The Grand Alliance (55 page)

The advance upon Baghdad began on the night of May 27, and made slow progress, being hindered by extensive inundations and blown-up bridges over the many irrigation waterways. However, our forward troops reached the outskirts of Baghdad on May 30. Although they were weak in numbers and there was an Iraqi division in the city, their presence was too much for Rashid Ali and his companions, who that day fled to Persia, accompanied by other troublemakers, the German and Italian Ministers and the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem. The next day, May 31, an armistice was signed, the Regent of Iraq was reinstated, and a new Government took office. We soon occupied with land and air forces all the important points in the country.

Thus the German plan for raising rebellion in Iraq and mastering cheaply this wide area was frustrated on a small margin. The landing of an Indian brigade at Basra on April 18 was timely. It forced Rashid Ali into premature action.

Even so there was a race with our meagre forces against time. The spirited defence of Habbaniya by the Flying School was a prime factor in our success. The Germans had, of course, at their disposal an airborne force which would have given them at this time Syria, Iraq, and Persia,

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with their precious oilfields. Hitler’s hand might have reached out very far towards India, and beckoned to Japan.

He had chosen, however, as we shall soon see, to employ and expend his prime air organism in another direction. We often hear military experts inculcate the doctrine of giving priority to the decisive theatre. There is a lot in this. But in war this principle, like all others, is governed by facts and circumstances; otherwise strategy would be too easy. It would become a drill-book and not an art; it would depend upon rules and not on an instructed and fortunate judgment of the proportions of an ever-changing scene. Hitler certainly cast away the opportunity of taking a great prize for little cost in the Middle East. We in Britain, although pressed to the extreme, managed with scanty forces to save ourselves from far-reaching or lasting injury.

It must be remembered that the revolt in Iraq was but one small sector of the immense emergency in the Middle East which lapped General Wavell on all sides simultaneously.

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This comprised the impending German onslaught upon Crete, our plans to attack Rommel in the Western Desert, the campaigns in Abyssinia and Eritrea, and the bitter need to forestall the Germans in Syria. In the same way the whole Mediterranean scene, as viewed from London, was but a secondary part of our world problem, in which the invasion menace, the U-boat war, and the attitude of Japan were dominant features. Only the strength and cohesion of the War Cabinet, the relations of mutual respect and harmony of outlook between political and military chiefs, and the smooth working of our war machine enabled us to surmount, though sorely mauled, these trials and perils.

The reader will be conscious of the tension which grew between the British War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff and their overstrained but gallantly struggling Commander-in-Chief in Cairo. The authorities at home, over whom I presided, directly overruled from Whitehall the judgment of the man on the spot. They took the issue out of his hands and assumed the responsibility themselves for ordering the relief of Habbaniya and for rejecting all ideas of negotiation with Rashid Ali or accepting Turkish mediation, which at one time was mentioned. The result was crowned with swift and complete success. Although no one was more pleased and relieved than Wavell himself, the episode could not pass without leaving impressions in his mind and in ours. At the same time General Auchinleck’s forth-coming attitude in sending, at our desire, and with the Viceroy’s cordial assent, the Indian division to Basra so promptly, and the readiness with which Indian reinforcements were supplied, gave us the feeling of a fresh mind and a hitherto untaxed personal energy. The consequences of these impressions will be seen as the story unfolds.

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15

Crete: The Advent

The Situation in Crete — Weak and Inadequate
Defences — The Overloaded Administration in
Cairo — Agreement at Home and on the Spot
About Defending Crete — Our Precise Intelligence

—
Wavell’s Visit, April
30 —
Bernard Freyberg in
Command — My Telegram to Admiral Cunningham of May
1 —
Efforts to Reinforce Our Air —

Wavell and Freyberg Under No Illusions —

Freyberg’s Telegrams to Wavell and to the New
Zealand Government — Wavell’s Telegram of
May
2 —
Anxiety in New Zealand
—
My Message
to Mr. Fraser, May
3 —
Freyberg Undaunted —

German Blockade of Crete from the Air — Our
Pitiful Air Resources — The German Plan of
Attack — “Colorado” and “Scorcher” — A Breathless Pause — Wavell’s Humour — I Keep Smuts
Informed — On the Verge.

T
HE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE of Crete in all our Mediterranean affairs has already been explained by argument and events. British warships based on Suda Bay or able to refuel there could give an all-important protection to Malta. If our base in Crete was well defended against air attack the whole process of superior sea power would come into play and ward off any seaborne expedition. But only a hundred miles away lay the Italian fortress of Rhodes, with its ample airfields and well-established installations. The capture and occupation of Rhodes had The Grand Alliance

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been our aim since the beginning of the year, and the Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation, a splendid body of men, most carefully trained and fitted together, fifty-three hundred strong, had been sent from England either for Rhodes or Suda Bay as circumstances might require.

Besides this the commando force, over two thousand strong, under Colonel Laycock, had also come round the Cape, and with the British 6th Division, which was being formed in Egypt, would have made an assaulting force capable of taking Rhodes. The pressure of events had forced us to postpone this enterprise, and meanwhile Crete was vulnerable in a high degree should German aircraft be sent to Rhodes. The Mobile Naval Defence Organisation was kept in hand at Alexandria for emergencies instead of helping either to take and hold Rhodes or to work up and man the defences of Suda Bay.

Locally in Crete everything had proceeded in a halting manner. The reader has seen my repeated injunctions to have Suda Bay fortified. I had even used the expression “a second Scapa.” The island had been in our possession for nearly six months, but it would only have been possible to equip the harbour with a more powerful outfit of anti-aircraft guns at the expense of other still more urgent needs; nor was the Middle East Command able to find the labour, locally or otherwise, to develop the airfields. There could be no question of sending a large garrison to Crete or of basing strong air forces upon its airfields while Greece was still in Allied hands. But all should have been in readiness to receive reinforcements should they become available and should the need arise. There had been, however, neither plan nor drive. Six successive commanders were appointed in as many months. The Middle East Command should have made a more careful study of the conditions under which Crete might have to be defended from air or sea

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attack. The need of providing if not a harbour at least landing facilities on the southern side of the island at Sphakia or Timbaki and the making of a road therefrom to Suda Bay and the airfields by which Western Crete could have been reinforced from Egypt was not foreseen. The responsibility for the defective study of the problem and for the feeble execution of the direction given must be shared between Cairo and Whitehall.

It was only after the disasters had occurred in Cyrenaica, in Crete, and in the desert that I realised how overloaded and undersustained General Wavell’s organisation was. Wavell tried his best; but the handling machine at his disposal was too weak to enable him to cope with the vast mass of business which four or five simultaneous campaigns imposed upon him.

With the German conquest of Greece, Crete became the last foothold for the Greek King and Government, and an important repository for evacuated troops of all kinds. We could be sure that German eyes were glaring upon it. To us it seemed a vital outpost both of Egypt and Malta. Even in this welter of failure and wreckage in which we were now plunged there were no disagreements between the authorities, either at home or on the spot, about holding Crete. “I am assuming,” telegraphed Wavell (April 16), “that Crete will be held.” And the next day, “We are making preparations for evacuation [of Greece] and for holding Crete.”

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We had known for a long time the efforts Goering had made to create and develop a powerful airborne force, capable of a large-scale descent from the air. This had appealed to the ardent and devoted Nazi youth of Germany. The German Parachute Division was
a corps
d’élite
which had played its part in our thoughts about home defence against invasion. All such plans, however, require at least the temporary command of the daylight air. This the Germans had failed to gain in Britain. Crete was a different tale. Ample and, as it seemed, long-lasting air superiority both in the Balkans and in the Aegean Sea was now the enemy’s master weapon.

At no moment in the war was our Intelligence so truly and precisely informed. In the exultant confusion of their seizure of Athens the German staffs preserved less than their usual secrecy, and our agents in Greece were active and daring.

In the last week of April we obtained from trustworthy sources good information about the next German stroke.

The movements and excitement of the German XIth Air Corps, and also the frantic collection of small craft in Greek harbours, could not be concealed from attentive eyes and ears. All pointed to an impending attack on Crete, both by air and sea. In no operation did I take more personal pains to study and weigh the evidence or to make sure that the magnitude of the impending onslaught was impressed upon the Commanders-in-Chief and imparted to the general on the actual scene.