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mand of the whole island. You may be sure we shall
sustain him in every way possible.

2. Our information points to an airborne attack being
delivered in the near future, with possibly an attempt at
seaborne attack. The Navy will certainly do their utmost
to prevent the latter, and it is unlikely to succeed on any
large scale. So far as airborne attack is concerned, this
ought to suit the New Zealanders down to the ground,
for they will be able to come to close quarters, man to
man, with the enemy, who will not have the advantage
of tanks and artillery, on which he so largely relies.

Should the enemy get a landing in Crete that will be the
beginning, and not the end, of embarrassments for him.

The island is mountainous and wooded, giving peculiar
scope to the qualities of your troops. We can reinforce it
far more easily than the enemy, and there are over
thirty thousand men there already.

3. It may be, however, that the enemy is only
feinting at Crete, and will be going farther east. We
have to consider all contingencies in the employment of
our scanty and overpressed air force. Why is it scanty
and overpressed? Not because we do not possess
ever-growing resources and reserves here. Not
because we have not done everything in human power
to reinforce the Middle East with air. It is simply
because of the physical difficulties of getting aircraft
and their servicing personnel to the spot by the various
routes and methods open to us. You may be sure we
shall try our best to reinforce our air power, and we are
at this moment making very far-reaching but hazardous
efforts. The disposition between competing needs of
such air forces as are in the East must be left to the
Commanders-in-Chief. I am not without hope that
things will be better in the Middle East in a month or so.

4. Everyone here admires the dignity and stoicism of
New Zealand in enduring the agonising suspense of
the evacuation. Its successful conclusion, after inflicting
so much loss upon the enemy and paying our debt of
honour to Greece, is an inexpressible relief to the
Empire.

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Freyberg was undaunted. He did not readily believe the scale of air attack would be so gigantic. His fear was of powerful organised invasion from the sea. This we hoped the Navy would prevent in spite of our air weakness.

General Freyberg to

5 May 41

Prime

Minister,

England

Cannot understand nervousness; am not in the least
anxious about airborne attack; have made my dispositions and feel can cope adequately with the troops at
my disposal. Combination of seaborne and airborne
attack is different. If that comes before I can get the
guns and transport here the situation will be difficult.

Even so, provided Navy can help, trust all will be well.

When we get our equipment and transport, and with
a few extra fighter aircraft, it should be possible to hold
Crete. Meanwhile there will be a period here during
which we shall be vulnerable.

Everybody in great form and most anxious to renew
battle with our enemy, whom we hammered whenever
we met him in Greece.

All New Zealanders greatly and justly incensed at
not being mentioned adequately in B.B.C. and press
accounts of the vital and gallant part played by them in
Greek rear-guard action.

I immediately did my best to remedy the sense of injustice from which the New Zealanders were suffering.

Prime

Minister

to

7 May 41

General Wavell

Please pass following to General Freyberg, unless
you disagree:

Everyone in Britain has watched with gratitude and
admiration the grand fighting deeds of the New Zealand
Division upon the ever-famous battlefields of Greece. It
is only gradually that we have learned and are learning
the full tale, and the more the accounts come in the

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more we realise the vital part you played in a task of
honour and a deed of fame. Throughout the whole
Empire and the English-speaking world the name of
New Zealand is saluted. Our thoughts are with you
now. God bless you all.

The geography of Crete indeed made its defence problem difficult. There was but a single road running along the north coast, upon which were strung all the vulnerable points of the island. Each of these had to be self-supporting. There could be no central reserve free to move to a threatened point once this road was cut and firmly held by the enemy. Only tracks unfit for motor transport ran from the south coast to the north from Sphakia and Timbaki. As the impending danger began to dominate directing minds strong efforts were made to carry reinforcements and supplies of weapons, especially artillery, to the island, but it was then too late. During the second week in May the German Air Force from its bases in Greece and in the Aegean established a virtual daylight blockade of Crete, and took their toll of all traffic, especially on the northern side, where alone the harbours lay. Out of twenty-seven thousand tons of vital munitions sent in the first three weeks of May to Crete, under three thousand could be landed, and the rest had to turn back with the loss of over three thousand tons. Our strength in A.A. weapons was sixteen heavy A.A. guns (3.7-inch mobile), thirty-six light A.A. guns (Bofors), and twenty-four A.A. searchlights. There were only nine part-worn infantry tanks, distributed at the airfields, and sixteen light tanks. On May 9 a part of the Mobile Naval Base Organisation arrived, including one heavy and one light A.A. battery, which were deployed for the better protection of Suda Bay. Altogether about two thousand men The Grand Alliance

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of this organisation landed in Crete, but over three thousand were held back in Egypt, though they might have got there. Six thousand Italian prisoners of war were an additional burden to the defence.

Our defending forces were distributed principally to protect the landing grounds. At Heraklion were two British and three Greek battalions; about Retimo the 19th Australian Brigade and six Greek battalions; in the neighbourhood of Suda two Australian and two Greek battalions; at Maleme a New Zealand brigade near the airfield and a second brigade in support farther east. Some parties of riflemen were added to these garrisons, consisting of temporary units of men evacuated from Greece. The Greek battalions were weak in numbers, armed with a mixed assortment of rifles and little ammunition. The total of Imperial troops that took part in the defence amounted to about 28,600.

But of course it was only our weakness in the air that rendered the German attack possible. The R.A.F. strength early in May was twelve Blenheims, six Hurricanes, twelve Gladiators, and six Fulmars and Brewsters of the Fleet air arm, of which only one-half were serviceable. These were distributed between the Retimo landing-strip, the Maleme airfield, for fighters only, and the Heraklion airfield, which accepted all types. This was but a trifle compared with the overwhelming air forces about to be hurled upon the island.

Our inferiority in the air was fully realised by all concerned, and on May 19, the day before the attack, all remaining aircraft were evacuated to Egypt. It was known to the War Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff, and the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East that the only choice lay between fighting under this fearful disadvantage or hurrying out of the island, as might have been possible in the early days of May. But there was no difference of opinion between any of us about facing the attack; and when we see in the light and

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knowledge of the after-time how nearly, in spite of all our shortcomings, we won, and how far-reaching were the advantages even of our failure, we must be well content with the risks we ran and the price we paid.

We may now set out the German plan of attack, which we have learnt since the war. It was confided to the XIth Air Corps, comprising the 7th Air Division and the 5th Mountain Division, with the 6th Mountain Division held in support.

Nearly sixteen thousand men, mostly paratroops, were to be landed from the air, and seven thousand by sea.

Additional air support was to be given by the Eighth Air Corps. The number of aircraft made available was: bombers, 280; dive-bombers, 150; fighter (M.E.109 and M.

E.110), 180; reconnaissance, 40; gliders, 100; Ju.52’s (transport aircraft), 530; total, 1280.

The seaborne troops and a quantity of supplies were to be carried in two organised convoys of Greek caiques.
1
They had no protection except from the German Air Force. We shall see presently what was their fate.

The air attack was planned on three areas: in the east Heraklion; in the centre Retimo. Suda, Canea; and of course most important, Maleme, in the west. The immediate preparation for the attack was in general an hour’s concentrated bombing of the ground and anti-aircraft defences with bombs of up to a thousand pounds weight.

This was to be followed by the arrival of the leading troops in gliders and/or by parachute descents. These again were to be followed by reinforcements in transport aircraft. It was vital to the whole conception that Maleme airfield should be secured. Mere landings of parachute troops in the

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countryside several miles away would not have enabled the troop-carrying airplanes to land the 6th Mountain Division by forties and fifties and then return for further instalments.

The Germans would have to have effective and undisturbed possession of the airfield, not only for landing but for taking off again. Only by repeated journeys could they bring the numbers which were the foundation of their whole enterprise.

We adopted the code name “Colorado” for Crete and

“Scorcher” for the German onslaught as we imagined it.

The breathless days slipped by. They were only rendered endurable by other cares. The hour drew near.

Prime

Minister

to

12 May 41

General Wavell

Will you consider whether at least another dozen “I”