The Grand Alliance (51 page)

He added the following:

Stop press. I have just received disquieting intelligence. I was expecting another German colonial The Grand Alliance

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division, which disembarked at Tripoli early this month, to appear in the fighting line about the end of the month. Certain units have already been identified. I have just been informed that latest evidence indicates this is not a colonial but an
armoured
division. If so, the situation is indeed serious, since an armoured division contains over 400 tanks,
2
of which 138 are medium. If the enemy can arrange supply, it will take a lot of stopping. I will cable again when I have digested this unwelcome news.

In a separate telegram of the same date General Wavell described his tank position in detail.

It will be seen [he said] that there are only two regiments of cruiser tanks in sight for Egypt by the end of May, and no reserves to replace casualties,
whereas
there are now in Egypt, trained, an excellent personnel
for six tank regiments.
I consider the provision of cruiser tanks vital, in addition to infantry tanks, which lack speed and radius of action for desert operations. C.I.G.

S., please give your personal assistance.

On reading these alarming messages I resolved not to be governed any longer by the Admiralty reluctance, but to send a convoy through the Mediterranean direct to Alexandria carrying all the tanks which General Wavell needed. We had a convoy containing large armoured reinforcements starting immediately round the Cape. I decided that the fast tank-carrying ships in this convoy should turn off at Gibraltar and take the short cut, thus saving nearly forty days. General Ismay, who was staying near by, came over at noon to see me. I prepared the following personal minute to him for the Chiefs of Staff. I asked him to go to London with it at once and make it clear that I attached supreme importance to this step being taken.

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Prime

Minister

to

20 April 41

General Ismay, for

Chiefs of Staff

See General Wavell’s latest telegrams. The fate of
the war in the Middle East, the loss of the Suez Canal,
the frustration or confusion of the enormous forces we
have built up in Egypt, the closing of all prospects of
American co-operation through the Red Sea – all may
turn on a few hundred armoured vehicles. They must if
possible be carried there at all costs.

2. I will preside at noon tomorrow (Monday), the
twenty-first, at a meeting of C.O.S. and Service Ministers, and any necessary action or collection of information must proceed forthwith.

3. The only way in which this great purpose can be
achieved is by sending the fast mechanical transport
ships of the fast section of [Convoy] W.S. 7 through the
Mediterranean. General Wavell’s telegram shows that
machines, not men, are needed. The risk of losing the
vehicles, or part of them, must be accepted. Even if half
got through, the situation would be restored. The five M.

T. ships carry 250 tanks, all but fourteen of which are “I”

tanks. Every endeavour should be made to increase
the numbers of cruiser tanks in this consignment. I am
told twenty more can be loaded at a delay of perhaps
twenty-four hours – that is, M.T. convoy would sail on
the morning of April 23.

4. The personnel will go by the Cape, subject to any
modifications which the C.I.G.S. may desire.

5. I have asked the Ministry of Shipping to try to find
two other M.T. ships of equal speed, without regard to
other interests, by the date mentioned. If these are
found, an additional hundred cruiser tanks should be
taken from the best armoured division at home, assuming that they are fitted for tropical warfare, apart altogether from the special “desert-worthy” fittings.

6. The Admiralty and Air Ministry will consider and
prepare this day a plan for carrying this vital convoy
through the Mediterranean. Of course, we must accept
the risk, and no guarantee can be expected. Malta,
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however, should have been reinforced by then. The
Mountbatten destroyers and other naval reinforcements
should have reached there (or else be with the convoy).

The

enemy’s

dive-bombers

have

many

other

objectives, and they will not know what the convoy
contains.

7. Speed is vital. Every day’s delay must be avoided.

Let me have a time-table of what is possible, observing
that at sixteen knots the distance is only about eight
days – say, ten – from the date of sailing, namely, April
23. This would give General Wavell effective support
during the first week in May. Secrecy is of the highest
importance, and no one outside the highest circles
need know of the intention to turn off at Gibraltar.

Everyone on board the convoys must think they are
going round the Cape.

The Chiefs of Staff were assembled by the time Ismay reached London, and they discussed my minute until late into the night. Their first reactions to the proposals were unfavourable. The chances of getting the M.T. ships through the Central Mediterranean unscathed were not rated very high, since on the day before entering the Narrows and on the morning after passing Malta they would be subjected to dive-bombing attacks out of range of our own shore-based fighters. The view was also expressed that we were dangerously weak in tanks at home, and that if we now suffered heavy losses in tanks abroad there would be demands for their replacement, and consequently a further diversion of tanks from the home forces.

However, when the Defence Committee met the next day Admiral Pound, to my great satisfaction, stood by me and agreed to pass the convoy through the Mediterranean. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Portal, said he would try to arrange for a Beaufighter squadron to give additional protection from Malta. I then asked the committee to consider sending a hundred additional cruiser tanks with

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the convoy. I was willing to accept two days’ delay in sailing. General Dill opposed the dispatch of these additional tanks
in view of the shortage for home defence.

Considering what he had agreed to ten months before, when we sent half our few tanks round the Cape to the Middle East in July, 1940, I could not feel that this reason was at this time valid. As the reader is aware, I did not regard invasion as a serious danger in April, 1941, since proper preparations had been made against it. We now know that this view was correct. It was settled that this operation, which I called “Tiger,” should proceed, and that a sixth ship should be added to the convoy to include sixty-seven Mark VI (cruiser) tanks. This ship could not, however, be loaded in time to sail with the convoy, though every effort was made.

I made haste to tell Wavell the good news.

Prime

Minister

to

22 April 41

General Wavell

I have been working hard for you in the last few
days, and you will, I am sure, be glad to know that we
are sending 307 of our best tanks through the Mediterranean, hoping they will reach you around May 10. Of
these, 99 are cruisers, Mark IV and Mark VI, with the
necessary spare parts for the latter, and 180 “I” tanks.

2. In your telegram of April 18 you said you had the
trained personnel for six regiments. We are, therefore,
sending only the vehicles to you by the short cut. The
men go round the Cape as already arranged, subject to
some adjustments.

3. You will receive through the regular channels (a)
full details of the tanks which are being sent and of the
spare parts, which fit in with what you have got already,
and (b) directions as to various fittings you have to

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make for desert service. I hope you will immediately set
to work on all preparations so that a real evolution can
be made of this job, and the famous 7th Armoured
Division, whose absence was so unexpected to us, will
resume under Creagh its victorious career.

4. On the receipt of the detailed information you
should furnish us with your plan for bringing these
vehicles into action at the very earliest moment. If this
consignment gets through the hazards of the passage,
which, of course, cannot be guaranteed, the boot will
be on the other leg and no German should remain in
Cyrenaica by the end of the month of June.

5. In making your preparations for bringing these
vehicles into action you should pretend that they are
coming round the Cape, as secrecy is most important,
and very few here have been told. Thus, when you get
them the chance of surprise may be offered. All good
wishes.

While all this was on the move Tobruk lay heavily upon our minds. General Wavell reported on the twenty-fourth that the air fighter situation was serious. All Hurricanes in Greece had been lost, and as a result of recent enemy air attacks on Tobruk a large proportion of the Hurricanes there had been destroyed or damaged. Air Marshal Longmore considered that any further attempt to maintain a fighter squadron inside Tobruk would only result in heavy loss to no purpose. Thus the enemy would have complete air superiority over Tobruk until a fresh fighter force could be built up. However, the garrison had beaten off an attack that morning, causing the enemy heavy casualties and taking one hundred and fifty prisoners.

There was much anxiety at this time, and some pessimism.

I could not refrain from a severe comment.

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Prime Minister to C.I.

22 April 41

G.S.

We must not forget that the besieged are four or five
times as strong as the besiegers. There is no objection
to their making themselves comfortable, but they must
be very careful not to let themselves be ringed in by a
smaller force, and consequently lose their offensive
power upon the enemy’s communications. Twenty-five
thousand men with one hundred guns and ample
supplies are expected to be able to hold a highly
fortified zone against forty-five hundred men at the end
of seven hundred miles of communications, even
though those men be Germans; in this case some of
them are not. The figures which I have used are those
which have been furnished to me by the War Office.