in the Kingdom until they numbered thousands of well-armed men. In September 1970 one faction hijacked no fewer than three Western civilian airliners to Jordan’s northern desert; after releasing passengers and crews they blew up the planes. To King Hussein this was the last straw. He had to act or risk losing the country to Arafat. On the morning of September 15 he struck, using artillery and tanks to drive into the refugee camps. His troops mercilessly butchered the Palestinians and sent them fleeing—ironically enough across the River Jordan into the IDF’s arms.
tkufat ha-mirdafim
(the period of pursuits) was delivered not by the IDF but by the Jordanian army. Ever since the Six Day War the PLO had been building its forces in the Kingdom until they numbered thousands of well-armed men. In September 1970 one faction hijacked no fewer than three Western civilian airliners to Jordan’s northern desert; after releasing passengers and crews they blew up the planes. To King Hussein this was the last straw. He had to act or risk losing the country to Arafat. On the morning of September 15 he struck, using artillery and tanks to drive into the refugee camps. His troops mercilessly butchered the Palestinians and sent them fleeing—ironically enough across the River Jordan into the IDF’s arms.
Three days later the Syrians intervened, sending a “small force” (according to the Israelis) or a full division with two armored brigades and one mechanized brigade (according to the Jordanians) to invade northern Jordan, where the Palestinians had “liberated” the town of Irbid. Advancing, they ran into a trap, and after some fighting the Jordanians (with Centurion tanks, their 105mm guns far outranging the Syrian T-55s) prevailed.
22
Backed by the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the IDF’s role in this episode was to provide the Jordanians with air cover and, at night, illumination.
23
It also concentrated reserves in the Bet Shean sector to deter the Syrians (apparently with success, judging by what Minister of Defense Hafez Assad later told his biographer).
24
22
Backed by the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the IDF’s role in this episode was to provide the Jordanians with air cover and, at night, illumination.
23
It also concentrated reserves in the Bet Shean sector to deter the Syrians (apparently with success, judging by what Minister of Defense Hafez Assad later told his biographer).
24
On the Syrian and Jordanian borders, the numerous military clashes that took place during these years remained rather limited. Not so along the Suez Canal, where the massive forces deployed by both sides threatened to draw in the superpowers. Dayan, reviewing Rabin’s plans for the 1967 campaign, had not wanted the IDF to reach the waterline;
25
then and later he argued that an Israeli presence there constituted an intolerable affront to the Egyptians and would only lead to further confrontations. However, when his forces once again exceeded his orders the minister of defense did not have what it took to recall them; nor, after Ms. Meir took over, did he carry his point of view in the Cabinet. Meanwhile, since the Egyptians would not allow Israeli boats to use the canal, the Israelis in turn fired on Egyptian shipping. Thus, by accident rather than design, the two sides glowered across a 150-yard waterway itself blocked by sunken ships.
25
then and later he argued that an Israeli presence there constituted an intolerable affront to the Egyptians and would only lead to further confrontations. However, when his forces once again exceeded his orders the minister of defense did not have what it took to recall them; nor, after Ms. Meir took over, did he carry his point of view in the Cabinet. Meanwhile, since the Egyptians would not allow Israeli boats to use the canal, the Israelis in turn fired on Egyptian shipping. Thus, by accident rather than design, the two sides glowered across a 150-yard waterway itself blocked by sunken ships.
Lavishly supported by the Soviets, who not only sent in arms but eventually activated 20,000 military advisers in the country, the Egyptian army recovered from its defeat with astonishing speed. Fewer than eighteen months after June 1967 its order of battle had been substantially rebuilt,
26
though restoring the self-confidence of commanders and men in the face of the supposedly invincible Israelis took much longer.
27
As mentioned above, in October 1967, Egyptian missile boats hit and sunk the old Israeli destroyer
Elat
, a sitting duck if ever there was one.
28
The IDF’s response was to mount a massive artillery bombardment of Egyptian oil refineries along the canal. While Dayan boasted that “nothing is burning” (Hebrew slang for “there is no problem”) except the refineries, 500,000-750,000 Egyptian civilians fled their homes, and the canal towns of Ismailia, Kantara, and Suez were turned into empty shells.
26
though restoring the self-confidence of commanders and men in the face of the supposedly invincible Israelis took much longer.
27
As mentioned above, in October 1967, Egyptian missile boats hit and sunk the old Israeli destroyer
Elat
, a sitting duck if ever there was one.
28
The IDF’s response was to mount a massive artillery bombardment of Egyptian oil refineries along the canal. While Dayan boasted that “nothing is burning” (Hebrew slang for “there is no problem”) except the refineries, 500,000-750,000 Egyptian civilians fled their homes, and the canal towns of Ismailia, Kantara, and Suez were turned into empty shells.
On September 8, 1968, the Egyptians in turn opened fire along the northern part of the canal, catching the IDF by surprise—some of the troops were playing football—and killing ten. Additional bombardments followed and served as cover for parties of Egyptian commandos; repeatedly, the latter crossed the canal and inflicted casualties on the Israelis. In retaliation the IDF sent aircraft to attack two bridges crossing the Nile River. Meanwhile a heliborne force landed at Naj Hamadi, far to the south, and blew up a power transmission station. The raid, which took place on the night of October 31-November 1, seems to have shocked the Egyptians, as it exposed how the entire country, not just the canal front, was wide open to attack.
29
In any case, the next few months were a lull.
29
In any case, the next few months were a lull.
Within the IDF a debate had been developing concerning the best way to defend the Sinai. One school, headed by Yisrael Tal (now in charge of developing an Israeli tank) and Ariel Sharon (in charge of training and doctrine), argued in favor of relying on counteroffensives of
egrofei shiryon
(mailed fists) concentrated in the rear, out of Egyptian artillery range; the forward area itself would be lightly held by patrols.
30
The other school differed in that it wanted, in addition to the armored reserves, a system of permanent strongholds constructed on the waterline itself. This second school, whose principal advocate was Chief of Staff Chayim Bar Lev, prevailed. His reasoning was mainly political, centering on the need to prevent the Egyptians from establishing a toehold that might be made permanent by UN Security Council resolution. Hence it was essential that a forward defense be adopted, even at the cost of putting Israeli troops under the barrels of Egypt’s superior artillery and abandoning the IDF’s traditional offensive doctrine.
egrofei shiryon
(mailed fists) concentrated in the rear, out of Egyptian artillery range; the forward area itself would be lightly held by patrols.
30
The other school differed in that it wanted, in addition to the armored reserves, a system of permanent strongholds constructed on the waterline itself. This second school, whose principal advocate was Chief of Staff Chayim Bar Lev, prevailed. His reasoning was mainly political, centering on the need to prevent the Egyptians from establishing a toehold that might be made permanent by UN Security Council resolution. Hence it was essential that a forward defense be adopted, even at the cost of putting Israeli troops under the barrels of Egypt’s superior artillery and abandoning the IDF’s traditional offensive doctrine.
Though Egyptian military strength had been rebuilt, the high command in Cairo well understood it did not have the capability to launch a general war with the objective of forcing the IDF out of the Sinai. It therefore opted for a limited “war of attrition” (Nasser’s term) with the objective of inflicting as many casualties as possible to the enemy’s limited manpower and creating political momentum to force Israel to negotiate an acceptable solution (i.e., withdraw from the Sinai and end the Arab-Israeli conflict).
31
The IDF raids, which took place in late 1968, had proved Egypt’s vulnerability and forced a delay; this in turn was utilized by the IDF to build fortifications along the canal. Eventually thirty-one
meozim
(strongholds) were built at intervals all the way from the northern coast of Sinai to the city of Suez. Each was designed to provide cover for fifteen to sixty troops; positioned nearby were earthen ramps designed to serve as cover for tanks. All were linked to the rear by specially built roads that, in turn, would carry the reserves for a counterattack.
31
The IDF raids, which took place in late 1968, had proved Egypt’s vulnerability and forced a delay; this in turn was utilized by the IDF to build fortifications along the canal. Eventually thirty-one
meozim
(strongholds) were built at intervals all the way from the northern coast of Sinai to the city of Suez. Each was designed to provide cover for fifteen to sixty troops; positioned nearby were earthen ramps designed to serve as cover for tanks. All were linked to the rear by specially built roads that, in turn, would carry the reserves for a counterattack.
On March 8, 1969, five days after the Egyptians announced they no longer recognized the cease-fire, the War of Attrition opened with a bang. Scarcely a day passed without clashes between the two sides. The number of so-called incidents rose from 84 in March to 475 in April before falling back to 231 in May; during that period the IDF suffered forty-three killed and 103 wounded.
32
The clashes ranged from light-arms and mortar fire to artillery bombardments by dozens of guns raining hundreds of shells (mainly the trusted World War II-vintage 122mm and 130mm towed guns but also including heavier models). As the Israelis cowered in their shelters Egyptian commandos repeatedly crossed the canal and attacked the
meozim
, occasionally penetrating them and raising a flag, though they never succeeded in actually capturing any stronghold. From time to time Egypt’s air force also participated. Flying its MIG-21s and Su-7s it attempted to strike targets in the Sinai but enjoyed limited success since IAF pilots almost always proved superior.
32
The clashes ranged from light-arms and mortar fire to artillery bombardments by dozens of guns raining hundreds of shells (mainly the trusted World War II-vintage 122mm and 130mm towed guns but also including heavier models). As the Israelis cowered in their shelters Egyptian commandos repeatedly crossed the canal and attacked the
meozim
, occasionally penetrating them and raising a flag, though they never succeeded in actually capturing any stronghold. From time to time Egypt’s air force also participated. Flying its MIG-21s and Su-7s it attempted to strike targets in the Sinai but enjoyed limited success since IAF pilots almost always proved superior.
On the Israeli side the IDF’s engineering corps seems to have done a credible job; except among lookouts, casualties in the
meozim
were limited. However, the troops needed to be relieved and supplied; since the gaps between them were rather large, the roads had to be patrolled. While doing this IDF units were targeted by ambushes and sudden bombardments—the latter often very accurate, directed by Egyptian observation officers who had infiltrated the area. The former IDF quartermaster, Maj. Gen. Matityahu Peled, wrote that men were being sacrificed for the sake of transporting tomatoes,
33
that staple of Israeli diets without which no meal seems to be complete (in or out of the military). The best that can be said for Bar Lev’s strategy—Dayan, as usual, found a way to shift responsibility to others—is that it was dictated by political constraints. Militarily, though, the Egyptians had presented the IDF with a challenge to which it had no effective answer.
meozim
were limited. However, the troops needed to be relieved and supplied; since the gaps between them were rather large, the roads had to be patrolled. While doing this IDF units were targeted by ambushes and sudden bombardments—the latter often very accurate, directed by Egyptian observation officers who had infiltrated the area. The former IDF quartermaster, Maj. Gen. Matityahu Peled, wrote that men were being sacrificed for the sake of transporting tomatoes,
33
that staple of Israeli diets without which no meal seems to be complete (in or out of the military). The best that can be said for Bar Lev’s strategy—Dayan, as usual, found a way to shift responsibility to others—is that it was dictated by political constraints. Militarily, though, the Egyptians had presented the IDF with a challenge to which it had no effective answer.
On July 20, toward the end of a particularly bad period in which IDF casualties seemed to be higher than ever, Dayan, in a measure of desperation, activated the IAF. Day and night the Mirages, Vautours, and Skyhawks screamed over Egyptian artillery positions, knocking out many but failing to inflict as much damage on the remaining enemy troops who now took over the burden of the fighting.
34
Two large air-to-air battles also took place, with twelve Egyptian aircraft being shot down; undeterred by such casualties they kept coming. IDF ground, naval, and heliborne commando units mounted operation after operation. On July 19 they raided the welldefended Island of Green in the Gulf of Suez. On September 19 they crossed over to the east bank of the Red Sea and mounted a major raid in which as many as 200 (Weizman says 300) Egyptian troops were killed.
35
On December 26 they captured and successfully took home an entire Soviet-built radar installation; on January 22-23, 1970, they temporarily took an island in the Suez Canal itself from its garrison. Tactically each raid was more brilliant than the last,
36
which, as one of the officers involved wrote in his memoirs, “led to much rejoicing.”
37
But none was nearly sufficient to make the Egyptians desist.
38
In fact, from August to December 1969, 180 Israelis were killed. On November 29 the Egyptians mounted their largest raid so far, sending a company-sized force across and attacking a
maoz
.
34
Two large air-to-air battles also took place, with twelve Egyptian aircraft being shot down; undeterred by such casualties they kept coming. IDF ground, naval, and heliborne commando units mounted operation after operation. On July 19 they raided the welldefended Island of Green in the Gulf of Suez. On September 19 they crossed over to the east bank of the Red Sea and mounted a major raid in which as many as 200 (Weizman says 300) Egyptian troops were killed.
35
On December 26 they captured and successfully took home an entire Soviet-built radar installation; on January 22-23, 1970, they temporarily took an island in the Suez Canal itself from its garrison. Tactically each raid was more brilliant than the last,
36
which, as one of the officers involved wrote in his memoirs, “led to much rejoicing.”
37
But none was nearly sufficient to make the Egyptians desist.
38
In fact, from August to December 1969, 180 Israelis were killed. On November 29 the Egyptians mounted their largest raid so far, sending a company-sized force across and attacking a
maoz
.
Thus perhaps for the first time, the IDF found itself without a spare arrow in its quiver. Given the difficult situation, it was decided to activate the air force against not only front-line targets but also Egypt’s economic and industrial infrastructures. Given that the IAF had always been a tactical service and did not have anything like the means needed for conducting a sustained strategic bombing campaign, just what the Israelis hoped to achieve is not entirely clear. Rabin, who was serving as ambassador to Washington, hoped to topple Nasser, and his theories seem to have found some support at home.
39
The possibility that the Soviets would respond by deepening their involvement was apparently considered but rejected as unlikely.
39
The possibility that the Soviets would respond by deepening their involvement was apparently considered but rejected as unlikely.
Its confidence bolstered by the F-4 Phantoms, the first of which had just begun to arrive, the IAF on December 25, 1969, mounted its largest operation since June 1967. It rained bombs into a fifteen-mile zone along the canal’s east bank, hitting many targets including twelve SAM-2 batteries. On January 7, 1970, the campaign escalated, concentrating on military targets such as bases and depots around Cairo as well as the area of the Nile Delta but occasionally missing its objectives and inflicting damage on nonmilitary installations and causing heavy civilian casualties. Nasser refused to surrender, instead visiting Soviet patrons and inducing them to send over fighter pilots—of which the Egyptians were desperately short
40
—personnel to operate antiaircraft defenses, and batteries of SAM-3s, which were more effective against low-flying aircraft than the older, larger SAM-2s. Both types of missiles were familiar to the Americans from the Vietnam War. Now the United States provided its protégé with pods of avionics to mount on aircraft and counter the new threat.
40
—personnel to operate antiaircraft defenses, and batteries of SAM-3s, which were more effective against low-flying aircraft than the older, larger SAM-2s. Both types of missiles were familiar to the Americans from the Vietnam War. Now the United States provided its protégé with pods of avionics to mount on aircraft and counter the new threat.
Thus, what later would be termed the first electronic war began to develop. In fact electronics had been used in wartime at least from the time of the Blitz; the British pioneered radar (and, later, the means for countering it) and the Germans pioneered use of radio signals for navigation (which in turn were countered by the British).
41
Vietnam and the Israeli-Egyptian struggle were, however, the first occasions when modern combat aircraft were faced by electronically guided missiles in addition to older antiaircraft artillery. Equipment provided the IAF during this period included gear designed to register the pulse of radar beams guiding the missiles, warning pilots and enabling them to break away in time. It may also have included jamming equipment
42
but almost certainly did not include as yet undeveloped homing missiles capable of using radar beams to lock on targets.
41
Vietnam and the Israeli-Egyptian struggle were, however, the first occasions when modern combat aircraft were faced by electronically guided missiles in addition to older antiaircraft artillery. Equipment provided the IAF during this period included gear designed to register the pulse of radar beams guiding the missiles, warning pilots and enabling them to break away in time. It may also have included jamming equipment
42
but almost certainly did not include as yet undeveloped homing missiles capable of using radar beams to lock on targets.
In the spring of 1970 the battle climaxed. Soviet pilots had arrived, and their presence was soon detected by the Israelis, who listened to them chattering Russian on the radio; as a result, from the end of March the Israelis no longer tried to penetrate in depth but limited operations to targets along the canal. As the artillery battle raged below, the IAF concentrated on preventing the Egyptians from rebuilding their antiaircraft defenses. They rained a hail of bombs—although probably not the 20,000 tons that Egypt’s minister of war, Mohammed Fauzi, claimed had been dropped during a twoday period.
43
Yet bombing did not prevent the Egyptians from laboriously constructing a vast defensive zone of sixty by twenty miles. The zone held no fewer than 1,000 concrete shelters for the thirty antiaircraft missile regiments deployed—to say nothing of the 1,000 antiaircraft guns.
44
43
Yet bombing did not prevent the Egyptians from laboriously constructing a vast defensive zone of sixty by twenty miles. The zone held no fewer than 1,000 concrete shelters for the thirty antiaircraft missile regiments deployed—to say nothing of the 1,000 antiaircraft guns.
44
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